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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/tomorrowincubaOOpepp 



To -Morrow in Cuba 



BY 



CHARLES M. PEPPER 




NEW YORK AND LONDON 

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

1899 






TWO COPIES RECEIVED, 






ossicr 



KGif : i> \m 




SECOND COPY, 



Copyright, 1899, by Harper & Brothers, 

All rights reserved. 









JDe&fcatfom 



TO THE MEMOBY OF MY FATHEK, 

THE REVEREND GEORGE W. PEPPER. 



PREFACE 



My profession as a newspaper correspondent took me 
to Cuba in the spring of 1897. With the exception of 
a short intermission passed with the American army 
and navy outside the island, it kept me there in the 
midst of the events shaping the destiny of the Antilles. 
Impressions of these events as they appeared to me 
were published in various journals. They were record- 
ed from time to time as they were caught up at the 
moment. 

In the new responsibilities that have come to the 
American people in the border tropics, exact informa- 
tion is above all things desirable. At the end of more 
than two years it has seemed to me possible to give 
information with perhaps more confidence than in the 
beginning. What is set forth in these pages is not for 
the purpose of supporting preconceived opinions or of 
defending any special policy. While the author's views 
are stated, it has been his aim to set forth the facts on 
which these views are based. Some persons, doubtless, 
will reach different conclusions. Whatever opinions 
may be developed, it is important to know that the 
problems of Cuba cannot be settled from without. On 
the surface are the political questions ; but deeper than 
these lie the social and economic problems. It has 



PEEFACE 

seemed to me that if the American people could feel 
themselves more at home in the surroundings in which 
all these problems must be worked out, they would be 
better equipped for the task. As the majority of them 
cannot see for themselves, I have sought to make them 
see through other eyes, with the belief that they will be 
the better able to discriminate between the fretting cir- 
cumstances which are transitory and the underlying 
conditions which are permanent. To do this it is nec- 
essary to know something of the past, and it has been 
my aim to exhibit the revolutionary movements of the 
island in their true perspective. 

In conclusion, the utterance of an Italian statesman 
may be paraphrased, "Cuba is made, but who shall 
make the Cubans?" and the answer be given, "Them- 
selves." But under what conditions? Perhaps these 
pages may aid those who seek an answer for the good of 
Cuba and for the proper discharge of the responsibilities 
of the United States. C. M. P. 

Washington, D. C. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

CHAPTEK I. 
Prologue to Autonomy, . . . . . . . .3 

CHAPTEK II. 
The Western Invasion, . . . . . . . .23 

CHAPTER III. 
Campos and Weyler, ........ 47 

CHAPTER IV. 
Wooing the Lost Colony, 65 

CHAPTER V. 

Epilogue to Autonomy, ........ 84 

CHAPTER VI. 
Transition to Local Home Rule, 107 

CHAPTER VII. 
Provinces as a Federal Framework, 124 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Race or Color, ........ 141 

CHAPTER IX. 
The Spanish Colony, 159 

CHAPTER X. 
Immigration and Colonization, ...... 175 

CHAPTER XL 

Sugar and Tobacco — Other Products, 192 

vii 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

PAGE 

CHAPTER XII. 

Trade and Taxation — Railways and Internal, Develop- 
ment, .......... 214 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Religion as a Withered Branch, . 235 

CHAPTER XIV. 
Cuban Priests the Living Branch, ..... 253 

CHAPTER XV. 
Manners and Morals, . . 273 

CHAPTER XVI. 
American Military Control, 291 

CHAPTER XVII. 
Political Aptitudes, ........ 309 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
To-Day, . .328 

Appendix A — Bibliography, 350 

Appendix B — Trade Prospects, 356 



PART I 

CHAPTERS FROM YESTERDAY 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 



CHAPTER I 

Prologue to Autonomy 

Record of an Experiment— The Pact of El Zanjtfn— Concessions 
Which Were Not Autonomy — Grouping into Political Parties — 
Programme of the Liberals — Loyalists the Union Constitutionals 
— Echo of European Democratic Movement — Points of Agree- 
ment — Disappointment of Autonomists— Promulgation of Con- 
stitution — Growth of Autonomist Movement — Alarm of the 
Privileged Classes — Farce of Cuban Representation in the 
Cortes— Birth of Reformist Party— Its Members Opportunists- 
Parties Engulfed in the Waves of Revolution— Influence of 
Reciprocity Repeal and the Sugar Market. 

Autonomy was instituted in Cuba on New Year's 
Day, 1898. Twelve months later to a day Spanish 
sovereignty was yielded in trust to the United States. 
The developments of the intervening year were swift. 
So rapidly had they moved that the chapter with which 
they began was forgotten. In the broader field of world 
domain that has opened to the United States as a con- 
sequence of the war with Spain, the brief existence of this 
colonial experiment has almost passed from mind. Yet it 
was the first attempt of Spain in four centuries to give her 
colonies a system of self-government. Short as was the 
period, the story of the experiment is worthy of record. 

3 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

When the system was decreed in Cuba, the fondness 
of the Latin intellect for historical sequences caused 
much philosophical and reflective writing, which traced 
the series of events precedent as the prologue to a 
national drama. The real prologue to autonomy in the 
Spanish Antilles was the Ten- Years' War, which raged 
from 1868 to 1878. The machete and the torch then 
gained what peaceful agitation had not been able to 
achieve. The pact of El Zanjon which brought that 
insurrection to an end was arranged by Martinez Cam- 
pos and Maximo Gomez. It affirmed forgetfulness of 
the past and gave pledges for the future. It was based 
on j)romises to Cuba which were to insure to the rebel- 
lious island, once more become faithful, distinct politi- 
cal rights. Radical changes were to be made in the 
organic laws and in the administrative system. Cubans 
were to be recognized and to share in the government 
of Cuba. They were to have representation in the 
Cortes of Spain the same as Puerto Rico. 

Spain carried out the letter of the pact of El Zanjon. 
The organic laws were changed. The restrictive stat- 
utes of printing, of public meetings, and of associations 
or societies were modified and liberalized. A sup- 
posedly popular basis of Cuban representation in the 
Cortes was provided, and the electoral law was passed 
in conformity with that provision. In the administra- 
tive system the statute changes were many. They were 
carried into effect to the extent of a nominal compliance 
with the new laws. Mediaeval absolutism yielded some 
of its cherished and hereditary privileges. 

Tet neither the spirit nor the letter of the legislation 
enacted in 1878, and in subsequent years, was autono- 




A R I B B B a 



5x<i 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

mous. It was as if one of the provinces of the penin- 
sula which had been under a discriminating system of 
laws and administration had succeeded in getting itself 
placed on the same plane as the other provinces. For 
a colony beyond seas requiring a definite measure of 
independence there was no recognition. A critical study 
of the statutes and the administrative reforms enacted 
by the Spanish Government after the peace of El Zan- 
jon produces a plain deduction. A Cuban citizen as 
a Spanish subject could engage in political agitation 
with less danger of coming under the charge of conspir- 
acy than formerly. Theoretically, also, his right to a 
share in the local administration was conceded. With 
a sincere and honest purpose on the part of the supe- 
rior authorities a reasonable degree of local and insular 
government might have been put in force. But the 
analysis of the legislation and of the decrees of 1878 and 
subsequent years shows that in essence there was little 
dilution of what had always been the cardinal principle 
of Spanish colonial government. This was military 
rule. The paths were sometimes crooked, the passages 
wound into labyrinths of cedulas, decrees, orders, 
edicts, circulars, and bandos. They brought up at the 
same barrier. The beginning and the end was the Gov- 
ernor-General exercising his military functions as Cap- 
tain-General. After 1878, Cuba had good, bad, and 
indifferent Captain-Generals. Their character was re- 
flected in the administration of the island. 

It would be an unnecessary task to set forth more in 
detail wherein the legislation and the administrative acts 
following the compact of El Zanjon were not autonomous. 
A comparison with the actual regime of autonomy 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

when established twenty years later is sufficient 
to demonstrate it. Though the conception of colonial 
home rule for Cuba was non-existent among the Spanish 
statesmen of that day, the perception of it was clear on 
the part of the thinking people of the island. They had 
felt it when, three years before raising the cry of Yarain 
1868, they signed a petition thanking the Duke de la 
Torre for his motion in the Senate that political rights 
be granted Cuba. All those things and many more, 
they said in this document, foreshadowed that within 
a few years there would be a change in policy, and 
Cubans would be allowed some voice in the government 
of their own island. The educated and wealthy Cubans 
who in 1865 formed themselves into a national party 
and urged administrative and economic changes upon 
Madrid felt the lack of understanding among Spanish 
statesmen. The concessions asked were not a broad ap- 
plication of civil liberties. When their programme was 
rejected in its entirety they ceased to ask favors. They 
inaugurated the Ten-Tears' war. 

Political organization of a mechanical and artificial 
kind followed the "restoration of peace. The grouping 
was into Liberal and Union Constitutional parties. 
This formal resolution of the political elements into 
distinct and opposing groups took place in August, 
1878. The first platform or declaration of Liberal prin- 
ciples was a conservative one. It accepted candidly the 
peace established by the treaty of El Zanjon, and pro- 
claimed the principles which were the bases of that 
compact. It was an organized, though timid, move- 
ment to hold the Spanish Government, to the pledges 

of reforms and enlarged liberties for Cuba. Its pro- 

6 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

gramme was comprised under the respective heads of 
social, political, and economic questions. Its founda- 
tion was the liberty of print, freedom of political meet- 
ing and association, religious liberty, and the right of 
petition. Immunity of domicile, of person, of corre- 
spondence, and of property was claimed. It demanded 
the application to Cuba in their integrity of the organic 
laws of the peninsula, including municipal, provincial, 
and electoral statutes. Eeforms in criminal law were 
included. It called for a colonial constitutional regi- 
men as a vivification of the lifeless constitution of the 
monarchy not then promulgated in Cuba. The admis- 
sion of Cubans to the public offices on equality with 
Spaniards was also affirmed. Laws which would insure 
decentralization within the limits of the national unity 
were indicated. The root trouble was recognized in the 
demand for a separation and independence of the civil 
and military powers. An Antillian constitution was de- 
clared to be necessary in order that the inhabitants of 
Cuba might consecrate and organize with respect to its 
government the principle of responsibility. This was 
also asserted to be essential in order to reintegrate the 
possession of the individual rights and the enjoyment of 
the liberties which were proclaimed in the first article of 
the constitution of the monarchy as inherent in the con- 
dition of the Spanish citizen. The economic difficulty 
was met with boldness. Suppression of the export 
duties was demanded. Eeforms in the customs were 
formulated which would prevent the excessive discrimi- 
nation of the Spanish tariff — a discrimination practised 
not for the benefit of Cuba, but for the enrichment of 

Spain. The basis was that the tariff system should be 

7 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

a fiscal and not a differential one. Reciprocity with the 
United States was particularly specified as desirable. 
Exclusive white immigration and further emancipation 
laws for the blacks were favored. 

The Union Constitutional party formulated a pro- 
gramme which, in some of its declarations, was the 
reverse of reactionary. It called for the liberty of the 
press, the right of petition, of peaceful public meeting, 
of assimilation in political rights to the other provinces 
of Spain, of special laws with relation to the particular 
interests of Cuba, for improved morality in public 
administration, and for new laws which would be effi- 
cacious in securing judicial responsibility. On the 
economic question it pronounced for customs reforms, 
special protection for the agricultural production of the 
island and for the tobacco industry, suppression of 
export duties, a rational reduction of the imposts, espe- 
cially on the necessaries of life, and a liberal commercial 
treaty with the United States on the basis of reciprocity. 
It favored the abolition of slavery on the terms of the 
law of Moret, but with modifications suitable to the con- 
dition of the country. It also favored immigration un- 
der the direction of the government on the basis of free 
contract. 

An echo of the democratic movement in Europe was 
found in a third platform, but there was no political 
organization standing upon it. This democratic pro- 
gramme called for free trade, free shipping, free banks, 
free labor, free teaching, provincial militias, municipal 
taxes solely, complete abolition of slavery, abolition of 
the death penalty, and universal suffrage. These planks 
were in addition to the principles which it indorsed in 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

common with the Liberals and the Union Constitution- 
als. Spanish laws had not been liberalized to the degree 
of allowing the propaganda of this theoretical universal 
democracy. A few Cubans of intellectual strength 
gave it their approval in the abstract, but it never 
became an organized political movement. Some of its 
tenets were subsequently modified and adopted by 
the Autonomists, and the definite programme was 
forgotten. 

Comparison of the declarations of Liberals and Union 
Constitutionals does not show a marked divergence. It 
may be said there were no conflicting principles which 
afforded a basis for political parties. This is true. In 
the beginning the difference was simply one of tenden- 
cies and of men. The economic ideas were similar, and 
there was not an essential point of distinction on the 
social and political articles. Both parties accepted the 
understanding back of the compact of El Zanjon and 
the promise of measures to make it effective. The 
similarity of their creed is the proof that Spain was 
pledged to grant Cuba political rights which would in- 
sure a certain degree of economic independence. The 
assertion of this understanding was broader and more 
definite on the part of the Liberals. The programme 
of the Union Constitutionals reflected more accurately 
the vice of Spanish politics. There were reservations, 
checks, and limitations which could be used to defeat 
the principles that were affirmed. Yet there was recog- 
nition of a new regimen under which would be political 
organizations. The tendency of the Union Constitu- 
tionals to become the party of the opposition — not to 
the authorities in power, but to innovations — was just 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

discernible in the provisos and the checks left in the 
hands of the peninsula. 

With so little cardinal difference in the announced 
principles of the two groups, the tendencies could be 
understood only from a knowledege of the men who in- 
terpreted and gave them direction. The Liberal party 
was a Cuban organization, and it so remained. Then 
and afterwards no leading Spaniards in the island took 
their stand for autonomy as an avowed creed. The 
Union Constitutional party might fairly claim the title 
of conservative from the character of its members. The 
reactionaries, the Spanish classes who did not accept the 
concessions to the insurgent elements and who wanted 
Cuba to continue a dependency of the peninsula with- 
out political rights, antagonized it. They were the in- 
transigentes. This term should be understood. For 
many years the temporary nature of the stay of the 
Spaniards in Cuba was shown by designating them as 
transeuntes — transients or sojourners. As it was the 
Spaniards who always stood out against granting what- 
ever Cuba wanted, and as they were the transients, by a 
Gallic adaptation in political discussion they became 
known as intransigentes. The etymology is that of 
Cuban politics. The term is no longer applied solely to 
the Spanish classes. The instransigente is the irrecon- 
cilable, the reactionary, the hopeless Bourbon ; the polit- 
ical ostrich who has only one way of avoiding the storm 
of the desert or the deluge. 

The antagonism of the blindly loyal Spanish classes 
to the enunciated programme of the Union Constitu- 
tionals is evidence of its agreement in essentials with 

the principles of the Liberals. But the inherent ten- 

10 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

dencies of the two parties developed trie difference when 
interpreted by men of divergent convictions and purposes. 
The artifical nature of the two organizations formed 
mechanically as part of a new political regimen was 
soon lost. Their growth was along natural lines. The 
Union Constitutionals modified or ignored their original 
economic precepts. Then they became jealous of the 
integrity of Spanish institutions in the Antilles. The 
control passed away from the original supporters. The 
intransigentes at first had looked with contempt on the 
group of Union Constitutionals. They began by criti- 
cizing its assumptions and combating its principles. 
They ended by dominating the organization. Whatever 
party was in power in Spain they were the government 
party in Cuba. The Union Constitutionals were minis- 
terial under all ministries. Being thus the props of au- 
thority, they gradually secured for themselves the offi- 
cial employments, and no Captain-General was strong 
enough to dislodge them. 

The Liberal party celebrated the second anniversary 
of its foundation in August, 1880, by a reunion of its 
chief members. The original programme was reaffirmed 
and broadened. The addresses reflected the disappoint- 
ment which already had come upon those who had 
trusted that the understanding back of the pact of El 
Zanjon would be vitalized and given force. Distrust 
and suspicion had given way to the conviction that they 
had been deceived by Madrid. They were discovering 
that the ruling influence in the peninsula did not mean 
to concede to Cuba real liberty of political action within 
even a limited sphere. The ministry of Martinez Cam- 
pos had fallen in the midst of doubts, perplexities, 

11 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

and hesitation. The ministry of Ciinovas del Castillo, 
always resolute in his opposition to colonial liberties, 
had taken its place. The Cuban Liberal Autonomists 
could only deliver addresses voicing their disappoint- 
ment and their fears. Nor were their voices heard from 
the housetops. They spoke to one another and among 
themselves. 

The Constitution which had been in force in the 
peninsula since 1876 was promulgated in Cuba in the 
spring of 1881. Previous to that there had been prose- 
cution of individuals, usually journalists, who inter- 
preted too literally and too liberally the royal cedulas 
and the laws enacted by the Cortes following the peace 
of El Zanjon. Some ayuntamientos, or municipal 
councils, which sought to apply the new regime to 
local government too broadly, found themselves stripped 
of their authority. It was a discouraging experience, 
which served as a warning and an example to other 
municipalities. The power of construing the law and 
the facts rested with the Governor-General, 'and the con- 
struction was commonly on the side of arbitrary power. 

The promulgation of the Spanish Constitution did 
not lessen the prosecution of the journals advocating 
Liberal principles, though convictions did not always 
follow. The most notable instance was that of the organ 
El Triimfo, which had not long previously declared 
that it was not autonomist. The newspaper was 
charged with attacking the national unity in propagat- 
ing the autonomist creed or doctrine. Ultimately the 
judicial tribunal absolved it. Yet the victory for a free 
press was not a signal one. These prosecutions were 
effective reminders that the law of imprint had not abol- 

12 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

islied the censorship of the press. They were meant as 
warnings against too great freedom of political discus- 
sion, and were so accepted. Nor were instances want- 
ing of the arbitrary suppression of journals. 

In 1882 the Junta Magna, or central committee, of 
the Liberal party ceased to apologize and deny that it 
was autonomist. In April it issued declarations that it 
favored colonial autonomy under the sovereignty and 
the authority of the Cortes and the head of the nation. 
It further demanded identity of civil and political rights 
for the Spaniards of both hemispheres. This was an 
effort to propitiate the Spaniards in Cuba, and to oblit- 
erate the line which divided insulars and peninsulars. 
The movement had been growing in strength. With the 
more open definition of autonomy as a political creed, 
its vigor spread. The shadow of military government 
and the press censorship rested over it, yet the organiza- 
tion grew within the shadow. The intransigentes took 
alarm. They sought to make the political division ap- 
pear as one between integristas and separatistas. They 
were the integristas, the defenders of Spanish unity and 
sovereignty. The Liberals were the separatistas, the 
traitors who would betray their birthright and encour- 
age the colony to set up an independent government. 
Autonomy was the viper which, if warmed in the bosom 
of Spain, would instil the poison that would destroy the 
national unity. Though the thought was not put in 
these words, to the intransigentes it was also the mon- 
ster that would devour the special privileges which 
made Cuba valuable to Spaniards, if not to Spain. 

Students of this period of Cuban political history will 

find its phases reflected in the newspapers, in mani- 

13 



TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA 

festoes, allocutions, addresses, and in pamphlets. The 
addresses, manifestoes, pamphlets, and controversial 
articles of the journals show a deep knowledge of his- 
torical precedents. They go to the root of the causes 
that destroy empires. They contain all that is true of 
political and civil liberty in the abstract. In the pres- 
entation of these subjects there is more of speculative 
political philosophy than of practical understanding 
of the principles of applied government. Beyond this 
the literature of the day is the ordinary polemics of 
parties. It is not of the campaign or of the stump as 
manifested in the United States, for there were no elec- 
tions of a kind which could give the opportunity for 
campaign discussion. Pamphleteering was never super- 
seded by newspaper discussion. For the leading Auto- 
nomists it is to be said that one true and consistent 
note is sounded through all the agitation which they 
carried on for twenty years. This is the warning of the 
fate which overtakes empires and absolutist govern- 
ments that refuse to recognize the element of popular 
representation. 

It has been truly said by a Cuban writer,* that "the 
virile advance of civism among the Cubans through the 
energetic and spontaneous organization of the Liberal 
Autonomist party resulted in the awakening of the 
old intransigente and reactionary party, fearful that the 
new order of things would undermine the edifice of its 
interests." The Union Constitutionals rallied against 
the movement with the passion of tigers whose prey is 
about to be taken away from them. Yield the first de- 



* Cabrera, " Cuba y sus Jueces." 
14 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA 

mand of these Autonomists and Spanish sovereignty 
decrees its own death, was their angry cry. National 
unity and colonial liberty were analyzed to their ulti- 
mate results logically and with ability. The speeches 
and pronunciamentos of the Autonomist leaders — some- 
times radical in talk, as when Antonio Govin, who was 
in time to become a member of the Autonomist cabinet, 
called the Spaniards birds of passage — were quoted to 
show the real purpose of the movement. This was de- 
clared to be separation from the mother country. 

The Autonomists in their turn would protest, the 
radical sentiments of individuals would be disclaimed, 
and the personal controversies would go on. Occasion- 
ally these were settled by duels after the French fashion. 
Throughout the agitation the intransigentes kept 
steadily before the Spanish classes that whatever threat- 
ened or lessened Spanish absolutism threatened their 
special privileges. It was the argumentum ad Jwminem 
applied with a tremendous effect. Intellectually, the 
discussion on the part of the Union Constitutionals was 
a morass, as discussion usually is in championing vested 
political wrongs. In this day the historian will not be 
repaid for losing himself in the bog. The intransigen- 
tes were the defenders of the theory of the divine right 
of Spain to govern the Antilles as possessions rather 
than as either provinces or colonies. Often, too, they 
were the inflexible champions of the Church, and 
charged their opponents with plotting to undermine that 
support of lawful government. 

During this period of political movement, Cuba had 
representation, of a kind, in the Cortes of Spain. It 
was of the kind that could be possible only under the 

15 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

system of government winch made elections the regis- 
tering of the will of the governing power. Among the 
Cuban Deputies and Senators, sometimes as many as 
half a dozen would be known as Autonomists. Ordinar- 
ily one-fourth would be Cuban born, and the remainder 
peninsulars. Eafael de Labra, the most eminent of the 
publicists in Spain who advocated colonial government, 
represented the district of Habana as an Autonomist. 
Martinez Campos sat as the Conservative Deputy for 
Matanzas. 

How far the Spanish statesmen comprehended the 
Cuban movement for autonomy must remain unde- 
termined. Emilio Castelar wanted no transatlantic Po- 
land, yet his republican principles did not carry him 
to the length of advocating complete home rule for Cuba. 
Moret, who was to formulate the system when it came to 
be proposed, at that time was giving it little support. 
Praxades Sagasta, in the regular changes of power which 
made him the ruler of Spain alternately with Canovas 
del Castillo, never suggested home rule for Cuba. The 
pendulum swung between these two prime ministers; 
sometimes vibrated with hope of broader and truer 
parliamentary government for Spain itself, sometimes 
remained in equilibrium, but never swung loose from 
the orbit of colonial subjection. Sagasta was up and Ca- 
novas was down : the Liberal party had its vague and 
hesitating schemes for the Antilles. Canovas was up 
and Sagasta was down: the Conservative party had 
liberal legislation in view, and nothing came of it. If, 
in the farcical election of Deputies from Cuba to the 
Cortes, the government in power occasionally permitted 

an Autonomist to be chosen, it was merely good-natured 

16 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

tolerance. If the Autonomists at times sent delegations 
to Madrid and were represented by resident committees, 
this was treated as a colonial chimera not worthy of seri- 
ous attention. C^novas had his policy of assimilation 
by which Spaniards and Cubans were to approach one 
another in their political rights. But he never yielded 
his ground that autonomy meant separation of Cuba 
from the peninsula. And what he called the national 
actualities, the need of supporting the bureaucratic 
classes, was always a bar to the real insular government 
of Cuba by its own people. 

In Cuba in time the stubbornness and the aggressive- 
ness of the autonomist propaganda, the steady growth 
of both industrial and political discontent, produced an 
effect on what had seemed to be stone. A score and a 
half of newspapers were advocating the doctrine. The 
mass of conservatism quavered a little. Then came an 
era of inquiry. Was it not better to do something to 
still this perennial discontent? Could not the Cubans 
be taken into limited partnership in the administration 
of insular affairs? Could not some of the abuses, the 
existence of which everybody admitted, be corrected 
and the system be modified without endangering the 
national unity? To these questions the majority of the 
intransigentes returned a passionate No. Yet the agi- 
tation, the need of doing something, continued. It came 
about that the conservatives divided among themselves. 
The Union Constitutional party had liberal tendencies 
within its being. It split into right and left wings. 
The left favored doing something. Its members were 
known as dissidents. The right favored doing nothing 
beyond castigating the sowers of sedition. After these 
2 17 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

divisions came the rapprochements, the reunion of the 
elements naturally cohesive which had drifted apart. 
Customarily the basis of reunion was simple. When the 
irreconcilables found that the reforms proposed in the 
Cortes were paper reforms, when they learned that the 
system which to them represented the unity of national 
sentiment and the preservation of special principles was 
in no real danger, the dissensions were healed. The 
Union Constitutional party took back to its bosom the 
repentant wanderers. 

Yet the movement grew. The Autonomist group be- 
came as much a political party as it could become under 
Spanish institutions. Perception of a great truth in 
human government ultimately dawned upon the more 
enlightened of the Spanish classes in Cuba. If the 
agitation would not down, and if the intransigente op- 
position would make no concessions to this alarming 
continuance of sentiment, the movement which was going 
steadily forward might be controlled and diverted into 
other channels. It was not possible to gain control of the 
Autonomist party. Had this been feasible, the connec- 
tion with supposedly separatist principles would have 
been too marked to permit the Spanish element so to 
identify itself. The diversion might be made if a new 
group were formed. 

Out of these conditions was born the Reformist party. 
It had a practical aim. Spaniards who sincerely wanted 
a more liberal government for Cuba, but who could not 
afford to join themselves with the Autonomist organiza- 
tion because it was too radical and too Cuban, could 
shelter themselves under this tenting. The Reformist 

party embraced many worthy Spaniards and Cubans. 

18 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

In one respect its aim was definite : it did not contem- 
plate colonial self-government at the expense of Spanish 
sovereignty. It welcomed the electoral reforms which 
Maura, the Liberal Minister of the Colonies, proposed in 
the Cortes in 1890, and in subsequent years. Its mem- 
bers joined the Autonomists in mocking the Union Con- 
stitutionals when that party accepted the reforms of 
Abrazurza offered by the Conservative ministry in the 
Cortes in 1895. 

The Reformist party was formally organized in 1893. 
It did not advance materially in numbers, but it was a 
distinct influence, and maintained the shell of an organ- 
ization till the last. It professed not to favor compro- 
mise with the radical tendencies of autonomy, but merely 
concessions to better government. Towards the end its 
propaganda was bold and clear. In the despair which 
was coming over Spanish rule in Cuba with the rising 
of the insurrection, its efforts partook of the activity of 
desperation. But there was a fundamental weakness. 
The poles were positive and negative. The Autonomists 
affirmed and demanded full colonial liberty. The Union 
Constitutionals denied and rejected the basis. No mag- 
net midway between them could draw. The Reformists 
were not a compromise party as compromise had been 
applied successfully in the United States. They simply 
favored concessions. At first the name of the Autono- 
mists, the thing to the Conservatives. Later it was a 
reversal of position with some substance for colonial 
home rule. 

Spanish conservatives who were of liberal tendencies 
and who foresaw destruction if something were not done 
joined the Reformists in moments of disgust and reac- 

19 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

tion from the hopeless Bourbonism of their own party. 
Timid Autonomists, with the ultimate outcome of sepa- 
ration before them, and face to face with the early prob- 
abilities, hesitated, faltered, and turned back. The 
Eeformist standard was their refuge. They, too, became 
opportunists. The Eeformist party pitched its tent 
on the beach. The waves of revolution were rolling 
inward. The Eeformists raised their brooms to sweep 
the billows back. The waves broke over the shore, and 
Conservatives, Eeformists, and Autonomists were swal- 
lowed in the waters. Their emergence, drowsled and 
dripping, is the subject for a later chapter of autonomy. 
Armed revolt, begun in 1868, had brought the first 
change in the outward form of Spanish absolutism dur- 
ing four centuries of despotic government. Peaceful 
agitation following the concessions wrung by the revo- 
lutionists of that day had been able to show little further 
progress in liberalizing the spirit of Spanish political 
institutions. The energies of the Liberal party in Cuba 
were absorbed and distraught in seeking to check the 
reactionary tendencies of parties in Spain which were 
reverting to the system that had obtained previous to 
the compact of El Zanjon. When it was apparently 
going forward the Autonomist party was in reality sim- 
ply checking the movement backward. There were 
periods of self-deception and of unconscious deception 
to the people of the island. Quiescence of the revolution- 
ary elements was mistaken for acquiescence. When the 
whole world was prospering, industrial prosperity could 
not be wholly destroyed by official corruption and mis- 
government. Sugar production with an abnormally 

profitable market aided in the temporary quietude. In 

30 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

1890 it was complacently remarked that the spirit of 
armed revolution had passed away in the embrace of 
agitation within constitutional lines by the great Auton- 
omist party. The Cortes was busy with reforms for 
Cuba. The plans were not for home rule, but they were 
pledges of improvement which, if carried out, would 
enable the Autonomists to show that the evolution of 
colonial self-government in the logical order which they 
advocated had begun. They were very fond of that 
phrase, "evolutionary colonial government." Then 
came the exigencies of Madrid politics, the shifting of 
ministries and the mockery of the Antillian aspirations 
for wider liberties. And then, too, came the tariff leg- 
islation in the United States, which repealed the Blaine 
reciprocity legislation and lowered at a stroke the profit 
of raising sugar-cane in Cuba. The quiescent elements 
began to move. They were no longer acquiescent. In 
this inchoate activity was disclosed the abyss which the 
Autonomists had not been able to bridge. This was the 
knowledge that the mass of revolutionists of the Ten- 
Years' war never had been reconciled to Spanish dom- 
ination. 

Antonio Maceo had been a young chief in that war. 
He had not accepted the regimen of peace, but had con- 
sented to depart from the island under a safe-conduct 
from Martinez Campos. His subsequent life in Central 
America and the watch which the Spanish authorities 
kept on his movements are matters of common history. 
They do not need recounting. Maximo Gomez had 
retired to his farm in Santo Domingo, and withdrawn 
himself from participation in the affairs of Cuba. Ca- 
lixto Garcia, after joining a second abortive rebellion 

21 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

known as the Little War, which raged in Santiago 
province within a twelvemonth after the peace of El 
Zanjon, had accepted the friendship of Campos and 
taken a civil position as a bank officer in Madrid, 
where he was under espionage. Other leaders of the 
Ten- Years' war had voluntarily exiled themselves to the 
United States, to Mexico, and to the countries of Cen- 
tral America. That they did not trust the Spanish 
promises was evidenced by their actions. Their lack 
of faith in the success of the Autonomist party was 
equally clear. Some conspired and plotted. Others 
merely waited. 

The culmination came with the simultaneous failure 
of Cuban reform legislation in the Cortes and the 
decrease in the profits of the American sugar market. 
Economic causes combined with political discontent in 
keeping the embers of insurrection glowing under the 
ashes of apparent indifference. The period of freedom 
from internecine war has been called a parenthesis 
within a fact. The insurrection of 1895 was the last 
act in the revolution which began in 1868. There had 
been an interregnum, nothing more. Armed revolt was 
coming again. 



22 



CHAPTER II 

The Western Invasion 

Alarm Bell of Insurrection Sounded— Old Leaders in Arms — Mani- 
festo of Autonomists Eeprobates the Insurrection — Subsequent 
History of the Signers — Activity of G6mez and Maceo — Martin- 
ez Campos Takes Command — Battle of Bayamo — Arrival of 
Spanish Reinforcements — Autonomists Deported — Formation of 
Revolutionary Government — G6mez' Address to the Cuban Peo- 
ple—His Plan for Nationalizing the Insurrection — March to the 
Occident Begun — Machete as a Weapon— Progress of Insurgents 
— Campos Quiets Censure of Spanish Classes — Promise of Vigor- 
ous Military Operations — Blazing Cane-Fields the Mark of the 
Insurgent Campaign — Tremor and Turmoil in Habana — Official 
Orders for Defence — G6mez in the Outskirts — Maceo in the To- 
bacco Country — The Invasion G6mez' Conception and Macro's 
Execution — Spain's Military Power Broken. 

Torch and machete make short work of constitutional 
agitation. They are not the weapons of political par- 
ties. When they were resorted to it was a question 
whether they would convert the Autonomists into re- 
cruits or into enemies of the faith that proclaimed its 
doctrines by war. A little time had to be allowed be- 
fore the answer could be given. 

It was known in the United States, in the winter 

months of 1894-95, that something was expected to 

happen in Cuba. The Spanish authorities in the island 

were both blind and impotent. They, too, knew that 

23 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

something was going on, yet they did not know where 
to look for the uprising. One day a small party of 
insurgents raised the banner of revolt at the hamlet of 
Ybarra in Matanzas province. Four hundred miles 
away in the villages of Baire and Juguani, in the prov- 
ince of Santiago de Cuba,* small uprisings also were 
noted. At Baire the peaceable demand was made for 
the implantation of the reforms of Maura. At Juguani 
the demand was for the removal of the local ayuntai- 
mento, or municipal council, because of some alleged 
malfeasance. At Guanta^iamo there was an open revolt 
without a stated grievance. 

The movement at Ybarra was premature. The little 
band of insurgents was quickly dispersed. Some of the 
leaders were arrested and deported in chains to the penal 
settlements of Africa, among them the mulatto publicist 
Juan Gualberto Gomez. Small risings in the province 
of Santa Clara were also dispersed. But the alarm bell 
had been sounded. It was to ring through months and 
years. The night of February 23d, 1895, the print- 
ing-presses in Habana were kept whirling with the 
proclamation of the Governor-General, Emilio Calleja, 
suspending the constitutional guarantees. This was fol- 
lowed by the official announcement that the provinces of 
Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba were in a state of war. 
Then was disclosed the existence of the Cuban revolu- 
tionary party with headquarters and branches in the 
United States, and with a net extended throughout the 
island the completeness of which was not suspected. 
All the agencies of secret police and of similar means 

* Santiago means St. James. Cubans and Spaniards call the city 
and the province simply "Cuba." 

24 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

which were a part of the Spanish system had not uncov- 
ered this universal political conspiracy. 

Jose Marti, dreamer, poet, and idealist, had visited 
Maximo Gomez in his retirement in Santo Domingo, 
and on behalf of the Cuban revolutionary societies had 
offered him the command of an insurgent army that was 
to come up from the earth. Gomez had accepted the 
command. Antonio Maceo had been communicated 
with and was ready to aid. The sympathizers in Cuba 
had been secreting arms, and were awaiting the call. 
Bartolome Maso, a sugar-planter at Manzanillo, who 
had been an insurgent colonel in the Ten- Years' war, 
was quickly in the field with armed followers. He had 
the respect of the Spanish classes. Though he had been 
friendly to the Autonomist propaganda, he had refused 
to accept the presidency of the party. Maso was said to 
have taken up arms in order to compel Spain to yield 
autonomy without granting absolute independence. Mi- 
nor engagements took place in the Oriente, as Eastern 
Cuba was called, and within a month the insurrection 
was in full movement. Spain was sending troops 
across the ocean, and the leading Spaniards in Habana 
were calling for more vigorous action by the Govern- 
ment. They were also seeking to place the responsibil- 
ity for the insurrection. The Union Constitutionals 
shrieked that the Autonomists had done it all. Insur- 
rection, which meant separation, they cried, was the 
fruit, as they had warned the loyal classes, of the per- 
nicious doctrines of autonomy. 

Thus attacked, the Autonomist leaders through the 

Magna Junta, or central committee, of the party made 

vigorous reply. They vindicated their loyalty by offer- 

25 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

ing their unconditional support to the Government. 
They issued an appeal to the country in which they 
eulogized themselves and reprobated the insurgents. 
The insurrection, they said, had sounded the cry of 
revolt at the moment when a new regimen was on the 
eve of being inaugurated. They condemned all over- 
turning of order because the Liberal- Autonomist party 
was a party of legality which had faith in constitutional 
methods. Besides, it was fundamentally Spanish be- 
cause it was essentially and exclusively autonomist. 
And colonial autonomy presupposed the reality of the 
Metropolis — Spain — in the plenitude of its sovereignty 
and of its historic rights. For that reality from its 
birth, their party had inscribed on its banner as its 
motto, "Liberty, Peace, and National Unity." It also 
resented the injurious imputations of its adversaries, 
meaning the Union Constitutionals. Eecurring to the 
rebellion again, the manifesto declared that the insur- 
rection made impossible at that time the liberties which 
the Autonomists had conquered. But by good fortune 
it would not succeed. All the signs showed that the 
rebellion, limited to a part of the eastern provinces, had 
with a few exceptions only succeeded in dragging into 
it the classes proceeding from the most ignorant and 
destitute of the population, who from lack of cohesion 
and discipline would soon disperse or give themselves 
up. The Liberal party of 1868 had folded its standard 
and abandoned its post to the revolutionists of Tara. 
The Liberal party of 1878 would not lower its flag nor 
cede the field to those who came to undo their laborious 
harvest and cloud the perspective of their destinies with 
the horrible spectre of misery, anarchy, and barbarism. 

26 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

By their characterization of the ignorant classes it 
will be observed that the Autonomist leaders did not 
consider the insurrection respectable. They themselves 
were eminently respectable. Their natural opponents, 
the Union Constitutionals, while denouncing them and 
their policies, always conceded their respectability. 
They proved poor prophets, because instead of the in- 
surrection failing from lack of cohesion and discipline, 
it grew more coherent and put disciplined ranks in the 
field. But truly the classes who formed its base were 
not respectable. They were farm laborers, workers in 
the cane-fields who had never risen to a high condition 
of education. Nor had they ever given support to the 
movement for autonomy, because the leaders of that 
movement, while championing the system of popular 
government, had no knowledge from experience of the 
function of the masses in popular government. The 
manifesto in its reference to the liberties the Autono- 
mists had conquered meant the reforms of Abarzurza. 
Having been unable to obtain the reforms of Maura, 
they accepted the diluted substitute as a step in their 
programme of evolutionary autonomy. 

It is instructive to follow the history of the signers 
of this manifesto, and of other Autonomists not mem- 
bers of the central committee who indorsed it. The 
majority of them had been for fifteen years and more 
advocating the principles of the party. They could say 
with truth that they had cradled the organization. In 
the years that were to come, some remained unwavering 
in the support which they had pledged to the Govern- 
ment of Spain. Among them were found apologists and 
eulogists of Weyler. But others went into voluntary 

27 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

exile, unable to stand between the two firing-lines. 
Many joined the insurgents in the manigua or brush. 
Some became involuntary exiles or political prisoners, 
because they either fell away from the policy announced 
in the manifesto, or because their support was not zeal- 
ous enough to satisfy the military authorities. 

This manifesto of the Liberal- Autonomist party was 
published on the 4th of April. The insurrection had 
been in movement for six weeks. Martinez Campos, 
the pacificator of the former revolution, had been named 
Governor-General of the island, and had sailed for his 
post. Antonio Maceo, his brother Jose, and a score 
of companions who formed the expedition from Costa 
Rica had disembarked near Baracoa on the north 
coast. A troop of Spanish volunteers lay in waiting 
for them. There was fighting in the hills, and some 
members of the expedition were taken prisoners. The 
brothers Maceo escaped, and Antonio placed himself in 
command of the increasing bands of insurgents in the 
eastern regions. Within a fortnight Jose Marti and 
Maximo Gomez landed near Guantanamo. Marti was 
the president of the revolutionary party. He had 
been a student in Seville and Madrid, and was old 
enough to be imprisoned during the Ten- Years' war for 
complicity in that uprising. He was not a military 
chief. Marti lost his life in combat with the Spanish 
troops on the banks of the Contraestre River, in the 
western part of the province, within five weeks after his 
arrival. Gomez at once took command of the insur- 
gent forces which began coming up from the earth to 
receive him. 

Two days after the secret landing of Marti and 



TO-MORBOW IN CUBA 

Gomez, General Campos disembarked in the po-rt of 
Guant^namo. He immediately assumed his office as 
Governor-General and Captain-General of the island, 
without waiting to take the formal oath and undergo the 
ceremonies customary at Habana. At that time the 
Spanish authorities estimated that the insurgents under 
arms in the province numbered 5,000. General Cam- 
pos issued an address to the people, and organized 
energetic military operations. In proclaiming martial 
law he enjoined on his own soldiers the recognized prin- 
ciples of humane warfare. His policy was to win back 
the insurgents by kindness, and to show them that they 
could trust the indulgence of Spain. At this time he 
had 27,000 troops under his command. After remain- 
ing in Santiago a week he proceeded to Habana. 

While Campos was combating the insurrection with 
the sword in one hand and the promise of pardon in the 
other, Gomez and Maceo were pushing it westward 
through Santiago to the thinly populated province of 
Puerto Principe. These Camagiieyans, as the natives 
of the central part of the island are called, were, like 
the inhabitants of Santiago de Cuba, perennial foes of 
Spanish power. The Autonomist party had an organi- 
zation in Puerto Principe which reaffirmed its condem- 
nation of the insurrection and its earnest desire to 
uphold the military authorities. After drawing to the 
ranks of the insurrection the leading Cubans of Cama- 
giiey, Gomez retired to the southern part of Santiago 
province. In the mean time General Campos had taken 
command in person of the Spanish troops in the field, 
and was directing the movements in that region. The 

volunteers in many places had been called into action 

29 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

and were supporting the regular troops. The guerillas, 
or native Spanish forces, organized in the different 
communities, and the movilazados, or irregular native 
forces, were also being utilized. 

On July 13th was fought the first real battle of this 
war. It was at Peralojo, near Bayamo. Maceo and 
Jesus Babi were known to be contemplating a descent 
on the Spanish garrison which held Bayamo. The 
columns under Campos were advancing from Manza- 
nillo. The Spanish troops, according to the statement 
of the officers, numbered 1,600. The insurgents under 
Maceo, the Spaniards afterwards said, numbered be- 
tween 5,000 and 6,000. There may have been 3,000 
of them who fell upon the advancing Spanish columns 
of equal number, — certainly more than 1,600, — attacking 
them in front and in the rear. General Juan Fidel 
Santocildes, a distinguished officer and the devoted 
friend of Campos, was killed at the head of his column. 
Other officers were killed and wounded. General Cam- 
pos himself narrowly escaped death. By a strategic 
movement, turning his rear-guard into the van-guard 
and changing the course, he succeeded in leading his 
troops into Bayamo. The laurels of the engagement 
were with Maceo, and the insurgent cause gained pres- 
tige. General Campos, after strengthening the fortifica- 
tions of Bayamo and increasing the garrison, succeeded 
in clearing the country in the immediate neighborhood 
of the insurgents, who confined their activity to the 
northern part of the province. He then returned to 
Manzanillo. 

Through the remaining months of the summer the 
insurgent activity was greatest in las Yillas, which is 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

the province of Santa Clara, or, as the Cubans call it, 
Villa Clara. One uprising followed another, and one 
band after another took to the manigua. The success- 
ful disembarkment of filibustering expeditions on the 
south coast with arms and recruits for the insurgents 
kept the fires of revolution flaming. The military au- 
thorities were energetic, but the bands of insurgents 
in the province managed to avoid many encounters with 
the troops. They attacked isolated Spanish garrisons 
successfully, though in some of the combats they were 
worsted. In Santiago de Cuba Maceo was active, and 
his followers had several sharp engagements with the 
enemy. At Sao del Indio a column of 1,000 Spanish 
soldiers attacked a force of insurgents under Maceo 
alleged to number 3,000, and probably numbering half 
as many, and dispersed them. All this time reinforce- 
ments were coming from the peninsula. By the end of 
summer a total of 80,000 Spanish regulars were in the 
field. A thousand loyal Spaniards had come from the 
Argentine Kepublic and Brazil to the city of Santiago 
de Cuba, and enrolled themselves as volunteers. Sub- 
sequently more Spaniards arrived from South America, 
and also from Mexico. In Habana the disembarking 
of the battalions was a weekly occurrence. The Leon 
battalion, that of the Asturias, of Barcelona, of Valen- 
cia, and of other provinces in Spain showed that the 
army was recruited from all parts of the peninsula. 
The insurgents may have had 20,000 men in arms and 
without arms, though this is a liberal estimate. 

During this period happened an untoward circum- 
stance. It was a rude shock to the credulous and loyal 
Autonomists. General Campos began deporting Auton- 

31 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

omists to the penal settlements of Africa without civil 
or military trial and without explanation. In the latter 
part of September, four leading citizens of Santiago 
de Cuba were deported to Ceuta by his orders. They 
were Don Eutaldo Tamayo, president of the provincial 
deputation and also president of the local autonomist 
central committee; Antonio Brava, an educator; Alfre- 
do Betancourt, a lawyer; and Desiderio Ortiz, a jour- 
nalist. Clearly these men did not belong to the igno- 
rant and destitute classes of whom the central committee 
of the Autonomist party had written in the celebrated 
manifesto reprobating the insurrection. Their political 
associates in Habana sought their releases, but the Cap- 
tain-General denied the request for reasons which were 
thought to indicate knowledge of complicity in the 
insurrection. Later, by his direction, other Autono- 
mists were deported. Military executions of insurgent 
cabecillas, or chiefs, who were captured in arms also 
began. These chiefs received more consideration than 
the Autonomist suspects exiled without trial, for they 
had the benefit of summary court-martial. 

The revolutionists, on their part, were beginning to 
destroy sugar plantations and blow up railroads and 
trains with dynamite. They also formed their provi- 
sional Cuban republic in the woods with Salvador Cis- 
neros Betancourt, better known as the Marquis de 
Santa Lucia, as President. The possessor of a Cuban 
patent of nobility and answering all the requirements 
of breeding and education, a revolutionist of 1868, he 
had taken into the field with him many young men of 
the older families of Villa Clara. The insurgent chiefs 

met and organized an assembly at Jimaguayu, a corner 

32 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

of Puerto Principe. They decided that the revolution- 
ary civil government should be kept separate from the 
military administration. They confirmed Gomez as 
general-in-chief and Maceo as next in command. Bar- 
tolome Maso yielded his commission in the field to 
become Vice-President of the provisional government, 
and he subsequently succeeded the Marquis de Santa 
Lucia as President. A civil cabinet was also formed. 
This assembly adopted the first constitution of the 
Cuban republic. Its creator, the provisional govern- 
ment, sought recognition from the United States. 
Nominally the provisional government in the woods 
was the supreme power. It issued commissions and 
directed the movements of the insurgent army. Nomi- 
nally, too, Gomez and Maceo and the other insurgent 
commanders respected and obeyed it. Actually the 
provisional government registered their plans, or if it 
did not it was ignored by them. At all times the Junta 
in New York, of which Estrada Palma was the head 
and Gonzalo de Quesada the representative in Wash- 
ington, was the more potent body, for it raised and 
disbursed the funds and managed the filibustering expe- 
ditions. The tribute or tax levied by Gomez on the 
sugar planters and railroad managers was frequently 
paid directly to the representatives of the Junta. 

Six months of revolt passed before the Spanish Gov- 
ernment in Cuba knew that the insurrection had a regu- 
larly organized plan of compaign. Insurgent maurad- 
ing bands, though acknowledging the orders of Gomez 
or Maceo while engaging in guerilla warfare, did not 
themselves fully realize that they were working as part 
of a whole. Maceo knew it, and the veteran chief of 
3 33 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

the revolution knew it. In the autumn of 1895 his 
plans began to take form. On assuming command of 
the insurgent forces, Gomez had issued an address to 
the Cuban people. It is worth reading in the light of 
the history that has since been made. Its language 
may appear verbose and extravagant to the unsenti- 
mental American mind. To the emotional people of 
the Latin and the African races, for whom the address 
was meant, it was neither verbose nor extravagant. In 
this manifesto Gomez promised to lead them in the 
struggle for their liberties. Though the words were 
glowing, the difficulties and the supreme nature of the 
task before them was set out with mathematical pre- 
cision. Spain, he warned them, would never yield 
Cuba to its people while the land was worth possessing. 
She would only yield when there was nothing to keep. 
And the inhabitants of Cuba must be prepared for the 
sacrifice. Every household, he declared, would have 
its martyr before the island became free. 

In this address Gomez put forth other ideas, though 
not with the distinctness with which they existed in 
his own mind. If not local, the Ten-Tears' war had 
been at least provincial. It was confined to the cen- 
tral and eastern part of the island. Barely an emeute 
had taken place in the west. If Cuba were to be freed 
from Spain, Gomez knew that the revolution must be 
made universal. He proposed to nationalize the insur- 
rection. Many young Cubans and some older ones had 
joined it believing that they could engage in a gue- 
rilla warfare in the neighborhood of their own homes. 
Gomez did not understimate the value of this support. 
He used this local aid, but did not depend upon it. 

34 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Instead, lie took the most capable of the recruits and 
sent them to commands in other localities. From 
Habana he chose officers for Puerto Principe. From 
Pinar del Rio he selected officers for the bands in Santa 
Clara. The development of this plan was coincident 
with the broader purpose of nationalizing the insurrec- 
tion by making war throughout the island. The west- 
ern invasion began late in the fall, at the end of the 
rainy season. The insurgents were leaving parts of 
Santiago de Cuba in a state of comparative calm while 
their bands were spreading west and attacking the 
Spanish garrisons. One of these assaults was on the 
fort of Cascarro, in Puerto Principe, which was made 
notable by the heroic defence of the Spanish soldiers. 

As the insurrection developed in intensity, the penin- 
sular classes in the island were alarmed and disgusted 
by rumors that a peace had been agreed upon with 
autonomy as a basis. The rumors were without foun- 
dation. The Autonomists were in eclipse with both 
insurgents and the Madrid Cabinet. Gomez crossed 
the Jiicaro-Moron trocha with a force of 1,200 or 1,500 
mounted Camagiieyans on the 30th of October. This 
trocha or trench runs from coast to coast a few miles 
east of the Santa Clara line, and is known as the rail- 
road trocha. It was established and maintained during 
the Ten- Years' war, and was again garrisoned as soon 
as the insurrection broke out. Gomez circled from 
Sancti Spiritus, in the southeastern part of Santa Clara, 
to the northwest, in the direction of Remedios, like a 
hawk. He reduced several small forts and released the 
Spanish soldiers who were taken prisoners. During 

November his forces fought with the Spanish troops at 

35 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

Manacas, Eio Grande, Covadanga, and other villages or 
sugar plantations. Later be moved eastward again 
and formed a junction with Maceo, who had advanced 
from Santiago province through Puerto Principe, meet- 
ing little resistance. They attacked a Spanish convoy 
under General Segura at Iguara, and, though having 
a superior force, were repulsed. Maceo crossed the 
Moron trocha on December 10th at Ciego de Avila, its 
central point. 

The march to the Occident, the western invasion, 
was begun. Las Villas — Santa Clara province — was 
the basis of military operations for this irregular in- 
surgent army which had mysterially mobilized itself. 
General Campos and his military advisers had foreseen 
the danger in that region, which was tremulous with 
the enthusiasm of revolution. They had also seen the 
signs in Matanzas and even in the provinces of Habana 
and Pinar del Eio. If the insurrection made headway 
in las Villas they knew they would have to combat more 
than spasmodic outbreaks in the west. General Cam- 
pos took command in person in Santa Clara, with his 
headquarters at Cienfuegos. In that central section of 
the island he had not fewer than 20,000 troops. Go- 
mez and Maceo divided their bands, and the Santiago 
negro farmer Quintin Banderas, who had developed 
capacity for getting small parties over the country with 
marvellous rapidity, baited the Spanish columns. On 
the 15th of December was fought the battle of Mai 
Tiempo. It was one of the genuine combats of the 
insurrection, though the number of men engaged in it 
was not large. Mai Tiempo was a village thirty miles 
northwest of Cienfuegos. Gomez and Maceo watched 

36 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

the engagement and directed it. Part of their forces 
harassed the Canaries and the Bailen battalions when 
the Spanish columns were marching through the brush, 
and galled them with a musketry fire. In the open 
road a party of insurgents, armed with machetes, fell 
upon a company of the Bailen battalion and annihilated 
it. This assault gave the machete a terror to the Span- 
ish troops. In the previous brushes with the insur- 
gents they had learned something of its effectiveness at 
close quarters, but the annihilation of the entire com- 
pany was to them a frightful revelation of its possibili- 
ties. The machete was more dangerous than the Span- 
ish shortsword, possibly because the insurgents who 
wielded it had trained their right arms to its use in 
cutting cane on the sugar plantations. Many of them 
served through the insurrection without possessing fire- 
arms. The weapon was used in other engagements, 
yet the machete charges by battalions of insurgents 
of which vivid accounts were related were rare in the 
actual warfare. 

Gomez and Maceo advanced northwest through Santa 
Clara to Matanzas province. Their movements were 
aided by a troop of insurgents under General Lacret 
Morlot, who constantly diverted the attention of the 
enemy. General Campos sought to throw his columns 
in a living trocha along the line to intercept them. He 
could not overtake them with his troops that were scat- 
tered through las Villas. Those in Habana and Matan- 
zas provinces were his trust, and they were moved 
quickly eastward. Experienced generals — Prats, 
Luque, and Suarez Valdes — were at their head. The 

insurgent leaders misled and evaded the Spanish gen- 

37 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

erals. Their forces, partly mounted, appeared unex- 
pectedly in the neighborhood of Colon on the railroad 
in the eastern part of Matanzas province. Blazing cane- 
fields announced their presence. The Spanish troops, 
including the battalion of the Asturias, were saved from 
rout in the encounters on the sugar plantations only by 
bringing up their artillery, which consisted of several 
field-pieces. The insurgents retired along the road 
eastward towards the town of Santo Domingo. General 
Campos himself was at the head of the column on the 
road between Cimarrones and Jovellanos which it was 
supposed the insurgents were following ; but Gomez ap- 
peared in the hamlet of Eoque, closer to Colon. The 
insurgents had outwitted the Captain-General. Three 
groups or parties were moving for a junction in the 
hamlet of Coliseo. One was under General Emilio 
Nunez, one to the north under Maceo, and the forces 
of Gomez to the south and east. They entered Coli- 
seo and destroyed it. Campos encountered them in 
the adjacent sugar plantation of Audaz. The insur- 
gents had their lines resting along the base of the hills 
in front and in the manigua, or chapparal, flanking the 
Spanish troops. They barred the advance of the col- 
umns and harassed the rear-guard. General Campos 
himself, for the second time— the first had been at 
Peralejo — was in danger of losing his life. His adju- 
tant by his side was wounded. Night came on and 
stopped the engagement. Before morning the insur- 
gents had disappeared. They retired eastward towards 
the village of Jaguey Grande, as if retreating to Villa 
Clara. 

At Jaguey, Gomez and Maceo reviewed their forces. 

38 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

The Spanish, officers at the time said that they had in 
all 10,000 men. Later the insurgents declared that 
their force was larger, but the statement was made for 
effect. The Spanish troops in active service in Cuba 
at this time were in excess of 100,000. From March 
to December 79,500 had been embarked from the pen- 
insula ; the regulars previously on the island had been 
sent to the field, and their numbers had been aug- 
mented by the volunteers and the local guerillas. 
Figures published in the Habana newspapers in the 
last days of December, 1895, placed the full number of 
the Spanish forces, active and in reserve, at 189,000. 
This included the whole body of volunteers, 63,000 ; but 
they were largely a reserve force, and did not go out of 
the cities and towns. While the insurgents had been 
marching across the country the harbor of Habana had 
been filled with transports disembarking the soldiers 
from the peninsula. General Luis Pando, next in 
rank to Campos, had arrived and had taken command 
in Santiago de Cuba. General Pando was supposed 
to have talents as a politician which would be service- 
able in dealing with the insurgent leaders in the Ori- 
ente. The sugar plantations there were also aflame, and 
sharp combats between the troops and small bands of 
elusive rebels were of common occurrence. 

The Captain-General returned to Habana, where it 
was felt that he had suffered defeat. He found it nec- 
essary to meet the movement that was arising against 
him for his ill success in checking the spread of the 
insurrection. The Autonomists proposed a political 
manifestation to show that bad fortune had not caused 

Campos to lose the confidence of the country. The 

39 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Reformists joined it, hesitating and doubtful. The 
Union Constitutionals held back. They were full of 
resentment towards the Captain-General, yet were not 
quite ready for a public rupture. Out of the divided 
opinions among themselves it was finally agreed that 
they should take part in the demonstration. Their 
spokesman was Santos Guzman, a violent intransigente. 
He referred dubiously to the circumstances, difficult, 
as it seemed, in which the country was laboring, but 
promised the loyal co-operation of the Union Constitu- 
tionals. Rafael Montoro spoke for the Autonomists, 
pledging their continued support. A word was also 
said for the Reformists. General Campos, in respond- 
ing, felicitated himself on the consoling union of the 
three parties. He had thought of resigning, he said, 
because of the apparent lack of unanimity in public 
sentiment in supporting him ; but with these evidences 
of approval he would reorganize the military operations, 
and so long as all parties continued to honor him with 
their confidence he would not separate himself from the 
island. The clouds were lowering over the head of the 
pacificator, yet his feet were still on firm earth. The 
demonstration for the moment quieted the distrust and 
the growing movement, which was in reality a political 
conspiracy, to demand his recall. 

The insurgents burned their way southwest through 
the province of Matanzas. They entered Habana prov- 
ince with a pillar of fire by night and black clouds by 
day. Gomez had said in his address to the Cuban 
people that Spain would never yield the island while it 
was worth possessing. He was showing how it might 

be rendered not worth possessing. "Various military 

40 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

proclamations by him had signalized the destruction of 
the sugar crop as the surest means of crippling Spain's 
resources. Nightly the skies were lit up by the blazing 
cane-fields. Tall chimneys in the centre of gaping, 
scorched plains were all that was left of the great cen- 
trales or sugar mills. Blackened walls were all that 
told of country villas. In the villages and towns the 
ruins were all that remained of fine residences and sub- 
stantial buildings. The destruction was not wanton. 
The insurgents did not riot in it. It was in pursuance 
of Gomez' campaign against property. They did not 
seek to take human lives. They released Spanish pris- 
oners when captured, and in their successful march were 
always merciful to the small garrisons that were re- 
duced. In regular fighting they would have been over- 
matched and in time their small numbers would have 
been exterminated. So they applied the most advanced 
principles of modern warfare by systematic and remorse- 
less destruction of property. It was also said that one 
purpose of Gomez was to force the plantation workers 
to join the insurrection by taking away their means of 
livelihood. Such a course was not necessary. The 
plantation hands flocked to the insurrection voluntarily, 
almost spontaneously. Later General Weyler was also 
to inaugurate a campaign of property destruction and to 
dispute the mastery of the scorched and barren wastes 
with Gomez. But in the beginning it was the insur- 
gents under Gomez and Maceo who made the trail of 
fire from Villa Clara to Pinar del Rio. 

Martial law was proclaimed in the provinces of Ha- 
bana and Pinar del Rio as a tardy New Year's greeting 
on January 2d, 1896. The whole island was therefore 

41 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

officially recognized as in a state of siege. The mili- 
tary operations of the Spanish troops in the western 
regions were paralyzed. The vanguard of Gomez ad- 
vanced to Marianao, within ten miles of Habana. The 
insurgents occupied Punta Brava, Hoyo Colorado, and 
other towns in the vicinity. Cane-fields were burned, 
railroad stations destroyed, trains given to the flames, 
tracks torn up, and bridges dynamited. The railroads 
running out of the city ceased to operate their trains. 

Habana was in tremor and turmoil. Though troops 
had been disembarking by tens of thousands, it felt 
itself defenceless. Though its fortifications and de- 
fences, properly garrisoned, could hold out, as was later 
boasted, against an invading army of 100,000 American 
soldiers, the community recoiled before a few thousand 
half -armed insurgents. Panic stalked its streets. The 
military authorities were overwhelmed with the pleas 
to protect the city and its people. To calm the per- 
turbed public mind, show that the defences were suffi- 
cient and the army authorities alert, General Arderius, 
chief of the general staff, issued an order.* This was 
one of the most remarkable documents of the insurrec- 
tion. It reprobated the cowardly insurgents for flying 
from every encounter with the valiant troops, but in 
order to guarantee absolute tranquillity gave an account 
of the measures of protection. The signal of alarm, 
this military manifesto said, would be five consecutive 
cannon discharges from the Castillo del Principe and 
the raising of the flag on that fort by day, or a streamer 
under the flag on holidays. By night the signal would 
be a red light on the flag-pole. This red light would 

*The full text may be found in "Cr6nicas de la Guerra" for 1890. 

43 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

be displayed also by the other forts when tliey saw the 
signal from Castillo del Principe. Minute directions 
were given to avoid false signals. The true signal once 
given — that is, the cannon discharges and the floating 
flag or the red light — the various bodies of troops would 
form in designated places. A caution was enjoined 
against allowing the cornets to be played while the 
troops were concentrating. Full instructions for the 
army formations followed. They filled several pages. 

The public alarm was increased instead of being 
calmed by this official proclamation. Castillo del 
Principe commands the highest hill in the environs 
of Habana. It did not come about that the flag was 
raised on its standard and the five consecutive cannon 
discharges made, yet the inhabitants of the city shiv- 
ered for days and nights awaiting that signal. Habana 
had passed through the Ten- Years' war without hearing 
the echo of a musket discharge from the insurgents in 
the Oriente. The difference between the two insurrec- 
tions in their ultimate probabilities is shown by the 
necessity of giving publicity to the cannon signal. It 
recalled the measures against English attack one hun- 
dred and thirty-four years earlier. Gomez knew where 
to let the demonstration stop. He never had the pur- 
pose of entering within the garrisoned outposts of the 
city. Yet he did enter the town of Bejucal, only fif- 
teen miles south, burned many of its buildings, and 
spread terror to the great city northward. Two or 
three days later in Bejucal again he successfully com- 
bated and evaded the Spanish troops under Generals 
Linares and Suarez Valdes. For a time thereafter he 

operated on the south coast. 

43 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Maceo and Gomez had divided their followers in 
pursuance of a specific plan. Maceo was pushing on to 
the west, not seeking to avoid the Spanish troops at 
some places, and at others carefully evading them. 
While Gomez was terrorizing Habana, Maceo entered 
the province of Pinar del Rio. He had a sharp skir- 
mish at the town of Guanajay, near the north coast, 
with the Spanish troops under General Prats. He 
ranged through the rich tobacco regions of the Yuelta 
Abajo as he had done in the sugar lands of Santa Clara 
and Matanzas. Constantly the insurgent forces were 
augmented by small parties of recruits. Never before 
had Pinar del Rio been in either secret or open rebel- 
lion. Now it blazed with revolt. Maceo carried his 
standard to the extreme western end of the island. 
During the last week of January he entered the town 
of Pinar del Rio and held it for a few hours. The fol- 
lowing day he fought a pitched battle on the adjacent 
hills of Taironas, in which, notwithstanding the Span- 
ish accounts, he could claim a victory, for it crowned 
his purpose. Maceo then turned and led his forces 
towards the eastern end of the province. On the 6th of 
February he attacked the railroad town of Candaleria 
and besieged it for twenty-six hours. The Spanish 
troops, the Volunteers, made a brave defence and Maceo 
retired. He next occupied the village of Paso Real. 
Another genuine battle was fought on the calzada, or 
highway, leading from this town. The Spanish troops 
under General Luque had both artillery and cavalry. 
The artillery was employed with some effect. The 
insurgents also had cavalry, and it was here as at Mai 
Tiempo that a genuine machete charge was made. The 

44 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

insurgent horsemen, according to the story of the Span- 
ish soldiers, bore down upon their columns in a cres- 
cent with such impetuosity that they were forced back. 
Finally the Spanish troops were rallied and made a 
successful stand. The fighting lasted several hours. 
Maceo led his followers in many charges. The losses 
on each side were nearly equal — possibly 100 killed and 
200 or 300 wounded. 

Thereafter Maceo ranged through the southern part 
of Habana province. He encountered the Spaniards at 
Artemisa. A week later General Linares attacked him 
unsuccessfully near Gitines. For a fortnight he moved 
back and forth through the southern part of Matan- 
zas. Later he returned to Pinar del Rio. For eight 
months he combated, in the western part of the island, 
the heavy reinforcements which General Weyler threw 
into that section. The trocha running across the nar- 
rowest neck from Mariel on the north to the south coast 
had been constructed in the mean time. Maceo crossed 
it in December with a small band, and with the sup- 
posed purpose of moving eastward to las Villas. He 
was killed in an encounter with the Spanish troops on 
the morning of December 7th, 1896, at a point in the 
woods four miles from Punta Brava, within fifteen 
miles of Habana. The weight of evidence is that it was 
a chance encounter, and not a betrayal or an ambush. 

Maceo 's real work was completed ten months before 
his death, when he massed his troops for the struggle 
on the hills of Taironas. He had brought most of them 
six hundred miles across the country. Some of his offi- 
cers declare that he had 11,000 men with him when he 

swept around Habana and into the province of Pinar 

45 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

del Eio. This march sometimes has been described as 
a mere raid. Students of military campaigning who fol- 
low its course and who examine the number and the 
disposition of the Spanish troops will give it a higher 
rank. It was in verity an invasion. Spanish officers 
in the later times showed with pride the decorations 
which were conferred upon them for engagements with 
the insurgents under Maceo's command. To have en- 
gaged the mulatto chieftain in combat was a title to 
distinction. The glory of the full execution of the 
western invasion is to Maceo, yet its conception is to 
the grizzled chief of two revolutions. Gomez planned 
it. The success of his plans nationalized the insurrec- 
tion and broke the military power of Spain in Cuba. 



46 



CHAPTER III 

Campos and Weyler 

Climax of Conspiracy Against Campos — Madrid Accepts Resigna- 
tion — Campos' Prophecy of Spain Losing Dominion — Gomez in 
Sight at the Departure — Two Men Who Understood Each Other — 
Arrival of Weyler — Welcome by Spanish Classes — End of Policy 
of Moral Agencies — Culmination of Fighting Period of the In- 
surrection — Issue of First Concentration Decree — Prison Camps 
for Pacificos— Failure of Weyler's Military Operations— Atti- 
tude of American People — Policy of the Cleveland Administra- 
tion — Abuse of Naturalization Laws — Consul-General Fitzhugh 
Lee's Reports — Inauguration of McKinley — Changed Attitude of 
Spain— Visit of Special Commissioner Calhoun to Cuba — Assas- 
sination of Canovas — Sagasta Ministry Proposes Autonomy. 

Columbus piloted the standard of Spain to Cuba. 
Martinez Campos bore it back. He was not the last of 
the Captain-Generals, but when he yielded his charge 
and withdrew from the island Spain's sovereignty in 
the Antilles was ended. Thereafter what was main- 
tained was the figment of power. The fate of her 
dominion was sealed. 

It was during Christmas week that the movement of 
the Spanish politicians in Habana against Campos was 
temporarily checked. Within a fortnight it was blazing 
forth. It had a degree of popular discontent among the 
Spanish classes to strengthen it. Yet the discontent 
was not universal. The Habana Volunteers, who dur- 

47 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

ing the Ten- Years' war had dominated Captain-Generals 
and had speeded their departure from the island, were 
not antagonistic to Campos. They were not the same 
aggressive organization that they had been during the 
previous period of insurrection, though they retained 
the strength of armed organization and of unwavering 
loyalty to Spain. The Spanish Casino, which was con- 
trolled by the higher classes of Spaniards and which 
was still a potent influence, was not more hostile to 
Campos than it had been to other Captain-Generals. 
The first move did not come from them. The Reform- 
ists were the opportunists of Cuban politics. They had 
advocated reforms and had upheld Campos. But they 
were weathercocks as well as opportunists. When the op- 
position began to develop strength the Reformists turned 
against the Captain-General. Their newspapers were 
filled with articles inculcating distrust and calling the 
situation an insupportable one. The Union Constitu- 
tionals also became open in their demands for a change 
in policy and in men to carry out policies. Madrid 
was deluged with telegrams of a disquieting nature. 

General Campos met the emergency like a soldier. 
He convoked the chiefs or leaders of the three parties in 
the palace of the Governor-General. Then he demanded 
to know the meaning of recent affairs. Santos Guzman, 
the Andalusian who three weeks before had promised 
hearty and loyal support, was again the spokesman of 
the Union Constitutionals. He declared that the party 
was not in conformity with the policy of Campos. The 
Reformist spokesman echoed the same sentiment. The 
Autonomists, faithful among the faithless, renewed their 
adhesion. General Campos said that he was only a sol- 

48 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

dier, and that if he had lost the confidence of the ele- 
ments whose union was necessary he would not remain. 
He sent a message to Cdnovas in Madrid, giving the 
result of the conference, and adding that the Autono- 
mists believed the policy he had followed should be con- 
tinued. 

The night of January 17th, 1896, it was known in 
Habana that Madrid had yielded and that the resigna- 
tion of Campos had been presented and accepted. Gen- 
eral SaMs Marin was named his successor temporarily. 
General Campos, in turning over his office to General 
Marin, made an address in which he said that the pub- 
lic opinion against concessions to the enemy, such as he 
had made, existed, but was unfounded. In the Ten- 
Years' war he had caused the rebels to be executed and 
they had retaliated in like manner. Now they were 
following a different course. They wished to raise the 
structure of independence on the ruins of the country. 
They burned and destroyed, but they did not harm the 
Spanish soldiers. They released prisoners and cared 
for the wounded. Therefore a different means was 
necessary to combat the present war. He had caused 
chiefs of the insurrection to be shot, and others to be 
condemned to perpetual chains, but it was because they 
had been taken in the acts of incendiarism. 

General Campos also spoke of the demands on Madrid 
for his recall as though they had not been spontaneous. 
He issued a brief and dignified farewell to the army. 
After he ceased to be Governor-General he talked to the 
Habana journalists of the political conspiracy which 
had made it necessary for him to retire. The traitor- 
ship of the Union Constitutionals and Reformists, he 
4 49 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

declared, was the cause, and lie spoke with bitterness 
of the domineering caprice of certain classes. Of Cuba 
he declared that which had happened would not have 
happened if it had been treated as a province of the 
peninsula. He uttered the warning that if the system 
were not changed it would confirm once more the his- 
toric apothegm, that Spain had lost dominion of Amer- 
ica through the fault of the Spaniards. Prophetic 
words were these. General Campos sailed on January 
20th. As he was about to embark he said to those who 
bade him farewell: "My successor will fail as I have 
failed." He dictated a message to the Madrid Cabinet, 
in which he said he had not known how to content all 
parties, although they had not been just. This was 
another way of saying that the Spanish classes in Cuba 
had driven him from power and must accept the respon- 
sibility of subduing the insurrection after their own 
manner. On his arrival in Coruiia, General Campos 
maintained silence in response to popular demonstra- 
tions. General Lanchez Bregua, his military friend and 
voyage companion, said if he would speak his thoughts 
they would be that on par with vigorous military action 
must be guarantees of administrative and political re- 
forms, even to autonomy. 

The day on which General Campos embarked from 
Habana, Maximo Gomez with his insurgent followers 
was encamped on the hills of Lajas on the road to the 
plain of Giiines, almost within sight of the city. It is 
said that persons in Habana scanning the surrounding 
country from their housetops with strong glasses were 
able to see the camp of Gomez. The insurgents knew 
that Campos was leaving. If ever two men understood 

50 



TO-MOEROW IN CUBA 

each other, they were Maximo Gomez and Martinez 
Campos ; and if ever two men knew Cuba and the Cu- 
bans, they were the ones. They had arranged the pact 
of El Zanjon. Gomez had retired to Santo Domingo; 
and Campos had returned to Spain, vainly to strive to 
implant the reforms and even the principles of political 
liberty which were the basis of that pledge. None 
knew better than he how shameful had been the betrayal 
and how complete the failure of the reforms. Knowing 
that, he could appreciate the intensity of the feeling 
which animated the Cubans. He also grasped the new 
plan of campaign which Gomez inaugurated in this in- 
surrection. He knew that the Spanish intransigentes 
had no conception of its scope and possibilities, and 
that they would beat against it hopelessly . Gomez, on 
his part, knew that the recall of Campos ended the pos- 
sibility that the Cubans would be seduced from the in- 
surrection by conciliatory methods. He knew that the 
first acts of the intransigente authority, when it should 
be free to act, would be in the line of greater rigor and 
blinder folly. The Union Constitutionals thought the 
recall of Campos was their triumph. They could not 
perceive that it was a victory for Maximo Gomez and 
Antonio Maceo. 

General Valeriano Weyler, marquis of Tenerife, was 
appointed the successor to Campos. After an interval 
of a few weeks he arrived and relieved General Marin. 
The Spanish classes welcomed him with real enthu- 
siasm. They had an inspiration of what his coming 
meant. Madrid had heeded their demands. The de- 
pendence on moral agencies to combat the insurrection, 

the policy of conciliation and attraction which Campos 

51 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

had sought to employ, would cease. In its place would 
come rigorous and relentless action against the Cubans. 
A score of years had not blotted out the memory of the 
new Captain-General's record in Cuba when he was first 
the Colonel and then the Brigadier Weyler, and always 
the Butcher. The veterans of the Ten- Years' war re- 
membered engagements between him and Gomez. The 
insurgents' welcome was an attack on the town of Mana- 
gua, fifteen miles from Habana, and a raid to the gates 
of the city. 

It might almost be said that armed revolution ceased 
with the departure of Campos, though actually there 
was some vigorous fighting after Weyler took command. 
But the Cubans had put forth their supreme fighting 
ability in the first fifteen months. They could not sur- 
pass those efforts, nor could they expect to continue 
them on the same scale. They had spread revolution 
in every province and in every hamlet of the island. 
Now their aim was to keep the insurrection alive until 
Spain yielded, because Cuba was not worth the sacrifice 
of blood and money which it was costing the peninsula, 
or until the United States intervened. The recognition 
of belligerency would have been grateful to them, but it 
was of small consequence how the United States came 
into the struggle, provided it could be actually drawn in. 

After the recall of Campos, the insurrection gained 
absolutely the support of the middle-class Cubans. 
Though sharing the aspirations of their people for po- 
litical liberty, they were not certain it con Id be achieved 
by fire and musket against the superior forces of Spain, 
and they were doubtful of the ability of their people to 
maintain an independent government. Autonomy under 

52 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

Campos would have held a portion of them to Spanish 
authority. Under Weyler they all became revolution- 
ists, and the insurgent juntas in the towns and cities 
were strengthened by their accession. 

General Weyler began by publishing the usual ban- 
dos, offering amnesty to the insurgents who presented 
themselves and sought pardon. The first concentration 
decree was issued within a week after his coming. The 
story of the reconcentration fits into the last chapter of 
Spain's efforts to subdue the insurrection. It was the 
belief in Cuba that the plan was conceived by Cdnovas 
del Castillo, and that Weyler was merely the instru- 
ment. Many circumstances supported this view; but 
the instrument was a willing one, and Philip II. had 
no more faithful servant in the Duke of Alva than the 
relentless Premier of Spain had in General Valeriano 
Weyler. 

Of the concentration itself, a paragraph will suffice 
to tell the story. It was a thorough military measure, 
but it failed to accomplish military results. And it did 
not recognize the principles of civilized warfare which 
require that prisoners shall be fed. The country peo- 
ple — the pacificos — were shut up in prison camps. Often 
they were herded in settlements enclosed within stock- 
ades or trenches, with forts commanding every approach 
and troops on guard. When they were permitted to 
wander in the larger towns the bounds were still set by 
military lines which kept them within the prison camp. 
No system of issuing rations to them was ever carried 
out. They were left to live on the charity of the beg- 
gared communities in which they were herded. Spain 

did not recognize the principle of humanity in its treat- 

53 



TO-MOBROW IN CUBA 

merit of the pacificos — the women and children, the non- 
combatants who were made prisoners by Weyler' s de- 
crees. That was the essence of it all. No apologists 
could ever alter this fact, and the defenders of military 
measures could not defend this enforced starvation. 
But famine did not conquer and could not conquer 
insurrection, though in time it would have exterminated 
the non-combatant portion of the rural population. Con- 
centration was the confession of Spain that it could only 
keep the island without the people. 

When General Weyler arrived, Spain had poured 
117,000 troops into Cuba. The Canovas ministry con- 
tinued to send him recruits. His military operations 
were active. Since the insurgents had carried the re- 
bellion to the western end of the island, he sought to 
isolate it and partition it. The building of the trocha 
from Mariel to Artemisa was one measure. It was not 
a difficult feat of military engineering to dig ditches 
along either side of the highway, garrison them with 
forts and barracks at short intervals, and to unroll 
barbed-wire fencing on either side. That was the 
trocha. 

General Weyler, in the beginning, threw most of his 
reinforcements into the province of Pinar del Bio. 
After the death of Maceo he moved heavy battalions 
into the interior, into Santa Clara. That section had 
now become the centre of Gomez' operations. After 
various encounters with the Spanish troops, Gomez 
retired to the heart of Yilla Clara, and from there he 
directed the scattered forces of the insurgents. The 
time for opposing the Spanish troops by open en- 
counters was past, and Gomez himself never intended 

54 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

that they should meet in battle. He rarely had with 
him 500 men, but he kept the insurgent troops moving 
in small bands in pursuance of a general plan. In San- 
tiago province it might be said that the war was waged 
on an independent basis, and there was occasional fight- 
ing even to the time of the invasion of the province by 
the American army. General Calixto Garcia, after being 
wrecked on the Hawkins filibustering expedition, had 
reached the island, and after Maceo's death he became 
next in command to Gomez. He conducted all the 
operations of the insurgents in the Oriente. 

The arrival of General Weyler in Cuba was almost 
simultaneous with the knowledge in the United States 
that a real war was waging. Lack of geographical 
knowledge and lack of consecutive news had caused the 
insurrection as an armed movement to be minimized. 
Practically nothing was known of what the Western 
Invasion had been, and in truth not much is known to 
this day. When the American people came to interest 
themselves in the fighting there was simply bushwhack- 
ing, guerilla warfare, and it never changed its character. 
The Spaniards continued to complain of the insurgents 
because they would not come out of the manigua into 
the open as though the affair were a knightly tourna- 
ment of the olden times. The insurgents were neither 
Don Quixotes nor crusaders. They'were perhaps a half 
rabble, and most of them were barefooted and shirtless. 
But they knew how to prevent the pacification of Cuba, 
and Weyler never pacified it. He destroyed property 
as the insurgents had done, and he made desolate what 
they, by chance or by policy, had left green. He 
cleared the country by fire, left staring walls as monu- 

55 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

ments to his military thoroughness, left standing the 
bare bamboo-poles which, when thatched, had been the 
bohios or dwelling-huts of the pacificos, and crowned 
every hilltop with a fortina. But neither by his mili- 
tary operations nor by his reconcentration as a military 
measure did he end the insurrection. After eighteen 
months his failure was more conspicuous than had been 
that of Campos. 

In the States the insurrection had received popular 
sympathy from the outset. It was little understood in 
its details. Enough was known of Spanish rule and 
Spanish character and of the history of Cuba to satisfy 
the public mind that the revolt was a just one. This 
popular sentiment was at first apathetic. Genuine re- 
forms, honestly applied, might have restrained it with- 
in bounds. No genuine reforms were honestly ap- 
plied, and the sentiment of sympathy grew. President 
Cleveland, in hi3 message of December, 1896, without 
asserting specifically the Monroe Doctrine, asserted 
the right of the United States to intervene in stated 
circumstances. Previous to that the proffer of the 
good offices of his administration to Spain in bring- 
ing peace to Cuba by helping to establish a system of 
autonomy had been rejected proudly and scornfully. 
Spain would subdue her rebellious subjects without the 
good offices of a friendly nation and without conceding 
a form of local self-government that would remove the 
basic grievances. Mr. Cleveland's message was a re- 
statement of the historic position of the United States 
with regard to Cuba. It was John Qnincy Adams 
speaking again. The message was a declaration of 
ultimate war between the two countries, and this was 

56 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

recognized more clearly in Madrid than in Washington. 
Mr. Cleveland, while ignoring the resolutions of Con- 
gress recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents, 
asserted the right of interference, but apparently he did 
not contemplate its exercise. 

But policy must sometimes give way to event. Mr. 
Olney, as Secretary of State, defiantly fought the For- 
eign Relations committee of the Senate when that com- 
mittee reported the Cameron resolution recognizing 
the independence of Cuba. The eclat of this antagon- 
ism may have afforded personal gratification to the 
Secretary of State, yet its purpose was a public one. 
This was to assure Spain and the world that the United 
States had no intention of involving itself in war over 
Cuba. The contemptuous term of Senatorial jingoism 
was thought to be sufficient to quiet all apprehension. 
It might have been sufficient had not other causes been 
working. Spain felt that she had a righteous grievance 
against American citizens who were either engaged in 
aiding the insurrection or who were suspected of aid- 
ing it. 

The impartial historian must admit that in the inter- 
national sense the naturalization laws of the United 
States were grossly abused. American citizenship in 
Cuba, as a lump or as a mass, was something to cause 
the republic to blush. But the United States having 
thrown the mantle of its citizenship over this mass, 
could not shame itself before the world by denying pro- 
tection to those who could lawfully claim the shelter of 
its flag. The State Department, under the direction of 
Secretary Olney, did the best it could to discourage 

recognition of this class of citizens. In doing so it 

57 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

clouded the rights of all American citizens in Cuba. 
The Spanish authorities under "Weyler became as intol- 
erant as they had been during the Ten- Years' war, 
which had culminated in the butchery of the Virginius 
prisoners. The forbearance and indifference of the 
State Department led them to the presumption that 
American citizens could be treated as Spanish subjects 
were treated. Suspicion was allowed to take the place 
of evidence. Treaty rights were ignored. President 
Cleveland and Secretary Olney were not willing to go to 
war in order to enforce the American construction of 
the Cushinp- protocol to the treaty of 1795. 

The jfeatment of American citizens by the Spanish 
v^Hoiais continued with a high hand until an untoward 
event brought the climax. General Fitzhugh Lee, of 
Virginia, had been selected by President Cleveland for 
the delicate position of consul-general to Cuba. One 
avowed purpose in his selection was to enable the 
administration to have the benefit of the presence of 
an experienced military observer. It was not publicly 
stated that he was to report on the military situation, 
but in time it became known that he credited the insur- 
gents with a strength in the field and in reserve of 
50,000 men. 

The correctness or incorrectness of this numerical 
estimate was not a vital question. The significant 
feature of the consul-general's reports was the reit- 
erated statement that Spain was making no real prog- 
ress in subduing insurrection. The purport of these 
communications may have been known to Madrid and 
to the Spanish authorities in Habana. The actions of 

the latter showed resentment towards the consul-gen- 

58 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

eral. His own Government was not upholding him with 
the vigor which he thought was due to his official posi- 
tion. The culmination in his relations with the Spanish 
officials came in the death in the jail at Guanabacoa, 
across the bay from Habana, of Dr. Ricardo Ruiz. Dr. 
Ruiz was a dentist who had been educated in Philadel- 
phia, had been naturalized as an American citizen, and 
had returned to Cuba to practise his profession. There 
was less ground to distrust his good faith in becoming 
a citizen of the United States than existed in the major- 
ity of cases. His character was excellent. In January, 
1897, some insurgents under Nestor Aranguren stopped 
a train on which Spanish officials were returning to Ha- 
bana, made a prisoner of the paymaster, but released 
the officers. It was one of the demonstrations which 
the insurgents were in the habit of making in order to 
show their contempt for the pacification of the province 
by the Spanish troops. Dr. Ruiz was arrested for 
alleged complicity in this affair. He was thrown into 
jail and kept incomunicado as prescribed by Spanish 
practice. The first information the consul-general had 
of the military arrest and imprisonment of this Ameri- 
can citizen was when the news came that he had been 
murdered by his jailers. Whether Dr. Ruiz was actually 
murdered or whether he was driven to madness and beat 
his brains out against the walls of his cell has never 
been satisfactorily determined. 

In its bearing on the relations of Spain and the United 
States the incident was reduced to the fact that Dr. Ruiz 
was dead in circumstances which created great popular 
indignation in the United States and fixed public at- 
tention afresh on what was happening in Cuba. The 

59 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Cuban question was in suspension during the brief 
remainder of Mr. Cleveland's term. The reasons which 
actuated Mr. Cleveland's policy were unquestionably 
patriotic, but in its historic aspect only one conclusion 
can be reached. By his administration Spain was given 
every opportunity and every aid towards putting down 
the insurrection. Her sensibilities were respected to 
the point of withdrawing American war-vessels from 
West Indian waters and keeping them withdrawn. The 
consuls of the United States in Cuba who began mak- 
ing reports on the actual conditions, including the first 
death-fruits of the reconcentration, were ignored and 
discredited by their own Government. That weakened 
them with the Government to which they were accred- 
ited. The State Department forbore to press the treaty 
rights of American citizens. That forbearance was mis- 
understood. Passed into review, it may be said that 
during the Cleveland administration the attitude of the 
United States towards Spain, with reference to Cuba, 
was one of indulgence which was barren of results. 
The assertions of the right of intervention made in Mr. 
Cleveland's messages were barren because of the indul- 
gent attitude that preceded and followed them. His 
administration had done its best for Spain. It had 
done nothing for the United States in so far as would 
place the army and navy on a footing to carry out the 
right of intervention which Mr. Cleveland affirmed, and 
it had done nothing for Cuba. 

When Mr. McKinley was inaugurated, with his cus- 
tomary acute penetration of the popular sentiment he 
outlined a policy for his administration which served a 
twofold purpose ; it freed him from the embarrassment 

60 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

of specific declaration of intentions, and satisfied the 
unquiet public mind to await future developments. The 
protection to American citizens which he announced was 
a broad statement. Its application was narrow. It 
meant American citizens in Cuba. From the 4th of 
March, 1897, no consular representative of the United 
States in the Antilles lacked support in maintaining the 
rights of American citizenship. Nor were their reports 
of the conditions of the country discredited. 

The astute minister of Spain in the United States, 
Mr. Dupuy de Lome, was quick to grasp the situation. 
He saw that American popular sentiment might not 
become dangerous if it could be kept in certain chan- 
nels. Sympathy for the Cubans would not cause an 
American administration to be driven into war. When 
their own citizens were touched the prospect was 
changed. The irritation over these instances would 
cause a clamor which could not be brooked. Mr. Du- 
puy de Lome was able to present this fact so forcibly 
that Premier Canovas modified the arrogant stand his 
ministry had taken. General Weyler, who was plung- 
ing violently to a collision with the United States by 
his arbitrary actions, was checked. Thenceforth Ameri- 
can citizens in Cuba were given the fullest protection 
due them. This protection extended to some individ- 
uals of whose unworthiness as American citizens there 
could be no dispute ; but they had the shield of citizen- 
ship, and that could not be tarnished. 

Mr. McKinley followed this definite evidence of the 

administration policy with another step. The death of 

Dr. Ruiz called for investigation. Spain professed its 

willingness to co-operate with the United States in ascer- 

61 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

taining the truth. Judge William R. Day, the friend 
and neighbor of the President, was selected to go to 
Cuba, in a legal capacity, to aid Consul-General Lee in 
the investigation. Actually it was known that he would 
be also a special commissioner to gather information 
about the real conditions. Before the time set for his 
departure, Judge Day became Assistant Secretary of 
State, and Mr. William J. Calhoun, of Illinois, who 
also possessed the friendship and confidence of the 
President, was chosen for the Cuban inquiry. Mr. Cal- 
houn reached Habana in May. The Ruiz investigation 
followed the usual lines. One report was made to the 
Spanish Government exculpatory of the Spanish author- 
ities, one to the American Government, incriminatory. 
Mr. Calhoun did little travelling. It was said at the 
time that one trip to Matanzas, sixty miles distant from 
Habana, and a visit to the reconcentrado settlements 
there, sufficed him. His temperament was judicial and 
his actions judicious. He sifted all he saw and heard. 

Mr. Calhoun returned to Washington in June. His 
report to the President was a private and unofficial 
document. In a general way it was known that he 
indorsed the consuls as worthy of credence. He, too, 
saw the first death-fruits of reconcentration. He also 
gained information which negatived the claim that the 
insurrection was maintained by bandits and the lower 
classes of negroes. He got a passing glimpse of the 
degree to which it had spread among all classes of 
Cubans. Mr. Calhoun noted that General Weyler was 
not pacifying the island so that peace could be assured 
at any definite time in the future. His own conclusions 

were understood to be that Spain could not subdue the 

62 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

insurrection and that the insurgents of themselves could 
not end the power of the peninsula. At the period of 
Mr. Calhoun's visit another chapter in legislation for 
Cuba had been taken in Madrid. New reforms had 
been proposed by Canovas. They had not secured con- 
fidence in Cuba and General Weyler had not promul- 
gated them. They were never promulgated, and their 
analysis is not worth the while. While hints of Mr, 
Calhoun's confidential report appeared, they were only 
hints and could have no official standing. The answer 
from Madrid to these hints was an official statement to 
the Spanish minister in Washington that the Queen 
Eegent would retain the Canovas ministry and that 
General Weyler would not be recalled. 

General Stewart L. Woodford, of New York, had been 
appointed minister to Spain. It was known that his 
instructions contained urgent representations on the 
imperative need of Spain adopting a policy which 
would bring prompt amelioration in Cuba. Diplomacy 
covered the ultimatum with feathered phrases. Pro- 
voking delays in the arrival and the reception of the 
American minister followed his appointment. It was 
August when his credentials were presented. For a 
month Premier Canovas made no sign. Then the assas- 
sin ended his career. The most resolute enemy to colo- 
nial liberties that Spain had produced was no more. A 
temporary ministry was formed with General Azcarraga 
as Premier. It was a weak attempt to continue the 
conservative policies and traditions. With the further 
months allowed him General Weyler had made no visi- 
ble progress in pacifying the island. The irritation 

over the treatment of American citizens in Cuba was 

63 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

stilled, but the public feeling against Spaii. had not 
lessened. During this time the horrors of the recon- 
centration in Cuba were continued. The American 
people were slowly learning what it all meant. They 
had disbelieved at first, because it was incredible. 
When they believed and knew, their wrath was men- 
acing to the peace of two friendly nations. Moreover, 
timid commerce was beginning to demand that some- 
thing be done to end the situation which destroyed sub- 
stantially all trade between Cuba and the United States. 
The Queen Regent of Spain formed a new ministry 
with Praxades Sagasta at its head. As Liberal Premier 
during the previous terms of power he had never pro- 
posed self - government for Cuba. In the month of 
October, the year 1898, he proposed the experiment. 
Weyler was recalled and Ramon Blanco was appointed 
to succeed him. A complete system of autonomy for 
Cuba was outlined with the promise of its early enact- 
ment. All this came to Cuba not from a conviction 
which had caused the rulers of Spain, and of such frac- 
tion of the nation as had a voice in the Government, 
to change their policy into one of enlightened justice. 
Autonomy came from without, from the pressure ex- 
erted by the United States with diplomatic inflexibility 
on the Madrid Cabinet and the monarchy. The insur- 
gents of 1895 had not been able of their own strength to 
compel either autonomy or independence. They were 
strong enough to create and to continue a condition 
which was bound to cause the intervention of the United 
States. 



64 



CHAPTER IV 

Wooing the Lost Colony 

Olive Branch Brought by Blanco — A Cold Reception — Measures of 
Amnesty — Concentration Decrees Revoked — Interest in McKin- 
ley's Message — Analysis of Autonomous Decrees — Insular Par- 
liament and Its Powers — The Cabinet and the Council — Veto of 
Governor-General — Comparisons with Canada — Defects in the 
Light of Experience — System Accepted by a Remnant of Au- 
tonomist Party — Allocutions and Addresses — Adhesion of Re- 
formists — Opposition of Union Constitutionals — They Adopt 
the Retraimiento — Rejection of Policy by Cubans — Formation 
of Autonomist Cabinet — Its Personnel — Historic Oath-Taking 
Scene — Aspirations of the Past. 

Cuba was lost to Spain. It was lost when General 
Ramon Blanco came to the island with autonomy as 
a peace-offering to the armed revolutionists and their 
unarmed supporters. The task before him was to win 
the island back to its allegiance. Conciliation was to 
supersede concentration. Recourse was to be had once 
more to the moral agencies. 

The instrument of the new policy was a good repre- 
sentative of the better type of the soldier of Spain. 
Ramon Blanco had been Governor-General of Cuba 
from the beginning of 1879 until the end of 1881, suc- 
ceeding Martinez Campos. He had served in the Ten- 
Years' war as a colonel and had reached the rank of 

general. The period of his authority in the island was 
5 65 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

the era of mild agitation for autonomy. As Governor- 
General lie had tolerated the movement, but had never 
shown a leaning towards its principles. The first year 
of his administration had been marked by the guerra 
chiquita — the little war — in the province of Santiago de 
Cuba. He had stamped it out. Though he had shown 
the military spirit in dealing with political movements 
during his term of office, he had left no harsh and bitter 
memories. What was remembered of his rule awakened 
no feeling of resentment deeper than would have been 
felt for any former Captain-General. He was not 
odious to the Cuban people for any conspicuous act of 
tyranny. 

General Blanco arrived from Madrid in the early days 
of November. His welcome was not a generous one. 
The partisans of Weyler, the Spanish classes, were 
sullen. The Autonomists were waiting further informa- 
tion before committing themselves to the new adminis- 
tration. They were now a very small body, but were 
still respectable. The mass of the Cuban people were 
distrustful or indifferent. The community was be- 
numbed. It had no faith. When not critical it was 
cynical. The public was apathetic. The presence in 
Habana of the celebrated bull-fighter, Mazzantini, 
excited greater popular interest than the promise of 
autonomy. 

The acts of Captain-General Blanco were an earnest 
of the intentions of the Sagas ta ministry. The Official 
Gazette was filled with decrees modifying, suspending, 
or annulling previous decrees. On paper the reversal 
of the policy of Canovas and Weyler was complete. 
The reconcentration bandos were modified so as to per- 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

mit the reconcentrados to leave their prison camps 
within an extended zone of cultivation under the ap- 
proval of the local military authorities. At the time it 
was erroneously supposed that the decrees were abso- 
lutely revoked. The difference is not of historical 
moment. If there had been power enough in Spanish 
authority as personified in the Captain-General to 
enforce the modification of the reconcentration bandos, 
the world would not have known that they were not 
revoked in their entirety. 

Proclamations of amnesty to those in arms against 
Spanish sovereignty followed one another. The fullest 
pardon of past offences was offered on the sole condi- 
tion of those in arms laying down their arms and 
accepting the new regimen. Political prisoners who 
for real or suspected complicity in the crime of rebel- 
lion had been deported to the penal settlements of 
Ceuta, Chafarinas, and Fernando Po, or shut up in the 
prisons, were freed and returned to their homes. This 
release was not universal, for after the peace between 
the United States and Spain hundreds more of Cuban 
political prisoners in the penal settlements or in the 
prisons were released. Yet the amnesty was general 
enough to give proof that it was genuine. The military 
executions in the Laurel ditches at Cabana fortress 
ceased. After Blanco took command no Cuban patriot 
puffed his last cigarette, nodded to the spectators 
gathered on the hill above the fortress, and cried, "Viva 
Cuba libre ! " while awaiting the volley of the firing 
squad. 

The royal decree implanting autonomy in Cuba and 

Puerto Rico was affirmed by the Queen Regent in 

67 



TOMOBEOW IN CUBA 

Madrid on November 25th, 1897. The same day were 
affirmed the decrees establishing universal suffrage, the 
laws of political equality, and the adaptation of the 
electoral laws of Spain for the Antilles. The promul- 
gation of the decrees in Cuba was made by Captain- 
General Blanco when the official text was received in 
the early part of December. As the new system was 
enacted through the pressure of the United States, it 
was of momentous consequence to Spain and to Cuba 
to know what would be the position of the national 
administration. This position was shown in the mes- 
sage of President McKinley. Spain could not com- 
plain. Having tacitly acknowledged the right of the 
United States to dictate colonial reforms in the interest 
of humanity and of peaceful commerce, she could not 
object to the temperate language in which the executive 
statement outlined the American policy. The best con- 
struction was put by the President on the system as 
meeting the demands of the hour, and credit for good 
faith and sincere intentions was given in outlining or 
sketching the decrees. An argument meant for Con- 
gress and the country was made against the recognition 
of either the belligerency of the insurgents or the inde- 
pendence of the provisional government for which they 
claimed an existence. The balm for Spain was soft, 
and the ointment was sweet. Yet there was vinegar, 
too. The message in its strongest terms reaffirmed the 
paramount right of intervention by the United States. 

The administration of Mr. McKinley having given 
Spain the benefit of the assumption that the system was 
genuine colonial self-government and would end the con- 
ditions of chronic insurrection in Cuba, the examination 

68 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

of the system itself remains, as also its reception by the 
Cubans and the Spaniards in the island. The decree of 
November 25th provided that for the government and ad- 
ministration of Cuba and Puerto Eico respectively there 
should be an insular parliament divided into two cham- 
bers and a Governor-General, representative of the Me- 
tropolis, who should exercise in the name of Spain the 
supreme authority. The legislation of colonial affairs 
should be the function of the chambers concurrently 
with the Governor-General. The parliament should be 
composed of two bodies possessing equal powers — the 
Chamber or House of Representatives and the Council 
of Administration. The Council should consist of thirty- 
five members, of whom eighteen should be chosen after 
the manner prescribed by the electoral law, and seven- 
teen should be designated by the Crown through the 
nomination of the Governor-General. The Crown rep- 
resentatives should serve for life; the elective ones for 
five years, unless the Council should be dissolved. The 
members of the House or Chamber of Representatives 
should be chosen in the proportion of one to each twenty- 
five thousand inhabitants, and their term should be for 
five years. 

The legislative powers defined were substantially 
those of an insular assembly with reference to local 
affairs. The colonial parliament was to control the 
colonial budget. To the Cortes of Spain it was reserved 
to determine what were the obligatory expenses inher- 
ent in sovereignty and to fix the revenues necessary to 
cover them. Regarding foreign commerce — a root sub- 
ject, a fundamental necessity for genuine colonial home 

rule — whether the initiative negotiations came from the 

69 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

insular government or the central authority in Spain, 
delegates especially authorized by the colonial govern- 
ment were to participate in the negotiations. The 
treaties of commerce in which the insular government 
had not intervened were to be communicated to it in 
order that it might declare whether or not it adhered 
to the stipulations. The framing of the tariff of both 
import and export duties was conceded to the insular 
parliament. These were the cardinal provisions of the 
legislative powers. There were reservations. After 
the definition of the powers and functions of the parlia- 
ment, note the definition of the Governor-General's 
authority: "The supreme government of the colony 
shall be exercised by a Governor-General." He could 
suspend the constitutional guarantees and apply the 
Law of Public Order, which was martial law. He was 
to be the viceroy patronate, exercising the faculties 
inherent in the patronate of the Indies. He was to be 
commander of the army and the navy, the delegated 
representative of the ministries of state, war, navy, and 
colonies in Spain. All the authorities of the island 
were subordinated to him. He was responsible for the 
order and security of the colony. His veto power 
allowed him to suspend parliamentary legislation, refer- 
ring the veto to Madrid for confirmation or rejection. 

The cabinet was to consist of five members or secre- 
taries with portfolios and a president without portfolio. 
The secretaries could be members of either the Camara 
or the Council, could take part in the discussions of 
both bodies, and could vote in whichever body they 
held membership. They were responsible to the par- 
liament. The debt incurred in the Ten- Years' war and 

70 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

in the then existing insurrection was left subject to 
future adjustment. 

This system of colonial government proposed by 
Sagasta and drafted by Moret was a laborious effort to 
apply to the Spanish Antilles the autonomy of Canada 
as it could be learned from the books. In his expo- 
sition of the subject to the Queen Regent, Sagasta 
declared that the Autonomist constitution was not 
exotic, was neither copied nor imitated, yet the student 
will search in vain through the pages of Spanish 
national or colonial history for evidence that it was in- 
digenous. The system could not be analyzed merely 
from the written text. Its nature was to be gathered 
from the circumstances in which it was proposed. Its 
application and interpretation had to be in the light of 
past events. Experience with Spanish administration 
of previous reforms could not be overlooked. When 
the critical examination was finished, the conclusion 
was strong that Spanish statesmen did not know the 
meaning of colonial self-government. In the ultimate 
analysis all powers centred in the Governor-General 
as the viceroy of the Crown and the representative of 
Spanish sovereignty; and notwithstanding Sagasta 's 
declaration that the Autonomist constitution was not 
exotic, the chief recommendation of its sponsors was 
its resemblance to the Constitution of Canada. 

A literature of annotation followed the publication of 
the decrees. This literature went into laborious com- 
parisons to show the points of resemblance and also the 
improvements. The difference was fundamental. The 
constitution of Canada is interpreted and applied in 

the spirit of free institutions. All parties to the com- 

71 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

pact understand parliamentary government. The for- 
eign office, the British Parliament, and the English 
people know the weakness of the reserve powers if their 
exercise should ever be attempted. A comparison on 
paper of the respective functions of the Governor-Gen- 
eral of Canada and the Governor-General of Cuba was 
an absurdity. Spanish statesmen had no conception of 
executive power falling into forgetfulness through dis- 
use. To their minds power was conferred only to be 
exercised. 

The people of Cuba were of a similar mind. They 
had no conception of authority reserved to a supreme 
power and not being exerted. Their knowledge was the 
knowledge drawn from experience. Their experience 
had been with one Captain-General after another who 
construed the laws to suit his own notions and executed 
them with military rigor. The composition of the 
Council was the broadest evidence of the lack of faith in 
colonial home rule. With the Crown creating seventeen 
life members, a condition could not arise in which it 
would be unable to secure the additional member, and 
thus having a majority, block absolutely all popular 
government. Taken in addition to the veto powers of 
the Governor-General, this Council was an exhibition 
of how easily Madrid could continue to control Cuba 
against the interests of the island. Leaving the debt 
unsettled was to leave an irritant which in the future 
was certain to cause dissensions between the peninsula 
and the island, and possibly foment another revolution. 
But it was the system itself which was submitted to dis- 
cussion rather than the debt, which properly lay outside 

of autonomy. And the discussion had hardly begun 

72 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

before the end was seen. Moret had joined his name 
imperishably with the emancipation law of 1871, which 
was crowned in 1886 by the complete freedom of the 
slave race. His fame was not to be joined imperish- 
ably with the constitutional autonomy which would save 
the Antilles to Spain. 

The adhesion of the Autonomists who had not joined 
the insurgents in the field, been thrown into prison, 
deported to the penal settlements, or gone into volun- 
tary exile was made clear after the promulgation of the 
decrees of autonomy. Madrid was waiting to know 
how the system would be received by the different 
political groups. Naturally the Autonomists were the 
first ones to be considered. Individually they pub- 
lished manifestoes, allocutions, and addresses pledging 
their support. They exchanged felicitations among 
themselves and sent congratulatory telegrams to Ma- 
drid. The Autonomists in Paris were also satisfied. 
Those in the United States, with a very few exceptions, 
were silent. Speaking collectively, the central Junta 
of Autonomists issued an address telling the people 
of Cuba to prepare for the elections without fear that 
the verdict of suffrage would be falsified. This was 
an indirect way of characterizing the former elections 
as fraudulently controlled by the Spanish authori- 
ties, which was simply history. The local juntas were 
requested to begin the preparation of the regimen of 
autonomy. The central Junta adopted as its sentiments 
an article in its newspaper organ * which declared that 
the new system was the realization of their doctrine of 
1881. Former reforms were slighted in the statement 

* El Pais. 
73 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

that the system proposed by Sagasta was not the ad- 
ministrative and economic decentralization previously 
offered by Liberal governments. This which was now 
presented was the genuine autonomy — representative 
autonomy with responsible parliamentary government, 
the ultimate evolution of the process which the Auton- 
omist programme had formulated. 

What was lacking in minor details, the Autonomists 
said, was unimportant. The system in its entirety con- 
ceded all that they had sought. It gave Cuba home 
rule without impairing the national unity. It was a tie 
that would forever bind the island to the peninsula not 
in chains, but in free will. Under it the mother coun- 
try and the erring child would walk again hand in hand. 
Peace and prosperity would come again. Cuba had been 
rebellious ; her aspirations for political liberties had been 
discouraged, and some of her children had unfortunate- 
ly taken up arms. But now that autonomy was to be 
implanted the past would be forgotten, and thoy would 
return to the ways of peace and cultivate its growth. 
The annexationists in the United States would redouble 
their efforts, would again talk of manifest destiny, but 
the Cubans would not be deceived. At the bier of the 
decrepit ancestor— absolutist government — they would 
imitate the heralds who preceded the funeral car of the 
French kings, and would cry, " Long live autonomy !" 
Dead the fault which had caused discontent, would die 
also the spirit of rebellion. Autonomy meant the defi- 
nite failure of the insurrection, already broken by arms. 
The central Junta appealed to the patriotism of the 
insurgents. It knew that the eternal revolutionists, 
the anarchists, would not be satisfied. No matter. 

74 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Autonomy would satisfy by its fruits. The arch of the 
new alliance between Cuba and Spain, it affirmed the 
indestructible sovereignty of the mother country in the 
love, the gratitude, and the liberty of the colony. The 
shades of the Autonomists who had died — most of them 
in exile, it was parenthetically observed — were saluted. 
" Long live Cuba — long live Spain !" 

But Spain in Cuba had not long to live, and a new 
life was unfolding for Cuba. 

The Keformists also proclaimed their adhesion. 
Nothing had been heard of them during a twelvemonth 
and its half. In the elections for deputies to the Cortes, 
which were held two months after General Weyler took 
command of the island, they had been retired along with 
the Autonomists. Their treachery to Campos was fruit- 
less. The Weylerites kept them under the ban of sus- 
picion. Now the weather-vane had shifted. The wind 
was north by northeast. Being opportunists, the Re- 
formists turned with the weather-vane. Autonomy was 
more than they had ever asked or wanted. It was 
something they had not believed in. But it was the pro- 
gramme of the day, and they would accept it. They 
sent effusive telegrams to Madrid, exchanged felicita- 
tions among themselves and congratulations with the 
Autonomists. They would co-operate with the latter in 
making the new system effective. Liberal leaders in 
Spain and the organs of their opinions were deceived 
by this effusiveness. They discussed it as a fusion, as 
though two great and powerful political organizations 
differing in principle had coalesced and would form a 
cohesive unit. 

It was left to the intransigentes dominating the Union 

75 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Constitutionals to demonstrate once more that they 
were the unchanging element in Spanish power in Cuba. 
When autonomy was proposed in October, 1897, the 
intransigentes were what they had been in 1879, when 
the proposition had been made to carry out in spirit 
and in letter the compact of El Zanjon. Their impor- 
tance and their influence could not be decried. They 
ostracized General Blanco. He dwelt in isolation 
among his own race and his own people. They re- 
ceived the first suggestion of autonomy with distrust. 
This gradually grew into violent opposition. The sen- 
timent was unified and consolidated when the Union 
Constitutional party called a convention for the third 
week in December. These Spanish Tories in Cuba had 
claims to be called representatives of public sentiment. 
They showed the vigor of party organization in dele- 
gated assembly. The Autonomists had been content 
with the declarations of adhesions from the local juntas. 
Three men might constitute a junta. The Eeformists 
had been satisfied with the approval of small groups. 
The Union Constitutionals were numerous enough to 
hold a convention to which delegates were chosen by 
the various local juntas. Some of these delegates were 
from sections of the island in control of the insurgents. 
It was the only political assembly held in Cuba in five 
years. 

The symptoms were stormy. Captain-General Blanco 
was making a shrewd and persistent effort to gain con- 
trol of the organization. The president of the Union 
Constitutional party was the Cuban-born Marquis de 
Apezteguia, who possessed more liberal instincts than 

the Spanish classes of whom he was the representative. 

76 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Blanco sought to make the conservatives more auton- 
omist than the Autonomists themselves. The Marquis 
Apezteguia was in sympathy with the plan. It was a 
conception of high politics. But the majority of the 
Union Constitutionals were not fitted for high politics. 
They thought the mission of their party was to preserve 
Spanish sovereignty, and they believed colonial self- 
government would destroy this sovereignty. " Author- 
ity, not autonomy," was their watchword. The deter- 
mination of their leaders was to make a demonstration 
of the rejection of the new colonial policy which would 
be echoed in Spain and would overthrow the Sagasta 
ministry. They were not satisfied with their experi- 
ence in forcing the withdrawal of General Campos. In 
the preliminary private meetings of the Habana dele- 
gates these cried out anathema to autonomy. 

The convention was as intolerant as conventions usu- 
ally are when conservatives become radicals in the 
violence of their opposition to a stated course. The 
central Junta, which had shown receptiveness for Cap- 
tain-General Blanco's schemes, was repudiated. Mar- 
quis Apezteguia was rebuked, shorn of his power as 
president of the party, and then left in that position. 
The Queen Eegent was congratulated in entire sincerity 
on the restoration of peace in the Philippines. Violent 
speeches were made against the United States, Presi- 
dent McKinley, and Congress. A telegram was sent to 
General Weyler which was meant to show that the con- 
vention was in sympathy with him and with his policy. 
The official attitude of the party was expressed by formal 
resolution which made opposition to autonomy a party 
creed. Sedition was condemned, and as loyal Spaniards 

77 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

the Union Constitutionals would not hint at armed resist- 
ance to the programme of the Government. They would 
not themselves become rebels by talking sedition, but 
they would have none of the responsibility for the new 
system. Instead, they adopted the Eetraimiento. This 
meant the drawing within the shell. It pledged the 
party to retire from participation in public affairs and to 
take no part in the elections. The Autonomists spread 
the table, the Reformists ate the feast, and the Union 
Constitutionals were asked to pay the bill. Never. 
This action was taken in order that the non-partici- 
pation should not be interpreted as lending moral 
support. It was passive resistance in the most sullen 
and embarrassing form. The Government was drawing 
nearer the precipice. They would not be the ones to 
push it over. 

After these declarations had been made specific and 
the attitude of the party defined, some leniency was shown 
the central Junta, whose membership had been altered. 
This directory was given power to act if developments 
later called for drawing out of the shell and partici- 
pating in x^ublic affairs. But the great end of the in- 
transigentes was accomplished. The powerful Union 
Constitutional party was placed on record as inflexibly 
opposed to autonomy. The intransigentes did not be- 
lieve that autonomy would conciliate the insurrection 
out of existence ; they did not believe it would succeed, 
and they meant that it should not succeed. 

There was no insurgent political party to which the 
Madrid authorities could turn in seeking support for 
autonomy, yet there was something which in a degree 

represented the insurgents. This was the Junta in New 

78 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

York and the secret revolutionary committees in the 
Cuban towns and cities. Weyler had not succeeded in 
breaking up the latter. Blanco did not succeed ; but it 
was thought that they might be persuaded out of exist- 
ence by securing the support of leading Cubans who 
were suspected of being in sympathy with them. A 
very small number of Cubans did join themselves to the 
Autonomists, but the majority of the Cuban people not 
in the field remained as determined in not accepting the 
new policy as were the actual insurgents. They had be- 
come revolutionists to the core. The American Junta 
also repudiated the system. Its effort was given to 
showing that the autonomy proposed was not genuine. 
It made comparisons with the colonial government cf 
Canada ; pointed out the defects in the regimen prepared 
for Cuba, and showed especially the danger of the reserve 
powers. All this was meant for American public opin- 
ion. The time had gone by when the actual provisions 
of autonomy — parchment autonomy, they called it — were 
of consequence to the Cuban revolutionists, whether in 
the United States or in Cuba. They were waiting for 
events to determine the limit of the near future fore- 
shadowed by President McKinley as determining Amer- 
ican intervention. 

Immediately after his arrival, General Blanco began 
putting the new policy into effect. The Weyler officials 
throughout the island were removed. Influential Cubans 
were invited to take office. Here was met the first diffi- 
culty. It was a responsibility which most of them 
sought to decline. In some instances what was called 
gentle compulsion was used. Jose Bruzon, a leading 

lawyer of Habana, was persuaded to accept the office of 

79 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

civil governor of the province. His position was de- 
fined as waiting while Cuba drifted to its destiny. The 
insurgents showed no resentment towards him. It was 
commonly believed that compromising documents in the 
hands of the Spanish authorities induced him to take 
the post of governor in preference to involuntary exile 
to Chafarinas. In Santa Clara province Marcos Garcia 
was prevailed on to accept the office of governor. Mar- 
cos Garcia was an insurgent colonel in the Ten- Years' 
war, in which he was associated with Gomez. He had 
not been suspected of active sympathy with the last in- 
surrection. For the other provinces fairly good men 
were secured, and in the municipalities changes were 
made in the alcaldes, or mayors, by selecting either 
Cubans or Spaniards who had not been too closely iden- 
tified with the Weyler administration. 

The royal decrees provided for an insular cabinet. 
Until elections could be held and the full system of 
autonomy be got in working order, the cabinet necessar- 
ily would be a provisional one. Captain-General Blanco 
and the officials in Madrid gave the composition of this 
body careful thought. It was developed that though 
the Autonomists were not numerous, they were broken 
up into factions. One faction was known as the historic 
Autonomists. The other faction was less historic and 
more radical. The Reformists also had to be taken 
into consideration. The comment at the time was that 
they showed a greedy eagerness to get office. Ulti- 
mately the cabinet was arranged. Madrid approved 
and Habana smiled. 

The cabinet was inaugurated on the 1st of January, 
1898. It was an historic scene in the throne-room of 

80 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the Palace — the same room which exactly a year later 
was to be the scene of the yielding of Spanish author- 
ity to the United States. All the foreign consuls, the 
official representation of Spanish authority, and the dig- 
nitaries of the Church were present. Captain-General 
Blanco, after the members had taken the oath of fidel- 
ity to Spain, the Queen, and Spanish institutions, ad- 
dressed them. Peace and the welfare of Cuba, he told 
them, formed the best propaganda they could make 
in behalf of autonomy and against the revolution, which, 
although it was never justified, would thereafter have no 
pretense whatever to exist. He closed his address with 
the exhortation, "Long live Cuba, forever Spanish." 
At the conclusion of the ceremony, mass was celebrated 
in the chapel of the Palace by the bishop of Habana. 
A few hundred of the populace were gathered outside. 
They made a feeble demonstration when the new cabi- 
net appeared. The community as a whole showed little 
concern in the ceremonies. Military precautions had 
been taken against an outbreak or an unfriendly dem- 
onstration. 

The new cabinet might justly be called representative 
of the aspirations and agitation of the Autonomists of 
the past. The president, without portfolio, was Jose 
Maria Galvez, a lawyer and political orator. His name 
was attached to the first manifestoes issued by the Auton- 
omists, in 1879. It was attached to the manifesto issued 
in 1895, reprobating the insurrection, deploring its effect 
in postponing Autonomist reforms, and predicting its 
failure. The leading figure in this Autonomist cabinet 
was the secretary of the treasury, Eafael Montoro. 

His had been the consistent career of a constitutional 
6 81 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

agitator. A student in Madrid, lie had been educated 
as a lawyer and had shown force as an advocate. He 
was the most accomplished orator in the island. His 
admirers called him the Cuban Castelar; and he was 
such, if allowance be made for the difference between 
the man of talent and the man of genius. Montoro's 
public addresses and writings are voluminous. His 
name appears to the introduction and prologues to many 
books by Cuban authors on politics and on literature. 
He was one of the founders of the Liberal- Autonomist 
party. He signed the manifesto of 1879, and afterwards 
was an Autonomist Deputy to the Cortes, where he sat 
in obscurity. Montoro's name appeared at the head of 
those who, in the name of the Liberal-Autonomist 
party, repudiated the uprising of 1895. He indorsed 
the reforms proposed by Canovas, and was rewarded by 
the bestowal of the title of marquis. From that time 
his influence with the Cuban people ceased utterly. 
They forgot his past services, and characterized him as 
Weyler's partisan and parasite. 

Antonio Govin was named as secretary of justice and 
administration. He was a forcible personality. He 
was both an historic and a radical Autonomist. He 
was the secretary of the party in its early days, one of 
the signers of the first platform, and the author of docu- 
ments which were put forth in its name in explanation 
of the principles of autonomy. Govin was capable of 
making enemies, and during the period of the active 
agitation for autonomy his boldness arrayed the Span- 
ish classes against him. He signed the manifesto of 
April, 1895, but he never permitted himself to be iden- 
tified with Weyler's acts. Ultimately he sought volun- 

82 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

tary exile, and settled with his family in the United 
States. He did not reach Habana in time to take the 
oath of office with his colleagues. Govin was a promi- 
nent freemason, and it was thought that his influence 
might be potential with the masonic organizations, 
which were filled with the revolutionary spirit. 

The Eeformists were given a member of the cabinet. 
He was Eduardo Dolz, a lawyer, who had shown some 
talent for arranging compromises. He was a Deputy in 
the Cortes. He came direct from Madrid, and it was 
said that he would represent Spanish sovereignty in the 
bosom of autonomy. Autonomy never warmed to this 
representative of the monarchy. Francisco Zayas, an 
educator who had the public respect, was made sec- 
retary of public instruction. Laureano Eodriguez, a 
peninsular from the province of Santiago de Cuba, be- 
came secretary of agriculture, industry, and commerce. 
The irony of these latter departments caused only a 
passing sneer. The actual functions of the Autonomist 
cabinet were never clearly discernible. The cabinet was 
chiefly useful as a shield for the unpopular acts of the 
Spanish Government. 



83 



CHAPTER V 

Epilogue to Autonomy 

Colonial Home Rule in Function — Persuasion for the Insurgents — 
Emissaries Who Were Not Envoys — A Major Andre Without a 
Benedict Arnold — Spanish Army Opposition to Autonomy — 
Conspiracy of Officers Starts Riots — Habana's Four-Days' Siege 
from Within — Its Incidents — The Riots a Political Demonstra- 
tion — The Press Disciplined — Influence on American Sentiment 
— Demand for Official Reports — Review of Relief Movement — 
Misgivings in Spain — Lack of Military Successes — Blanco's 
Journey — The Maine Explosion — Hysterical Feeling Preceding 
and Succeeding That Event — Rejection of Amplified Autonomy 
by the Insurgents — Elections for the Cortes — End of the Experi- 
ment. 

Colonial home rule was finally in function, as the 
Castilian idiom has it. The insurgents in the field had 
shown little disposition to assist in the functions. A 
glance backward is necessary to understand their atti- 
tude. When the system was first proposed, Gomez, 
Calixto Garcia, and the other insurgent commanders 
made known positively that their demand was for inde- 
pendence, and they would not consider autonomy. It 
was abundantly and conclusively proven that they repre- 
sented the feelings of the ragged soldiers who acknowl- 
edged military allegiance to them. The insurgent 
army, as an army, would not permit autonomy to be 
talked. It was held that to propose it was a violation 

84 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

of the Cuban constitution and required the proponent 
to be passed through arms — that is, executed. 

Coincident with the promulgation of the decrees of 
autonomy the Spanish authorities began what they 
called their moral campaign. This was a campaign of 
bribery and persuasion. They were very persistent in 
seeking to disintegrate the insurrection individual by 
individual. Every inducement was offered to the Cu- 
bans in arms to present themselves. The list of pre- 
sentados began to be followed with interest. But those 
in arms who presented themselves were discouragingly 
few. The insurgents in the field, by an understanding 
among themselves, permitted the presentations of their 
sick. This enabled some of their numbers to die among 
friends and relatives rather than in the camp. A few 
chiefs did present themselves, some of whom held the 
rank of colonel. The invariable explanation of these 
presentations by the Cubans was that the officer had 
been deprived of his command or degraded by Gomez, 
and that his presentation was in revenge. While this 
was not true in every instance, it was the fact in a sur- 
prising number of cases. A few of the minor chiefs 
who were among the presentados undoubtedly did so in 
good faith. They were weary of the long struggle and 
were willing to accept the promises of the Spanish 
Government ; but these were the exceptions rather than 
the rule. 

All of Spain's efforts to secure the adhesion of the 
insurgents in the field were made by private messengers 
and emissaries. They were not envoys. Frequently 
these were relatives who were forced to undertake the 

doubtful mission. Towards winning the moral support 

85 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

of public opinion of the world, which might have been 
had by an honest effort to present the policy of auton- 
omy to the insurgents, Castilian pride was an insuper- 
able obstacle. The last shred of territory gained in 
centuries of conquest was at stake, yet Spain could not 
bring herself to recognize that the revolutionary force 
which had brought 200,000 of her soldiers to Cuba to 
combat it was a force in arms. No conference was 
asked, no truce proposed to discuss the proposition of 
autonomy, and no white flag shown. Instead, depend- 
ence was placed on secret messengers. That some of 
these emissaries were executed by the insurgents is be- 
yond question. 

The Buiz case was the best known. Joaquin Buiz 
was a colonel of the Spanish engineers in Habana, and 
was of a winning personality. The military authorities 
sought to disintegrate the band of Nestor Aranguren 
through him. Aranguren was a young man who had 
made reputation by his daring in attacking and annoy- 
ing the Spanish forces close to the city. He had been 
employed in the office of a firm of contractors which 
constructed the water works, and this had brought him 
in relation to Colonel Buiz, who was the engineer in 
charge. If Aranguren could be reached it would have 
a great effect in Habana and among the insurgents in 
that province. Colonel Buiz undertook the task. He 
opened a correspondence with Aranguren — a less diffi- 
cult matter than might be supposed. Former personal 
ties and family relationship kept up communication 
between many Spaniards and insurgents in the field so 
long as no efforts were made to treat of the insurrection. 

Buiz sought a personal interview with Aranguren. The 

86 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

latter agreed to it if lie did not come on a political mis- 
sion, and warned him that if he came proposing auton- 
omy it would be at his peril. Ruiz' first attempt was 
unsuccessful. Subsequently he succeeded in reaching 
the camp of Aranguren, in defiance of the latter's warn- 
ing, with his propositions from the Spanish authorities. 
The story of the insurgents who were in the camp was 
that on Ruiz' appearance Aranguren burst into tears, 
and asked him why he had come to certain death. 
Then an insurgent summary court-martial was held and 
Ruiz was executed. The full story was never told, but 
the common belief was that he was macheted. 

Rumors of Colonel Ruiz' disappearance reached Ha- 
bana. The authorities feared for his fate, but did not 
dare let the truth be known. Finally it was arranged 
that a foreign consular representative in Habana who 
was a personal friend of the reckless colonel of engi- 
neers should ask General Lee's aid. The United States 
consul-general, in his unofficial capacity and with the 
consent of the Spanish authorities, despatched a mes- 
senger to the camp of the insurgents. When the mes- 
senger reached the camp Aranguren was absent, but the 
officer next in command sent a message that Ruiz had 
been tried and executed. Intense excitement was caused 
by the news, and the officials sought to make capital of 
it in the United States, where some weak sentiment was 
shown, and the execution of Ruiz was denounced as an 
act of savagery. 

A dispassionate study of the circumstances of the case 
does not uphold this contention. Colonel Ruiz bore 
no white flag and no safe-conduct to the insurgent camp. 
He went against warning. He sought to serve his Gov- 

87 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

ernment, and that service would have been rewarded by 
military promotion. The service could only be per- 
formed by securing the treachery of Aranguren to his 
comrades in arms. Back of the attempted interview 
with the young insurgent was the purpose of creating 
distrust and suspicion among the revolutionists of one 
another. The mere fact that a Spanish emissary had 
sought to visit Aranguren in his camp was relied upon 
to arouse distrust among the other insurgents. The 
military authorities professed that they had letters 
which would show that Aranguren 's course was barbar- 
ous and treacherous. They never disclosed such letters. 
Instead, Aranguren himself made public the documents. 
These were a conclusive showing of the plot to discredit 
him and to spread dissensions among the insurgents. 
The plot recoiled, and the death of its agent was the 
sequel. Colonel Buiz was called the Cuban Major An- 
dre. The difference was that young Aranguren was not 
a Cuban Benedict Arnold. Weeks afterwards Aran- 
guren was surprised in the hills of Tapaste by the Span- 
ish troops and killed. His whereabouts were betrayed 
by a camp follower. His body was brought to the 
morgue in Habana. He was buried in the cemetery of 
Columbus. His grave is a few yards away from that of 
Colonel Buiz. 

The execution of Buiz took place in the latter part of 
December, 1897. A month later Augusta Morales, the 
alcalde of a village in Pinar del Bio, penetrated the camp 
of the insurgent general Pedro Diaz, near San Cristobal. 
He brought propositions for autonomy. Morales was 
tried by a court-martial. Dr. Hugo Boberts, a? young 
insurgent officer, defended him. He was condemned as 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

an emissary of the enemy and was executed. This 
ended the visits of secret messengers to the insurgent 
camps. 

The army of Spain in Cuba was the last to be heard 
from regarding the new system. By the army was al- 
ways meant the officers. The privates, dumb beasts 
of burden and abuse, were not taken into account. The 
army never had been for autonomy. That was perfectly 
well understood. But its opposition heretofore had been 
passive. Military discipline was lax and the military 
commanders in the different districts were supreme. 
Where they happened to be in sympathy with General 
Blanco, a little support was given the new policy by not 
throwing insurmountable hindrances in the way of ex- 
tending the zones of cultivation and aiding the reconcen- 
trados. These cases were not numerous. Usually the 
military commander nullified every effort to relieve the 
starving population. The army was not in its own un- 
derstanding disloyal to Spain, but it did not want the 
insurrection to end just then. That would end also the 
double pay, the pensions and promotions, the decora- 
tions, and the monstrous system of corruption which 
prevailed. The army had not been fearful of autonomy 
succeeding, and therefore did not fear the early end of 
the insurrection. All it wanted was to be let alone. 
But it was not let alone, and this precipitated the dem- 
onstration which showed that the army was not for 
autonomy. 

The restrictions of the Weyler rule had been relaxed 
in so far as affected the freedom of the press. The cen- 
sorship was not abrogated under Blanco, yet a certain 

latitude of comment was permitted the newspapers. 

89 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Some of tliem, professing faith in the sincerity of the 
more liberal policy, ventured criticisms of admitted 
abuses. A newspaper called La Discusion had been 
suppressed by Weyler because of its insurgent leanings. 
It had been an organ of radical autonomist tendencies. 
The paper reappeared under Blanco. It began to call 
attention to gross abuses of the army, and to demand 
their reform. Another paper of less character than La 
Discusion, which had adopted the title of The Reconcen- 
trado, was also sensational and personal in its criticisms. 
The army officers took alarm. One night groups of them 
dropped into a cafe and did not leave till after midnight. 
The next morning a score or more of these officers in 
uniform went in a body to the office of The Reconcen- 
trado and wrecked it. Then they proceeded to the office 
of La Discusion and began to demolish it. The office of 
this journal was on the Prado, opposite Central Park, in 
the very heart of the city. Soon the officers had a mob 
back of them which completed the wreck. Many mem- 
bers of the Volunteers were seen among the mob. The 
officers, having started the demonstration, retired and 
left the rioters to finish their work. The Orden Pub- 
lico, the military police of the city and the finest body 
of regulars in the service of Spain, sought to drive them 
back by gentle means. They were not allowed to use 
their swords or firearms. The rioters flouted them, and 
mob orators addressed the populace, inciting them to 
greater activity. The authorities were powerless. 

It was a Wednesday morning, the morning of January 
12th, when the rioting began. There was a lull during 
the midday, but in the afternoon the mob rallied. It 
made little demonstration, however, and was content 

90 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

with throwing stones and breaking windows. But the 
city feared something more. It was known that the 
authorities had been unravelling several supposed con- 
spiracies, and that at all the recent bull-fights extraordi- 
nary precautions had been taken to prevent an outbreak. 
In Spain the popular uprisings usually begin at the bull- 
ring. That afternoon the feeling was as if a black cloud 
had settled over the city. It was like waiting for the 
thunder-storm on an oppressive summer day. General 
Parrado, who was next in command to Blanco, person- 
ally took command of the police forces. Orders were 
given that all shops should be closed, and within half 
an hour the doors were locked and the iron shutters 
fastened. People were warned off the streets. The 
Guardia Civiles, or military rural police, were brought 
in to reinforce the Orden Publico. Then some of the 
regulars began to arrive and make their evolutions in a 
public square. After them came the Fifth Battalion of 
Volunteers, suspected of disloyalty, who were stationed 
in the palace of the Governor-General half a mile away 
from Central Park, where the rioting had begun. 

In the evening the mob rallied. The narrow streets 
leading to the Palace were choked with rioters. The 
plaza in front of it was filled with them. They cried 
" Long live Weyler ! " " Down with autonomy ! " 
"Death to Blanco!" Captain-General Blanco and the 
members of the Autonomist cabinet who were with him 
in the palace could hear these cries. After a while the 
troops succeeded in clearing the plaza and the streets 
leading to the palace, and holding them against ap- 
proach. Their instructions were to be gentle. The 

disorderly crowds were permitted to roam almost at will 

91 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

through the streets, crying long life to Weyler, to the 
Volunteers, to Spain, to the army ; death to Blanco and 
death to autonomy. Sometimes they had sharp col- 
loquies with the troops. One group cried, "War to 
autonomy ! " and the captain of the guard which had 
been brought in from the country afterwards told how 
he had heard that cry before. It was when a band of 
insurgents had laid an ambush for his men and had 
borne down on them crying, " Death to autonomy ! " 
The night was passed without bloodshed. 

The following day General Juan Arolas, recently 
named as military governor, took commmand of the 
forces. He had just arrived from Santiago province. 
Artillery was brought in from the country, and the gar- 
risons were reinforced by the addition of 8,000 regulars. 
In spite of this heavy force the mob made several 
demonstrations during the day, but without any set 
purpose beyond baiting the troops. At night there 
seemed to be actual danger. The rioters gathered in 
numbers on the Prado on each side of Central Park. 
The troops frequently charged them, sometimes with 
the cavalry in the lead, sometimes with the infantry on 
the double quick. The soldiers were not allowed to use 
their firearms unless a shot should be directed against 
them. Happily this did not happen. The hospitals 
were filled with people suffering from bruises and sabre 
cuts, but they had not drawn the fire of the troops. 
The belief at the time was that if the order had been 
given to fire it would not have been obeyed. The word 
ran around that Spaniards would not fire on Spaniards. 
It took four days for Habana to resume the semblance 
of order, and this semblance was not reached until the 

93 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

artillery was placed in position to command every 
point. 

The events of that week constituted a real siege, and 
Habana was garrisoned against the rioters by thousands 
of regular troops. But they were not a bloody mob, and 
this caused a misapprehension of the serious nature of 
the uprising. During the days of rioting it was ob- 
served that the rioters seemed to be incited by persons 
not taking part, and the presence of the fraternal spirit 
between them and the military forces was also manifest. 
Yet Habana was on the brink of bloodshed all the time, 
and 8,000 troops could not have prevented it if there 
had been one musket discharge on the mob. 

When the tension was relieved the Spanish authorities 
gave themselves up to explaining that the rioting had 
been trifling and had no meaning. But it had a deep 
meaning. It was a political demonstration of the army 
against autonomy, and it served its purpose. Three or 
four score of the officers who precipitated the rioting 
were placed under military arrest, but they were never 
punished. Not one was court-martialled. Pretexts were 
found for releasing most of them within a few days after 
their arrest, and they were returned to their commands. 
This was the significant confession of the weakness of 
Spanish authority in Cuba. Captain-General Blanco 
did not dare to discipline the insubordinate and rebel- 
lious army officers. Instead, the Spanish authorities 
disciplined the press, which was held responsible for 
the trouble because it had attacked the honor of the 
army. The Captain-General issued a decree which, 
without superseding the already rigorous laws against 

the freedom of the press, placed the censorship abso- 

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TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

lutely in the hands of the general staff of the army. 
Persons who transgressed the censorship, in addition to 
their liability for the penalties of the law were held 
guilty of the crime of rebellion ; and the crime of rebel- 
lion was punishable by either death or exile in chains 
to the penal settlements. And this was done with an 
Autonomist cabinet in nominal power and under a regi- 
men whose first principle had been the liberty of the 
press. The army ended autonomy. 

The influence of the outbreak on American public 
opinion was pronounced. The people of the United 
States were not deceived when the news was published 
as to what had happened. The censorship of cable 
messages prevented the history of the days of siege 
from reaching the north until the vessels could carry 
the true story. Then it was felt that the army officers 
and the rioters had uttered a true cry in their " Death 
to autonomy." The rioting had been at no time di- 
rected against Americans, but there was inquietude and 
a natural fear of further trouble. It might be said that 
the American public was convinced of the failure of 
autonomy. There was at once a demand for the reports 
of the consuls and for full information regarding the 
actual state of affairs in Cuba. The condition of the 
reconcentrados was one of the subjects on which infor- 
mation was wanted. Their relief had been part of the 
promise of Spain that went with autonomy. In the 
generous impulses following the promise of that system 
a proposition had been advanced that the American 
people aid the starving population. Captain-General 
Blanco proudly rejected it, declaring in an official tele- 
gram to the Madrid Cabinet and to the Spanish minis- 
94 



TOMOBKOW IN CUBA 

ter in Washington, that Spain could care for her own. 
Within a fortnight he was compelled to admit that 
Spain could not care for her own. 

President McKinley issued a Christmas appeal to 
the American people for help. At first the responses 
were slow. The American people wanted the aid, if 
given, to reach the starving Cubans, and they were not 
willing to trust it to Spanish officials. But back of this 
was their perception that this kind of relief could only 
be temporary, and that no permanent alleviation could 
come until the circumstances were changed. They saw 
that until the cause was removed the distressing condi- 
tions would continue; and the cause, they were con- 
vinced, was the inability of the Spanish Government 
to govern the island satisfactorily. Nevertheless their 
hearts and their purses gradually opened, and within a 
few weeks American aid was pouring into Cuba, and 
continued to pour in until war between Spain and the 
United States was declared. 

Captain-General Blanco's Government was able to 
make appropriations which ultimately reached $250,000 
in silver for the relief of a suffering population of half 
a million. All the functions of Spanish sovereignty 
were paralyzed and it could do no more. This was one 
cause of the continued refusal of the Cuban people to 
believe in autonomy. Material relief was promised 
with it, and this relief did not come. The consuls of 
the United States could not have reported honestly that 
progress was being made in relieving the distress. Nor 
could they report that autonomy was making progress. 
It was not even standing still. It was going backward. 
The consuls could see what was going on in the vain 

95 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

effort to implant the new system. They could see the 
exploradores, or pilot engines, preceding the trains with 
armored cars and troops for guards. This was railroad 
travel in a pacified country. 

They knew other things that could not be treated 
of publicly. With one exception, every consul had 
lists presented to him of Spaniards, generally of the 
commercial classes, who wanted Cuba annexed to 
the United States. They had private and confidential 
statements made of the movement which had begun 
in October among the sugar planters of Habana and 
Matanzas provinces for the intervention of the United 
States. These classes had absolutely lost faith in the 
ability of Spain to maintain her sovereignty. As the 
failure of autonomy became more apparent, they became 
more pronounced in their desire for American interven- 
tion. They could not take overt action because they 
were Spanish subjects. Such action would have made 
them amenable to the statutes against sedition, and 
placed them in the category of the insurgents who were 
charged with the crime of rebellion. But they managed 
to let their attitude be known. The United States con- 
suls in giving their judgment had to take account of 
these indications. They could also note the full effect 
of the sullen and passive opposition of the Spanish 
classes to autonomy as manifested in the attitude of 
the Union Constitutional party. The intensity and the 
influence of that opposition could not be fully under- 
stood in the United States. It had to be measured in 
the atmosphere and in the midst of the events which 
were in process of development. 

It was a question how fully Spain understood the 

96 



TOMOKBOW IN CUBA 

desperate conditions at the time of the army riots. She 
had been watching the experiment of autonomy in igno- 
rant hope. The capacity for national self-deceit was 
apparently illimitable. Yet the reassuring accounts, 
without practical results, were beginning to cause dis- 
trust. The query in the peninsula was why greater 
progress was not made in securing the support of the 
Cubans. Her statesmen were afraid to tell the peo- 
ple the truth. Blanco was not winning Cuba back to 
Spain. Conciliation had failed, and autonomy must 
be implanted by the sword. The Captain-General was 
unable to make a vigorous military campaign. Weyler 
had left the army in a state of suffering and demorali- 
zation second only to that of the pacificos. General 
Blanco began its improvement at once like the trained 
commander that he was, but it was certain that the 
troops could not be got in condition for service in the 
field till the rainy season came on. Then there could 
be no real campaigning, and the insurgents would ask 
the United States if the reasonable time given Spain in 
which to implant autonomy had not expired. Blanco 
did one thing which showed that he intended to employ 
the army. He called for more recruits. The Madrid 
press spoke of it as the last sacrifice; but the 15,000 
fresh troops were started, and the last detachment of 
them reached Cuba just in time to form part of the 
defensive force against invasion from the United States. 
The exact position of Spain was exposed in February 
by the letter of Dupuy de Lome, with its coarse abuse 
of the American executive. Military successes were 
imperative. The best possible efforts were made to 

manufacture these successes. General Jiminez Castel- 
7 97 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

laiios started out from the town of Puerto Principe with 
2,500 troops. They reached the mountain hamlet of 
Cubitas, where the Cuban provisional government had 
had its wandering existence. The government was gone, 
and the place in the woods was not worth taking. 
Eight hundred of the insurgents harassed the troops, 
and a few were killed and wounded on either side. 
Then the columns returned to the garrison at Puerto 
Principe. That was the nature of the military suc- 
cesses which the Spanish troops were achieving at this 
critical period. 

General Blanco left Habana in the latter part of Jan- 
uary and made a trip through the island. He went by 
the south coast to Santiago de Cuba, and returned by 
the north coast. His journey could not be called tak- 
ing the field. It afforded him a full insight into the 
despairing state into which Spanish sovereignty had 
fallen. When he returned to Habana the Maine had 
been in the harbor for ten days. The condition of the 
Spanish mind was one of irritation and disappoint- 
ment. It was seeking to hold the United States respon- 
sible for the failure of autonomy because the Junta was 
not expelled from New York and because occasional 
filbustering expeditions were successful. The Spanish 
authorities in Madrid and in Cuba were willing to 
forego their irritation and to forgive the United States 
if it would undertake the task of forcing autonomy on 
the insurgents. The proposition offered by Mr. Cleve- 
land, which would have placed the United States in a 
position of guaranteeing the Spanish flag in the An- 
tilles, would now have been accepted with eagerness. 

But with the knowledge that the American Government 

08 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

would not coerce the people of the island into keeping 
allegiance to that flag the resentment was fierce. 

The Spanish warships were ordered to Habana har- 
bor to keep the Maine company. When that vessel was 
blown up the feeling in Cuba was hysterical and Span- 
ish authority bordered on anarchy. To one living in 
the midst of those events as was the writer a plain con- 
clusion was inevitable. With the passions born of that 
hour of national sorrow stilled, and with every circum- 
stance reviewed in the calmer moments of reflection, I 
have not changed that opinion. A very large element 
of the Spanish classes in Cuba rejoiced in the destruc- 
tion of the Maine. It was not alone the ignorant popu- 
lace. The feeling was manifest among the army offi- 
cers. Outside of the possible conspirators none might 
know whether the explosion was due to accident or 
design. But the satisfaction felt was the same. The 
higher officials from the Captain-General down deplored 
it in itself and in its consequences. Many of the Span- 
ish merchants were sincere in their sympathy. Yet 
this did not obscure the more common sentiment of 
satisfaction. The violent anti-American circular which 
was distributed the day a breakfast was given by Con- 
sul-General Lee to Captain Sigsbee and the officers of 
the Maine is sometimes cited as evidence of the plot- 
ting that was going on. My own belief is that this 
circular was like others of the same character, an in- 
vention. It was a coincidence. Genuine circulars were 
occasionally circulated, but they were of a different 
kind. They were short, and usually typewritten or 
struck off from a hand-press. The resentment which 

was capable of the deliberate destruction of the Maine 

99 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

was too deep for utterance in inflammatory circulars. 
Regarding the higher officials, while they sought to 
exculpate Spain, my impression was that they did not 
feel sure of their own ground. They hoped the explo- 
sion was due to an accident, and they advanced the 
grounds for the theory of an accident, yet with the 
apparent fear that there were Spaniards capable of 
causing the destruction of the American warship. 

The violent intransigente classes were in earnest in 
wanting war with the United States after the report of 
the naval board of inquiry was made. A part of the 
military and naval element, as well as of the official 
class, believed in war in order that Spain might lose 
Cuba with honor. Her honor would not permit her to 
accept a guarantee of $200,000,000 from the United 
States and concede independence. But she would go to 
war and take the consequences rather than make a 
trade bargain for the most precious of her colonial pos- 
sessions. 

It was impossible for the people of the United States 
to understand that the Spaniards in Cuba believed that 
in the event of hostilities there would be another war of 
secession and the Southern States would revolt. Yet 
that delusion existed. It found utterance in the news- 
papers and in numerous pamphlets. These pamphlets 
described supposed invasions of the North American 
nation, and their repulse. Some of them were filled 
with contempt for the bargaining Yankee. They are 
interesting reading now as showing that the delusion 
did exist. One pamphlet told how the North Ameri- 
cans achieved success after success over the Spanish 
in arms, but were finally compelled to withdraw, be- 

100 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

cause the spirit of Spanish resistance was impregnable. 
Other pamphlets were filled with Don Quixotism. The 
knight of La Mancha really seemed to walk abroad. 
More important than this supposed secession sentiment 
in the United States was the belief in European inter- 
vention. That was found in the pamphlets, in the 
newspapers, and among the army and navy officers, and 
the representatives of the Spanish Government. Spain 
would yield Cuba with honor; but perhaps it would not 
be to the United States, and perhaps it would be after a 
general war had been precipitated. This was both the 
spoken and the unspoken sentiment. 

All this time the overtures to the insurgents were 
redoubled. Autonomy could be cast aside and Cubans 
could have the island if they would keep the flag and 
leave the forts and the garrisons to Spain. Govin and 
Dolz of the Autonomist cabinet were encouraged to 
press these overtures on the insurgents. Eadical Au- 
tonomists were aided and indorsed in formulating a 
new set of propositions for Gomez. These were a 
dozen or more in number. They failed. Gomez and 
the insurgent chiefs who were invited to share in 
the government treated the overtures with contempt. 
Whenever Spain would concede independence as the 
basis they would open negotiations. And with inde- 
pendence as the basis they would welcome the inter- 
vention of the United States, and whatever terms it 
made would be accepted. 

It might be said that the last chapter of autonomy 
was written when the Maine was blown up. But there 
was an epilogue. Elections were held. The prepara- 
tions which were commenced in November proceeded 

101 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

slowly. An electoral census had to be taken. It was 
completed in March. It was a remarkable census. 
Though the official reports showed that people had 
been dying by the hundreds of thousands, this demon- 
strated that there had been no diminution in the num- 
ber of inhabitants. The island was divided into dis- 
tricts. This first election under autonomy took place 
the last Sunday in March. The Union Constitutionals 
had been satisfied to let affairs drift. An arrangement 
had been made by which they were to have one-third of 
the deputies to the Cortes to be known as the opposi- 
tion, and the Autonomists, or Government, two-thirds. 
The arrangement was not carried out to the letter, for 
two or three of the conservatives were rejected, and the 
Government was charged with treachery. It was the 
old story. No one cared to deposit a ballot, and the 
authorities arranged the election. 

In April there were also elections for members of the 
insular chambers, that is, the House of Representatives 
and the Council. Previous to that time Galvez, as 
president of the Autonomist cabinet, issued a public 
appeal to President McKinley in the name of autonomy, 
urging the American executive not to let the system, 
which was on the eve of success, be made a failure 
through American encouragement of the insurrection. 

The chambers were inaugurated in May, and the 
provisional Autonomist cabinet also became a permanent 
cabinet. President Galvez declared that the programme 
of the colonial government should be to defend the 
Autonomist constitution. Of this Autonomist congress, 
few names are known unless they are gathered from the 
official list. In the flowing Castilian idiom it is said 

102 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

of them that they celebrated sessions, pronounced dis- 
courses, and adjourned. But they also passed laws. 
After the signing of the protocol between the United 
States and Spain they held no sessions. In October 
Captain-General Blanco declared the chambers dis- 
solved. The Autonomist cabinet was dissolved a fort- 
night before the end of Spanish sovereignty. Auton- 
omy would have been better thought of by the Cuban 
people if it had never been formed into an insular gov- 
ernment. 



103 



AIRPIT. 



CHAPTEE VI 

Transition to Local Home Eule 

Groundwork in Autonomous Constitution — Spirit of Spanish Local 
Institutions — Paternal Edicts of Governor-Generals — Cuban 
Municipality Similar to Township and County Government of 
American States — Details of Organization — Illustrations of 
the Geographical Basis — Minority Eepresentation — Alcalde the 
Chief Functionary — His Position and Power — Attributes of the 
Ayuntamientos — Creatures of the Central Authority — Former 
Military System — Lack of Knowledge by Citizens — Autonomist 
Modifications — Changes Under American Military Authority — 
Sources of Income. 

Armed revolt of Cubans brought autonomy when too 
late for Spain. Armed intervention of the United 
States ended the experiment which had failed. As a 
system, the breath was out of the body before vitality 
could be discerned. From the beginning autonomy 
was pulseless. Has it then left no trace? 

The question cannot be answered in the negative. 
Most of the Autonomists who consistently opposed the 
insurrection and who took office under the Spanish 
Government were old men. The unpopularity which 
was visited upon them by the masses of Cubans may 
die out, but none of the leaders among them will be 
called on to direct the destinies of the new government. 
Their day is gone. Yet it cannot be said that their 
work was in vain. They gave Cuba the only political 
education in its history. The propaganda which they 

107 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

maintained for twenty years was a preparation. Under 
centralized Spanish authority, with the traditions and 
inheritance of absolute power, the failure of autonomy 
was certain. With free institutions under the guidance 
of the American republic it may not be said that the 
principle is worthless. It is already the hope of Cu- 
bans and Spaniards who fear either annexation or in- 
dependence. The foundation of the Cuban common- 
wealth was laid in insurrection, but it may projierly be 
said that autonomy furnished the scaffolding for the 
new structure. The Cuba which came to the United 
States in trust was under an autonomous constitution, 
legitimately proclaimed by recognized Spanish sover- 
eignty though never put into complete operation. It is 
therefore as much an inheritance as the Spanish code 
of civil and criminal laws. 

In the administrative sense autonomy may be called 
the basis of the future Antillian state. It recognized 
the political and geographical division of the island 
into six provinces, it affirmed the principle of decen- 
tralization under provincial government, and it provided 
for a new basis of municipalities. It also provided 
that in pursuance of the autonomous constitution, laws 
should be enacted for local self-government. The stage 
was never reached at which these laws could be enacted, 
or the pledge of enacting them be neutralized by the 
Spanish authorities as with the compact of El Zanjon; 
but their formulation should not be difficult. The sys- 
tem of geographical divisions gives an excellent ground- 
work for home rule. The groundwork exists to-day, 
and on it may be built a popular system of homr^rule 
administration. This possibility is the first inquiry 

108 



TO-MOREOW IN CUBA 

made by American statesmen who have practical no- 
tions about the building of commonwealths in the trop- 
ics. For that reason I analyze it first, though this is 
not the process of the Cuban political philosophers. 
They would build a republic in the clouds and set up a 
complete structure at the very beginning of independ- 
ence. Its present discussion is also contrary to the 
natural order of the Spanish system, for that began 
with centralized authority, and what there was of local 
government came from above. 

But before the municipal statutes are the municipal 
institutions. The spirit of Spanish local administra- 
tion as it existed for a hundred years is breathed in 
hundreds of orders, edicts, and circulars of the Captain- 
Generals. It must be sought there, instead of in town 
records and in the histories of village communities. 
The Spanish regime in its relation to the individual — 
the individual was a subject rather than a citizen — for 
three-quarters of a century is embodied in the Bando 
of Good Government of Governor-General Geronimo 
Valdes. In a degree it is the regimen up to the present 
day. The compilation is both curious and instructive. 
This bando or edict was published in 1842. It was 
republished at intervals up to the end of the Ten- Years' 
war. It is something more than a codification of 
laws, regulations, and customs. It is a living exposition 
of a system of government without the popular element. 
It reflects the political existence of the Cuban people 
under absolutism — sometimes administered by a benev- 
olent and progressive despot such as General Valdes, 
oftener by a miltary tyrant such as Yaleriano Weyler. 

Though a score of years have passed since the Span- 

109 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

ish Constitution was extended to the Antilles and mu- 
nicipal legislation enacted, to a large proportion of 
Cubans and Spaniards the old system is better known 
than the new one. Their transition will be as much 
affected by the old traditions as by the present munici- 
pal statute system. Furthermore, while the new sys- 
tem was embodied into statutes the former practices 
continued. So the gap is not so wide as a reading of 
the written local laws would lead one to think. The 
spirit of Don Geronimo Valdes walked abroad through 
this old body of laws, customs, regulations, edicts, ban- 
dos, decrees, circulars, orders, and injunctions which 
he gathered together and vitalized. The regulations 
relating to slavery are the only ones that entirely dis- 
appeared. 

The titles of the bando relate to Keligion and Public 
Morality, Order, Health, Security, Theatres, Cleanliness, 
and Decoration. It required two hundred and sixty-one 
articles to define the relation of the citizen to the govern- 
ment or the municipality with respect to these headings. 
A special chapter is devoted to the pedaneos, or petty 
law officers. The instructions give an insight into the 
entire lack of personal or civil liberty reserved to the in- 
dividual. The pedaneos and their assistants, the cabos 
de rondas or roundsmen, were real Paul Prys of the 
State. The list of cases in which they could acquire 
fees is a long one, and they could impose fines in com- 
pliance with specific articles of the bando. They were 
practically charged with the regulation of both the pub- 
lic and the private morals of the community. 

The regulations are wearisome in their minuteness, 
from their prohibition of the picador at the bull-fight 

no 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

pricking the animal when in the centre of the ring, to 
the requirement that the bodega keepers should have a 
basin of water standing in front of their shops so that 
the dogs which ran through the streets might drink as 
they listed, and thus avoid the danger of hydrophobia. 
But through them all runs the authority from above, 
and it is the very highest authority. Long after Don 
Geronimo Yaldes had gone to his reward, the Captain- 
General and his Council of Administration continued to 
fix in detail the regulations for the cock-fight. The 
existence of this supreme authority and the extent to 
which it was exercised in the most trivial subjects 
should be kept in mind in reaching an understanding 
of local government under the general municipal leg- 
islation, the basis of which was the provisional law 
of 1878. 

In the Spanish meaning the term municipality has a 
territorial significance broader than that which is given 
it in the United States. The county in one of the States 
of the Union corresponds to the municipality in Cuba. 
There is little distinction between city and country gov- 
ernment. The city and county of New York answers to 
the municipality of Habana. The present system, in 
its administrative features, dates from the municipal 
law of 1878. After the enactment of that law the mu- 
nicipal life of a Cuban community, whether village or 
urban, underwent little change, because Spanish admin- 
istration did not change materially with the modifica- 
tion of the statute. But the system had a recognized 
legal existence which is the existing basis. It is a 
good working basis, too, for the development of local 
self-government. The island was divided into 132 ayun- 

111 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

tamientos or municipalities. In the United States it 
would be said that there were 132 counties. By prov- 
inces, there were 25 municipalities in Pinar del Bio, 37 
in Habana, 23 in Matanzas, 28 in Santa Clara, 5 in 
Puerto Principe, and 14 in Santiago de Cuba. The 
municipal termino, or district, is the extent of geo- 
graphical territory over which the administrative action 
of the municipality extends. 

For the creation of a termino municipal these were 
the exact conditions : first, not less than two thousand 
resident inhabitants ; second, territory proportionate to 
the population ; third, ability to sustain the obligatory 
municipal expenses out of the resources which the law 
authorized to municipalities. Every termino munici- 
pal forms part of a judicial district of a province. The 
census of population determines the number of conce- 
jales — aldermen or county commissioners — and their 
division is into the two classes of lieutenant alcaldes, or 
assistant mayors, and regidores, or ordinary council- 
men. There are grades of municipalities based on 
population. Cities possessing a population of forty 
thousand and upward have an ayuntamiento or council 
composed of thirty members, and this is the maximum 
number. Habana, Matanzas, and Santiago de Cuba 
are the cities of this class. Under the statute defini- 
tion, a municipality is the legal association of all peo- 
ple who reside in a termino municipal or district. 

The original law of 1878 also provided for a body 
known as the junta municipal. This was composed 
jointly of all the members of the ayuntamiento and of 
vocales or special delegates in equal number chosen by 
the electors. This junta municipal was in effect an 

112 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

auditing committee, as it was charged with the revision 
and censoring of the ayuntamiento accounts. This 
form of organization underwent various changes; but 
the junta municipal was never a real factor in local ad- 
ministration. The members of the ayuntamiento were 
elected theoretically by the residents who possessed the 
electoral right, which was based on both property and 
personal taxes. The concejales selected three of their 
number, from among whom the civil governor of the 
province, subject to the Governor-General, could choose 
the alcalde or mayor if it so pleased him. If not, he 
designated some one else. Generally it was some one 
else. 

The grades of communities still recognized are ciua- 
des or cities, villas or towns, pueblos or villages, and 
caserios or hamlets, and urban districts and rural 
districts. Aldea, which is the name in Spain for a 
small village, is seldom used in Cuba. Lugar, the 
Spanish designation of a town or place, is rarely heard. 
Bayamo, with a population of 17,000, is a ciudad, as 
are Habana, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and other places. 
Bejucal, with 8,000 inhabitants, is also a city. El Ca- 
ney, where the first attack was made by the American 
troops in seeking entrance to Santiago, is a villa or 
town. Dos Caminos, with 500 inhabitants, is a pue- 
blo. Guani, in the tobacco country around Bemedios, 
in Santa Clara province, has 200 inhabitants, and is a 
caserio. El Cerro, one of the suburbs of Habana, is a 
barrio urbano. Guamo, near Bayamo, has 700 or 800 
inhabitants, and is a barrio rural or country district. 
Barrios, rural or urban, consist of territory which for 
any reason is not organized into a municipality. Agua- 
8 113 



TO-MOREOW IN CUBA 

cate is a municipality of the province of Habana and 
belongs to the judicial district of Jaruco. Its area is 
121 square kilometres, or 75 square miles. The munici- 
pality is divided into four barrios or districts, which are 
the pueblos of Aguacate, Campastizo, Reoj, and Zabaleta. 

The pueblo of Aguacate is the headquarters of the 
municipal district of the same name. It has 600 or 700 
inhabitants, and is a barrio urban or town ward a3 dis- 
tinguished from a barrio rural or country township. 
The pueblo has a municipal judge. Jaruco, with an 
area of 253 square kilometres — 157 square miles — is a 
partido judicial or judicial district belonging to the 
province of Habana and to the audiencia or general 
court. Jaruco has eight municipal districts or termi- 
nos, including that of the same name, which is a ciu- 
dad or city. The officials are the alcalde and members 
of the ayuntamiento, a primary judge or judge of the 
first instance, a municipal judge, and a register of prop- 
erty. Batabano, with a population of 8,000 and an 
area of 147 square kilometres, is a municipality of the 
province of Habana, belonging to the judicial district 
of Bejucal. It has six barrios, of which the pueblo of 
Batabano, with a population of 1,700, is one. It has a 
municipal judge. Bejucal is a judicial district in the 
province of Habana, and depending from it are eight 
municipalities, the largest of which is the municipal 
district of the same name, which has a population of 
7,900 and an area of 400 square kilometres. The mu- 
nicipality is divided into four urban barrios and seven 
rural barrios. It has a judge of the first instance, and 
also a municipal judge and a register of property. 

Other illustrations might be given, but these may 

114 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA 

suffice to show the geographical basis of local govern- 
ment in Cuba. The municipalities, as stated, corre- 
spond as closely as can be under different political 
systems to the counties in the American States. The 
barrios rural are the townships. Before the insurrec- 
tion and the reconcentration wiped out whole communi- 
ties, there were a dozen more than 700 barrios rural or 
townships in Cuba. By geographical divisions there 
are still that number, but scores and scores of them 
are without a living inhabitant. The official statistics 
formerly gave 600 caserios or hamlets, but these have 
no political meaning. Usually the caserio is adminis- 
tratively part of the barrio rural. In perhaps thirty 
instances the caserios and the rural barrios or townships 
are identical in boundaries, but in the general sense the 
caserio may be ignored in seeking to determine the basis 
of home-rule government. The whole question of future 
local administration lies in these 700 townships and the 
100 or more city districts which combined form the 132 
ayuntamientos or municipalities. 

Under the law a census of the inhabitants of each 
municipal district was directed to be taken every five 
years. This provision was rarely observed. The con- 
cejales — aldermen, or members of the county board, as 
they would be called in some parts of the United States 
— were chosen by the citizens of the municipality in ac- 
cordance with the electoral law. As before explained, 
the grouping of the rural population was into barrios or 
country districts, each of which had an alcalde or town- 
ship governor named by the superior authority. It was 
the same with the urban barrios, except that they had 
celadors or police magistrates. 

115 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

Minority representation was recognized in the provi- 
sion that when three concejales were chosen, each elec- 
tor should vote for two out of the three, for three out of 
the four, four out of six, five out of seven, and in that 
proportion up to the limit. Half the membership of 
the ayuntamiento ceased every two years. The mem- 
bers were subject to fines for absence from the ses- 
sions. In actual administration it was not common for 
the alcalde named by the aldermen to be approved by 
the civil governor or the Governor-General unless the 
wishes of these officials had been ascertained in ad- 
vance. The Governor-General having the power " when 
he believed it convenient to the interests of the local- 
ity," often rejected the entire list of nominations and 
named an alcalde who did not belong to the munici- 
pality. In the larger cities the teniente alcaldes, or 
assistant mayors, who had jurisdiction as municipal 
sub-rulers over different districts, were named from 
among the aldermen. The alcaldes de barrios, or town- 
ship rulers, were named by the alcaldes of the munici- 
palities from the territory in which they exercised their 
functions. 

Sometimes difficulty was encountered. A notable 
case was that of the municipal alcalde of Mangas, in the 
province of Pinar del Bio. He refrained from naming 
alcaldes in the rural districts of Pueblo Nuevo and 
Guamanor because in them there was no elector who 
knew how to read and write. The case was taken up to 
the Governor-General's Council of Administration, be- 
ing too knotty for the intermediate authorities to settle. 
The Council of Administration found no precedent and 
no analogy. After mature discussion it resolved that 

116 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

there being no electors within those two country dis- 
tricts who could read and write, the alcaldes could be 
selected from electors who could not read and write. 
The decision stood, and the selections were made. On 
the part of the central authority there seems to have 
been some idea that the office of alcalde should be 
considered a non-partisan one. The Madrid decree of 
1880 directed the governors of provinces to prohibit 
alcaldes from assisting at reunions of a political char- 
acter, and also from acting as editors or directors of 
newspapers. The primary application of this order 
was to the provinces of the peninsula rather than to 
those of the island. 

A visitor to any rural community of Cuba is im- 
pressed with the evidence that the alcalde is the local 
authority and the only authority. He is so clearly the 
functionary that inquiry is seldom made for other func- 
tionaries. It is he who receives the higher officials, 
who meets the stranger, and who dispenses the honors 
of the town. In American towns due regard is paid the 
official position of mayor, but he is not allowed to mo- 
nopolize the honors. In a Cuban village these privi- 
leges are conceded unhesitatingly to the alcalde be- 
cause he represents political power commensurate with 
them. A beneficent instance of this power may be seen 
in the proclamations reducing the price of bread when 
it becomes too high. His proclamations enforcing 
public order contain frequent references to the culture 
and good name of the people. In the plays at the the- 
atre which represent Spanish customs the alcalde is 
always a leading character. It is the same in Cuba. 

The governors of the provinces could suspend the 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

alcaldes, this act being subject to the approval or 
disapproval of the Governor-General. Similarly they 
could suspend the assistant alcaldes and the regidores, 
or ordinary councilmen. Eegarding the superior au- 
thority, it was specifically declared that the alcalde 
was the representative of the state. Being so, he could 
not be the representative of the people of the commu- 
nity. In everything relating to the political govern- 
ment of the municipality, the authority, duties, and 
responsibilities of the alcalde were independent of the 
ayuntamiento. Likewise the assistant alcaldes and the 
alcaldes of the country districts were under the direc- 
tion of the municipal alcalde as the representative of the 
government. They did not represent the people. 

Under the system in force until the legislation fol- 
lowing the peace of El Zanjon, there were thirty-one 
gobiernos, or political districts, in the island, each of 
which had an ayuntamiento ; while the villages which 
were the heads of jurisdictions had local councils whose 
members were named by the civil governor of the prov- 
ince and were nominally responsible to him. Actually, 
they were responsible to the military authority. The 
elective officials in the larger municipalities were jus- 
tices of the peace and collectors of fines who were known 
as syndics. Besides their responsibility to the military 
authority, the civil governor, and the Governor-General, 
the auyuntamientos had also a central administration 
with a jefe or chief residing in Habana. The main 
functions of this central administration were the con- 
trol of the rural police. 

In spite of its defects, the law of 1878 was in one 
sense a concession to popular government. Before that 

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TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

time mairy municipalities had consisted simply of mili- 
tary districts whose absolute rulers were the military 
commanders. And the commander, though described 
as the captain of the district, was always a lieutenant 
ruler of some military official higher in power. When 
he was a benevolent and energetic despot he gave a 
good local administration ; but it was a military, and not 
a representative one. Where the military commander 
was a bad or an indifferent despot, the municipality 
reflected his character. This law also did away with 
the regidores perpetuales, or aldermen who held their 
offices for life. It may be said to have made a clear- 
ing in the jungle of centralized municipal government. 
But its application was limited, and the majority of the 
people had little conception of the system. To-day a 
question put to intelligent Cubans or Spaniards regard- 
ing the details of municipal government in past years 
is usually met with an apology for ignorance. They 
never knew much about it. 

The attributes and functions of ayuntamientos in- 
cluded the usual municipal services : opening of streets 
and parks, enrolment of residents, draining and sew- 
erage, bridges, water supply, baths, slaughter-houses, 
markets, sanitation, public construction, policing, and 
local public works generally, including the roads. Also 
charitable institutions and hospitals of their own or ad- 
ministered through benevolent societies. Penalties were 
provided for the infraction of municipal ordinances by 
fines. The ayuntamiento had power to require from all 
males between the ages of sixteen and fifty not to 
exceed twenty days' labor on public works. This is in 
another form the road tax of many of the States in the 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

American Union. The teniente alcaldes in the larger 
towns and cities were acting mayors in the absence of 
the alcaldes. Each also had a district in which he 
exercised the administrative municipal functions under 
the direction of the alcalde. The ayuntamientos se- 
lected from their own numbers one or two members 
who as procuradores sindicos, or attorneys, represented 
the corporation in all legal proceedings, and also re- 
vised the local bills and estimates. The ayuntamientos 
named their employes. The income of the municipal- 
ities came from goods owned by them, taxes on person- 
ality and realty, taxes laid for maintaining the police, 
fines for violations of ordinances, assessments upon 
the citizens or landowners, and imposts upon articles 
to eat, drink, and burn. Where the town was large 
enough to maintain a market, that was owned or con- 
trolled by the municipality. Generally it may be said 
that the chief source of income was the slaughter-house 
tax, which was from two or three cents a pound on 
beef. Habana had power to lay other imposts. 

A brief critical examination of the municipal law of 
1878, independent of its administration, is sufficient to 
show that under it there could be little growth in local 
self-government. The clear statement of the central- 
ized conception appears in the declaration that the al- 
calde is the representative of the central government; 
that in everything relating to the political government 
of a municipality his authority, powers, and responsi- 
bility are independent of the ayuntamiento. The ap- 
pointment of the alcaldes by the Governor-General, 
frequently not residents of the community, was the 
affirmation of this fact. A further check on the inde- 

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TO-MOREOW IN CUBA 

pendence of the ayuntamientos was devised in their 
subjection to the provincial deputations and again to 
the civil governors. The law underwent no organic 
statutory modification. It was interpreted and con- 
strued in the first place by royal orders and decrees 
from Madrid applicable to the municipalities of the 
peninsula. Then there were the circulars and decrees 
of the Governor-General construing and interpreting it, 
often in contradictory instructions. The saying that 
Spanish government in Cuba was government by decree 
f oundits_ aptest illustration in the municipal adminis- 
tration. 

Under the Spanish system everything came from 
above and from without. Spain began its administra- 
tion of the colonies on the principle that they should 
be treated as directly subject to the throne, commer- 
cially and politically. One was the corollary of the 
other. Columbus memorialized their Catholic Majes- 
ties for permission to appoint an alcalde in each group- 
ing of population. The Council of the Indies and the 
House of Trade were created within a few years after 
Columbus' discovery to secure and insure commercial 
monopoly. They exercised all the functions of civil 
administration, legislative, executive, and judicial. In 
that age was constructed the framework of the Span- 
ish colonial administrative system, which endured with 
little fundamental change until no colonies remained. 
This power began with the viceroys and Captain-Gen- 
erals. It ended with the municipalities. Captain- 
Generals ruled in Cuba for four hundred years. In 
the beginning they nominated governors and mayors. 
They were doing the same thing when the last Captain- 

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TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA 

General but one took the office in order to implant 
autonomy. Obedience to the superior authorities was 
exacted as rigorously in 1897 as in 1527, and with less 
power of local rule to the municipalities. 

All that the people of Cuba knew of municipal or of 
rural government is embodied in the statute. Less of 
actual knowledge was gathered by them from the sys- 
tem in operation than from reading the law, because the 
application was at the will of the Spanish authorities. 
These officials contrived to bring it into harmony with 
their own ideas of administration. Few abuses were 
corrected. Elections were made farces, so that good 
citizenship found no encouragement. In a municipal 
election of Guanabacoa the registry list was posted 
up as required. Three electors voted. The officials 
returned the whole list as voted, though some of those 
whose names were on it had been tenants of the grave- 
yards for months. The same thing was done elsewhere. 

The Autonomist constitution made important changes. 

Instead of the alcaldes being nominated by the Gov- 
ernor-General or the civil governor, it provided that 
the election by the ayuntamientos should be final, and 
that the alcaldes should exercise the active functions 
of the municipal administration as executors of the 
ordinances of the ayuntamientos and as their repre- 
sentatives. Instead of two thousand inhabitants for a 
termino municipal, the municipal organization was 
made obligatory on every group of population of more 
than one thousand. This provision was never carried 
into effect. The Autonomist legislation is useful as 
suggesting changes which may be made on a basis of 
the old laws for genuine local self-government. 

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TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA 

The American military authority through decrees 
of Governor-General Brooke modified and enlarged 
the sources of municipal income. They abolished 
the imposts on killing cattle which were known as the 
slaughter-house tax, along with those on food for arti- 
cles of consumption, and on wood and charcoal for 
burning. That is, the power of making the necessities 
of daily life dearer by local taxation was taken away. 
In recompense the municipalities were allowed to util- 
ize the state share of direct taxes upon town and coun- 
try real estate, and also the industrial tax. Some 
minor sources of income were further transferred from 
the central authority of the state to the muncipalities. 
The local imposts on alcoholic or spirituous beverages 
were not disturbed. These changes were necessarily 
provisional, and subject to the readjustment of the in- 
ternal fiscal system of the entire island. 

Under the American military authority a reappor- 
tionment of the municipalities in their boundaries and 
classifications was also outlined. Its provisional and 
temporary character renders valueless a detailed exam- 
ination of its effect on the local political organisms of 
the island. To a proper understanding of the future 
system of municipal self-government a knowledge of 
their relation to the provinces is necessary. 



123 



CHAPTER VII 

Provinces as a Federal Framework 

No Identity with Municipalities — Municipal Measures of Self-De- 
fence in Past — Provinces Not Similar to American States — Forms 
of Civil Authority — Governor and Deputation — Not Genuine 
Local Parliaments — Instruments of Central Authority — Provin- 
cial Commissions the Real Power — Deputations Abolished Under 
American Administration — Judicial Districts as Political Units 
— Establishment of Supreme Court — Registries of Property — 
Creation of Advisory Cabinet — Changes in Boundaries of Prov- 
inces Not Probable — What Regionalism Means — Remedy for It 
— Plans for Decentralization. 

Midway between local administration and the central 
authority was the provincial government. It will be of 
more importance in the future of Cuba than it was in 
the past of Spain. Its former relation was hardly 
definable. The provinces were facts of geography and 
fictions of administration. 

They did not grow out of any system of town and 
country government. With the insight afforded into 
the municipal administration of Cuba, and even with 
the modifications proposed by autonomy, the investiga- 
tor will not find much of local self-rule. He will search 
in vain for the genesis of the New England town meet- 
ing. His quest for something resembling the newly 
formed community of the West in the pioneer days, 
coming together by natural movement, calling itself 
into being, and providing for the management of its own 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

affairs, would be barren. One reason would be that 
Spanish colonial government is old and there was a 
precedent for every condition that might arise. And as 
the precedents were not favorable to the self-ruling 
instinct, the ideas which would be encountered on this 
subject would be primary, hardly rudimentary. 

Jaruco, in the province of Habana, has a connected 
municipal history of one hundred and forty years, but 
there is no record of a town gathering to consider 
public improvements or of an indignation meeting to 
protest against acts of public officials. Trinidad, in 
Santa Clara province, has an historic banner going 
back almost to the foundation of the town in the early 
part of the sixteenth century, but it has no memorials 
of local government. The town of Villa Clara has a 
history filled with incident, but the incidents are not 
of the community's management of its own local affairs 
by elections and by free discussion. Matanzas has a 
municipal organization recorded stage by stage from 
the opening of the seventeenth century to the present 
day. Its leading chapters in local administration are 
the measures it organized at various periods for de- 
fence against the pirates and the filibusters. Puerto 
Principe tells the same story, and its most luminous 
chapter is the heroic defence of the alcalde and the citi- 
zens against the land incursion of Morgan and his buc- 
caneers in 1668. 

Habana's early history is filled with similar inci- 
dents. When the English assaulted the city the regi- 
dores, or aldermen, were in charge of the garrisons. 
Habana at that time was a larger city than the Boston 
which held the tea party or the New York which a 

125 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

dozen and more years later expelled Lord Howe. It 
was almost as large as the Philadelphia in which the 
Continental Congress met. It complained righteously 
that its municipal basis had continued since its primi- 
tive creation that of the smallest councils in the penin- 
sula. In the first quarter of this century it remon- 
strated that it had no power to control municipal 
government, that its council was in shackled hands. 
There was, nevertheless, more local or municipal lib- 
erty, though not of free discussion, during the first three 
centuries of Spanish government of Cuba than during 
this last century. The need of measures of self-defence 
was one. The Council of the Indies was also concerned 
with the commercial benefits arising from liberal treat- 
ment of the municipalities, and the dangers of political 
revolution were not great. But in those times the prov- 
inces of Cuba did not exist as geographical or political 
divisions. 

Rising from the subject of local and municipal gov- 
ernment to that of provincial or territorial government, 
it may be said that there was none in the American 
sense. The provinces did not have that degree of inde- 
pendence which is conceded to territories in the United 
States. There was nothing that approached the idea 
of a provincial legislature. No conception of such a 
function could exist in a country where there was no 
national legislature; where the Cortes across the sea 
legislated, and the agents of the crown administered 
according to their own will. For>a series of years Cuba 
was divided politically into territorial provinces each 
with a lieutenant-governor appointed by the Captain- 
General. There were also military, judicial, regional, 

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TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

maritime, ecclesastical, and economic divisions. Their 
spheres and functions are indicated by their names, 
except possibly the economic division, which is better 
described as the real hacienda, or royal treasury. It 
was the fiscal department of the island. These depart- 
ments interlaced as it were in a network, without clear 
distinction between administrative and other branches ; 
but since the Spanish system was essentially military, 
they all converged in the Captain-General, called in his 
civil capacity the Governor-General. 

By the royal decree of 1878 the provinces of the 
island were fixed as they exist to-day, the division be- 
ing into six civil jurisdictions, which took their names 
from their respective capitals. With these provinces 
in mind, the other divisions into maritime, regional, 
ecclesiastical, and so on may be ignored. The admin- 
istrative authorities of each province were the governor, 
the provincial deputation, and the provincial commission 
or junta. The governor was named by the supreme au- 
thority. He had a substantial veto on the acts of the 
ayimtamientos and of the deputations. He supervised 
elections. To him was especially intrusted the admin- 
istration of public order in the province. Genuine 
provincial government was lost somewhere in these 
centralized functions of government and administration. 
To find it again and restore it to its proper place and 
rightful function is one of the tasks of the future. 

The political entity of the province was recognized 
in the provincial deputations. Their similarity to the 
same bodies in the peninsula was often quoted as evi- 
dence that Cuba enjoyed as much civil liberty as did 
the mother country herself. Cuba, it was declared, 

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TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

had local parliaments, and could ask nothing more with- 
out placing herself on a higher plane than the provinces 
of the peninsula. But the parliamentary character of 
these provincial deputations does not disclose itself on 
inquiry. They were anachronisms. They were merely 
another check on local self-government. They were 
neither provincial legislatures nor provincial councils. 
The deputation was composed of deputies selected by 
the electors who voted for concejales. Three were 
chosen from each judicial district of the province. 
Their term was four years. The deputation was es- 
pecially charged, first, with the improvement of the 
roads, irrigation canals, provincial public works, hospi- 
tals, and instruction ; secondly, with the administration 
of provincial funds and the general management of the 
fiscal affairs. Educational establishments might be 
created or sustained by the deputations, subject to the 
general law regarding public instruction. With rela- 
tion to the municipalities the deputation enjoyed the 
faculties conferred upon it by the municipal law, which 
were of a general supervisory character. 

Then there was the provincial commission, which 
was named by the Governor-General from the members 
of the deputation. Its membership was five. The com- 
mission was assumed to hold regular sittings at the 
capital of the province. It answered to the Governor- 
General's Council of Administration. Its members 
were lawyers, and they gave opinions upon the laws 
and regulations submitted to them by the governor of 
the province or by the Governor-General. It decided 
disputed elections, and the eligibility of deputies when 
this was questioned. It acted as the provincial deputa- 

128 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

tion in emergencies when the full deputation could not 
be got together. In practice the commission, created 
out of the body of the deputation, served a useful 
purpose as instrument of the central authority. By 
chance or by neglect it would sometimes happen that 
the majority in a provincial deputation would be Au- 
tonomists. The superior power would feel obliged to 
check their too dangerous gropings after liberal gov- 
ernment, and their tendency to exercise to the limit 
the narrow prerogatives which the statutes gave them. 
This was done by the Governor-General in naming the 
permanent commission. There could always be found 
five or six members who would be subservient to the 
powers above. And thus what little good was in the 
provincial deputations was destroyed. 

The provincial commissions underwent an organic 
change in the law of 1890, but the change is not impor- 
tant now. Under the autonomous constitution of 1897 
they were declared to be of a permanent character. 
They were given essentially judicial functions. The 
provincial magistrates of the audiencia, or general court, 
were to preside over the commissions, which were to be 
known as provincial juntas. These juntas were to be 
composed of fifteen vocales, or delegates. By virtue of 
their being provincial deputies, the president and vice- 
president of the deputation and the oldest ex-presi- 
dent were to be vocales. There were also to be four 
tax-payers chosen by lot from among those who paid 
the first quota of the industrial tax, four from among 
those who paid the first quota of the land tax, and four 
citizens who had official titles showing their profes- 
sional or academic standing. 
9 129 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

The autonomist decrees made the deputations auton- 
omous in everything relating to the creation and dota- 
tion of establishments of public instruction, charitable 
institutions, provincial rights of way, maritime or 
fluvial, and the budget. The decrees also authorized 
both the municipalities and the provinces to establish 
freely the taxes to cover their expenses without other 
limitation than that these should be compatible with 
the general taxing system of the island. The resources 
for taxation of a province were declared to be indepen- 
dent of the municipal resources. In the election of 
members of the ayuntamientos and the deputations, 
provision was to be made for minority representation. 
From these provisions some hints may be had for 
the future, but that is all. The provincial deputations 
were so utterly useless that they were abolished by 
the American military administration. They are not 
likely to be re-established under any system of govern- 
ment that may be adopted. 

In describing the municipalities, reference has been 
made to the judicial districts. In Spain's colonial 
administration the judicial district seems to have been 
the political unit. At one period it was almost synony- 
mous with or meant the same as the military partido, 
or district. The laws following the compact of El Zan- 
jon made no important change in the judicial system of 
the island. There were 33 judicial districts then, and 
the number has been increased or decreased by one or 
two at different times. The judicial districts in the 
island number at present 34. They are divided among 
the provinces as follows : Pinar del Kio, 5 ; Habana, 7 ; 
Matanzas, 6; Santa Clara, 6; Puerto Principe, 3; San- 

130 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

tiago de Cuba, 7. Each judicial district is the cabe- 
cera, or head, of a number of municipalities. Some- 
times, as in the case of the city of Habana, there is 
only one municipality, but most of the districts have 
included in their jurisdiction half a dozen municipali- 
ties. Each district has a judge of the first instance, 
except that of Habana, which necessarily has more 
than one. This judge of the first instance, or primary 
judge, might be designated variously as a county, dis- 
trict, or circuit judge. The judicial partido would be 
known in the United States as a circuit rather than as 
a district. What are known as the municipal* judges 
come closer to the definition of county judges and jus- 
tices of the peace. They are more numerous than the 
judges of the first instance, numbering two hundred. 
The municipal judges have the ordinary functions of 
local magistrates and possess police powers. The 
judges of all classes were appointed by the higher 
authorities. 

The audiencias, or general courts, as commonly un- 
derstood, would be called appellate courts in most of 
the States of the Union. Under Spanish sovereignty 
the final appeal was to the courts in Madrid. Origi- 
nally in Cuba justice was administered from the ancient 
audiencia established in Santo Domingo. When that 
island was ceded to France in 1795, the judicial tribu- 
nal was translated to the city of Puerto Principe as 
the most midland one of Cuba. It began its functions 
in 1802. In 1838 a second audiencia was established in 
Habana, and with a pretorial character which was lack- 
ing in the Puerto Principe tribunal. For the adminis- 
tration of justice the aim was to adapt the judicial 

131 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

districts to the political and military boundaries. Till 
recently Habana constituted the superior audiencia ; but 
Puerto Principe was a royal audiencia to which per- 
tained civil jurisdiction over Santiago de Cuba. For- 
merly the division was into twenty-six judicial districts, 
known as the territory of the royal pretorial audiencia, 
or general courts. Each of these judicial districts had 
an alcalde mayor or ordinary judge who had auxiliary 
alcaldes or local judges. The appeal lay direct from 
these courts of conciliation and counsel to the audiencia 
sitting in Habana. 

Each province of the island is a criminal audiencia 
in itself. The judgments of this criminal court may be 
appealed to the criminal section of the Habana audi- 
encia. The audiencia of Habana includes the province 
of that name and the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Ma- 
tanzas, and Santa Clara. While each municipality is 
supposed to have its municipal court, there are some 
places not municipalities which have their municipal 
judge. Habana is divided into districts with different 
branches of the audiencia having jurisdiction. Under 
the American military authority, a supreme court was 
established to take the place of the Madrid tribunals, 
which were the courts of last resort. The Supreme 
Court of Cuba consists of a chief-justice and six asso- 
ciate justices. An independent court had previously 
been organized in the province of Santiago without ref- 
erence to the former pretorial audiencia of Puerto Prin- 
cipe, of which jurisdiction it was part. A question was 
raised whether this Santiago court was final in its decis- 
ions or whether they could be appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the island. The only logical answer which 

132 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

could be given to this question was given, and the San- 
tiago tribunal was declared a subordinate one. This 
sketch of the administrative organism of the judicial 
system is presented here without reference to the laws 
themselves, because the courts are a part of the local 
and the provincial regimes as of the general govern- 
ment. 

Another organism is that of the registry of property. 
These do not follow the lines of the municipalities or 
county divisions, as is customary in the United States, 
but in a general way follow the boundaries of the judi- 
cial districts. Actually they are not so numerous. By 
royal decree of July 4th, 1879, twenty-five registries 
were established for the whole island. In most in- 
stances the boundaries are coincident and coequal with 
the boundaries of the judicial districts; but Habana 
City has one register for its three districts and for its 
suburb of Marianao ; and in the eastern provinces there 
are also consolidated registries. This accounts for the 
number of registries not being equal to that of the 
judcial districts. It may be said that the registries of 
landownership and the records of property transfers 
are well kept. Contrary to the common belief, titles in 
Cuba are easily traced, and are, if anything, more secure 
than in the United States. 

From what is and what has been, an idea may be 
gained of what the internal political and administrative 
framework of the Cuba of the future may be. For the 
present it is not of moment to discuss the external 
aspects of the prospective state, or whether it shall have 
departments of foreign relations, of the army, and of 
the navy. Cuba may be considered as a federal body 

133 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

■with central authority and central administration. The 
difference in the future will be that the central author- 
ity will rest on a foundation of local and provincial 
government, instead of the provinces and municipalities 
depending on it and from it. The old conception of 
centralized authority will disappear. Though the Cap- 
tain-General was the supreme power, even before the 
implantation of autonomy he had his Council of Ad- 
ministration which advised him in regard to the inter- 
pretation of the colonial statutes and their application 
to the island, or to its provinces and municipalities. 
The only point w r as that he could enforce his own arbi- 
trary construction whenever he chose. This freedom of 
the executive from responsibility is one of the defects of 
the past system which is certain to be remedied. What- 
ever form the future government of the island may 
take, Cuba will have a judiciary department coequal 
with the executive branch. It has seen too much of 
the subordination and the prostitution of the courts ever 
to consent to placing them on a lower plane than the 
executive power. 

For what might be called the internal federal admin- 
istration, autonomy made little change in the outward 
system. The Autonomist cabinet in practice was little 
more than raising the departments of the treasury, 
public works, and education to cabinet positions, with 
separate functions which also embraced the administra- 
tive features of the courts and of agriculture. The Ameri- 
can military authority created a provisional advisory 
cabinet for the four departments respectively of the 
treasury, of state and government, of public works, 
and of justice and education. These departments are 

134 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the central power in what might be called internal 
administration, for the control of the customs was kept 
so largely within the American military authority that 
it could hardly be called a part of the actual juris- 
diction of the provisional treasury department. The 
department of state is a misnomer. In the provisional 
arrangement it is the department which regulates the 
relations of the municipalities and provinces to the gen- 
eral government. In the evolution of the common- 
wealth of Cuba its functions are decidedly the most 
important of all the departments. 

The six provinces will probably exist in the future as 
they exist to-day geographically and politically. Vari- 
ous suggestions have been made of rearranging their 
boundaries and consolidating them. The natural divi- 
sion would be into the eastern, central, and western 
provinces. The Spanish authorities in their military 
and judicial divisions split the island into two districts. 
Pinar del Eio was also at one time joined with the 
province of Habana. But the inhabitants have become 
accustomed to the present boundaries, and they are a 
people who cling strongly to that to which they are 
accustomed. Each province has its history, its local 
usages, and its traditions. Each province has a capi- 
tal of the same name. When General J. C. Bates fixed 
the military headquarters of his department at Cienfu- 
egos, a mere military convenience, strong feeling was 
aroused in the little city of Santa Clara, which under 
Spanish sway was the centre of both political and mili- 
tary administration. The people protested against the 
removal of the ancient capital of the province. Tri- 
fling as was the incident, the intensity of the protests 

135 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

showed how difficult it would be to enter upon a series 
of changes which upset old boundaries and did violence 
to ancient memories. 

Some of the Cuban revolutionary leaders have 
worked out a plan of five provinces to replace the exist- 
ing division. The first Cuban revolutionary assembly 
divided the island into four jurisdictions, with prefec- 
turas and sub-prefecturas as the subordinate adminis- 
trative districts. But this was for the military opera- 
tions of the insurgent troops, and never came to the 
knowledge of the masses of the people. They are at- 
tached to the present divisions and may be depended 
on to oppose a change. 

These six provinces are also to be considered as six 
states or territories within a nation, rather than as six 
great counties within a state. But this is within defi- 
nite limitations. The wisest among the Cuban lead- 
ers already appreciate the importance of nationalizing 
the sentiment while decentralizing the administration. 
The provinces will have elective civil governors — that 
can be readily foreseen. The uncertain question is 
how much further they will go. The uselessness of the 
provincial deputations has been disclosed, and at this 
day there is little disposition to revive them. A pro- 
vincial parliament in the sense of a twofold legislative 
body corresponding to the American State legislatures 
is not an apparent necessity even as a part of the edu- 
cation in popular government. With the laws uniform 
for the whole island, as they will be, there does not 
appear to be a wide sphere for provincial lawmaking. 
The administrative functions are the important ones. 

It may be that the doubt will ultimately resolve itself 

136 



TO-MORBOW IN CUBA 

into the creation of councils something like the territo- 
rial councils in the early history of the Western territo- 
ries of the Union. These councils may possess mixed 
executive and legislative functions. They may become 
the general board with reference to the municipalities, 
but not in the sense of the veto power possessed by the 
old provincial deputations. An understanding of the 
sentiment as it exists to-day will make this clear. The 
people of the various communities have a real longing 
for home rule. They may not know much about the 
system in operation, they may not do it so well as 
higher authority would do it for them, but they have a 
full determination to do it themselves without the veto 
of provincial assembly, provincial governor, or Gover- 
nor-General. Some general legislation will undoubt- 
edly be enacted which will simplify their work. Prob- 
ably the line between town and country government will 
be drawn more distinctly, so that the confusing term 
municipality — confusing to Americans — will not have 
its present wide application. But the organization of 
either country grouping or of town inhabitants will be 
on the basis of self-government within the administra- 
tive organism of the province. The municipalities, 
whether city or rural, are units of the future provincial 
administration. The provinces are the units of the 
decentralized federal authority that is to be evolved 
into a commonwealth. 

The physical features of the various provinces may 
be said to have a bearing on the political characteristics 
of their inhabitants; yet these are not marked enough 
to develop strong differences. Most of the mineral 
wealth is in the eastern section of the island, and the 

137 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

tobacco districts are the central and western regions. 
Beyond this there is a general similarity of products. 
No dangerous diversity is likely to spring up among 
people who follow similar pursuits. Like the Span- 
iards in the island, the Cubans have their distinctions 
of localities. With the blacks of Santiago there is a 
slight mixture of Jamaica negroes, while Haiti and 
Santo Domingo also have representation. The mulatto 
element there is the result of the crossing of French 
blood. Around Baracoa and the towns on the north 
coast are yet traces of the habits and customs of the 
French refugees of Santo Domingo. These French ref- 
ugees were the most progressive industrial element that 
ever entered into the life of Cuba. The Camagiieyans, 
the inhabitants of the central province of Puerto Prin- 
cipe, are fond of calling themselves the genuine Cu- 
bans; and in this part of the island it must be con- 
fessed there is little of Spain, though sometimes a trace 
of Africa appears in the blood. Santa Clara, more par- 
ticularly the eastern part of the province, also claims 
the distinction of being purely Cuban. As with the 
Camagiieyans, its men are superior physically to those 
in the western part of the island. From Matanzas west 
through Habana and Pinar del Bio there is more 
mezcla or reunion of Spanish and Cuban blood. 

The Spanish writers called this provincial sentiment, 
when applied to the people of the various provinces 
of the peninsula, regionalism. It might be translated 
into English by the word sectionalism. Whatever dan- 
ger of sectionalism exists is in the two eastern prov- 
inces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe. They 
were in constant rebellion against Spanish authority, 

138 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

and the query is whether they will riot insist on having 
independent governments of their own rather than be 
parts of a central political organism. Santiago prov- 
ince especially is credited with this possible ambition. 
The city of that name in a small way is a rival of Ha- 
bana. The province is geographically almost discon- 
nected from the rest of the island. Symptoms of oppo- 
sition to the general government were shown under the 
American control. At regular periods protests would 
be made against the customs receipts being distributed 
throughout the island, instead of the dues received at 
the Santiago ports being disbursed exclusively in that 
province. This attitude was indirectly encouraged by 
the American officials who were administering the af- 
fairs of the province as an independent department. 
Santiago, as it happened, came under the American 
control several months before the remaining provinces. 
So much was accomplished there under the wise di- 
rection of General Leonard Wood, that it was perhaps 
naturally his part to seek the fullest freedom of admin- 
istration, as though the eastern end of the island were 
a separate country. 

Should the popular currents run for annexation when 
the time comes to determine the form of stable govern- 
ment which is to prevail, a revival of this feeling may 
be looked for in the request of Santiago to be joined 
with Puerto Principe and be erected into a separate 
state. But in the presumption of an independent isl- 
and government too much stress should not be given 
temporary outcroppings of regionalism on the part of 
Santiago or Puerto Principe. The building of the cen- 
tral or backbone railroad will draw these provinces into 

139 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

closer industrial and commercial relation with the west- 
ern provinces, and their political interests are in any 
circumstance identical with the rest of the island. The 
free institutions for which all aspire are the same. To 
check the spread of regionalism or sectionalism all the 
provinces should share equitably in the central admin- 
istration. With uniform general laws, and with the 
municipalities acting as independent local organisms 
within the provinces, the latter will have a distinct 
function in the commonwealth. They should form the 
administrative federal framework on a decentralized 
basis. 



140 



CHAPTEE VIII 

The Race of Coloe 

Senor Don a Gentleman— Official Definition of Civil Status— Spanish 
Law Affirmed by American Authority — Nightmare of Black West 
India League— Analysis of Statistics of Population — Comparison 
with Jamaica, — Relative Decrease of Blacks — Temporary Relative 
Increase as the Result of Reconcentration — Colonization Improb- 
able—Value of Negro Labor on Plantations— Higher Industrial 
Plane than in the United States— No Color-Line— Dispropor- 
tionate Number of Criminals — Nanigoism a Misleading Term 
for Crime — Advance of Blacks Under the Spanish Civilization 
— Future Standing that of Political and Industrial Equality. 

A staring interrogation is better answered when first 
met. What of the black race? The question cannot 
be evaded. The existence of the blacks must be reck- 
oned with in every phase of the reconstruction of the 
island. Consequently their standing and their pros- 
pects are now discussed with the simple reminder that 
Cuba has social and economic problems to solve as 
well as political ones. The African population has a de- 
fined status socially, industrially, and politically. The 
black race has no future separate from that of the other 
inhabitants of Cuba. It is essentially and integrally a 
part of that future. 

The negro or the mulatto may call himself "Don," 
and ask that others use the prefix in addressing him. 
This is more than the simple " Mister " of American fa- 

141 



TOMOKBOW IN CUBA 

miliarity. " Senor " answers to that meaning. " Don " 
is the "Esquire," the old English designation for gen- 
tleman, the title of courtesy, and it is translated by 
the dictionaries as the Spanish name for gentleman. 
The colored man is not simply Senor So-and-So: he 
is Senor Don So-and-So. The prefix was the posses- 
sion of the proudest grandees of Spain, and it is still 
supposed to carry with it a certain dignity. The Cap- 
tain-General of Spain, whose titles filled half a page, 
was always " Don " in the beginning of his official dig- 
nities and honors. And under Spanish law, by formal 
resolution of a Captain-General, the humblest negro in 
Cuba was decreed as rightfully using the same prefix. 

The distinct recognition of the civil status of the 
African race under the Spanish law was formally pro- 
claimed by Captain-General Calleja in 1893. It was, 
in effect, the interpretation and indorsement given by 
the Council of Administration in affirming previous de- 
crees. This action is sometimes described as a mere 
authorization of the blacks to use the title of "Don." 
In reality it was far more. The story of this definition 
of the civil rights of the race of color under Spanish 
law is instructive. Yarious societies of blacks peti- 
tioned the superior authorities that they direct the 
governors of the provinces and the presiding judges and 
fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, of the courts to com- 
municate to their subordinates the decrees and official 
dispositions previously made affirming the right of the 
colored classes to enjoy equal rights with the white 
classes, and prohibiting the establishment of distinc- 
tions by reason of color. The official dispositions pre- 
viously made forbade the proprietors of cafes or simi- 

142 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

lar public places to discriminate against persons of 
color, and affirmed the privilege of the blacks to travel 
on the railways on the same terms as the whites. 

The Council of Administration under Captain-General 
Calleja did not consider instructions to the courts nec- 
essary, but it granted the other requests of the colored 
societies.* The basis which it affirmed was an official 
disposition made by the governor of the province of 
Pinar del Eio in 1885. A negro complained that the 
proprietor of a cafe refused to serve him because of his 
color. The government thereupon issued an order 
directing that the penalties be enforced and that the 
discrimination cease. This order recited that " if cus- 
toms were the fruits of the ideas which inspired the 
laws, it was the duty of the supreme authority, mindful 
of its own, to combat the prejudices in the minds of the 
people from usages and opinions born of times which 
had disappeared, never to return. For the success of 
such important ends it was competent for the superior 
authority to consecrate itself to the maintenance and 
the respect of the rights which the Spanish constitution 
guaranteed to every Spanish citizen, and which reposed 
in the principle of equality." This declaration stands 
unchanged. Under the Spanish rule few instances 
arose in which this enforcement was necessary. 

After the American occupation a mulatto chief of the 
insurrection was refused entertainment in a cafe kept 
by Americans. The Spanish code of civil rights, cited 
above, was invoked and was enforced. However dis- 
tasteful it may be to American prejudices, the code will 
be enforced. Nor will there ever be discrimination 

* Gaceta de la Habana, December 19th, 1893. 
143 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

on account of color in the privileges of railroad travel. 
The American military authorities from the outset 
showed a scrupulous regard for the civil rights of the 
blacks. So far as their official acts went, they studi- 
ously ignored the color-line and discouraged race prej- 
udice. The social toleration which was so natural for 
Spaniards and white Cubans did not prove difficult for 
the military commanders. But their example was not 
always followed by their own countrymen. 

The idea of a black West India republic has been 
both a dream and a nightmare. It haunted the Eng- 
lish historian, James Anthony Froude, like a spectre, 
and conjured up for him visions of a mongrel nation of 
negroids. In moments of despair American states- 
men have dreamed it as the solution to the problem 
of the African race in the United States. To more of 
them it has been a nightmare, a fear that the Antilles 
would become, if not a menace, at least a bar to the 
civilization of the continent. Haiti, on the map hardly 
bigger than a man's hand, in the Antillian sky became 
a portentous cloud. The cloud is a psychic, not a physi- 
cal phenomenon. It disappears on analysis. In the 
early part of the century, when Humboldt * began to 
differentiate the population of the West Indies, the 
blacks in Cuba were in excess of the whites. The fig- 
ures as then collated were as follows : 

* After Humboldt, the most complete analyses were given by Ar- 
boleya in his "Manual de la Isla de Cuba," published in 1859, and 
by Pezuela in the "Diccionario de la Isla Cuba," published in 
1863. The fullest analysis of the subsequent censuses may be found 
in "La Revista Cubana" in a series of articles by Senor Coppinger. 
While perplexed by confusing figures and unreliable official statis- 
tics, all the authorities substantially agree in their conclusions. 

144 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA 

1811. 1817. 1825. 

Whites 274,000 290,000 325,000 

Blacks 336,000 340,268 390,000 

Total 610,000 630,268 715,000 

A discrepancy between the statistics of 1811 and 
1817 is chargeable to imperfect census-taking. It is 
also noted that from 1811 to 1825 the jurisdiction of 
Habana received 185,000 negroes brought by the slave 
traders from Africa. With respect to other countries in 
1825, the population of Cuba was almost double that of 
Jamaica. By color, thus : 

White. Black. 

Cuba 46 per cent. 54 per cent. 

Jamaica 6 " 94 " 

Taking the greater Antilles as a group, Humboldt 
found that, excluding fractional percentages, the pure 
blacks were 68 per cent, the mixed blacks 15 per cent, 
the whites 17 per cent. These estimates are simply 
relative, the exact proportion not being determined. A 
generation may be passed over without special observa- 
tion, and the statistics gathered in 1855 be analyzed. 
During those thirty years the slave trade had not been 
seriously restricted, though Spain was party to the 
treaty with Great Britain for its abolition. Here is the 
relation of the two races in Cuba in 1855 : 

Whites 498,752 47.65 per cent. 

Blacks 545,433 52.35 " 

Total 1,044, 185 100.00 per cent. 

A fractional reduction of the black percentage and a 
corresponding increase of the white percentage appear, 
10 145 



TO-MOEKQW IN CUBA 

yet so slight as to indicate no real change in the rela- 
tive position of the two races. Arboleya, taking the 
years 1827 and 1854, analyzed the statistics which he 
considered trustworthy a little differently. He placed 
the percentage of whites in 1827 at 44, and of blacks at 
56. In 1854 he made it, whites 47 per cent, and blacks 
53. Another ten or twelve years, and the change had 
begun which has since continued. The census of 1867, 
taken a twelvemonth before the outbreak of the Ten- 
Years' war, and before the gradual emancipation of the 
slaves commenced, shows : 

Whites 764,750 55.09 per cent. 

Blacks 605,461 44.91 " 

Total 1,370,211 100.00 per cent. 

Here is an apparent increase in the number of whites 
of 326,000, while the increase of the blacks is only 
60,000. Actually it was less, because the Chinese, 
vaguely enumerated, were included. In 1877 the total 
population had grown to 1,509,291. Leaving out 40,000 
Asiatics and 8,400 foreigners, and making the correction 
of the Madrid statistics for transients and absent resi- 
dents, we have a difference of 7,000. 

Whites 973,725 67 per cent. 

Blacks... 480,166 33 " 

Total whites and blacks .... 1,453,891 100 per cent. 

These figures show an actual, as well as a relative 
decrease in the number of blacks. It is so large as to 
be puzzling. The Spanish statisticians explain it on 
the ground of imperfect census-taking. This is always 
a justifiable explanation in dealing with Spanish statis- 

146 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

tics. It does not alter the known fact that the relative 
decrease of the blacks had begun, and that a large in- 
crease of the whites was taking place, partly from 
immigration and partly from natural development. 
Coming to 1887, the last regular census that was taken, 
the results show : 

Whites 1,102,889 69.46 per cent. 

Blacks 484,987 30.54 " 

Total 1,587,876 100.00 per cent. 

Asiatics 43,811 

Grand total 1,631,687 

Foreigners, who had grown to exceed 32,000, are in- 
cluded among the whites. They were relatively so 
large an element that they may properly be considered 
in balancing the races. 

Here is an actual decrease in the percentage of the 
blacks during the ten years. If the figures are in 
error, it is possible to accept the conclusion that the 
blacks were stationary while the whites were progress- 
ing. There was a large increase by white immigration 
from Spain during this period. This steady decrease 
of the negroes under the most favored conditions seems 
to be conclusive as to the natural ascendency of the 
whites by force of numbers. It is true that the cen- 
suses taken were all based on slave conditions ; but the 
emancipation of the negroes had been going on, and 
there is nothing to show that the increase of population 
has been larger during the years of freedom. In the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century, 54 per cent of 
Cuba was black blood, 46 per cent white blood. In the 

147 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

middle of the century practically the same conditions 
obtained. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
relatively 30 per cent black and 70 per cent white blood 
is the proportion. 

The census of to-day may show a larger percent- 
age of negroes and mulattoes, due to artificial causes. 
Every observer noted during the period of reconcentra- 
tion that the black victims of Weyler's policy stood it 
better than the whites. The blacks formed the larger 
element of the surviving country population. But this 
is a temporary condition only. The broad fact can be 
stated that at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the black population of Cuba was 54 per cent and of 
Jamaica 94 per cent. At the end of that century nor- 
mally it would not be greatly in excess of 30 per cent. 
Actually, as a result of the reconcentration, it may 
prove to be 40 per cent. In Jamaica it is 99 per cent. 
In Cuba, two whites for one black ; in Jamaica, 99 blacks 
for every white. Some writers classify the blacks in 
Cuba into various divisions of natives, Africans, and 
mulattoes or mixed blood. Spaniards and Cubans do 
not talk of the black race. With them it is the race of 
color. In some of the censuses taken, distinction of 
mulattoes and blacks is drawn; but it is not necessary 
in determining the number of whites. Whether of the 
Latin race born in Spain or born in Cuba, the propor- 
tion of white to colored blood is as two to one. 

The mixture may be traced through all grades and 
through a wilderness of statistics in slavery and since 
slavery, but for half a century there is the steady de- 
crease of the African race relatively to the white race. 
Superficial observation is so often relied on to settle 

148 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

this question, and the conclusions drawn from this 
observation are put forth with such positiveness, that it 
is fair to measure these conclusions by the history of 
a century as shown in the census statistics. Before 
them, assumption falls to the ground. Unless artificial 
conditions arise, the history of the last fifty years 
seems to show that Cuba is in no danger of becoming a 
negroid nation, which means a preponderance of black 
and yellow blood. 

The possibility of an artificial movement can be 
judged in the light of what has happened. For a 
quarter of a century there has been a free movement of 
the blacks throughout the West Indies. They could 
come to Cuba from Jamaica, from Haiti, from Santo 
Domingo, and from the Bahamas. A sprinkling of all 
these classes of blacks was found among the insur- 
gents—the Bahamas and Santo Domingo furnishing 
the greater number of them. This free movement will 
doubtless continue, though after the American occupa- 
tion it was temporarily checked by the application of 
the immigration laws of the United States. This was 
due to exceptional circumstances in the eastern end of 
the island. It prevented the influx of idle blacks from 
Jamaica. 

No reason exists for thinking that the free movement 
of the West Indian population will have a greater influ- 
ence in the future than in the past. The industrial 
conditions may call for harder work, and that assur- 
edly will not invite a heavy immigration from the other 
islands. It is evident that the black population of 
Cuba can only be swelled by colonization or immigra- 
tion on a colossal scale. Both whites and blacks are 

149 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

opposed to negro colonization. If a heavy black immi- 
gration is to be sought, it can only come from the 
United States. Such a thing might happen as a mil- 
lion or more American negroes, wearied over the con- 
tinued denial of their political rights, taking their 
flight across the Florida straits, but it is not an hy- 
pothesis based on probability. The American negroes, 
as a class, have not given up their destiny in the 
United States. Small projects of colonization may be 
attempted; some negroes in the Southern States will 
inevitably drift to Cuba ; but the physical surroundings 
will not be substantially different from the cane-fields 
and the cotton-fields of the South. Moreover, while 
they will find themselves among people of their own 
color, the tongue will be a strange one to them. No- 
body who knows the habits of the Southern negro and 
his sociable nature believes he will long endure this 
isolation. The scheme of negro colonization has been 
broached in the United States, but the American ne- 
groes have shown little disposition to encourage it, and 
it finds no support among their race in Cuba. 

In the industrial sense the value of negro labor in 
Cuba has not had full justice done to it. Agricultu- 
rally, it is essentially of the sugar plantation. Admit- 
tedly the black does not do well at fruit-raising, and 
the intricacy of tobacco cultivation is too great for him 
to become a successful veguero, or tobacco farmer. In 
the cane-field he is at his best as a laborer. The right 
arm that wielded the machete in cutting cane was more 
feared by the Spanish troops than the arm which 
sighted the Remington rifle. The estimates of the 
sugar planters vary, but out of a sheaf of such esti- 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

mates it is possible to form the conclusion that fully 
one-half of the plantation laborers are black. On some 
estates they have remained with little change since slav- 
ery times. They do not work hard enough and long 
enough in the sun to suit the plantation owner, espe- 
cially if he be an American or Englishman. Labor, 
whether white or black, in the tropics will never sweat 
quite enough to please capital. Knowing the wealth 
of the soil, the capitalist frets at his inability to gather 
the fullest fruits of its fertility. 

The negro field-hand is not always willing to work 
six days out of the seven, though the oxen which may 
be his own and the cart which is his would lend their 
aid to continuous productiveness. His traits in this 
respect are not dissimilar to those of the negro in the 
South and of the white laborer everywhere under the 
burning sun of the tropics. But under sympathetic 
management the race is fairly industrious. The Cuban 
negro has a marked trait in the instinct of landowner- 
ship. It is one of the standard complaints of the sugar 
planters that he clings to his cabin and his patch of 
ground to the detriment of successful cane-raising. He 
does not care to be swallowed up in the big plantation, 
and usually his wish for a bohio or palm-hut of his 
own in preference to quarters in the plantation bar- 
racks has to be gratified. Under encouraging circum- 
stances this drawback may be surmounted. The way 
lies open. It is to increase the negro's wants by edu- 
cating him up to a higher standard of consumption. 
Then he will exert his strength more in order to meet 
that standard. It is also worth noting, as every trav- 
eller in the West Indies does note, that the Cuban ne- 

151 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

gro supports his family. The negro women do not 
work on the roads and in the fields as in Jamaica. 
The men perform that labor. The women care for the 
children — always a numerous brood. 

In the industrial life of the towns and cities the 
Cuban negro is on a higher plane than is his brother 
in the United States. It may be that the African has 
no aptitude for the mechanical arts. Cuba is hardly 
the field for determining that question, because it is not 
a manufacturing country; but in such light manufac- 
tures as it has, the negro works on an even plane with 
the white man of the border tropics. The cigar facto- 
ries of Habana attest this fact. Between twenty and 
twenty-five per cent of the cigar-makers are blacks. 
They work at the same bench with the whites. They 
receive the same pay. They have the same voice and 
the same influence in the labor unions. In the shoe 
shops there is the same equality in labor. The white 
lad and the black lad work side by side. The negroes 
are found in the tanneries and in the shops where sad- 
dles are made. They are in the building trades, many 
of them as masons and painters. No complaint is heard 
that the black artisans do less work than the whites. 
They hold their own in the less skilful grades of labor. 
A fair proportion are also clerks. The broad general- 
ization can be made and confirmed by observation that 
in the industrial life of Cuba, whether agricultural or 
mechanical, the negro shows an equal aptitude with the 
white man. 

The outline which has been given of the industrial 
condition of the blacks and the mulattoes has inferen- 
tially carried with it a statement of their position in the 

152 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

social organization. That there is no color-line is re- 
marked by every traveller. Caste feeling is not absent, 
social equality does not exist, but there is social tolera- 
tion. The presence of the negro is not an offence to 
the whites. Kace prejudice is not rabid. It is further 
noted that the African race in Cuba is homogeneous. 
The mulattoes are not antagonized by the blacks. The 
military leaders who gave the race its share in the 
honors of the insurrection were, with few execptions, 
mulattoes. The pure black knows that he shares their 
honors, and is content. 

This sketch of the position of the negro in Cuba 
would be incomplete and misleading if it failed to note 
the blemishes. A controversial literature exists in 
which Spanish and Cuban authors discuss the relative 
statistics of crime with reference to peninsulars and 
insulars. With the African race such a discussion is 
not necessary. A disproportionate number of crimi- 
nals are black. The chain-gang which may be seen 
daily going through the streets of the cities under 
armed guard is made up of blacks. The Nanigoes, 
frequently cited as a society of banded criminals, are 
chiefly of blacks. Nevertheless it is doubtful if these 
Nanigoes are as entirely criminal as is generally as- 
sumed. The Spanish authorities made it out so for 
their own convenience. The American police officials 
who organized the Habana police force did not describe 
the organization as a distinctly criminal one. What 
they found was that criminals of all classes and of all 
colors took refuge under the shadows of the Nanigoes. 
Whenever a crime was committed, it was said to be by 
the Nanigoes. Originally the society had no criminal 

153 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

element in it. It was formed by the Africans brought 
as slaves from the regions tributary to the Gulf of 
Guinea. Bryan Edwards, in his volume on the British 
West Indies, published a century ago, notes a similar 
society in Jamaica. The classes who were most promi- 
nent in its formation were from the districts of Africa 
known as Carabali. They brought the superstitions 
of their tribes with them. 

The first organization of the slaves, in 1836, as Nani- 
goes was permitted by the masters as something en- 
tirely harmless. The rites of Yoodooism were prac- 
tised, and natives not born in Africa were not admitted. 
Subsequently separate societies of Cuban-born ne- 
groes were formed, but not on the same plane as the 
ones born in Africa. These various societies were 
known as Juegos. They had their ceremonies of initi- 
ation and of burial — grotesque and superstitious. In 
time these Juegos became imbued with the criminal 
element, and personal vengeances were executed. Ulti- 
mately Juegos of white Naiiigoes were also formed. 
As it existed in its greatest vigor, the society had no 
central organization. Each Juego was independent. 
These Juegoes were sometimes at war with one an- 
other. The Spanish police claimed that the Nanigoes 
had a ritual of crime and assassination, that the cere- 
monies provided for the commission of crime as a 
condition of initiation. The Nanigoes had seals or 
signs for each Juego or society. This was tattooed 
on the wrist, while the Nahigo mark was tattooed on 
the shoulder. A society of professed criminals would 
hardly take this means of identifying its members. 

At a period when crime was prevalent in Habana, 

154 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

assassinations and robberies of daily and nightly oc- 
currence were attributed to the Naiiigoes. Punish- 
ment was difficult, because it was said that many of 
the officials charged with administering the laws had 
been in their youth Naiiigoes and were fearful of the 
vengeance of the society to which they belonged. The 
more probable explanation was that the criminals, un- 
derstanding the process of the Spanish justice, bought 
immunity from the magistrates. During his rule, Cap- 
tain-General Weyler gathered up all the criminal classes 
of Habana, and deported them as Naiiigoes. By this 
means he was enabled to exile hundreds of non-criminal 
Cubans suspected of complicity in the insurrection. 

After the signing of the protocol, the Spanish Gov- 
ernment returned the criminal classes of Cuba from 
the penal settlements of Africa. Some of these were 
undoubtedly Naiiigoes, but the majority were ordinary 
criminals, without membership in any criminal society. 
A few of the Juegos were formed again after the return 
of the deported criminals. It is doubtful whether 
these societies are as criminal as represented. They 
are as likely to be groupings of the superstitious ne- 
groes in whom the rites and practices of their ances- 
tors have not been effaced. Cabildos, or processions of 
Africans, were forbidden in the days immediately fol- 
lowing the American occupation. In olden times these 
cabildos often carried a snake as a symbol. They are 
never without their drums. The African dance is 
also a feature of Cuban life. All these things go to 
show that inherited superstitions, and practices, and 
ignorant customs, and usages have not been completely 
uprooted. But it gives an unfair idea of the Cuban 

155 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

negroes to identify Nahigoes solely with them, and to 
assume that all crime is committed by organized and 
banded negro criminals. Naiiigoisni has come to be 
the general term for crime. This should be borne in 
mind whenever the doings of the Nanigoes are reported 
from Cuba. 

It is not my purpose to enter into a full discussion 
of the future political standing of the race of color in 
Cuba. Their place in the industrial element is of infi- 
nitely greater consequence, but it is worthy of recording 
that the industrial progress has been coincident with 
social toleration and civil recognition. The blood of 
the Latin races does not repel the African blood so vio- 
lently as that which runs in the veins of their fellow- 
Caucasians of the Saxon stock. Amid the ruins of 
Castilian empire, Spanish civilization has left one en- 
during monument in the Antilles. It has not denied 
opportunity to the black man, and the black man has 
risen to his opportunity. He has assimilated to the 
toleration of the Latin civilization, and his position to- 
day is a refutation of the theories of the pessimists. 

It is probable that after a few years, when the cur- 
rents of immigration flow in natural channels, the rela- 
tive importance of the race of color, black or blended, 
will decrease, because relatively the proportion of the 
colored population will decrease. The culmination of 
their influence may be marked in the calendar of to- 
day. But this is not the end of opportunity. Unless 
an overwhelming wave of Americanism with race preju- 
dice on the crest sets in, the future opportunities will 
continue as in the present and as in the past. That 
there is distrust at this period is undeniable. It has 

156 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

been created by Americans urging their own ideas of 
inferiority, and telling the white Cubans that the only 
hope for them is in ignoring the African race. Towards 
this aggresive movement the blacks and the mulattoes 
have shown a natural resentment. 

On the resumption of peaceful relations between the 
United States and Spain, the Cuban blacks manifested 
no antagonism to the American authority. Their lead- 
ers complained that they showed too great an indiffer- 
ence to their own future in the island whose freedom 
they had helped to win. The mulatto insurgent General 
Eligio Ducasse, issued an address in which he regretted 
the indifference of the race of color, which was due, he 
said, to the lack of civic valor. It was necessary for 
them to turn their faces to the light. He urged upon 
them the indefatigable propaganda of democratic the- 
ories, and proposed that they form a group and unite in 
order to work in accord with the white Cuban element. 

This appeal and similar ones met with little response 
until the American newcomers, most of them of the 
kind without influence at home, raised the color-line. 
Then the solidarity of the race of color began to show 
itself. It might be converted into a harmful influence, 
for while not dominating the whole island, there are 
sections in which the blacks are numerically prepon- 
derant. In Santiago province, in the period from 1877 
to 1887, the blacks increased four per cent, and in 
Puerto Principe two per cent, though they decreased in 
the other parts of the island. This is one reason why 
the white element in Santiago is to-day fearful of the 
experiment of independence. But with the understand- 
ing of the purposes of the United States Government 

157 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

and the knowledge that individuals who seek to raise 
the color-line do not reflect the views of the American 
people, this solidarity of the race of color will not con- 
tinue. It is defensive rather than antagonistic. 

The figment of a black republic, of a West Indian 
league, vanished in the air when Antonio Maceo fell at 
Punta Brava. When the news of his death was con- 
firmed, the Spanish authorities in Habana sent up 
rockets as signals of rejoicing. Every rocket was a 
dart which pierced the hearts of the Cuban patriots in 
the city. Yet in their anguish the wisest of them felt 
that it was an agony not in vain. Maceo brought to 
the revolution the support of his race. Under him 
the Santiago blacks fought their way across the island. 
They were enlisted to extermination against Spanish 
rule. In their leader were the military potencies of the 
African race. Had he lived, the notion of a black 
league might have grown and spread. Maceo died 
sword in hand, and the blacks fought on as part of the 
insurgent forces, looking for their share in the future 
government of Cuba that was to come out of the chaos 
of revolution. Those who feared and doubted lest 
negro supremacy might succeed were encouraged to 
fight by the side of the blacks. There was no color- 
line in the revolution, there need be none in peace. A 
monument will be raised to Maceo. His deeds will be 
celebrated by the Cubans not as whites or blacks, but 
as Cubans. His memory will be cherished by the 
blacks as one of their own heroes. He raised them to 
his own level. Their political and their industrial 
standing in Cuba for all time to come is that of equal- 
ity. 

158 



CHAPTER IX 

The Spanish Colony 

Strangers in the Country of Yesterday — Description of Themselves 
by Spanish Classes — Composition of Colony — Madridlehos and 
Andalusians — Catalans the Masterful Latin Element — Asturians 
the Town Population — Castilian Yankees — Gallegos Widely Dis- 
tributed — Other Provincials — Benevolent Societies — Instinct of 
Nationality — Change in Peeling Towards United States — Kecip- 
rocal Eelations of Cubans and Spaniards — Present Political 
Attitude, the Eetraimiento — Temporary Isolation — Status Under 
Treaty of Paris — Strangers in the Cuba of To-morrow. 

Stbangebs in the country of yesterday. Thus in bit- 
terness and in anguish the intense Spaniards described 
themselves when the flag which for four centuries had 
floated over Cuba was lowered forever. 

Though they called themselves strangers, the Span- 
ish classes did not care to be known as aliens. That 
would be too great humiliation. It would convey a 
false impression of their affection for this Antillian 
land and of their concern in its future. They meant 
that they were strangers to the new surroundings and 
the new institutions. They chose to treat themselves 
as guests of the United States accepting its protection. 
No longer masters, they would not be the servants of 
the natives of the island. By a natural impulse they 
formed into the Spanish colony. In places they 
grouped themselves into an organization under this 

159 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

name. In other sections they kept the old name of 
the Casino Espaiiol, or Spanish club or circle; but 
whether they formed into societies or not, they took 
the designation of foreign subjects. Cuba was no 
longer a territorial possession of Spain, and they as- 
sumed the attitude of a colony in a foreign territory. 

The Spanish colony was a spontaneous development. 
It was the outgrowth of the instinct of nationality. It 
reflects the sentiment and the aspirations of a peo- 
ple rather than of a class. Its members have the com- 
mon basis of language, usages, tradition, and religion. 
They all have kin across the sea. Since this Spanish 
element is to be for a time a separate unit, its compo- 
sition is worthy of analysis. First are the natives of 
Catalonia, then Galicia, and Asturias. After them the 
people from the adjoining districts of the Cantabrian 
Mountains, as also from the Basque provinces on the 
slopes of the Pyrenees, the Montaneses from Santander, 
the Aragonese from Aragon. Spanish officers and sol- 
diers who settled in the island gave all of the provinces 
of the peninsula representation ; but these did not affect 
the main tide from the northern provinces. 

The provincial customs of the peninsula are still seen 
in all their literalness, and the proverbs which describe 
the usages and peculiarities are heard as in Spain. 
The Madridlenos were the most cultured class. They 
were the office-holders, the bureaucrats, the leeches 
and the locusts. They were strong because of their 
intrigues and their influence with the government in 
Madrid. Almost the same may be said of the Andalu- 
sians. They, too, lived on the offices and were leeches 
and locusts. At one time they had a society of natives 

160 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

of the province. It was not strong in numbers, but its 
members included the violent and irreconcilable Span- 
iards who opposed every concession to popular govern- 
ment in Cuba because popular government threatened 
their privileges. Until an immigration movement sets 
in, the Andalusian element in the Spanish colony in 
Cuba is not likely to be of moment. The natives of 
Andalusia are the scorn of the other provincials. " As 
lazy as an Andalusian ;" " an Andalusian said it " (mean- 
ing a doubtful statement); "the women for beauty, 
the men for wit, and all Andalusians for lying;" — 
these are the proverbs most commonly heard. They 
show the estimation of the Andalusians by their fellow- 
peninsulars. 

The Aragonese are numerically not a large element, 
but they are a good one industrially. They carried 
their hard heads and their stubbornness from Spain to 
Cuba. Euns the saying in the island, " when an Ara- 
gonese says two and two make five, don't dispute it; 
for in Aragon two and two make five." The natives of 
Vasco-Navarre are also a small numerical element who 
brought their customs unchanged to the island. They 
are seen on holidays in the red-and-blue caps of their 
province. Formerly they possessed political influence 
which came from their clannishness. The natives of 
Castile and Leon have sought to preserve their iden- 
tity under the designation of Castilians. At one time 
they had a society, but it was not influential. They 
were mostly poor people, neither strong in numbers nor 
aggressive in public affairs. 

Following the natives of the provinces back to their 
birthplaces, it will be seen that Catalans, Asturians, and 
11 161 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

Gallegos have lost little of their individuality. Their 
charitable societies in all parts of the island are monu- 
ments to their spirit of union and to their thoughtful- 
ness for their own. The memorial chapels to their 
patroness are evidences of their religious fervor and 
their devotion to Catholicism. The Catalans are the 
masterful Latin element in trade and in politics. They 
are synonymous with commercial enterprise. Of all 
the provinces of the peninsula they have left the deep- 
est impress on the island of Cuba. In many places the 
Catalan is still spoken of when a Spaniard is meant. 
Some of the colloquialisms of the Provengal tongue are 
preserved among them. They have always been the 
most independent politically, and their demands on the 
peninsula for legislation in the interest of Barcelona 
have always been heeded. In government administra- 
tion they have been prominent more for their influence 
in shaping economic policies than for holding office. 
In that respect the difference between them and the 
Madridlehos and Andalusians has been a radical one. 
They have been the intellectual life of the Spanish ele- 
ment in the island, and have dominated in journalism 
and in the Church. From them have also come sug- 
gestions of political anarchy and of labor proletari- 
atism. 

The Catalan peasant is as sturdy in the labor of the 
fields and towns as his fellow-Catalans of higher grade 
are in commerce and in public affairs. He has the 
same traits of dogged perseverence and of unyielding 
opinions. In spite of these strong traits, the Catalans 
have been numerically a decreasing class in Habana 
and the western part of the island for the last score of 

162 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

years. The opportunities in trade and in commerce 
have not been wide enough for them. Their influence 
and their numbers have not been impaired in the east- 
ern provinces. In Santiago de Cuba they are still the 
dominating force, and their enterprising and adventu- 
rous character has found full play there. The Santiago 
Catalans gave some recruits to the insurrection. 

Aside from the commercial privileges which made the 
Catalans aggressive Spaniards, they have shown them- 
selves possessed of progressive and liberal ideas. They 
yet dominate the Spanish press of the island. The Cen- 
tral Union and various other societies in Habana had at 
one time ten thousand members, with branches in other 
cities. In Matanzas the votive chapel to the Yirgin 
of Monserrate is a testimonial of their devotion. In 
Habana an hermitage or memorial to the patroness of 
the province was projected, but never finished. In 
whatever concerns the Spanish colony of Cuba the Cata- 
lan influence will be strong, but its independent char- 
acter will be preserved. It has shown no disposition 
to yield the field of commerce and industry which it 
has held. Instead of bowing to American competition, 
the Barcelona merchants prepared to meet it on the 
even ground of Cuba instead of in the unequal territory 
of Spain. They will not give up what is theirs with- 
out a struggle. 

The Asturians are the most numerous element of 
peninsulars in Cuba. It was they who crowded the 
Catalans in Habana and the western provinces. They 
are estimated to form forty per cent of the Spanish- 
born population. They were the most loyal of loyalist 
Spaniards, and their sentiments have undergone little 

163 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

change. When the insurrection broke out, of 63,000 
enrolled volunteers in Cuba, 26,000 were born in Astu- 
rias. The Asturians have the largest and most power- 
ful provincial society in the island. It is known as the 
Centro-Asturiano of Habana, and has branches in Cdr- 
denas, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Sancti Spiritus, Camaju- 
nani, Pinar del Rio, and other places. The society of 
clerks known as La Sociedad de los Dependientes de 
Comercio is also made up largely of Asturians. It is 
within the last twenty years that they have gained such 
power. Originally they were engaged chiefly in the 
retail business; but they soon mounted to wholesale 
trade, and gained a strong foothold in the tobacco in- 
dustry and in financial enterprises. In recent years they 
have had many influential men who have divided political 
and commercial influence with the Catalans. 

The Asturians are essentially a town population. 
Barely a fraction of them are engaged in agricultural 
pursuits. They are the most potent and the most 
representative Spanish class. Their patriotism is the 
patriotism of ignorance. The majority are also zealous 
churchmen. Our Lady of Covodanga, the patroness of 
the province, has a splendid memorial chapel in Haba- 
na, and in the smaller towns there are also memorials. 
The Asturians have transplanted all their Spanish tra- 
ditions. Gil Bias would be as much at home among 
them as among his kinsfolk in Oviedo. Their charac- 
teristics are thrift and trustworthiness. For this rea- 
son they make good clerks and tradesmen. They also 
furnish the largest criminal element among the penin- 
sulars in the island. This may be due to the fact that 
they are inhabitants of the towns. Several years ago 

164 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

when a Scotch sociologist made systematic inquiries 
regarding the inmates of the jails, the number of Astu- 
rians was reported as exceeding all the other natives of 
the peninsula. 

The Asturians are also more given to drink than their 
brother Spaniards. Drunkenness is so rare that it 
seems invidious to single out any class ; but the Span- 
iard of whatever province will say that the Asturians 
are the drunkards of their race. In trade they have 
sometimes been called the Yankees among the Span- 
iards. A nasal twang in their speech has been cited as 
further evidence of their kinship with New England. 
The major portion of the shops and stores in Habana 
are owned by Asturians. This ownership is advertised, 
and the patronage of the natives of the province is solic- 
ited and secured on these grounds. The Asturians are 
gorged with Spanish pride. They are at present the 
most compact element; but being townspeople, they are 
not likely to increase in numbers by immigration until 
conditions change. They are tenacious of their trade 
and will not readily be driven out by American compe- 
tition. Their thrift and industry make them a most 
useful factor in the industrial ranks of the island. 

The Gallegos are next to the Asturians in numbers. 
They are widely distributed in both town and country. 
Commercially they have little foothold, and are not 
to be considered on the same plane as the Catalans 
and the Asturians. Their acquisitive instincts are not 
marked, and they have not exercised a controlling in- 
fluence in either trade, politics, or in the army. Appar- 
ently they have fewer material interests in Cuba than 
the Catalans and the Asturians. In the towns their 

165 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

labor is what would be called unskilled. In the coun- 
try they work in the fields. They are employed in all 
the shipping ports. Most of the boatmen in the Haba- 
na harbor are Gallegos. Many of the inhabitants of 
this northwest corner of Spain drifted from the mer- 
chant marine of the peninsula to the shipping trade of 
the island. The Gallegos are also employed in the 
mines of Eastern Cuba. They have been called dull in- 
tellectually, but this may be because of their indiffer- 
ence to material comforts, for to a stranger they seem 
quick-witted. The Gallegos have shown the same ten- 
dency towards organization as their brothers from other 
provinces. The central society in Habana is an un- 
usually good one, and has been noted for its efforts 
to popularize education. The probability is that the 
Gallegos will continue to increase in numbers, though 
they suffered greatly during the insurrection and the 
war, and lost some of their unity. They show less re- 
gard for the past and greater adaptability to new condi- 
tions than the other natives of the peninsula. 

The Canary Islanders, the Islenos, are called Span- 
iards, for their speech is that of Spain and many of 
them were born in the peninsula. Nevertheless they 
have been less Spanish than the other Castilians. It 
might be said that their feelings were neutral as be- 
tween the peninsulars and insulars. The similarity of 
the climate of the Canaries to that of Cuba induced 
an immigration which was assisted for selfish reasons. 
During the slave times, when England was in the habit 
of reminding Spain of its obligations to suppress the 
traffic, Spaniards in Cuba were wont to retort that Brit- 
ish shipmasters were engaged in a system of white slave 

166 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

traffic from the Canary Islands. The Islenos had a so- 
ciety in Habana which was charitable and useful. Most 
of the haughty Spaniards looked down with contempt 
on the Canary Islanders, who were engaged in minor 
employments, such as peddling and raising vegetables. 
In the tobacco country of the Vuelta Aba jo, the Canar- 
ians are admittedly the best industrial element. They 
have never been a compact political force. They make 
good laborers in the fields, and many of them have 
small tobacco farms of their own. Every year the large 
tobacco plantations bring laborers from the Canaries, 
who return when the crop is over. In the future the 
effort will be to keep these islanders in Cuba. There is 
work for them on the sugar plantations as well as on the 
tobacco farms. 

It should be observed that the various societies of the 
provinces have their newspapers. These are not politi- 
cal journals, yet while maintaining the traditions of the 
province they contribute powerfully to preserve the idea 
of Spanish nationality. They are given up chiefly to 
news from Spain. They tell what is going on in Coru- 
ha, in Barcelona, in Oviedo, or in Santander, as the case 
may be. That is to say, they keep the people informed 
of what is happening in their old homes. Some of them 
also give space to the literature of the provinces. This 
is especially true of the Galician newspapers. After the 
conclusion of war with the United States some of these 
journals voiced very accurately the conditions in Spain. 
They contained articles which the censorship would not 
have permitted in the journals published at home, but 
which showed the real feelings in the provinces. 

The reciprocal relations of Cubans and Spaniards 

167 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

cannot be fully determined in a single year. In the 
past, the animosity and the antagonism have been undeni- 
able. It was a psychological problem to determine just 
when this antagonism of two classes of the same race 
began to develop. In Cuba all persons born on the 
island, whether white or black, of native or of foreign 
parentage, are Criollos or Creoles. The child of a 
Spanish father born of a Cuban mother was a Cuban 
from the cradle. The child of Spanish parents born 
in the island sometimes became a Cuban in the first 
generation. General Calixto Garcia was born of Span- 
ish parents. 

Commonly two generations would pass before the 
Spanish offspring ceased to be a Spaniard. Invariably 
in the third generation the offspring would be Cuban in 
sentiments and aspirations. The Spaniard was wont to 
say : " What is best in Cuba is our work. See us. We 
are hard-working, frugal, thrifty, peaceable, developing 
the riches of the soil, conserving its productiveness for 
other generations, sowing that which the spendthrift 
Cubans may cast to the winds. And we pay our debts. " 
Eetorted the Cuban : " See yourselves. You labor but it 
is not in the fields. The Spaniard works in the shade. 
You grow rich on the labor of others. Your government, 
which is not our government, gives you the advantages. 
You save that you may spend away from the island 
that which you have drawn from it. You do not bring 
your families. You demoralize our morals. You are 
birds of passage who would carry away the seeds of 
prosperity. We are the true economists, for we both 
produce and consume." 

As in most disputes, the truth was midway. The 

168 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

Spaniard unquestionably was the middleman. He 
monopolized the shipping trade partly by reason of his 
inclination for commerce and partly by official favorit- 
ism. The trade conditions in Cuba had their begin- 
nings in the old monopolies granted by the Council of 
the Indies to Cadiz and Seville. Barcelona's heritage of 
these monopolies was a natural one; but in the retail 
trade it cannot be said that a Spaniard became the mer- 
chant through special privileges. His superior ability 
as a trader placed him in that position. With the 
end of Spanish sovereignty the commercial conditions 
changed along with the political system. The Cuban 
is on an equal plane with the Spaniard in everything 
that belongs to industrial enterprise, and politically he 
is a little higher up. Cubans and Catalans in the new 
circumstances may be left to assimilate the industrial 
virtues which they have in common. I shall have occa- 
sion to write of the industrial phases with reference 
to the Spanish element in discussing prospects and 
sources of immigration. The position of the Spanish 
colony as an influence apart and by itself is of present 
concern. 

When the Spaniards in Cuba declared themselves 
strangers in the country of yesterday, they had been 
for six months aware of their condition. In the first 
burst of passion following the conclusion of peace they 
turned to the conquering nation. They would owe al- 
legiance to the United States rather than to a govern- 
ment of Cubans. If opportunity had been given to 
declare themselves they would have been unanimously 
American because that was the only means of being 
anti-Cuban. Then came the American military occu- 

169 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

pation and a change of feeling. The Spanish classes 
liked the Americans less among them than at a distance. 
They began to doubt whether they could get along better 
with them than with their own Latin blood. 

At this period the feeling of resentment and revenge 
was very strong among the Cubans. A voice came 
from the woods which stilled it temporarily. Maximo 
Gomez risked his popularity and challenged the radi- 
cal elements by preaching peace and concord. He ac- 
cepted invitations from the Spanish casinos, declared 
that the insurgents had fought against the Spanish 
Government and not against the Spanish people, and 
that all classes must join together in the industrial 
reconstruction of the country. This was not new doc- 
trine with him. He had preached it in the height of the 
insurrection. His words were received gratefully by 
the Spaniards and respectfully by the Cubans. 

Afterwards there were periods of proscriptive agita- 
tion against the Spanish classes and of demands for 
them to leave. Some left ; but it must be taken into 
account that the parasites of Spanish bureaucracy and 
militarism were numerous. They could not all get away 
when the troops left. Others went because they felt 
there was no opportunity remaining for them in Cuba; 
yet in estimating the departures for Spanish ports 
regard must be had for the arrivals in Cuba from Span- 
ish ports. The mass of the Spanish population in the 
island — 'the Asturians, the Catalans, and the Gallegos 
— have not made up their minds to leave for good, and 
the streams of immigration have already begun to flow 
back. It is a simple explanation. The opportunities 
are better in Cuba. 

170 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

In present conditions a numerical estimate of the 
number of Spaniards who remain in Cuba could only 
be a guess. Without making that guess, it is enough 
to know that the number is considerable. Spanish 
newspapers all over the island reflect the existence 
of the Spanish colony. The financial and commercial 
classes, the merchants and the planters who secretly 
sought American intervention when Spain was trying 
to implant autonomy, want annexation or indefinite 
military occupation, which they look upon as the same 
thing. Nothing is likely to change their views. Some 
of them have been encouraged in the belief that though 
Spain has ceased to govern Cuba, the island will con- 
tinue to be governed for the benefit of Spaniards. Oth- 
ers simply fear, and fear sincerely, that a Cuban gov- 
ernment would be a failure, and they are not wiHing 
that the experiment shall be tried within their own 
lifetime. 

While this is the feeling of the distinctively commer- 
cial element, I have never been able to discover by what 
process of reasoning the conclusion was reached that 
it was anything like the unanimous sentiment of the 
Spanish classes as a whole. It is encouraged politically 
by some of the old-time Eeformists, weathercocks as 
ever, who have tried to create a Spanish party. But as 
in the days of the Autonomist agitation, followers are 
needed to build up a political organization, and the 
former Eeformists are lacking in that respect. The 
Spanish element is not to be judged by a few men. 
The bodegueros — the grocery keepers and retail mer- 
chants — and their clerks are a distinct power. They 
have had violent spasms against even the temporary 

171 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

presence of the American troops. They have been the 
most passionate in their opposition to the change in 
forms of government and in laws. They stand for old 
customs and usages, whether good or bad. The appeal 
to preserve the Latin civilization from the brutal ag- 
gression of Anglo-Saxonism is addressed to them, and 
they are responsive to it. Their Spanish national- 
ism is sincere and intense. 

The present attitude of the majority of the Spanish 
classes is their favorite one, that of the "Eetraimi- 
ento," the drawing within the shell and disclaiming 
responsibility for whatever may happen. They ac- 
knowledge their debt to that portion of the Cuban press 
which combats the intolerant tendencies of the rabid 
Cubans. They declare their faith that the policy of 
peace and concord and union of all the Latin elements 
will ultimately prevail. But they are not willing to 
trust themselves to it just yet. And from their " Be- 
traimiento," despite the representations of individuals, 
the majority of the Spanish classes still look with dis- 
trust on American influence. They want to be with- 
drawn from it as much as from Cuban politics. 

Out of this retreat there is only one path. It may be 
regretted, but that does not affect the controlling forces. 
It leads to the temporary isolation of the majority of 
Spaniards in Cuba in so far as relates to the policies 
which are to be determined. Some of the newspapers 
hint at political action as a means of annexation, but 
these hints are received coldly. For a while the idea 
prevailed that they could elect to remain Spanish sub- 
jects and yet have a voice in establishing the govern- 
ment which is to obtain in Cuba. It grew until the 

172 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

belief became a delusion that, though Spanish sover- 
eignty was gone, the Spanish classes would continue 
to rule Cuba through the United States. But with 
the understanding of the terms of the treaty of Paris 
this vanished. 

All peninsular-born inhabitants of the island now 
know that by April, 1900, they must decide whether 
they shall renounce their nationality, because that will 
end the year from the time of interchanging the 
treaties. The certainty is the creation of a Spanish 
colony in Cuba similar to that which exists in Mex- 
ico and in the countries of South America. The reg- 
istry of Spaniards as subjects of Spain will not be 
universal. Some prominent ones among them will 
elect to take the uncertainties of the immediate future 
in the belief that the authority of the United States will 
ultimately prevail. Others of the bodeguero class and 
of small landowners in the country will cast their 
lot with the Cubans. But the majority of the Span- 
ish residents will elect to continue their allegiance to 
the peninsula. On the part of the commercial and 
professional classes of Spaniards this will be simply 
the affirmation of the position they have always held. 
They came to the island to better their fortunes and 
then return to Spain. Permanent residence has never 
been their intention. The paucity of registrations after 
the Spanish consul-general opened the registry for 
Spanish subjects should not mislead. The majority 
of them will wait until the last month. 

What the course of the Spaniards may be in the 
years to come, when the political incertitude is ended 
and possibly immigration is flowing from the penin- 

173 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

sula, is conjecture not worth wasting time on now. In 
the formative period of the future government of Cuba 
their attitude is that of the Eetraimiento. The begin- 
ning of American sovereignty in trust found them, by 
their own characterization, strangers in the country of 
yesterday. By their own choice the members of the 
Spanish colony remain strangers in the Cuba of To- 
morrow. 



174 



CHAPTER X 

Immigration and Colonization 

Prospective Greatness of Habana — Agricultural Population the Basis 
— Economic Epitome of the Eeconcentration — Acclimatization 
of White Men in Border Tropics — Spanish Immigrants Not from 
Southern Provinces — Comparison of Latitudes — Madrid Govern- 
ment's Policy of Encouragement — Drawback in Political Insti- 
tutions — Failure of Plans to Keep Spanish Soldiers in Cuba — 
Little Prospect of Earm-Hands from the United States — Evils of 
Proposed Systems of Colonization — Former Experiments — His- 
tory of Chinese Coolies — Probability of Exclusion Measures — 
Treaty Between Spain and China — Family Immigration for the 
Future. 

Of the people who once were in Cuba it is not dif- 
ficult to write. Of those who remain it is even less 
difficult, for they are fewer. Of the race that will be, it 
is too early to write comprehensively. But an explo- 
ration must be made in search of those who shall till 
the fields. 

Whatever race and national characteristics are devel- 
oped, the leading traits must always be those of an 
agricultural people. Habana will become a greater and 
a more magnificent commercial mart. It will show 
the possibilities of the civilization of commerce in the 
tropics. Seventy-five years ago Humboldt placed it 
with Rio Janiero as one of the five great tropical cities 
of the world. The Cuban metropolis then had 100,000 

175 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

inhabitants; Rio Janiero, 135,000. Habana lies in 
north latitude 22 °. The parallel of south latitude 
22° passes close to Rio Janiero. The latter city has 
in this day a population in excess of 600,000. Habana 
rises a little above 200,000. Yet with the establish- 
ment of a stable government it is possible to look for- 
ward to a day not so far distant when the commercial 
capital of the Antilles will equal in size and import- 
ance the metropolis of Brazil. With its progress 
other ports will grow and spread, and Cuba's coasts 
will be lined with as many flourishing ports as once 
lined the coasts of the Mediterranean. 

The basis of these entrepots of trade will be the 
land, because Cuba is so essentially an agricultural 
country. Its development will be such as comes from 
the harvests of the soil. The mines will give up their 
wealth. The forests will be cleared. And when it is all 
done the island will be more than ever before the land 
of the farmer. Light manufactures will spring up, and 
they, too, will lean on the soil, not as a crutch, but as 
a prop. It is, then, of an agricultural people, and of 
the commerce and trade which develop from agricul- 
ture, that the future must be written. Hence the initial 
question is of field-labor immigration. 

There is in the first place an artificially created gulf 
to be closed. It is the void that exists in the produc- 
tive agencies of the island — the void that will be years 
in filling. I wish to write here of the reconcentration 
only in its economic effects. It was meant to extirpate 
the people from the soil in which they had taken root. 
The rooting out was partially successful. The victims 
included the heads of families, the children whose arms 

176 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

would have been bent within a few years to the tilling 
of the land, and the women who would have borne 
other children. The strongest, if not the fittest, sur- 
vived. Probably in the eye of political economy they 
were the fittest. More women than men also survived — 
not exactly the reconcentration, but the events leading 
up to reconcentration, because many of the husbands, 
fathers, and brothers were killed by the Spanish gue- 
rillas. Two illustrations from widely separated points 
may suffice. In the six months from July 1st to De- 
cember 31st, 1897, in the community of Sancti Spiri- 
tus, in Santa Clara province, the births were 202 and 
the deaths 1,944. In the rich agricultural district of 
Guines, in the province of Habana, within defined limits 
the population was 15,000. In the two years from Jan- 
uary 1st, 1897, to January 1st, 1899, the deaths were 
9,802, the births 319; the excess of deaths over births, 
9,483. This page from the story of Guines is the eco- 
nomic epitome of the reconcentration. 

Recent discussion has reopened the whole question 
of the acclimatization of the white man in the equato- 
rial regions and in the border tropics. Assumption 
has given way to investigation. Distinguished natu- 
ralists, among them Alfred Russell Wallace, have chal- 
lenged assumption in the light of experience. Special- 
ists in medical science have also challenged it. Its 
latest exponent* may find it necessary to go beyond 
generalizations in upholding his theory. The effect 
of Cuba's climate cannot be fairly demonstrated until 
modern sanitation has cleared away the artificial 
hindrances. When the yellow fever becomes in Cuba 

* Benjamin Kidd, "The Control of the Tropics." 

12 177 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

no more an epidemic than pneumonia in the United 
States, the experiment of acclimating the white man in 
the border tropics will be fairly entered upon. Mala- 
ria will always exist there, just as it exists in immense 
regions of the United States. Calentura or breakbone 
fever will not be destroyed any more than ague can be 
destroyed in the United States. But medical science 
may continue to check it and mitigate it in Cuba as in 
the United States. 

Applied to Cuba, two criterions may be set up with- 
out intricate analysis. They are experience and com- 
mon sense. The natives of the Iberian peninsula are 
of the white race. They have shown that they can 
work in the fields with equal endurance with the blacks. 
The Spanish soldiers who have settled on the island 
have always proved good laborers. The peasants from 
Catalonia and Galicia are admittedly of the best class 
of laborers. And in spite of all the talk the descend- 
ants of the Spanish peasants, the Cuban peasantry, are 
hard workers in the field. 

In describing the Spanish colony in Cuba I have 
stated that it was composed substantially of the na- 
tives of the three provinces of Catalonia, Asturias, and 
Galicia. Those who have not studied the subject will 
be surprised when they take their geographies and fol- 
low the streams of immigration to the source. Though 
the Council of the Indies sat in Seville and in Cadiz, 
giving those towns the monopoly of the trade, Andalu- 
sia did not people Cuba. Nor has the immigration 
tide, whether at ebb or at flood, been from that prov- 
ince of olives and oranges to the land of palms and 
oranges. The fertile regions of Southern Spain were 

178 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

not deserted for the more fertile lands of Cuba. The 
industrial immigration came from the northern prov- 
inces. Allowing for the moderating influences of the 
Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay, the inhabitants 
of the peninsula who settled in Cuba came from regions 
which, nevertheless, cannot be called tropical. The 
damp and cold mountain-lands of Northern Spain, the 
high plains which are swept by the cold winds, have 
contributed the bulk of the Spanish inhabitants in Cuba. 
First they came from the commercial mart of Barcelona 
aud from the surrounding districts of Catalonia. Later 
they came from Asturias, Galicia, and the mountainous 
provinces of the north. 

The beginning of immigration from Galicia in a sys- 
tematic manner was half a century back, when the 
great poverty prevailing among the inhabitants of the 
province caused measures to be taken to assist some of 
them to emigrate. Now it is to be observed that Cata- 
lonia lies, roughly speaking, between north latitude 
40.5° and 42.5°, that Aragon extends from the parallels 
of 40° and 43°, and that Asturias and Galicia are north 
of 43°. They are in the latitude of Middle New Eng- 
land, New York, Northern Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indi- 
ana, Illinois, and Iowa. Allowing for the softening 
influence of the Mediterranean on the bordering prov- 
inces, the broad deduction remains unchanged. A line 
drawn laterally from continent to continent shows that 
the bulk of the white immigration to Cuba has come 
from north of latitude 41°, and latitude 41° takes in the 
great wheat-growing regions of the American continent. 
There is no wheat to be grown in Cuba, and the ques- 
tion becomes one of how far people from the wheat- 

179 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

growing latitudes can raise products in the tropics. 
The answer is given in the agricultural development of 
the island. The laborers who have been a leading ele- 
ment in it have come from the wind-swept plains and 
the barren mountain regions of the north of Spain. 

In a blind way the Madrid Government encouraged 
Spanish immigration to the Antilles. It was the one 
instinct of national polity which it showed. The voy- 
ager in the waters of the West Indies sometimes puts 
into Man-o'-War Bay at Great Inagua Island, midway 
between Eastern Cuba and Haiti. The English customs 
officer, who receives him courteously, tells him that 
there are four white families on the island who admin- 
ister the affairs of the fifteen hundred black inhabitants. 
The same is true of the Bahamas and the other British 
West Indies. England has never sought to people these 
islands with her own colonists ; or when she has done it, 
has given up in dismay. Jamaica is the most striking 
instance. The development of the future will show the 
defect of this policy, strong in its administrative feat- 
ures and weak in its economic basis. Spain, in the 
midst of unutterable errors and deficiencies of political 
administration, did manage to avoid the economic error. 
A progressive government would have given the island 
5,000,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, four-fifths of them of Spanish blood. An unpro- 
gressive government managed to insure a population of 
1,600,000, two-thirds of Spanish blood. The instinct was 
correct. The drawback was bad political institutions. 

When, during the decade from 1880 to 1890 the tide 
of immigration from the peninsula to the Argentine 
Republic and other South American countries alarmed 

180 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

the Madrid ministry, various explanations were sought 
for it. One Spanish writer said the potent reason was 
that the emigrants from the peninsula were seeking new 
institutions rather than a new country. He declared 
they would have gone to Cuba in preference if it were 
not that they would encounter their own bad govern- 
ment in even worse form than at home. At this time 
there was an actual halt in the immigration to the 
Antilles, and for a while more people were returning to 
Spain from Cuba and Puerto Rico than were coming to 
those islands. This was in one sense the climax of the 
system which did not settle Spaniards in the island 
permanently, but only to draw from it wealth enough 
to return in comfort and ease to Spain. While the 
bureaucratic policy of the Government upheld this sys- 
tem, it nevertheless groped about for a means of feed- 
ing the industrial deficiencies by immigration. The 
various provincial societies also aided immigration. 
The Cuban and Spanish authors who in multitudinous 
array have written of the island have differed radically 
regarding political liberty and administrative govern- 
ment, but they have always agreed that the number of 
inhabitants was never sufficient to utilize the natural 
richness of the soil. This phrase, "the natural rich- 
ness," is found in all their writings. 

When the movement of population to the South 
American countries was at its height, the Government 
issued various decrees relating to immigration which 
had for their object the encouragement of immigrant 
families settling in Cuba. State aid was advanced, and 
privileges were given families similar to those which 
were granted to soldiers whose time expired and who 

181 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

settled on the island. Immigration was stimulated 
somewhat, yet not in great degree, because of the fa- 
tal defect in Spanish administration, which is its lack 
not of formulating, but of executing national policies. 
With it, "la inertia" is what "la guillotine" was to 
the French people at a period of their history 

The future coming of Spanish immigrants to Cuba in 
the first instance will be dependent on the government 
which is set up in the island. The hypothesis of polit- 
ical stability is necessary to all discussion of economic 
and industrial prospects. If the policy of peace and 
concord succeeds, and the Spanish who remain in Cuba 
are well treated, there is encouraging probability that 
the Spanish peasants will come in numbers. They will 
gain advantages which cannot be secured to them at 
home. If the Cuban government proves stable and 
liberal, they will find both new institutions and a new 
country in which they will not be strangers, because 
they will be among people of their own tongue and 
their own race. Galicia has 100 inhabitants to the 
square kilometre. The land is poor and thin. In 
years past its inhabitants have spread into Portugal, 
and even to Andalusia and the southern provinces, 
competing with the laborers there, and under this com- 
petition doing better than they could do at home. 
And in Andalusia the laborer's wages are rarely more 
than 20 cents a day. The Gallegos have also gone 
by the tens of thousands to South America. Cuba 
offers them far greater inducements in soil and oppor- 
tunities. They have shown their capacity for every 
kind of labor — in the fields, the jnines, and in the mer- 
chant marine. 

182 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

Asturias, from the fact that it contributes a town pop- 
ulation instead of farmers and field laborers, is not apt 
to be a source of immigration for many years to come. 
But Catalonia is a fountain of agricultural and com- 
mercial industry, and the prospect is for an increased 
immigration from that province. The island can re- 
ceive no more valuable contributions than these sturdy 
and independent Catalans. Probably the earliest 
source will be the Canary Islands, because the move- 
ment of immigration and settlement from them is al- 
ready under way. But the Canaries have a total pop- 
ulation of only 250,000 inhabtants, and from that cannot 
be drawn a heavy increase for Cuba. When the insur- 
rection broke out immigration had been started from the 
Basque provinces to renew the labor of the sugar planta- 
tions. The men were strong and excellent laborers. 
This experiment was promising. It may be renewed 
under more favorable conditions. It is also possible to 
look for a permanent and steady immigration from 
Andalusia in place of the scattering settlement that has 
heretofore taken place. The similarity of climate and 
products affords a natural economic basis. It may be 
that within a few years the olive, which heretofore has 
not been cultivated for commercial purposes, will be 
under cultivation by thousands of Andalusian peasants 
and farmers in Cuba. 

When the Spanish troops were evacuating the island 
a prospect was held out that a definite number of the 
soldiers, sometimes placed as high as 20,000, would 
secure their discharges and remain. They were of the 
classes whose terms of military service expired during 
that period. These soldiers would have been an im- 

183 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

mense addition to the depleted labor population of the 
island. They were from all the provinces of the penin- 
sula, and belonged to the soil. But it was found that 
the promises made them of their pay would prove 
worthless if they stayed in Cuba. The Spanish Gov- 
ernment, which at first had been well disposed to the 
plan, became indifferent, and various causes contributed 
to its failure. A few hundred Gallegos went to the 
mines in Santiago, but it is doubtful if 2,000 Spanish 
soldiers remained on the island. So the problem of 
immigration from the peninsula has to be taken up as 
a new question. 

It may be asked where the encouragement for immi- 
gration from the United States is to come from if the 
labor is to be drawn from the provinces of Spain. I 
am not one of those who look to see Cuba Americanized 
in that sense. It is my belief that climate will not be a 
bar to the men of the temperate zone seeking homes in 
the island. The wiser ones will push aside all fancy 
schemes and seek a stake in the land. A fair number 
of American farmers will undoubtedly engage in fruit- 
raising successfully. They are certain to work into 
tobacco cultivation as into coffee plantations. In time 
the readjustment of the sugar industry will be likely to 
find many Americans raising sugar-cane extensively on 
their own capital for the central mills to grind. 

This may happen without changing the prospects 
as a whole. It is not probable that the farm-hand 
from an American wheat-field or corn-field will seek em- 
ployment in cutting cane in Cuba. That labor can be 
drawn from the blacks and from the Spanish peasantry. 
Agricultural labor will be leavened by what it receives 

184 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

from the United States, as will other industrial ele- 
ments ; but this does not alter the probability that the 
labor supply of the fields as a mass and in a mass will 
be drawn from other sources. It is the fashion to talk 
otherwise, to assume that in a few years American farm 
laborers and unskilled town laborers will be spread 
over the island like the industrious ants ; but there is 
little ground for this talk. Of the 35,000 American 
soldiers who were stationed in Cuba during the win- 
ter months, and who therefore saw it under the most 
favorable conditions, a percentage which cannot yet be 
guessed will gather together what resources they have 
and return to settle there. Others will follow, but not 
as hired hands, and the bulk of immigration to Cuba 
for a long series of years must be that of farm-hands. 

Colonization differs from immigration. As applied 
to the present and future needs of Cuba, it is undesir- 
able, for it contemplates a continuance of the old evils in 
disguise. These were the treatment of Cuba as a tem- 
porary settlement incapable of maintaining a perma- 
nent population on a high, civilized plane. Some pros- 
pective employers of labor have looked longingly to 
Chinese colonization. They have imagined the em- 
ployment of coolies to be the solution of the industrial 
problem. If the island could be treated as an immense 
farm or plantation to be farmed by aggregation of capi- 
tal from the outside, this might be possible. But such 
a plan will never succeed. It finds lodgment with 
many unthinking Americans who have only this notion 
of labor in its impersonal sense, and who do not know 
the real conditions. They have the idea that labor 
might be imported and exported like any commodity. 

185 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

This idea was held by some Spanish publicists. 
Half a century ago Don Urbano Sotomayor,* a great 
landowner and capitalist, planned an extensive scheme 
of the kind. It was at the time that the Gallegos 
at home were suffering the keenest industrial distress, 
and in a small way were being aided to emigrate to 
Cuba. Don Urbano Sotomayor looked on Cuba as an 
immense plantation with only a transient population 
convenient to Spain and the island. He was a very 
patriotic and loyal Spaniard, and he rejected with 
horror the idea of a permanent settlement because, 
though it might be of Spanish origin, he saw that ulti- 
mately it would breed rebellions subjects. So he pro- 
posed that the island should be forever an enormous 
farm with gangs of men brought from the peninsula to 
work it, and then returned at intervals of five years, 
while their places should be taken by fresh gangs. He 
rejected absolutely the idea of bringing men to stay or 
women to raise families. His plan was the formation 
of a patriotic mercantile society which should bring the 
Gallegos and natives of the other provinces under con- 
tract, and should return them in as good condition as 
they were brought. Don Sotomayor believed in white- 
race colonization because of the slave traffic then being 
interdicted and labor importation being necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of agriculture. His delusion 
as to the probability of enforcing this scheme of 
transient labor population was no greater than that 
of some Americans of to-day. Don Sotomayor also 
declared that Chinese immigration was not a success. 
He had tried it, and had reached the conclusion that 
*"Inmigracion de Trabajadores Espaiioles," Habana, 1853. 
186 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the social, hygienic, and economic objections were 
fatal. 

This Chinese immigration was begun in 1847. It 
was part of a corrupt and money-making scheme by 
Spanish officials in Madrid and in Habana. The Chi- 
nese coolies were brought under contract, but it was 
virtual slavery. In the beginning many came from 
the Philippines, and all the immigration was from the 
ports of Southern China. Many of the coolies were 
kidnapped. China and Spain still have an unsettled 
diplomatic controversy growing out of the claims of 
Chinese subjects who were thus abducted. In 1860 
there were 16,000 Chinese in Cuba. The Madrid Gov- 
ernment at that time took measures for facilitating the 
importation of the coolies, and in 1877 the Chinese 
on the island numbered 40,000. Ten years later their 
numbers were 43,000. Their introduction was contin- 
ued through government corruption in the face of warn- 
ings of the bad effect of this element. 

It cannot be said that the Chinese immigrants were 
worthless. They were a fair agricultural population, 
and contributed their share of employment in other 
occupations. They also made a little headway in 
trade, and the Chinese genius for conquering the civ- 
ilization of the conqueror began to manifest itself. 
They did not spread over the whole island, but were 
massed in Habana, in Cardenas, and other sugar- 
* growing regions on the north and south coasts. In 
some places they became numerous enough to form 
a social element of their own. They erected casinos 
or clubs. In Habana they still have a fine casino and 
theatre. 

187 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

The Chinese suffered greatly by the insurrection. 
They were a neutral class, with the friendship of neither 
the Spaniards nor the insurgents. They lost heavily 
by deaths, and those who were able to do so got away 
from the island. A population of 43,000 dwindled, ac- 
cording to the estimate of the consulate, to less than 
20,000. While the Chinese as an industrial element 
were fair, the moral results were inevitably bad, be- 
cause the immigration from the beginning was one of 
males. The criminal population among them was also 
unusually heavy, and in the present day they have a 
very large proportion of beggars. This, however, is 
declared to be solely the outgrowth of the war, because 
formerly a Chinese beggar was rare. The Chinese 
quarter in Habana was not as bad as Chinatown in San 
Francisco, even in these enlightened days. Before the 
thoroughfare was purified by the American authorities, 
the stranger might stroll along Zanja Street and some- 
times catch the fumes of opium or peer into rooms and 
see shocking sights. But with the exception of the 
opium-smoking he could see equally shocking sights in 
other quarters of the city. 

Spanish civilization made no impress, one way or 
another, on the Chinese in Cuba. In few instances the 
Chinese contracted regular matrimonial alliances, and 
the offspring of these alliances have not proved a 
vicious class. But naturally the bulk of the alliances 
were illicit. Many of the Chinese who left Habana 
managed to find shelter in the United States in spite 
of the exclusion law. The tendency among those who 
remained is yet to seek this stealthy shelter; but an 
effort has been made to revive the immigration into 

188 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

Cuba of contract laborers. Inevitably whatever Cuban 
government is established will antagonize these at- 
tempts. 

The agitation in the United States which resulted in 
the Chinese exclusion laws of 1889 and 1890 found a 
reflex in Cuba among Spaniards and Cubans alike, but 
no legislation was enacted. The rights of the Chinese 
in Cuba under Spanish sovereignty were protected 
by the treaty of 1864, which was fairly liberal in its 
provisions. Though Cuba was regarded as foreign ter- 
ritory under American military control, the exclusion 
laws of the United States were not enforced against 
the coming of small groups of Chinese. The immigra- 
tion rules of the Treasury Department, which are of a 
general character, were applied without reference to the 
nationality of the objectionable immigrants. 

The possibility of an influx of coolies excited the 
cupidity of the speculators. Some steps were taken to 
replace the depleted Chinese population. Immigration 
of this kind, for a year or so, will do no lasting harm. 
It will bring back to the wasted industrial fabric of 
the island good working blood. But when a permanent 
and unrestricted movement is indicated, the question 
becomes a momentous one. In the temporary status 
of Cuba some delicate international questions are in- 
volved. The consul-general of China sought to have 
the treaty of 1864 recognized by the American authori- 
ties. That treaty was a reciprocal engagement between 
Spain and China. While the United States inherited 
the obligation to protect the rights of the Chinese in 
Cuba, it did not inherit the commercial privileges and 
advantages granted to Spain. The ground on which 

189 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

it can be asked to continue this treaty in force is not 
clear. The clause relative to emigration permitted 
Chinese subjects to make contracts with Spanish sub- 
jects for labor in the Spanish colonial possessions and 
to embark from designated ports of China. Many of 
the Chinese having come direct from the Philippines, 
this provision was not necessary to them. 

Whatever form of Cuban government is established, 
a restrictive treaty or an exclusion law undoubtedly 
will be enacted. This will not grow out of racial 
hostility, for there is little of that among either the 
Cubans or the Spaniards. It will grow out of the 
instinct of self-preservation and of national advance- 
ment. Chinese immigration to Cuba must always be 
an immigration of males. Its nature was disclosed in 
the census of 1877, which gave 77 females among a total 
of 40,000 Asiatics. That is why Chinese colonization in 
Cuba on a grand scale will be discouraged. If the civil- 
ization of the millions of Caucasians on the Pacific coast 
was threatened by Asiatic irruption, the probable effect 
on the mixed races of Cuba can be judged. The reason 
for restriction is a thousandfold stronger. The indus- 
trial gain would be lost in the social demoralization. Be- 
cause of its social and political bearing, Chinese coolie 
colonization cannot be looked upon as a means of supply- 
ing workers in a mass. At the most it will be simply 
a help, and not a source of labor supply. 

With this fully understood, the Sugar Planters' Asso- 
ciation, which knows the agricultural needs of the 
country, has held steadily to white immigration. The 
Autonomist party in its first declaration of principles 
was specifically for white immigration. And the few 

190 



TO-MORKOW IN CUBA 

enlightened Spanish leaders who gave the subject at- 
tention took the same ground. In no case was the 
hostility to the race of color the reason. The relation 
between whites and blacks was proof of the lack of 
hostility as a motive. The governing cause was the 
fear that with the incoming of blacks and without white 
immigration the whites would be absorbed by the race 
of color, and that the common level would sink. With 
the white immigration kept preponderant, Latin civili- 
zation has brought the African race up to a high stand- 
ard. In a previous chapter I have indicated the be- 
lief that no scheme of negro colonization in Cuba will 
lower it. 

But whatever the color of the laborers, the people of 
the island realize that the hope of the country for to- 
morrow lies only in the immigration that is based on 
the family. They will be true to that instinct, though 
it may disappoint projects of venturesome and impa- 
tient capital. They will be exercising the principles 
of the broadest statesmanship and the most enlight- 
ened patriotism in whatever measures they may enact 
to protect themselves from an immigration that does 
not bring with it the' family of the immigrant. 



191 



CHAPTER XI 

yV Sugar and Tobacco— Other Products 

Shadow of Beet-Root Competition Not New — Comparison with Cane 
Production — Cost of Labor — Effect of Hawaii's Free Market — 
Local Conditions of Cuban Industry — Modern Methods in Use- 
Latest Crop — System of Colonos — Improvement Probable— Large 
Capital Eequisite for Growing Cane-Sugar — Contrast of Tobacco 
Production — Eield for Small Capitalists — Family-Group Labor 
—Control of Crop Not Likely — Statistics of Exports— Prospec- 
tive Revival of Coffee Cultivation — Fruit Raising and Its Op- 
portunities — Commercial Productiveness of Soil — Mineral Re- 
sources—Value of Forests— Stock Raising a Profitable Field — 
Extent of Small Landownership. 

Revolutions of government do not revolutionize the 
soil. Industrial ruin was the inevitable consequence 
of the Cuban insurrection. In the distress which fol- 
lowed, the prophets of dismay declared that the stricken 
cane-sugar industry never could meet the new condi- 
tions of competition and production which were arising. 
Nevertheless, Cuba is the greatest natural sugar planta- 
tion in the world. 

The decadence of the cane-sugar industry is not a 
new topic. In the year 1812 A.D., cane was the subject 
of a series of vaticinations, and a dozen years pre- 
viously it was observed that the introduction of the 
beet-root plant in Germany was a menace to the sugar- 
growing islands of the West Indies. The industry was 

192 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

so profitable that during the first half of the century 
the change from coffee raising to sugar planting began — 
a change which continued steadily, and reduced the 
coffee production to a comparatively small number of 
cafetales, or plantations, in the eastern end of the is- 
land. Yet the shadow of the beet root lengthened, for 
the stalk was growing. In the 'fifties it was the beet 
root, not in Germany, but in France, that was causing 
concern. Pezuela, the learned and laborious author of 
the "Dictionary of the Island of Cuba," writes of it as 
a "prejudicial rivalry." The complaint was that this 
" prejudicial rivalry " had begun in 1828, when the 
sugar of Cuba was preparing to take greater value. At 
that time France had ninety refineries of her own and 
supplied the whole French consumption. Pezuela also 
remarks that as an offset to losses in the French mar- 
ket, Cuba gained by the decline of the sugar production 
in Jamaica which the freeing of the slaves caused. 
Little note is taken of the steadily increasing consump- 
tion in the United States, and the market which was 
then widening for Cuba as an offset to the European 
exclusion. 

In 1830, when, in spite of the French beet-root com- 
petition, the development of the cane-sugar industry in 
Cuba really commenced, a negro plantation-hand was 
accounted worth $400, a yoke of oxen $135, and a 
horse or a mule $60. The negro cotton-hand on a 
plantation in the United States had a greater worth. 
In 1857 Pezulea estimated the value of the 2,000 sugar 
plantations on the island at $239,000,000, of which 
the land was figured at $80,000,000 and 150,000 slaves 
at $105,000,000. The balance was made up of the 
13 193 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

plantation animals and implements. New inventions 
were also utilized to increase the production. The 
number of separate ingenios, or plantations, diminished 
by absorption into larger ones. 

In 1860 the production of cane-sugar in Cuba was 
1,127,348,750 pounds. The aguardiente, or cane- 
brandy, and other by-products also had to be taken 
into account. In that year the production of cane- 
sugar in all countries of the world was 2,750,496,950 
pounds. The beet-sugar production was 449,999,943 
pounds, divided between France and Germany in the 
relative proportion of two-fifths to three-fifths. Com- 
ing down to a later period without intermediate anal- 
ysis, the situation may be seen at a glance, and the 
changes that have taken place be understood by the 
following comparative figures of cane and beet root : 

Cane. Beet. 

1887-88 2,541 tons 2,407 tons. 

1896-97 2,452 " 4,772 " 

Cuba's quota had fallen abnormally on account of 
the insurrection, and the percentage of cane production 
was therefore not trustworthy. But this deficiency did 
not obscure the steady increase of beet production. 
Since then some further changes have taken place, due 
largely to the tariff legislation of the United States 
intended to foster its own beet-sugar industry. Cuba's 
future must be examined in the light of all these 
changed circumstances. 

During the worst years of the insurrection the Cuban 
sugar planters were confident that when peace should 
be re-established they would be able to meet the beet- 
sugar competition. They never feared that the cane of 

194 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Cuba would lose its market. All their hopes were de- 
pendent on the United States. This is so obviously 
the correct view that it does not need elaboration. The 
United States is fostering beet-root production by a 
relatively high protective tariff. The growth of the 
industry has not yet reached the proportions which 
justify the belief that the "Western farmers will "go into 
its production extensively rather than to continue rais- 
ing bread-stuffs for the sugar-producing West Indies. 

Investigations made by the United States Agricultu- 
ral Department show that in Puerto Rico cane-sugar 
can be raised for two cents a pound of the same stand- 
ard that it will cost the producer of the United States 
three and one-quarter cents a pound to produce beet 
root. The limit of production in Puerto Eico is so 
small, being not over three per cent of the total con- 
sumption of the United States, that it is not an impor- 
tant factor. In Cuba it is different. A careful exami- 
nation will show that in the new conditions cane-sugar 
cannot be produced there much below two cents a 
pound. The margin may be one cent a pound between 
that and the beet-root production in the United States 
when beet-root production cheapens. The cost of labor 
is relatively high. This cost will increase rather than 
diminish in the future, because the Cuban plantation 
laborers are likely to reach a higher standard of living. 
Cane-sugar production in Cuba at one and one-half 
cents a pound is due to exceptional advantages. It is 
not general. It is probable that in its elementary 
stages the beet-root industry of the United States and 
the Louisiana interests will prevent the free intro- 
duction of Cuban sugar. They will not be able to pre- 

195 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

vent that liberal reciprocity which is so essential to 
the Cuban cane production, especially since a conces- 
sion has been made to the British West Indies. The 
steady increase in consumption in the United States 
will justify broad reciprocity. A spoonful of beet root 
for the morning coffee from the home product, a sau- 
cerful from Cuba for other household purposes, will be 
the relative proportions for many years to come. 

Hawaii has the advantage of the free market forever 
secured by annexation. Its production is undergoing 
an abnormal stimulus. No reason exists for placing 
the ultimate Hawaiian production beyond 300,000 tons 
annually. Under the free market afforded by reci- 
procity the greatest annual output was 237,000 tons. 
All the economies of production and new methods have 
been utilized in Hawaii for years past. The area of 
soil suitable for cultivation is limited. Because Ha- 
waii once thought 100,000 tons the limit of her produc- 
tive capacity does not prove that 300,000 is not the 
limit. 

Jamaica and the British West Indies, under the pres- 
ent policy of the British Empire, are not apt to see the 
revival of their cane-sugar industry. The British im- 
perial policy changes slowly. Grants-in-aid are far- 
things tossed to a ragged beggar. Though Jamaica 
has secured partial reciprocity with the United States, 
her recuperation must be slower than that of Cuba 
because the conditions of the recuperation are not so 
favorable. Cuba has more to fear from the develop- 
ment of cane-sugar in Mexico and perhaps in the Phil- 
ippines than from the reconstruction of the industry 
in Jamaica and Barbadoes. 

196 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

These are what may be called the external condi- 
tions affecting sugar production in Cuba. They give 
fair basis for the assumption that a profitable market 
may be assured for the next few years, possibly until 
the former production of 1,000,000 tons annually is 
reached. In the mean time the conditions under which 
this production must go forward become important. 
Sugar planters in debt, with years of non-production 
and of wreck and ruin behind them, were not in posi- 
tion to make a vigorous start. Probably many of the 
mortgaged plantations will pass into other hands. But 
the soil is there, and if the American market can be 
assured the redevelopment will come, first to the plan- 
ations closest to the sea-coast, then of those farther 
back in the interior, and finally there will be new plan- 
tations. In this development the revolution in methods 
of production which has been going on will be con- 
tinued. Already machinery has effected a saving of 
twenty per cent in production. The economic basis of 
production may be modified, so that there will be prac- 
tically no wastage, and these new processes must serve 
as the compensation for the relatively high cost of 
labor. One fact seems to stand out. This is that 
while capital will be cautious, it will not find the beet- 
sugar competition too dangerous to prevent investment 
in Cuba. In 1905 the Queen of the Antilles may be 
producing as large a quantity of cane as she produced 
in 1895, but under different conditions and at a less 
relative cost of production. 

It is a common mistake that the prodigality of nature 
destroyed systematic cultivation of sugar-cane in Cuba. 
Pen pictures of the planters spending the riotous earn- 

197 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

ings of their cane-lands in Saratoga and Paris while the 
plantations produced and reproduced without manage- 
ment were often drawn. These pictures gave a false 
idea. Some of the Cuban planters were as extravagant 
and as improvident as those of Louisiana in former 
days. In time the mortgages ate the substance of the 
soil, and the plantation-owners were ruined. It was 
also true that they did not act together as one body in 
establishing a scientific basis of production as the Ha- 
waiian planters have done. The latter by their organ- 
ization have brought cane cultivation to an exact science 
which assures the fullest return of natural wealth from 
every acre of land. 

But improvidence was not true of the whole class of 
Cuban planters. After visiting the few estates which 
were enabled to plant and grind during the worst pe- 
riod of the insurrection, it came to me to visit the 
leading plantations in the islands of the Hawaiian 
group and to observe the methods of production. 
During a subsequent stay in Cuba further opportunity 
was given to study the cultivation there when peace- 
ful industry reigned. I did not find a single process 
in Hawaii, with the admitted perfection to which the 
use of improved machinery has been brought and the 
economic devices for preventing waste, that was not 
understood and practised in Cuba. The progressive 
planters of the Antilles knew how to utilize every prod- 
uct of the sugar-cane. The difference was that while 
the rule of scientific production in Hawaii was uni- 
versal, in Cuba it was followed simply by individual 
planters. Needless to say it must become universal in 
Cuba also before the sugar industry can recuperate on 

198 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

a lasting basis. The day of the prodigal planter is 
gone. I might add that he was not always a Cuban. 
In the province of Habana the plantation which is 
usually cited as an example of modern methods and of 
keen business administration is owned and managed 
by Cubans. In Santa Clara province a magnificent 
estate which may fairly claim to be one of the finest 
sugar plantations in the world is the property of a 
noted Cuban family. The supposedly prudent Eng- 
lishman in the role of a planter ruined by his own 
extravagance is too often seen in the West Indies to 
charge that quality solely to the Latins. 

The sugar crop of 1898-99 was a disappointment to 
unthinking persons. They imagined that with the 
return of peace the scorched cane-stalks which spread 
for hundreds of miles over the island would at once 
bear sap. The net production for the year was 304,- 
360 tons of 2,240 pounds against 290,028 tons the pre- 
vious year. Eighteen months are necessary from the 
time the cane is planted until the first crop is ready for 
grinding. Then the soil produces seven years with- 
out renewal. The planters needed first of all oxen, 
then laborers, then money for machinery, and all the 
time money for interest on the accumulated mortgages. 
Some of them by the closest figuring of which they 
were capable declared they could not replant their 
ruined estates under $30 an acre. Others in favored 
localities thought they could do it for $15 an acre. 
The owner of a small estate of 1,700 acres which came 
within my notice said he could replant for $23,000, or 
a little less than $14 an acre. He had the seed-cane 
available, and this was not included in the estimate. 

199 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

With a proper understanding of cane-sugar cultivation, 
no one will look for a heavy increase in the crop before 
the season of 1901. By that time an output of 500,000 
tons may be in sight. One general fact must be kept 
in mind. A maximum of two cents per pound must be 
allowed for production. The profit is in the fraction 
below that figure. Ultimately this fraction will be as- 
sured in the reciprocity granted by the United States as 
a compromise between the pressure of the sugar-refining 
interests for free raw product and the opposition of the 
beet-sugar producing interests to any lowering of the 
duty. 

Whether the system of colonos will remain is a prob- 
lem. In the beginning it seemed an ideal system. A 
large plantation, in addition to the land worked by the 
owner, would have a dozen or more tenant producers. 
The cost of production was largely lessened by having 
one great central mill grind for the surrounding coun- 
try. Machinery which on separate plantations would 
cost $2,000,000, on a single plantation at an investment 
of $500,000 could do the same work. Production was 
unquestionably cheapened. It is certain that the cane 
will continue to be ground by the central mill. The 
practical difficulty is in the adjustment of the relations 
of the plantation-owners and the colonos, or tenants. 
Under the old system, on a big plantation in return 
for so many tons of sugar-cane brought to the cen- 
tral mill the plantation-owner would return to the 
colono a definite quantity of raw sugar. The profit 
to the mill lay in the amount or quantity of sugar 
taken as compensation for the grinding. Naturally 
the colonos claimed that the mill wanted too large a 

200 



TO-MOKKOTV IN CUBA 

proportion. That is a difference of opinion which 
will always exist. 

The real difficulty lay in the fact that the colonos 
leased the lands from the plantation-owners. The lat- 
ter were always large borrowers, and in return they 
made advances of money to the colonos. With a debtor 
loaning to another debtor, the unsatisfactory results 
were certain to follow. But the system is clearly capa- 
ble of improvement. It is possible to imagine a time 
when the central mills will grind the product of sugar- 
farms which vary in area from a caballeria to two hun- 
dred acres, the land either owned or leased by the far- 
mer, who can raise enough farm products for the support 
of his family, and devote the rest of the land to the cul- 
tivation of cane to be ground at the central mill. On 
the larger scale the colono system will also be developed. 
An ambitious American may lease 2,000 acres and up- 
wards for a period of five or six years. If he has his 
own capital with which to do that and can secure his 
own labor, the central mill will become his servant and 
not his master. 

Though the great planters are not encouraged with 
this prospect, and though the sugar industry in Cuba 
must always be dependent on large investments of capi- 
tal, the failure of the colono system cannot be affirmed. 
It demands a new trial under new conditions. The 
planters apparently have not considered the probability 
of the industry shifting to a new basis. The amount 
of capital required to be invested in a central mill 
is large, ranging sometimes from $500,000 upwards for 
the machinery. There seems to be no inherent obstacle 
to the mills representing capital independent from that 

201 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

which controls the plantations, just as the great flour- 
mills of the Northwest are independent of the wheat- 
fields. In some form it is an industrial possibility. 

In the economic history of the island the old writers 
note that cane-sugar became a profitable industry when 
negro slaves were introduced in numbers. They re- 
marked the progress made during the short period of 
English occupation in 1763, when 5,000 slaves were 
added to the stock of human blood which the island 
already possessed. The slaves came from Jamaica and 
the other adjacent islands. The English went, but the 
Africans remained. The slaves whom the English left 
gave a marked impetus to the sugar plantations. This 
growth continued until the beet root caused inquietude 
and until the prophecies were made on the prospective 
ruin of the industry. The beet root did not cause the 
fears of the planters to be realized. Sugar-cane con- 
tinued to add to the wealth of the Pearl of the Indies. 
The aggregate of slave labor increased, keeping pace 
with the increase of sugar production. 

When the African slave trade was restricted under 
treaty agreement and failed to fill the void, Chinese 
coolies were introduced. This experiment was not a 
promising success. The influence of the Chinese im- 
migration is discussed elsewhere, but the fallacy of the 
slave-labor necessity was shown after the Ten- Years' 
war, when the progressive emancipation of the blacks 
was in operation and sugar production increased. It 
was a demonstration again of the greater productiveness 
of free labor over servile labor. The years of greatest 
production were those following 1886, when the remnant 
of slavery was abolished. 

202 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

This, however, may be said to be shifting the labor 
issue instead of meeting it. The question to be met is 
whether sugar production can continue on a profitable 
scale under conditions which are not substantially ser- 
vile labor. The coming industrial life of Cuba is so 
largely one of immigration that the bearing of immi- 
gration on sugar production calls for a word. It may 
be taken as a maxim that white labor from the United 
States is not going to work in the cane-fields. Western 
farm-hands who show little willingness to exchange 
the freedom of the wheat and corn fields for the more 
tedious labor of beet-root cultivation will not transfer 
themselves to the cane-fields of the Antilles. The labor 
of the cane plantations in the future will be drawn from 
the same sources as in the past. It will be made up of 
black and white Cubans and Spanish peasants. Capi- 
tal will find the means of securing labor, and the island 
will benefit in the collateral branches which come from 
handling the sugar crop. If, however, the future of 
Cuba were for it to be simply a huge sugar-cane plan- 
tation, that future would be dark politically, socially, 
and economically. Happily the promises for develop- 
ment are along other lines which will be parallel with 
its sugar production and will offset its drawbacks. 

The smoke of the Vuelta Abajo curls upwards from 
millions of cigars in Europe and the United States and 
in every corner of the known world. The conditions of 
the tobacco industry in Cuba are not limited by the 
uncertainty of tariff duties. The effect of these must 
be weighed, but they do not permanently restrict the 
output. It might also be said that the production of 
cheaper tobacco, following the laws of natural econ- 

203 



TO-MORROW m CUBA 

oiny, has not reached its limit. Its growth will be 
accompanied with greater economic developments and 
with fewer drawbacks than the redevelopment of the 
sugar-cane production. It benefits, too, the artisans of 
the island as well as the agricultural laborers. With 
the increase of tobacco production, the number of cigar 
factories in Habana is certain to increase. This is the 
kind of light manufacturing suitable to the tropics. It 
pays to have an Habana brand on the tobacco of the 
Vuelta Abajo and Partidos districts. Remedios, in the 
central part of the island, may ship its strong products 
to the United States, and the poorer grades raised in San- 
tiago may go to Germany without affecting this fact. 

Centuries of privilege did not destroy the Government 
monopoly of tobacco which Spain enforced. From the 
time when the Government factory was established in 
Seville by the Council of the Indies to the end of Spanish 
sovereignty in the island, both production and distribu- 
tion were regulated by the authorities. When the royal 
decree of 1817 was promulgated, it showed the reluctance 
which the Spanish Government yet preserved to making 
the cultivation and manufacture of tobacco entirely free. 
During the insurrection the export duties were moulded 
to suit the Barcelona monopoly. Under an independent 
government or an American protectorate they will be 
shaped so as to lighten the burden of the producer. 

The leading characteristic of tobacco production in 
contrast with sugar-cane is that it is emphatically an 
industry for the small capitalists and farmers. The 
island is in little probability of becoming a vast tobacco 
plantation controlled by a trust or syndicate with the 
power to regulate production. Capital in this form or 

204 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

in other forms is of immense benefit to Cuba, but it 
lias its limitations. The tobacco industry may become, 
in the regions which have tobacco soil, an immense 
grouping of small farms. The uncertainty of the crop, 
the difference in grades, the necessity of manufacturers 
having a variety from which to choose, militate against 
a monopoly of production. To control the production 
of potatoes in the United States would be as simple as 
to control tobacco production in Cuba. While the syn- 
dicates or companies which own the factories may also 
own large plantations, the conditions of production are 
such that it does not pay them to work the plantations 
as a single tract. 

Experience may be needed to demonstrate this fact. 
The vegas or small farms, whether leased to the pro- 
ducers or owned by them, are to the interest of the fac- 
tories as well as to the producers. Where the veguero 
needs money, the amount is small compared with that 
which the sugar planter must advance to the colono, and 
the risk of losing its return is less. In 1858 there were 
8,250 caballerias of tobacco land under cultivation, and 
the production was 1,700,000 arrobas of 25 pounds. 
In 1894 the number 8,875 was given as plantations, 
rather than as caballerias. The number of people em- 
ployed directly and indirectly by the industry was 
80,000. Of these there were in Pinar del Rio — the 
Vuelta Abajo district — 26,000 men and 10,000 women 
and children. Aside from its economic and industrial 
value, tobacco raising will be of great worth in the tran- 
sition of political conditions and in its effect on rural 
prosperity. Its labor is of the highest type, which is 
that of family-group labor. 

205 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Ordinarily four or five years are needed to learn the 
science of tobacco growing. It is also an art. One 
man may grow nine bales, or about 1,000 pounds, of 
tobacco. The plants are placed in the ground from Oc- 
tober to January, and the harvest is from January to 
April. The first cutting is for wrappers and the later 
cuttings are for fillers. Tobacco is thus a three-months' 
crop. When it is in the drying-house, corn or some 
other cereal is planted and a crop had from the same 
soil. 

The foreign demand for Habana cigars and Cuban leaf 
tobacco is not likely to be met for a long while because 
the consumption grows steadily. The prohibition of 
exports and the lack of leaf for local manufacture dur- 
ing the insurrection make an accurate comparison im- 
practicable, but a general idea may be gained from the 
cigars and the leaf tobacco exported for a ten-years' 
period. This is afforded by the following table : 



Year. Cigars. 



Tobacco. 
Pounds. 



1889 250,000,000 30,000,000 

1890 212,000,000 

1891 197,000,000 17,000,000 

1892 167,000,000 16,000,000 

1893 147,000,000 18,000,000 

1894 134,000,000 22,000,000 

1895 159,000,000 23,000,000 

1896 186,000,000 30,000,000 

1897 123,000,000 Prohibited. 

1898 98,000,000 9,000,000 

Coffee promises to become what it was in the early 
years of the century, a staple for all sections of the 
island. At present its cultivation is limited to the east- 
ern province, and the excellence of the plantations 

206 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

around Guant^namo is well known. The French refu- 
gees from Santo Domingo who established the industry 
there also carried it to the western end. Until they 
were abandoned for cane growing, the cafetales in Ha- 
bana province were very productive. Their re-establish- 
ment is probable. Uplands from 1,000 to 2,500 feet 
above sea-level abound in Matanzas, and also around 
Alquizar and Artemisa in Habana, and this height in- 
sures a good crop. The capital invested in coffee pro- 
duction must wait four and possibly five years for its 
full return. The field is not, therefore, one for the jjell- 
mell investment which wants one hundred per cent, 
within a twelvemonth ; but when the fever of this kind 
of speculation passes away and normal inducements are 
followed, the increase in plantations will be seen. The 
coffee industry has a great advantage in that it does not 
require large capital, and while a plantation is being 
brought to the point of market productiveness the land 
affords other means of support for those who cultivate 
it. With a coffee-consuming population such as the in- 
habitants of Cuba will always be, and with a soil capa- 
ble of producing almost unlimited crops, the importa- 
tion of coffee from Puerto Rico and the United States 
is bound to cease. A better quality can be produced at 
a cheaper price than it can be imported. The Santiago 
grade commands a premium in the markets of the isl- 
and. In a few years Habana will probably be supply- 
ing its local consumption from the cafetales within forty 
or fifty miles of the city. 

Fruit raising may be engaged in earlier than coffee 
production. American interests are understood to be 
supplementing their successful development of fruit 

207 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

growing in Jamaica by purchases of land in Eastern 
Cuba, where Banes and Baracoa are the ports of export. 
There is opportunity for the small fruit farmer also. 
Sugar planters are discovering that the raising of bana- 
nas, pineapples, cocoanuts, and oranges may be carried 
on in connection with sugar production. Those who 
are in a position to do so are willing to try the experi- 
ment. This does not mean that oranges will cease to 
grow in Florida. It means that the productiveness of 
the Cuban soil is likely to be further diversified in such 
products as find at their door the markets of the United 
States. 

The fertility of the soil of Cuba is so boundless that 
exaggerated estimates of what is worth producing are 
sometimes made. The tables of the leading authorities 
on industrial subjects are taken in their literal meaning 
as though applicable to all the cultivators of the soil. 
But this is not the commercial productiveness. Their 
figures show the limit of capacity of a caballeria, or 
33^ acres, and the number of families which may be 
supported from that area of land. Sugar, coffee, to- 
bacco, cocoa, corn, hay, potatoes, rice, yucca, or starch- 
plant — which stayed the hunger of Columbus and his 
mariners — even wheat, cotton, bananas, and other 
fruits may all be raised on one farm, besides the pigs 
and the poultry which can be fed ; but the limitation of 
this productiveness in practice must be noted. Cot- 
ton grows on trees instead of bushes, but it is not going 
to be produced in Cuba to compete with that raised in 
the Southern States ; nor will wheat be coaxed from the 
ground when it is cheaper to ship sugar and fruits to 
the Mississippi Valley and import flour and cotton goods 

208 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

in return. The diversity of products is great, but in the 
lifetime of the producers of to-day they will not be pro- 
ducing everything that they want to eat. Corn alter- 
nates with tobacco beneficially to the soil, and other 
crops rotate with advantage ; but they do not reduce cul- 
tivation to a minuteness vastly greater than that of the 
farm laDds in many portions of the United States. 

Homely calculations have been made of the increased 
area which was brought under cultivation on American 
farms when the barbed-wire fences straightened out the 
corners lost in the elbows of the rail fences. The esti- 
mate of the wheat and corn and vegetables which might 
be raised on all the railroad rights of way would be an 
interesting one. In the same way the generalization 
might be made of the increase in production when every 
caballeria of Cuban land is under cultivation of crops di- 
versified scientifically and mathematically ; but it would 
have no present bearing. The thing to be known about 
the soil of Cuba is that its cultivators need never be 
dependent on one staple, as the Western farmers are de- 
pendent on wheat and corn. The value of this condition 
is in the probability that, while sugar-cane will not lose 
its supremacy, agricultural industry will be diversified 
by the increase of lesser farming. 

The mineral wealth of Cuba has been prospected with 
passable thoroughness. Imberno,* one of the best of 
recent authorities, says that besides the country imme- 
diately adjacent to the city of Santiago de Cuba, there 
is iron in the region around Holguin and Baracoa in the 
same province, in various parts of Santa Clara, near 
Jaruco in the northeastern part of Habana province, 

* Guia Geografica y Administrativa. 
14 209 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

and in Pinar del Eio, especially near the coast along 
Bahia Honda. Copper he locates chiefly in Santiago, 
but he refers to the deposits near Minas in Habana. 
These deposits are now owned by Americans. Plum- 
bago, he says, is found with iron in Santiago, and anti- 
mony with lead in the Holguin district. Coal he lo- 
cates in the region of Consolacion, del Sur in Pinar del 
Eio and in Matanzas province ; gypsum in Pinar del 
Eio, magnetic ore around Guanabacoa, which is across 
the bay from Habana, in the hills of Trinidad, around 
El Caney near Santiago, and in other districts. The 
marble in the Isle of Pines is extensive, but it is of 
inferior quality. 

The best report on the asphalt and bituminous oil 
deposits was made by the Spanish official engineer, 
Pedro Saltarian, in 1883. He located bituminous wells 
in various sections of Santa Clara province, and the 
asphalt beds in the Cardenas district as well as several 
in Pinar del Eio were described by him. Some of 
these have been partially worked with divergent opin- 
ions as to their commercial value. 

Americans who prospected in Eastern Cuba thought 
they saw the greatest possibilities in the manganese 
and copper mines, with some encouragement for lead 
deposits. Discoveries of this kind became as common 
as the location of silver mines in the Western States. 
Some of the prospectors were doubtless mistaken; yet 
the authorities who are competent to judge do not differ 
in their opinions regarding the value of the copper 
deposits and the uncovered wealth of the Sierra Maes- 
tre range of mountains in Santiago. 

Trustworthy information concerning the iron ore 

210 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

deposits, the Bessemer hematite, is given by the large 
amount of duties paid into the United States treasury 
by the American companies which work these mines. 
Of recent years they have been shipping ore also to 
Europe. The following table shows the productiveness 
of iron ore in Santiago by tons : 

Year. Tons. 

1884 23,997 

1885 80,095 

1886 110,880 

1887 94,810 

1888, 204,475 

1889.. 255,406 

1890 356,060 

1891 . 261,620 

1892 320,859 

1893 , 346,341 

1894 153,650 

1895. 377,041 

1896 405,671 

1897 452,559 

Total 3,443,464 

It is a question whether there are the 10,000,000 
acres of virgin forests in Cuba that have been vaguely 
estimated. Sometimes the innumerable groves of royal 
palms, the most useful tree known to the tropics, are 
included in this guess. Experienced Americans who 
for a year travelled over the island seeking to deter- 
mine the most valuable timber locations became doubt- 
ful of the extent of the wooded area, though the eastern 
province seemed to them a single forest. But the area 
is great enough to take many years to clear it. The 
cedar from which the cigar-boxes are made is found in 
Pinar del Eio as well as in Santiago. The mahogany 

211 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

close to the coast has been thinned out, but further in 
the interior it is untouched. The other hard woods are 
of great variety. Their commercial value is uncertain 
until systematic lumbering as known in Michigan and 
Wisconsin is developed. In the building of railroads 
the ties may be taken from the woods which it will be 
necessary to clear. 

Stock raising in Cuba offers one of the most profit- 
able fields for a quick return on invested capital. The 
high rolling land which begins in Santa Clara and 
extends into Santiago affords the best ranges. Much 
of this grazing land is capable of sugar cultivation, but 
many years must pass before this can be engaged in to 
advantage. The central province of Puerto Principe is 
a vast grazing region. Its Cuban name, Camagiiey, 
means a cattle-pasture. Hundreds of thousands heads 
of cattle disappeared during the insurrection. To-day 
the traveller may journey from sunrise to sunset and 
see no signs of live stock ; but this barrenness will not 
last. The grazing ranges are bound to be restocked not 
only with cattle, but also with horses. Animals from 
the United States may be imported to help restock 
them. Heretofore they have been imported simply as 
live beef for daily consumption. The supply, however, 
will not be solely from the United States. In securing 
oxen for the sugar plantations it is found that Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Honduras are the main sources. Live 
stock from the United States will have to be crossed 
with animals from those countries and with the native 
stock. It is the common experience that the stock runs 
out in three generations unless it is renewed by breed- 
ing with imported animals. 

212 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA 

The landownership instinct is very strong with the 
mass of the Cuban population. This means that it 
was strong with their Spanish progenitors and will 
be strong with the Spanish immigrants of the future. 
This is shown in the government reports, which were, 
for Spanish statistics, fairly trustworthy because on 
them were based the taxes. The last enumeration 
which was made before the insurrection broke out 
showed that in the whole island there were 1,119 sugar 
plantations, 4,214 stock farms, 375 haciendas or large 
country estates, 188 coffee plantations, 8,485 vegas or 
tobacco farms, and 22,224 sitios or estancias. A sitio 
is simply a place, and an estancia is a small farm. The 
number of city, town, and village real-estate holdings 
was 76,402. These fincas urbanos, as they were called, 
shaded off into land-holdings capable of cultivation. It 
will be several years until an exact estimate can be had 
of the products of small farming in Cuba. 



213 



CHAPTEE XII 

Trade and Taxation — Railways and Internal De- 
velopment 

Some Primary Principles — Adjustment of Purchasing Power of Prod- 
ucts by Eeciprocity — Tariff Dues and Their Capabilities — New 
Sources of Revenue — Decay of Spanish Shipping — American 
Markets for Tropical Products — Unwarranted Expectations of 
Merchants — Railway Building and Its Limitations — Systems in 
Operation — The Backbone Line — Value of Existing Railroad 
Property — English Ownership — Water-Way Competition — Har- 
bor Improvements — Good Eoads the Coming Question — Cheap 
Labor Not Found — Prospect for Agricultural Banks — Strikes Not 
a Recent Development — Artificial Monetary Basis — Ultimate 
Supremacy of American Financial System. 

Trade and taxation in Cuba may be reduced to a few 
simple formulas. The elaboration of these formulas 
into economic treatises is not difficult. When the elab- 
oration becomes wearisome and confusing the return 
to the starting point is easy. There is really little need 
of wandering far away from it into the wilderness of 
speculative economics. 

The island for all time will have to supply the wants 
of its inhabitants by what they can get in exchange for 
a bag of sugar, a bale of tobacco, a sack of coffee, and 
a cargo of fruits and nuts. The adjustment of this pur- 
chasing power of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and fruits so 

214 



TaMOKEOW IN CUBA 

as to bring back the largest quantity of flour, lard, and 
bacon, the greatest amount of agricultural machinery, 
and the most extensive assortment of cotton and other 
dress goods is the problem of trade and also of tariff 
taxation. The United States consumes everything the 
island produces. It produces everything that Cuba 
consumes. The doors open one to the other. There is 
the whole question of Cuban commerce, and its basis is 
reciprocity. 

It is shown since the American control of the cus- 
tom houses that an impoverished people not number- 
ing much more than 1,000,000 can pay $1,000,000 
monthly in customs duties. This is done by light 
rates on articles of commerce and consumption. With 
the restoration of prosperity the rates can be further 
shifted to articles of luxury, because the Latin- Ameri- 
can's fondness for luxuries when able to gratify itself 
pays tariff tribute willingly. 

A hitherto untouched source of internal-revenue taxa- 
tion exists. It is ample enough to supplant most of 
the present unsatisfactory internal taxes. This source 
of revenue is in the tobacco that is consumed in Cuba 
and in the by-product of sugar known as aguardiente or 
cane-brandy. Everybody in the Antilles smokes, and 
smokes countless cigars and packages of cigarettes. 
Under the Spanish system the wax tapers which were 
used for lights paid an internal-revenue duty, but the 
infinitely greater income from cigars and cigarettes was 
neglected. The aguardiente, besides its use as a bev- 
erage, is employed in a variety of household ways. It 
takes the place of a score of toilet articles which in 
the United States pay an internal-revenue tax. Inter- 

215 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

nal taxation of this kind would easily replace the in- 
come lost by the jjrohibition of the lottery and would 
also replace the vexatious industrial tax, which was 
literally an impost on progressive industry and enter- 
prising commerce. 

When the Blaine reciprocity provisions were in force, 
the harbors of Cuba were filled with vessels flying the 
American flag almost to the exclusion of the ships of 
other nations. After Spanish sovereignty ceased, ships 
continued to enter Cuban ports under its flag, but the 
cargoes they carried were small. With the artificial 
restrictions removed the peninsula had little to sell 
to the island, but it was not itself independent of the 
products of the Antilles. Its exports dropped to a 
cipher. That may not be a permanent nothingness. 
Cuba will buy some things of Spain, and the traffic from 
Barcelona to Buenos Aires by way of Habana may not 
entirely cease. The Barcelona merchants are already 
making an aggressive struggle to keep their Antillian 
trade. But with no discriminating tonnage dues, and 
with no preferential tariff forcing Cuba to receive the 
products of the peninsula at a low rate while its own pro- 
ducts pay a high import duty into the peninsula — that 
was the basis of the Spanish system — Spanish shipping, 
it might be said European shipping, must remain near 
the vanishing point which is represented by the cipher. 
There have been years in which 95 per cent of Cuba's 
exports were sent to the United States. Those years 
are coming again, and under conditions which render it 
certain that American vessels will not enter or leave 
Cuban ports in ballast. 

The great country to the north is so little to the 

216 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

north that the vessel twenty-four hours or thirty-six 
hours out from a Cuban port may start the distribution 
of products over an area of 1,500,000 square miles and 
among 50,000,000 consumers — all the region from the 
Mississippi valley to the New England coast. Habana 
can ship its freight to reach New York, Chicago, St. 
Louis, and Cincinnati within four days. The Ameri- 
can markets await the tropical products which 5,000,- 
000 inhabitants of Cuba can supply. These border 
tropics will not encroach seriously on the products of 
the temperate zone. The crevices between the rocks in 
New England will be sprouting hand-nurtured blades of 
grass when the caballeria of rich Cuban land is yielding 
its maximum of sugar, coffee, and fruits, but not of 
wheat in competition with those blades of grass or with 
the prairies of the West. 

On the part of merchants in the United States there 
was keen disappointment because they did not find a 
market of 5,000,000 consumers awaiting them within 
three months after Cuba ceased to be a possession of 
Spain. They did not stop to reflect that the inhabi- 
tants had been reduced in four years by at least 25 per 
cent, and that consumption could not make a quick 
stride forward until the surviving population was recu- 
perated. The Mississippi valley was surprised that 
the demand for bread-stuffs was not vastly larger than 
when the flour had to be shipped by the way of Barce- 
lona, while the Atlantic coast was disappointed that 
the $100,000,000 of Cuban commerce which was in 
vision when the insurrection broke out did not im- 
mediately sweep into its ports. A little thought 
was needed to recall that industrial recuperation 

217 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

has its limitations of time, and that increased com- 
merce can only come from increased development and 
increased population. And the basis of these is in- 
ternal development. 

The question recurs to the resources of the island 
and the means of unfolding them as the prelude to the 
growth of commerce. A quaint Spanish author once 
wrote of Cuba as an island "whose population and 
whose richness were a drop of water in the grand ocean 
of Spain's colonial treasure." The grand ocean has 
dried up. Shall the water-drop become a stagnant pool 
or a fountain fed] by steady streams? The answer is 
again to be sought in the uncovering of that natural 
richness and in the population which uncovers it. 
What is of first concern is the lines which the develop- 
ment will follow in the lifetime of the young men of 
to-day. The market is assured.* Capital starts with 
that certainty. Its nest movement is for the quickest 
and largest returns where there is the least competition 
and not too great adventure. 

The clearing of the forest lands and the building 
of railways and ordinary roads for a time will go for- 
ward evenly with the reconstruction of the sugar planta- 
tions. The island to-day has 1,135 miles of railway, ex- 
clusive of the narrow-gauge lines on the sugar planta- 
tions which serve to bring the cane to the central mills. 
When 1,300 or perhaps 1,200 miles more are built, 
railway construction will be ended, because there will 
be no need of further means of rail communication. In 
its industrial aspects the Cuba of the past must be 
viewed almost as a stationary body. The building of 
* See Appendix B. 
218 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

railways was a slow work. A description of the island 
in 1900 would vary little from a description in 1845. 
The towns in 1850 were what they were in 1895. The 
means of travel were the same, the roads were the same, 
and few new highways of commerce were opened dur- 
ing half a century. The first railroad was built from 
Guinea to Habana within a few years after George 
Stephenson told the poking Parliamentary committee 
which quizzed him, that the locomotive he had invented 
would undoubtedly prove an inconvenient thing for the 
cows which happened to get in its way. 

The 1,200 or 1,300 miles of railway which are yet to 
be constructed will join the city of Santa Clara with the 
city of Santiago, closing a gap of less than 300 miles. 
It will have feeders to the north and south coasts to 
Nipe, Gibara, Baracoa, Sancti Spiritus, Santa Cruz del 
Sur, and Manzanillo. When this construction is fin- 
ished the backbone or central railway across the length 
of the island will be a fact, because existing lines will 
complete the links. The narrowness of Cuba forbids 
parallel roads, except for short distances. This back- 
bone railway was for fifty years an inviting project; but 
the English and the French capitalists who organized 
companies, made surveys, and secured what they sup- 
posed were Government concessions were always foiled 
in the end by the Spanish shipowners. Only the mem- 
ory of banquets to the government officials remained to 
the capitalists ; but that will not be the case in the fu- 
ture. 

The railways in actual operation in Cuba to-day, as 
given by the American military authorities, are as fol- 
lows; 

219 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Name. Miles. 

United Kailways of Habana 244 

Western Eailway 109^ 

Marianao Railroad 9 

Habana Terminal Railway (American military line) 6 

Regla and Guanabacoa Railroad 2£ 

Matanzas and Sabanilla Railroad • • ■ ■ . . 172f 

Cardenas and Jucaro Railroad System , . . , 248^ 

Sagua la Grande Railroad 88 

United Railroads of Caibaridn 57|- 

Trinidad Railroad 22 

San Cayetano and Vinales Railroad (narrow gauge, 2£ feet).. 15 

• Zaza and Sancti Spiritus Railroad (narrow gauge, 3 feet) 22| 

Jucaro-Moron Railway (military line) 40 

Nuevitas and Puerto Principe Railroad. 45 

Guantanamo Railroad. . . 10| 

Gibara-Holguin Railroad 9^ 

Santiago Railroads „ 33 



Total „ 1, 135 

Of the systems, the Jucaro-Moron Eailway belongs 
to the future Government of Cuba. It is an inheri- 
tance from Spanish sovereignty, being the old military 
trocha. It passes through a thinly populated region, 
and its commercial value has been doubted because 
neither of the terminals has a good harbor. Neverthe- 
less the country which is tributary to it is very fertile 
and capable of great development, while branches may 
be built from the main stem to good ports on both the 
north and the south coast. This line cost the Spanish 
Government $1,152,800 in gold. The Habana Terminal 
Eailway, so called, is a belt-line running from the docks 
at Triscornia and intersecting the lines which enter 
Habana. It was built to facilitate the movement of the 
troops and the handling of the supplies. When the 

220 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

United States ceases to have use for it, this belt-line 
will be valuable t to the existing roads, and if sold to 
them should bring a good price. 

The present ownership of the Cuban railways is 
chiefly in London. English capitalists were heavily 
interested before the insurrection broke out. They 
built the Western Eailway running from the city of Ha- 
bana to the town of Pinar del Eio, through the tobacco 
country. Surveys have been made to extend this line 
30 miles farther westward. English capitalists also 
control the United Eailways of Habana, which enter 
the city from both east and west, though the most of 
the lines run eastward. Cubans and Spaniards were 
the chief stockholders in the sugar-carrying roads 
known as the C^rdenas-Jiicaro and the Matanzas-Sa- 
banilla systems. After the signing of the protocol, in 
order to get money with which to work their plantations 
or for other purposes they sold their holdings to the 
Englishmen. 

At one time American capital seemed likely to con- 
trol the Cuban railways. It had the opportunity, but 
the chances of manipulation, of reorganization commit- 
tees, and of new issues of stock and bonds apparently 
were not great enough to appeal to the daring finan- 
ciers of New York. So the American capitalists retired 
and left the ground to their English rivals. It was 
another illustration of American disgust because Cuba 
was not a promising field for " quick returns and double 
money." Some financial interest is still held by Amer- 
icans, but the supremacy is in London. The English 
owners, after they gained control, sent agents to the 

United States to offer a profitable share in the enter- 

221 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

prises to public men whose political influence was 
thought desirable. 

In a general way it may be said that it does not mat- 
ter whether the capital invested in the Cuban railway 
system is from the United States or from Great Brit- 
ain. The English owners will buy their material in 
the States if they can get it there cheaper than in Eng- 
land. Nevertheless it is to be regretted that enter- 
prising American railway managers will not operate 
the Cuban railways. The slow and conservative man- 
agement of the Englishmen is not suited to the new 
industrial life of Cuba. Under the Spanish system 
railway charges, both freight and passenger, were exor- 
bitant. Both the theory and the practice were a lim- 
ited business and high charges. The English capital- 
ists follow the same plan. During the insurrection 
both freight and, passenger business paid a war tax of 
20 per cent in addition to the regular government im- 
post of 10 per cent on passenger business and 3 per cent 
on freight traffic. The English management does not 
seem likely to get out of the old rut. It looks forward 
to continuing to collect 7 cents a mile in American gold 
for first-class passengers and 5 cents for second-class 
passengers. Freight tariffs are enormous. The bur- 
den for the sugar industry is too heavy to be borne. A 
fall in rates must come either by the voluntary action 
of the railroad companies, which is improbable, or by 
the action of government. 

There is something of a political side, also, to this 
European ownership of Cuban railways. Controlling 
the system from Pinar del Eio to Santa Clara, it is 
natural that the English capitalists should want to con- 

222 



TO-MOREOW IN CUBA 

trol the backbone railway to Santiago when it is con- 
structed and the branch lines to the coasts. No one 
supposes that the main stem, or trunk line, between 
Santiago and Santa Clara will be in itself a paying one, 
or that there will ever be much through freight from 
Habana to Santiago unless the Florida straits and 
the Caribbean Sea dry up. Nevertheless the extension 
will be valuable in a way. At the present time the 
projects of the English capitalists are combated by 
interests which are said to be American. These inter- 
ests claim to have acquired certain rights with refer- 
ence to the Cuba Central Railway, partly by the action 
of Generals H. W. Lawton and Leonard Wood during 
the early military occupancy of Santiago province, but 
chiefly by acquiring the rights of the French company 
which organized the project for the backbone railway 
in 1881. The surveys made by the French engineers 
were the most complete and valuable of any that had 
been attempted. As to the precise rights regarding the 
projected railway, either Congress or the future Govern- 
ment of Cuba must determine. The most important 
point is not to delay the construction of the road too 
long. 

The telegraph and the telephone systems of Cuba 
were owned by the Spanish Government. The tele- 
phone privileges were leased to a private company, but 
the telegraph system was operated in connection with 
the post-office. Under the American military authority, 
the lines have been repaired, extended, and improved. 
They will be valuable property to the State or the Re- 
public of Cuba, but they are better operated in connec- 
tion with the railway system than independent of it. 

223 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

The existing 1,135 miles of railway are valued at 
$43,000,000 Spanish gold, according to the stock and 
bond issues. This would not amount to $40,000,000 in 
American money. While some of the stock and bonds 
were quoted above par and some below par after the 
restoration of peace, the general average would bring 
the total value up to the capitalization, regardless of 
temporary fluctuations due to the efforts of rival inter- 
ests to obtain control. These lines have been described 
by American experts as equal to the worth of any simi- 
lar length of railroad in the United States; and it is 
probable that when the island has a complete system of 
2,500 miles, this system will be equal in value to any 
2,500-mile system in the States. 

As they stand in the present day, the Cuban railroads 
must spend large sums of money in betterments and in 
repairing the destruction caused by the insurrection. 
This work will be completed by the time political con- 
ditions reach the stage at which there will be some 
authority capable of granting the franchises necessary 
to the construction of new lines. Once entered upon, 
ten years will be enough for constructing all the rail- 
ways Cuba will need, for clearing the forest lands of 
the eastern provinces, and for opening up the mines of 
the Sierra Maestre Mountains which are yet untouched. 
The laborers engaged in railway construction may be 
drawn from the inhabitants, or they may be of a class of 
immigrants who will settle down as a part of the agri- 
cultural population. When the construction is com- 
pleted it is a simple process to estimate the number 
of people who will be engaged in the administration 
and operation of 2,500 miles of railway. 

224 



TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA 

The Cuban railroads will always have water-way- 
competition. They will have no rivalry in hauling 
sugar to the sea-board ; but in the general commerce of 
the island, and especially in the local commerce, geog- 
raphy is against a monopoly. Under the Spanish rule 
the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic 
waters were a monopoly because the coasting trade was 
a privilege. It was made the more valuable by the 
obstacles which were interposed to railway construc- 
tion. But with the artificial limitations of government 
removed there can be no monopoly, and with the coast- 
ing trade free a permanent alliance of railway and ves- 
sel interests is improbable. Too many American skip- 
pers can engage in it for the big steamship lines to 
control the coasting trade.* Every fishing-smack is a 
competitor. Most of the towns are on the coast or so 
short a distance inland that electric lines are also cer- 
tain to compete with the steam railways for passengers 
and even for light freight. A few years will be enough 
to demonstrate the opportunities Cuba offers to the 
merchant marine of the United States. When the 
island has 5,000,000 inhabitants relatively no more 
people will be engaged in the midway occupations than 
to-day. Light manufactures will increase proportion- 
ately, while the shipping at the ports due to increased 
commerce will give further employment. When this 
is stated there is no disturbance in the balancing of 
natural occupations which grow out of the turning over 
of the soil, seed-time, and harvest. In its broadest 
sense the subject of internal development ends with the 
agricultural population, though it does not begin there. 
* See Appendix B. 
15 225 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

The domestic commerce of Cuba, as well as its for- 
eign shipping trade, if shipping trade with the United 
States can be called foreign, makes the question of 
the water-ways one of the earliest of public improve- 
ments. The island may never have a river-and-harbor 
bill such as regularly floats through the Congress of the 
United States, because there is only one navigable 
river. This is the Cauto, in the province of Santiago. 
But when it comes to improvements, harbors supply 
the deficiency of rivers. Their betterment and mainte- 
nance will be at once an encouragement to commerce 
and a temptation to extravagance on the part of the 
State. Private enterprise will be sufficient to supply 
every need and to meet every deficiency of the shipping 
interests in so far as relates to docks, wharfs, and 
piers, but the actual control of the water-ways, and 
therefore the improvement of the harbors, will remain 
the function of the commonwealth. Bahia Honda, Ca- 
bana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sagua, Caibarien, Nuevitas, 
Nipe, Baracoa, Gibara on the north coast, Santiago, 
GuanUnamo, Mazanillo, Santa Cruz, Trinidad, Tunas 
de Zaza, Cienfuegos, and Batabano on the south coast 
are the leading ones, but there are a large number of 
smaller havens which the coral reefs do not render 
entirely inaccessible. 

The most important public improvements in the 
future of Cuba are the roads. To insure its success 
the work must be that of the central Government rather 
than of the provinces or the municipalities. A system 
suitable to the development and the permanent interests 
of the island can only be carried out under a central 
plan and by a central authority. Good roads are the 

226 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

industrial and in a degree the political future of Cuba, 
and good roads cannot be limited to a province or to 
a municipality. National turnpikes are the promise 
of the island, and the Cuban statesman who emulates 
Henry Clay's championship of the old Cumberland 
road will be its true benefactor. Whatever form of 
government is adopted there will be nothing in the 
Cuban constitution which the strict constructionists 
will be able to invoke against this form of public im- 
provement. 

The calzada, as it is called, will be the Cuban turn- 
pike or national highway running in all directions 
across the country. The extent to which the building 
of roads was neglected and even discouraged by the 
Spanish Government has been so often recounted that 
it does not bear repetition in detail. The military road 
was always a good one. The others were of no impor- 
tance. There are caminos reales, king's highways, on 
the maps of Cuba by the hundreds, but neither king 
nor peasant could find them in actual travel. "Where 
not trails they are wagon-ruts which in the rainy sea- 
son are entirely lost. The real highway of internal 
commerce and of agricultural intercourse is the calzada, 
or macadamized road. When once constructed it resists 
the changes of the seasons and is easily kept in repair. 
Four of these calzadas lead out of Habana. The 
longest one is 40 miles, and extends southeast to the 
plains of Gtiines, the market-garden of the city. The 
shortest one runs south to the village of Managua, 15 
miles away. The town of Pinar del Kio has a cal- 
zada connecting with its port, Coloma, 15 miles south. 
Santiago has a few miles of good roads, and other 

227 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

cities have short calzaclas, but there is no general 
means of continuous communication in any section of 
the island. When good roads furnish this system of 
continuous communication, not only will an industrial 
advance of one hundred years be made, but brigandage, 
the commonest form of rural crime, will be destroyed. 

Whether it be in railway construction, in road build- 
ing, or in tilling the soil, the cost of labor is relatively 
high in Cuba. The probability that it will continue 
relatively high, especially agricultural labor, cannot be 
argued away. But what is commonly lost sight of is 
that the profits of capital are both relatively and abso- 
lutely high. Well-paid labor cannot be considered an 
unhealthy industrial condition when well-remunerated 
capital goes with it. Nor can it be looked upon as 
a discouragement to investment in lands or in commer- 
cial and industrial enterprises. Sugar plantations for a 
series of years paid 12 per cent on highly secured 
loans, and were not depleted. The individual usurers 
in the country districts drew their 18 per cent from the 
farms of the neighborhood for long periods without the 
opportunity of foreclosing on the land. It was too 
much. It drew the life-blood from the small farmers, 
but their endurance of it showed what the capabilities 
of production were. In time agricultural banks will 
come, and in displacing the individual usurer will be an 
immense gain to the industrial life of the country. 

The agricultural banks will not be established until 
a stable government is beyond the sphere of experiment 
and the old Spanish laws relating to debtor and credi- 
tor and mortgages are codified into a general banking 
law. That may not be so far off. When it is reached, 

228 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the country banks will be able to exact an annual inter- 
est of 8 per cent, while performing their functions of 
loans and deposits in the community, without interfer- 
ing with the prosperity of the people or becoming the 
masters instead of the servants. I have made the state- 
ment of 8 per cent as a probable rate of interest from 
a large number of individual calculations without go- 
ing into the intricate details on which they are based. 
Two crops a year on much of the land is one basis. 
Americans hardly conceive of a community of 15,000 
people, such as Guines, engaged in varied and profit- 
able forms of farming without a bank, or of the town of 
Pinar del Eio, in the centre of the tobacco-raising coun- 
try, without one. That is, however, true of these places 
as of many others. 

It does not seem to be an unwarranted assumption 
that a country which can pay 8 per cent on banking 
capital conservatively loaned in the rural regions can 
pay fairly well for labor. Farm labor in Cuba is 
usually accounted at $20 per month throughout the 
year where the laborer finds his own "keep." On the 
sugar plantations in the season of cutting and grinding 
the cane it is accounted higher. The planters are 
always willing to pay $1 per day, and hands are in 
demand just as they are on American farms during the 
harvest season. In talking with many planters, per- 
haps a majority will give the amount of $1 a day as 
what they pay for nine months out of twelve; but the 
average $20 per month is commonly accepted as the 
basis for farm labor in Cuba. 

Unskilled day labor on the streets and roads and on 
public works generally may be said to command $1 a 

229 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

day also, though sometimes 80 cents is the maximum. 
The day's labor begins at six in the morning and ends 
at four in the afternoon, with an hour for breakfast, 
making a day of nine hours. This, of course, does not 
apply to the plantations, where work begins at sunrise. 
Formerly the wages were paid in Spanish silver, which 
was usually at a discount of 18 per cent from gold ; but 
the common necessities of life were also measured in 
silver. Considering that the laborer in Cuba does not 
have to lay up fuel for winter, that less clothing is re- 
quired, and that all the means of existence are more 
easily procured than in the temperate zones, it is clear 
that $15 to $20 a month in the country and $25 in the 
city is good pay. After the military occupation began, 
American contractors who had contracts for public 
improvements did not find it possible to secure labor 
at cheaper figures. The laborers who were employed 
directly by the military authorities received substan- 
tially the same. The dollar-a-day basis is not likely 
to be materally modified under prospective conditions. 
Artisans, railway employes, and skilled labor of what- 
ever kind receive higher pay, the cigar-makers being 
the best paid. But the development and the recon- 
struction of Cuba are in the land and in public improve- 
ments, so that unskilled labor in the mass is the real 
basis for computing the cost. 

In the industrial readjustment following the Ameri- 
can occupation, a series of strikes occurred in Habana 
and in other cities. These were cited as evidence that 
American methods had been introduced, and that labor 
disturbances were thenceforth to be expected as though 
they were something new. Strikes may be looked for 

230 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

in the future of Cuba just as they may be looked for in 
the United States ; but they will not be a new develop- 
ment nor due to new institutions. They occurred under 
Spanish dominion with all its rigor of military repres- 
sion. The most determined of these strikes were by 
the cigar-makers and by the stevedores, or longshore- 
men. There are numerous gremios, or trades-unions, 
but the majority of them are benevolent and social 
organizations. Under the Spanish authority the 
cigar-makers' unions were partly political conspiracies 
against the Government and partly centres of theoreti- 
cal socialism where collectivism and the collective labor 
life were taught somewhat in the manner of the French 
theorists. After the exit of the Spanish rulers the So- 
cialist or Workingmen's political party was organized 
in Habana with the avowed purpose of incorporating 
socialist principles into the industrial and political gov- 
ernment of the island. It gained vitality in Habana, 
but did not spread to the other towns. The majority 
of its members were from the cigar-makers' unions. 
The movement did not give promise of becoming a for- 
midable organization. 

Most of the strikes after the American control was 
assumed were based on demands for the scale of wages 
which obtained before the insurrection, or for payment 
in United States money or its equivalent. 

It is unsafe to guess when the artificial monetary 
conditions in Cuba will work into natural channels. 
The only safe course for Americans who are making 
investments or engaging in enterprises is to follow the 
example of their Government and base their transac- 
tions on the money of the United States. A disloca- 

231 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

tion must come at some period when the inflated value 
given the Spanish and the French gold coinage by de- 
crees of the Spanish Government will cease. It served 
the good end of keeping abundant gold in the island ; 
and though silver was in common use, the white metal 
was a subsidiary coinage and always so recognized. 

The amount of American money in circulation may 
be estimated at the end of the first year with some 
degree of accuracy. Then a judgment may be formed 
of the time when the bankers who received deposits at 
the inflated government value of Spanish and French 
gold coinage will pay the deposits back in the equiva- 
lent of the American standard, and when the value of 
debts incurred on the old basis can be computed in the 
money of the United States. The requirement for the 
payment of customs duties in American money or its 
equivalent at a valuation which ignored the inflation of 
the European coins, the disbursement of the expenses 
of administration and of public improvements in Amer- 
ican money, the distribution of the $3,000,000 to the 
insurgent troops, the resumption of commerce with the 
United States, the payments for the sugar crops — all 
contributed to the one end of establishing a uniform cur- 
rency of the American standard of value. 

In the city and the province of Santiago it did not 
take long for the American money to establish its su- 
premacy. In Habana and throughout the island as a 
whole the change was not so rapid. By all natural 
laws Spanish silver ought to have depreciated, but 
instead it appreciated. This was partly due to specu- 
lative manipulation and partly to a genuine need of the 
silver in commercial transactions. But with the steady 

232 



TO-MORBOW IN CUBA 

influx of United States currency in the circumstances 
noted above, it is possible to foresee the disappearance 
of the Spanish silver. When that happens the period 
cannot be a long one until the Spanish and the French 
gold pieces will circulate at parity with the money of 
the United States on their bullion value. Cautious 
financiers who peer further into the future, and who 
also take a glance backward, may see the shadow of an 
irredeemable paper currency. They may recall that 
the various Cuban constitutions adopted by the assem- 
blies which met in the woods all provided for the issue 
of paper money. But the shadow need not take the 
outlines of spectre. There were mitigating circum- 
stances for those revolutionary assemblies in devising 
means of support for the insurrection. 

With what has been said of commerce and internal 
development, in conclusion it may be worth recalling 
the primary formulas. Cuba will have no expenses of 
sovereignty and no budget of a huge debt to maintain 
out of her customs collections. The expenses of sov- 
ereignty were the burden with which the peninsula 
broke the back of the island. The million dollars a 
month from customs receipts which the present popu- 
lation seems capable of contributing will be so far in 
excess of the expenses of administration that the bulk 
of it may be devoted to internal and external improve- 
ments. If the ratio of increase in customs collections 
does not keep pace with increasing population, it will 
at least show a substantial growth. In the utter de- 
moralization and impoverishment of the finances of the 
provinces and municipalities the American authorities 
applied a portion of the customs revenues to provincial 

233 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

and municipal purposes. That was a temporary meas- 
ure. Ultimately it will be unnecessary. 

The question will then be with regard to the applica- 
tions of the customs revenues to island purposes, pub- 
lic improvements, and the like. They may be large 
enough to discourage the laying of an internal impost 
upon cigars, cigarrettes, and aguardiente. Yet this 
means of raising revenues is so easy and would be so 
little felt by the consumer that it will hardly be over- 
looked. It is not in any sense a tax on agricultural 
production as were the Spanish export duties. Looked 
at in any light, the subject of revenue and taxation in 
Cuba is a simple one. The matter of the purchasing 
power of a bag of sugar and a bale of tobacco is not quite 
so simple. In it are involved both the future commer- 
cial and the future political relations of the Cuban com- 
monwealth to the United States. 



234 



CHAPTER XIII 

Religion as a Withered Branch 

Reflections of a Spanish Captain-General — Scarcity of Native Priests 
— Statistics of Shepherds and Their Flocks — Historical Review 
of the Roman Catholic Church — A Part of the State — Provisions 
for Its Support — Ecclesiastics Against Toleration and Civil Lib- 
erties — Freemasonry as a Foe — Sketch of the Institution — Con- 
flicts with Authorities — Controversies with Champions of the 
Church — A Protest Against Intolerance — State of Religion in 
Cuba Summarized — Dregs of Spanish Priesthood — Popular Con- 
ception a Low One — Exaction of Birth and Burial Fees — Ob- 
stacles to Future Usefulness. 

Can the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba call again 
the day that is past? The dry branch withers. The 
living branch puts forth fresh leaves. 

Half a century ago Don Jose Guiterrez de la Concha, 
who had been twice Governor-General and Captain- 
General of the island, wrote his memoirs. During his 
term of office he studied the maladies which threatened 
the life of the Spanish possessions in the Antilles. In 
1846 he found 458 ecclesiastics, cures, and sacristans 
to administer to the spiritual needs of nearly 1,000,000 
inhabitants. Many parishes were without priests. 
The clerical households of the archbishop of Santiago 
and the bishop of Habana were not included in this list, 
as he was estimating the parish priests. Fifty years 

235 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

earlier Humboldt had incidentally noted, according to 
Concha, that 1,500 ecclesiastics guided the spiritual 
paths of 500,000 inhabitants.* 

General Concha was impressed by the falling off in 
the number of the parish priests. As became a devout 
and reflective churchman he deplored it, and he ana- 
lyzed the sources of the Church's decay. The lack of 
interest on the part of the Government in Madrid he 
criticised. One cause of the decay, he said, was the 
indifference to the education of the clergy. An igno- 
rant priesthood, was his pained comment. He urged 
immediate and sweeping reforms which would insure 
educated priests. He wanted the Government to look 
specially to the welfare of the Church. The memoir- 
writing Captain-General also noted the paucity of Cu- 
ban priests. At that time the right of the native-born 
inhabitants, or insulars, to share with the peninsulars 
in administering the secular affairs of the island was 
not admitted. To trust them with spiritual authority 
was suggestive of sedition. Yet General Concha coura- 
geously gave this proscription of Cuban priests as one 
of the causes of the low state into which the Church 
had fallen. He wrote frankly and warningly of the bad 
results of excluding the natives. He advocated an edu- 
cated Cuban priesthood which would vitalize the Church 
by keeping it in sympathy with the people. So far from 
this course being dangerous to the authority of the 

*The Paris edition of Humboldt's work, published in 1827, says 
that the number of ecclesiastics did not exceed 1,100 according to 
the official census which he had, but gives the number of churches as 
224. He speaks of the clergy as neither numerous nor rieh, except 
the bishop and the archbishop. 

236 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

mother country, lie believed it would give the priests 
the confidence of the people and would encourage loy- 
alty. This was a plain hint that the Spanish shep- 
herds were not trusted by their flocks. 

Preceding and succeeding Captain-Generals might 
have written memoirs, and might truly have said what 
General Concha said about the state of the Church in 
Cuba. Don Jose Garcia de Arboleya, a layman, writ- 
ing a few years later, drew a more complacent picture. 
He noted that in all the island there were 364 temples 
or places of worship, of which 173 were hermitages and 
oratories. He recited that there were 41 parishes in 
the jurisdiction of Santiago de Cuba, with 68 places 
of worship and 128 parishes in the Habana diocese. 
Each diocese had a conciliario, or theological seminary, 
for the education of priests. In all he estimated 700 
persons consecrated to the service of religion, including 
the monks. As General Concha had not included the 
monks in his estimate, it is probable that when Arbo- 
leya wrote there had been no increase in the number of 
parish priests. 

In 1864 the Government budget made provision for 
106 cures and sacristans in the eastern diocese and for 
244 in the western jurisdiction. At that time in Ha- 
bana diocese the parish churches numbered 137, with 
8 auxiliary chapters, 32 oratories and hermitages, 6 
convents for monks, and 8 convents for nuns. The 
appropriation for maintaining the Church in the Santi- 
ago diocese was $186,000, and of that in Habana $345,- 
000. In 1872 the " Guide for Strangers" placed the 
parish clergy, cures, coadjutors, and sacristans in the 
Habana diocese at 240, and in the eastern diocese at 

237 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

75 — a stationary condition in Habana and an apparent 
decrease in Santiago. 

General . Francisco de Acosta y Albear, writing from 
his estates in Spain during the closing years of the Ten- 
Years' war, enumerated the causes of the trouble in 
Cuba. He had long been a resident of the island, 
and was familiar with its internal affairs. One of the 
causes of the trouble, he declared, was the lamentable 
results of religious abuses. Beligion in Cuba, he said, 
was a myth. It was a useful agency to the political 
party which secured its influence for national integrity, 
but it was grossly abused. The parish priests, he de- 
clared, were models least of everything of the virtues 
necessary for the good discharge of their sacred mis- 
sion. The example of their bad conduct was demoral- 
izing to people favorably disposed to religion. He 
himself knew their exactions from personal experience, 
they sometimes demanding four times the regular fees 
for baptisms and burials. A concurrent cause in per- 
verting the moral sense of the Cuban people, he said, 
was the lack of religious belief. 

In 1898, according to the official figures, there were 
110 parish cures and sacristans in the diocese of San- 
tiago and 216 in the diocese of Habana for whose sup- 
port provision was made out of Government funds. 
The amount set aside for the support of the Church 
was $352,000. This was not a heavy draft out of peace 
revenues which some years reached the total of $26,- 
000,000, though it was more than was appropriated 
for public education, that amount being $250,000. The 
salaries of the parish priests were good, ranging from 
$500 to $1,500. It is more than the majority of coun- 

238 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

try clerymen of Protestant denominations in the United 
States receive, though they have families to support. 
The budget figures three or four years earlier, at the 
beginning of the insurrection, were substantially the 
same. There were not as many church edifices devoted 
to worship because some of them were barricaded and 
turned into garrisons for the Spanish troops. 

When Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles ceased, the 
Pope designated the Yery Eeverend Archbishop Cha- 
pelle, of New Orleans, as apostolic delegate to Cuba 
and Puerto Eico. Cuba, which had once formed part of 
a diocese with Louisiana and the two Floridas, thus 
again came into relationship with Louisiana. The 
bull of Pope Leo X. in 1518 erected a bishopric in 
hitherto unknown Cuba with the seat at Baracoa. A 
Franciscan friar, Juan de Witte, of Flanders, was 
named the first bishop, but he was not able to go to 
Cuba to take possession of his mitre. By the pontifi- 
cal bull of 1522 the seat of the diocese was transferred 
to Santiago de Cuba. Other bishops were nominated, 
but did not administer the diocese, and it was not until 
1537 that the island enjoyed the presence of its bishop. 
He was Miguel Eamariez de Salamanca, a Dominican 
friar. His successor was a Carthusian monk, Friar 
Diego Sarmiento, of Seville. Then there were a few 
bishops who were not monks; after them the monks 
again, mostly from Valladolid; and then prelates who 
were natives of Mexico. 

Don Jose Hechavarri, the first bishop of Habana, 
was translated from Santiago. His diocese included 
the Floridas, Louisiana, Cuba, and Jamaica. In 1788, 
Cuba, having lost more than one-half of its jurisdic- 

239 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

tional territory, was assimilated to the political and 
military territory. It was divided into two dioceses. 
In 1804 Santiago was created a metropolitan archi- 
episcopal diocese, which it remains to this day. Ha- 
bana was made a suffragan bishopric of Santiago, 
but each diocese served as a court of appeal from the 
other. The geographical division was by a line run- 
ning from coast to coast through the western section of 
Puerto Principe province; so that Habana, while a 
suffragan diocese, had the larger territorial area and 
much the greater population and wealth. 

The spiritual and temporal regimen of the Eoman 
Catholic Church in Cuba was embodied in the sinodo 
diocesana, the synod celebrated in 1681 by Bishop Juan 
Garcia de Palacios. This was approved by Royal 
pragmatic, and with some modifications has since re- 
mained in force. Under Spanish dominion the eccle- 
siastical authorities were part of the State. The bishop 
of Habana was a member of the Governor-General's 
council. The ecclesiastical tribunals were respected, 
and the ecclesiastics did not hesitate to oppose the sec- 
ular authorities in insisting on the rights of the Church. 
Both Santiago and Habana have cathedrals, with ca- 
thedral clergy and the privileges thereto appertaining. 
Each has also a theological seminary for the education 
of priests. Under Spanish rule the secular or temporal 
head of the Church in Cuba was the Governor-General, 
and as his delegate in the archbishopric of Santiago 
the general commanding that military department. The 
archbishop and the bishop were appointed by the Vati- 
can on the nomination of the Madrid Government. 

Arboleya, in the edition of his manual published 

240 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

forty years back, observes that the Church was poor, 
especially in the archbishopric. The acts of worship 
were celebrated with some pomp, although there were 
no sumptuous processions. He thought the royal ced- 
ulas, issued a few years previously, would contribute 
without doubt to the aggrandizement arid decorum of 
worship. These royal cedulas fixed definitely the 
charges of the Church and its ministers on the royal 
treasury, and also fixed the salaries of the priests and 
their assistants. A computation of income and effi- 
ciency was to be made every five years. If the in- 
come were in excess of the salary, the excess was to be 
apportioned among the assistants and to the mainte- 
nance of the church edifice. If deficient, the deficit 
was to be made up by the royal treasury. One-third 
part of the canons, prebendaries, and sub-prebendaries 
when vacated, were to be filled from parishes whose 
cures had at least twenty years' service, reserving to the 
dioceses of the peninsula a certain number of preben- 
daries and dignities in the capitularies of the two dio- 
ceses, or in the parishes in which they had options. 

Arboleya gives an interesting list of the church fees, 
and these were not greatly modified during subsequent 
years. He also notes as one of the softening influences 
of the Church on slavery that in addition to the 52 
Sundays there were 20 church holidays on which the 
obligation was to hear mass and not to work, so that 
the slaves had actually 72 days of rest. The 20 church 
holidays were known as the days of two crosses because 
they were thus marked in the calendar. The days of 
one cross on which it was obligatory to hear mass and 
permissible to work numbered 22. 
16 241 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

With respect to civil reforms and to liberal political 
movements, the Church in Cuba was what it was in 
Spain — always reactionary. Clerical intransigentism 
became a phrase as common as political intransigent- 
ism. It opposed innovations. The Spanish conserva- 
tives in Cuba joined it in complaining that religious 
toleration and free study encouraged the separatists and 
fomented disaffection towards Spain. They, too, de- 
plored what they called the vacuity of the religious 
sense in the island ; but they laid this to the concessions 
and the tolerations that were granted. The statutes 
protected the Eoman Catholic Church as the state re- 
ligion. The penal code provided that those who in 
offence of state religion broke or profaned objects sa- 
cred or devoted to worship should incur the penalty of 
traision correctional. A similar penalty was applicable 
to whomever made ridicule of the Eoman Catholic 
religion by word or writing, by publicly contemning 
its dogmas, rites, and ceremonies. The Church op- 
posed civil marriages. In defending in the Cortes the 
toleration which the constitution of 1876 extended, 
Canovas, rigid churchman that he was, declared that 
three hundred years of intolerance had so brought it 
about that religious indifference was the distinctive 
character of the Spanish society of the age. But the 
clerical intransigentes would not have it so. 

In Cuba as in Spain the Church was against free- 
dom of worship. The religious toleration extended by 
the Constitution of 1876 was promulgated in the An- 
tilles several years later. It was confined within the 
narrowest limits. The Baptist mission which was 
established in Marianao, a suburb of Habana, by ap- 

242 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

pealing to the higher authorities secured the reversal 
of a ruling by the alcalde who had held that public 
religious services were within the restrictions of the law 
of public meetings. By statute provisions, dissenting 
sects were limited to precincts or places set apart for 
them, and within those precincts were protected from 
interference or disturbance by ordinary police regula- 
tions. The provision was not broad enough to have 
covered the Salvation Army. Under it the Baptist 
mission was maintained in Habana, and a Protestant 
cemetery under the same denomination was secured. 
The Presbyterians had a small mission in Matan- 
zas, and there were missions in two or three other 
places of the island, but they never had a vigorous 
growth. 

The ecclesiastical influence was exerted strenuously 
against the more liberal provision of the law which 
permitted civil marriages. The Church combated this 
in inception and in operation. As late as 1894 there 
was a dispute between the bishopric and the civil au- 
thority regarding the certificates of baptism required in 
order to contract civil marriages, and it was necessary 
to issue a legal process against Juan Bautista Casas, 
ecclesiastical governor of the diocese. 

The Spanish ecclesiastics laid much of the irreligious 
condition of Cuba to Freemasonary, ignoring the degree 
to which their reactionary tendencies encouraged that 
institution. Toleration they declared to be an evil to 
the State, and toleration of Freemasonry they held was 
an encouragement of a foe to the Church and to the 
State. The history of this movement is worthy of a 
brief review, and it comes as much within a chapter on 

243 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the Eoman Catholic Church as within an analysis of 
the political side of Spanish dominion. 

Freemasonry * was introduced in Cuba by the French 
refugees from Santo Domingo in the first years of the 
century. Lodges were formed by the immigrants who 
established coffee plantations in Santiago province, and 
also in the west in the country around Habana. Hos- 
tile public opinion growing out of Murat's attack on 
Madrid in 1808, during the war between France and 
Spain, caused the French colony to emigrate a second 
time. Its members went to Louisiana, and with them 
the lodges disappeared from Cuba. It was not until 
ten years afterwards that lodges were again formed in 
Cuba under charters from the grand lodge of Penn- 
sylvania. In the same period the grand oriente of 
France authorized the founding of lodges in Cuba, and 
the conferring of the thirty-two degrees of the Scottish 
rite. A few years later the grand oriente Spanish 
American Symbolical of the Island of Cuba placed 
itself under the jurisdiction of the grand oriente of 
Spain, but shortly afterwards declared its independ- 
ence. A fusion was effected of the various lodges in 
Cuba, and in 1822 they numbered 67. It was the 
time of political conspiracies and revolt from Spain by 
the South American countries. The Captain-General 
of Cuba, Francisco Vives, protected the masons, not 
because he was one of them, but because by introducing 
the official element into them he was able to check their 
tendencies towards political treason. After his recall 
Freemasonry came under the ban of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, and a dozen years later, through the vigorous 
*"La Masoneria en la Isla de Cuba," Inza. Habana, 1891. 
244 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

prosecution of the aggressive Captain-General Tacon, 
the masonic lodges disappeared from Cuba. A score 
of years passed and they reappeared with the vigor of 
a new growth. 

When the cry of Yara portended the Ten- Years' war, 
it was disclosed that some of the leading insurgents 
were prominent masons. The lodges in Santiago de 
Cuba were disrupted in consequence, and those of 
Habana came within the suspicion of the authorities. 
When one lodge was celebrating a memorial session the 
police and an armed force of Volunteers surprised the 
meeting and took fifty-two members prisoners. Those 
who were Spanish subjects were kept in prison nearly 
four months. They were finally released by direction 
of the Madrid provisional Government, which was then 
under the Presidency of General Prim, himself a mason. 

The Spanish authorities in Cuba were in constant 
dread of the lodges as centres of conspiracy. In the 
closing year of the Ten- Years' war there was another 
police descent on a lodge meeting in Habana, and two 
hundred members were arrested while celebrating a 
memorial session. Captain-General Jovellanos was a 
mason. By his direction the members were paroled, 
instead of being imprisoned ; and though they were kept 
under surveillance, no further consequences were visited 
upon them. At all times the lodges had among them 
officers of the army and Spanish civil officials. After 
the peace of El Zanjon the lodges reunited and Freema- 
sonry had a fresh growth. There were 60 lodges with 
a total membership of 2,800. Three years later, more 
than a score of new lodges had arisen, and the member- 
ship was 3,800. Ultimately it reached 7,000. What 

245 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

was known as the Law of Associations, promulgated in 
1888, enabled the grand lodges and the subordinate 
lodges to be registered as lawful societies. Neverthe- 
less the Spanish authorities always feared them as 
cloaking conspiracy. 

At various periods the Cuban lodges had controver- 
sies among themselves and with the Spanish grand 
oriente for attempted usurpation of authority. They 
always resented this usurpation. When the masonic 
fraternity of Spain split, the Cuban lodges celebrated 
a mutual compact of recognition with the faction of Don 
Praxades Sagasta, so often Prime Minister of Spain. 
Though Cuba was a political dependency, a possession 
of Spain, the Cuban lodges uniformly asserted that the 
masonic confines did not run with the political confines. 
The Cuban grand lodge regularly reaffirmed that it was 
a masonic potency, free, independent, and sovereign. 
Previous to the last insurrection, masonic newspapers 
were published in Habana, and a school was main- 
tained. The lodges ceased to exist to all public intents 
and purposes during this insurrection. The large ma- 
jority of their members were Cubans. This meant that 
they were in sympathy, either actively or passively, 
with the revolt. So prudence and the frown of the 
authorities kept them from holding sessions. More- 
over, most of the members were either in the field with 
the insurgents or in exile. Some of the leading chiefs, 
incuding Calixto Garcia, were Freemasons. 

From this sketch of Freemasonry in Cuba the infer- 
ence might be drawn that it was considered solely on 
its political side. This would be incorrect. Its prog- 
ress was opposed by the Church on twofold grounds. 

246 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

The main one was that it was a secret society, and 
m contravention of the doctrines of the Church. The 
other objection was that its tendency and even its aim 
was to weaken the civil authority of which the Church 
was the beneficiary and the bulwark. Clerical intransi- 
gentism opposed it as vigorously as did political in- 
transigentism. 

Following the revival which Freemasonry had in 
Cuba after the peace of El Zanjon, a fierce dispute 
raged over its tenets and its tendency. A notable con- 
troversy was carried on between the masonic writers 
and Don Rafael de Rafael, the ablest Spanish editor of 
the leading conservative paper. Rafael de Rafael was 
a Catalan who believed that Freemasonry had initiated 
and fomented the insurrection of Yara, and that its 
object was the destruction of the Church and of Span- 
ish sway. Its character, he sought to prove, was revo- 
lutionary alike towards established government and 
established religion. Since in the Spanish dominions 
the two fundamental institutions which served as a base 
of society were religion and monarchy, he reasoned 
that masonry was the special enemy of Spanish institu- 
tions. Other journals continued the controversy, which 
lasted for several years; and the Church authorities 
persistently opposed the progress of the society. But 
with Premiers of Spain and Captain-Generals of Cuba 
themselves Freemasons, it was not always easy to make 
out that the fraternity was the enemy of the State and 
of the State religion. Some Cubans of intelligence 
joined the lodges as much as a protest against ecclesi- 
astical intolerance as from fondness for the principles 
of masonry. 

247 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

The fruitage of a century of Eoman Catholicism in 
Cuba bears a simple analysis in so far as it relates to 
the spiritual welfare of the masses. It may be studied 
without prejudice and without bias. All that is bad 
that may be said of it has been said by those whose 
faith it is. The state of religion in Cuba, if not retro- 
gressive, was at least stationary, while the movement 
of population was progressive. The parish clergy who 
ministered to the spiritual needs of 1,600,000 people 
were fewer by at least one-fourth than those who ad- 
ministered to 800,000 souls. Cuba, not being in parti- 
bus infidelium, was not the object of missionary zeal. 
Its inhabitants were Catholics from the time the Con- 
quistadores exterminated the native Indians and immi- 
grants from the peninsula filled the void. The Africans 
whom the good Las Casas thought it merciful to im- 
port into human servitude in order that the soil might 
yield its fruitfulness also were converted, and in time 
came within the pale of the faith. 

With entire homogeneity of the language and pre- 
dominant homogeneity of the Spanish race, the conver- 
sion of the inhabitants of Cuba was not an incentive 
during this century that could be urged on zealots or 
missionaries in the peninsula. The stream of faith 
was allowed to grow sluggish and become a stagnant 
pool. Perhaps the trouble was in the fountain from 
which it was fed. The Catholic Church in Spain has 
its rancorous critics, its sturdy champions, and its apol- 
ogetic defenders. They may all bury their differences 
in the acknowledgment of a craggy fact, and then dis- 
pute the cause. The Church in Cuba was not respon- 
sive to the aspirations of the inhabitants. Church and 

248 



TO-MOREOW IN CUBA 

Crown were one. By its union with the State, the 
Church became identified with the oppression and mis- 
government of Spanish dominion. Out of this condi- 
tion came the refuse of the priesthood as ministers of 
the spiritual wants. Often they were in ecclesiastical 
exile from the peninsula because of offences which 
forbade their exercising their sacred offices among the 
people who knew their offences. Before the last insur- 
rection, in the popular mind the Spanish priesthood in 
Cuba as a class personified ignorance, cupidity, and 
indifference to their holy office. This is a harsh judg- 
ment, It has been pronounced in calmness and sorrow 
by Catholic observers. 

The popular conception is shown in the theatres. In 
the best of the plays the foibles of the cures or parish 
clergy are received by cultivated audiences as sugges- 
tive of something grosser. In the low variety theatres 
the grossness of the stage representation makes the 
suggestion unnecessary. The escapades of the cures 
are a stock subject. The nephews and nieces of the 
priests are sometimes given in polite company their 
rightful relationship. It does not need a moral essay 
to show that these ideas would not prevail or would not 
be tolerated if they were baseless. The slanders and 
insinuations of the scoffer are ignored where holy liv- 
ing enforces the respect due to the holy office. A rep- 
resentation of Catholic priests or of Protestant clergy- 
men such as finds favor in Habana would be fiat and 
dull to a depraved American audience because of their 
consciousness of its falsity. In the Habana variety 
theatres the sauce comes from the truthfulness of the 
suggestion. It was the same in the vile literature. 

249 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Americans are sometimes momentarily shocked when 
they see a priest in his vestments sitting in a cafe ; but 
this is an exaggerated sentiment. For the priests to 
smoke in public or to lounge in a cafe does not offend 
the customs of the country or degrade religion. The 
degradation comes from a deeper cause. A priest in 
one of the suburbs was in the habit of gambling in 
public with the Spanish officers. He invariably won. 
One night the game broke up in a fight. The officers 
accused the priest of cheating. In another village the 
parish priest played regularly, and won the money of 
the officers. Knowing his habits, the insurgents knew 
when the officers were occupied and took advantage of 
it. During the blockade of Habana by the American 
fleet, public gambling was licensed and the license fees 
used for the benefit of the poor. At one of the most 
notorious places a priest in vestments nightly tempted 
fortune at the roulette wheel. These were individual 
instances of which the writer had personal knowledge. 
The American military commanders, when they took 
control, also had a chance to inform themselves. In 
one of the most prominent towns the American gene- 
ral sent to his superiors a peremptory demand for the 
bishop to remove the parish priest because he was a 
drunken old vagabond. 

Here is a portraiture of the Spanish priest in Cuba 
painted by what may be called an unfriendly hand,* 
yet it cannot be called the hand of an enemy of the 
Church, for it is that of a native-born Cuban priest: 
" Cuba, like all of Latin America, has been the refuge 
of the Spanish clergy expelled from their dioceses, the 

* "Veritas" in the newspaper El Grito de Yara, December, 1898. 

250 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

filon of ambitious prelates. Here they have come in 
totality, least of all to preach the dogma, to make Cath- 
olic propaganda, to moralize. They have betrayed the 
design of domination; for hope, they have substituted 
lucre and usury ; for charity, tyranny ; the god of the 
majority of priests has been the vile metal. In their 
time of power they were not seeking to save souls or to 
administer the sacraments, but to make money, to dom- 
inate, to collect dues. Not to educate, but to prosti- 
tute." 

It is the general testimony that under Spanish rule 
the Church fees for marriage, baptism, and burials were 
mercilessly exacted. The people paid tribute from the 
cradle to the grave. Some controversy occasionally is 
heard in the United States about the abuses of the 
priestly office and the exaction of these Church fees. 
There could be no controversy in Cuba, where the fact 
was one of prominent experience. Whoever wishes to 
understand the feeling of the masses of the population 
towards the Spanish priests because of these exactions 
has only to select a given community and judge for him- 
self. The good priests remitted or moderated the legally 
authorized tithes; but the good priests were few. By 
the majority of cures the parish was administered for its 
commercial gain. The Church thus became the partner 
in the abuses of the Spanish political system. 

During the insurrection, in some parts of the island it 
was the belief — a belief which remains to this day — that 
the secrets of the confessional were betrayed to the 
Spanish authorities, and that insurgents were sent to 
their deaths from the altar. That belief may be base- 
less, yet its existence cannot be ignored. Of other acts, 

251 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

conjecture is not needed. Some Spanish priests, with- 
out sympathizing with the revolt, labored nobly to mit- 
igate the horrors of Weyler's reconcentration. Others 
were indifferent, and some abetted it and gloried in it. 
The memory lingers in certain parishes of priests who 
told their flocks that the enforced death of women and 
children by starvation was the judgment of God be- 
cause the husbands and fathers rose up against lawful 
authority. Physicians of Spanish blood honored an 
honorable profession by their ministrations to the sick 
and dying without thought of political passion. Too 
often the spiritual physician was reproachful in his 
ministrations. So the obstacles to the future useful- 
ness of the Spanish clergy are clearly discernible. 
They are gross ignorance and lack of the sympathy and 
confidence of the Cuban people. 



252 



CHAPTER XIV 

Cuban Priests the Living Branch 

Native-Born Clergy in Sympathy with Their People — Persecutions — 
Movement Against Spanish Bishop and Clergy — Manifesto of 
Cuban Priests — Hint to Vatican Against Italian Intrigue— De- 
mand for Ecclesiastical Home Rule — Pastorals of the Bishop of 
Habana — Acceptance of the New Conditions — Jesuits' Adapta- 
bility — Appointment of Native-Born Archbishop in Santiago 
Diocese — Alienation of People Not Permanent — Preemasonry 
Not Virile in Opposition — Weakness of Religious Orders — Un- 
grounded Fears— Conservative Action of American Authorities 
— Protestant Evangelization — A Religion of Deeds. 

The morning of promise which came to the island 
when its political freedom was assured was not her- 
alded by a sunburst of ecclesiastical rejoicing. To the 
mass of the Cuban people, the Church as it remained to 
them was hateful. It was identified with all that was 
bad in the buried Spanish domination. If not hostile, 
they were indifferent. Yet the withered tree of the 
Church has a fresh branch. This is the Cuban clergy. 
Through all periods and through all phases of Spanish 
authority this small Cuban priesthood interpreted the 
feelings of the people and was true to their aspirations. 
With it rests the future of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Cuba. 

The Cuban priests came out from the shadows into 

sunlight. Don Manuel Santander y Frutes, the Span- 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

ish-born bishop of Habana, is credited with describing 
them as mutinous and pugnacious. From the stand- 
point of superior ecclesiastical authority that may be a 
proper designation of their defiant and aggressive stand 
in these days. In the former period it would hardly 
fit. The opportunity was lacking for them to be pug- 
nacious and mutinous, but they were intensely and con- 
sistently patriotic in the Cuban national sense. They 
were with their people in all the struggles for freedom. 
For their national instincts they suffered contumely, 
discrimination, ecclesiastical persecution and exile, po- 
itical deportation to the penal settlements, and even 
death by military execution. 

The story of Padre Escambre is known to every Cu- 
ban priest. In the Ten- Years' war he blessed a flag 
for the insurgents, and within twenty-four hours was 
shot by the Spanish troops. Padre Luciano Santano 
was present at a political meeting in Santa Clara. 
Cespedes, its leading spirit, afterwards raised the ban- 
ner of revolution. Padre Santano was taken to Habana 
a prisoner and deported to Santo Domingo. Padre 
Sera, of Esperanza, in the province of Santa Clara, 
blessed a Cuban flag. He was arrested, fined, and only 
through the influence of the colonel of Volunteers who 
arrested him was enabled to go into exile of his own 
choice instead of to the penal settlements. The colo- 
nel of Volunteers had personal reasons for his course. 
Eight priests were deported to Fernando Po. One of 
them died on the voyage. It was charged that he had 
been poisoned. 

In the last insurrection no Cuban priest was sub- 
jected to military punishment, but some were driven 

254 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

into exile, and others were made to feel the superior 
ecclesiastical displeasure. The few who had churches 
were changed to other parishes. It was known that 
some of the flags carried by insurgent troops — the flags 
were not numerous — received the blessing of patriotic 
priests, though their identity was not disclosed to the 
ragged, bushwacking troops who carried them. In the 
village of Artemisa, in the province of Habana, when 
the church was occupied by Spanish soldiers, the priest 
got arms and ammunitions past them in a coffin to the 
insurgents. It is possible to suppose that this was 
not the only instance of the kind. In known instances 
the sacraments were administered to dying insurgents 
when to visit them was governmental and ecclesiastical 
peril. This encouragement of rebellion was contrary 
to the teachings of the Church. It was sedition against 
the Spain which sustained the Church. But it is over. 
The revolution triumphed, and through it comes lawful 
government not under Spain. 

After the termination of Spanish rule in Habana and 
the ending of the press censorship, articles on the rela- 
tion of the Church to the new conditions began to ap- 
pear in the newspapers. Some of the violent sheets, 
which were demanding a boycott of everything Spanish, 
named individual priests (Malos sotanas — evil robes) 
whose removal was demanded because of their crimes 
against the Cubans. Most of the articles were of a dif- 
ferent character. Though acrid in tone, they were not 
attacks on revealed religion nor on the Eoman Catholic 
Church. A sceptic or a free-thinker could not have 
written them. They were in purpose and in substance 
an attack on the Spanish priests in Cuba and on the 

255 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

bishop of Habana. They were also a notice to the 
Vatican that something different was expected. Their 
authors were known to be Cuban priests. 

The essence of these articles was that religion, the 
Roman Catholic religion, in Cuba had fallen into a low 
state through the fault of its bad ministers who had cor- 
rupted the purity of doctrine and of discipline. The first 
obstacle to the revival of Catholicism in Cuba was its 
Spanish representatives. In peace the attitude of the 
Spanish clerics had been to collect dues, live well, and to 
mix in politics. In war, to encourage the shooting of 
Cubans, betray the confidences of the confessionals, and 
to deny Christian burial to the reconcentrados and the 
insurgents. The religious communities — the Jesuits, the 
Dominicans, and the Franciscans — it was charged, had 
followed in the rut. The Paulists were especially cen- 
sured for their violent denunciation of the insurgents. 

The persecutions of the Cuban clergy, both by the 
civil and the military authorities, were made the basis 
of a special indictment. Bishop Santander was bit- 
terly assailed. The pastorals in which he abused the 
Cubans for their patriotism were recalled and analyzed. 
He had contributed $1,500 to the Spanish navy, had 
encouraged converting the churches of God into bar- 
racks and garrisons. He should not try to seduce the 
Cubans. Rather he should remember the pastorals in 
which he calumniated them when he changed the frock 
of the shepherd to the sword of war. He had done 
nothing to alleviate the miseries of the reconcentration. 
It had been stated that he did not approve of the prin- 
ciple of the reconcentration. Where was the evidence? 
When he should have protested against it, he was shut 

256 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

up in his closet dreaming of Spanish victories. The 
conclusion of all these articles was that the Spanish 
clergy from the bishop down, having been identified 
with the odious Spanish rule, and having made them- 
selves odious champions of it, should go because 
Spanish sovereignty had gone. The sons of the coun- 
try should be called to represent the Church. It was 
not possible for the Spanish priesthood to continue 
directing the Cuban conscience. 

Preceding this series of polemics appeared the mani- 
festo of the Cuban clergy. It, too, furnished the test of 
newspaper articles. In some of the journals the docu- 
ment was treated as apocryphal. It was not apocry- 
phal. It was written by Cuban-born priests of the 
Habana diocese. Some authorized their signatures 
directly, and some gave their adhesion to a general 
statement, not caring in what language the utterances 
were clothed. A very few of the Cuban priests disap- 
proved of the doctrine. Several avowed to the author 
of this volume that they indorsed it in every line. 

From either the ecclesiastical or the political stand- 
point, this manifesto was a remarkable document. It 
declared that divine Providence had made to shine 
resplendent the inalienable right of the Cuban people 
to liberty. Coincident with the establishment of the 
Cuban republic would be necessary the rejection of a 
foreign and a hostile clergy. Now was the time, the 
manifesto insisted, for the Spanish clergy to renounce 
spiritual sovereignty over a people not its people. The 
same reasons that the Cuba people had for rising in 
arms, the native clergy had for not wishing to be de- 
pendent on the Spanish clergy. " We, the most humble 
17 257 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

of the citizens who compose the little nucleus of the 
suffering and persecuted clergy," said these things. 
They reviewed the history of the struggle for Cuban 
independence. The seminaries overflowed with Galle- 
gos, Asturians, and peninsulars from other provinces 
of Spain. Was it strange that the Cuban families 
should dissuade their sons from the priestly calling 
when to the priestly peninsulars were the roses and 
violets and to the insulars the thorns? 

The manifesto rejected energetically the idea of a 
schism from the Eoman Pontificate, but it was a bold 
hint that Italian intrigue would not be tolerated. Ee- 
specting dogma, the Cuban priests feared nothing, be- 
cause the canonical law permits dissidences with the 
divine end that the Catholic clergy be advised. They 
would obey faithfully the Pope because they were 
persuaded that never a Eoman Pontiff such as Leo 
XIII. would impose upon a free people other clergy 
and prelates than those which the sacred canons and 
the sovereignty of that free people held respectively — 
that is the duty of granting and the right of having. 
In the actual circumstances the Cuban Church must 
enter the new orbit of reorganization. The first step 
was that the Spanish ecclesiastics should go. They 
proposed that the spiritual administration should be 
conducted by means of two delegates appointed to 
organize and direct the Catholic Church in Habana 
and Santiago de Cuba dioceses. These two delegates 
should be chosen from priests of the native Cuban 
clergy of recognized fitness, and indorsed by the most 
conspicuous defenders of the liberty of the island, and 
should not be members of the Spanish Catholic clergy, 

258 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

which always had been a political organization of the 
Spanish Government, and which was greedy for spir- 
itual domination in Cuba to compensate in a measure 
for the lost temporal sovereignty, the one being as fatal 
as the other. 

The purpose of these Cuban priests was to impress 
on the American authorities and on the Vatican the 
right of the Cuban priesthood to the administration of 
the Church in Cuba. Its aim was also to accentuate 
the demand that the Spanish priests depart. The 
manifesto and the articles in the daily journals caused 
a mild controversy. Some of the moderate Cuban 
newspapers in an apologetic strain, while approving the 
principle, deprecated the polemical and personal tone 
in which it was couched. They eulogized the worthy 
attitude of the Cuban clergy who did not subscribe to 
the violent language. It appeared, nevertheless, that 
the Cuban priests were in full accord on the capital 
points of the manifesto. All the native clergy aspired 
that the Catholic Church in Cuba should be as free and 
as expansive as in the great American nation. 

The manifesto was censured by the Spanish press for 

its uncharitable and unchristian sentiments, and for 

the contempt it showed for ecclesiastical authority even 

to the degree of heresy. The Spanish papers also 

pointed out that it was directly contrary to the political 

doctrines of Maximo Gomez and other insurgent chiefs 

who were urging peace and concord among all classes, 

Cubans and Spaniards, forgetfulness of the past and 

union for the future. The Spanish priests as a body 

made no answer. Silence was their best if not their 

only defence. 

259 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

The bishop of Habana did not reply directly to 
the contumacious Cuban clergy. His displeasure was 
shown by mild rebukes in his pastoral letters, and by 
his efforts to put them in the wrong before the Ameri- 
can authorities. He appeared as a grieved prelate, 
deprecating the violence and the uncharitableness of 
his enemies. 

What the Cuban priests said of the bishop's Span- 
ish partisanship was true. He had been the most 
zealous of loyal Spaniards in combating the insurrec- 
tion. When war with the United States was portend- 
ing he made an Easter offering of the goods of the 
Church, and during its continuance he exhorted his 
flock to the lawfulness of resistance. Notwithstanding 
the harsh judgment of the Cuban priests for his failure 
to denounce the reconcentration, Bishop Santander was 
generally credited with opposing the Weyler policy, 
and with exerting himself to relieve the suffering it 
caused. But his opposition to the Spanish military 
authorities taking possession of church property, such 
as hospitals and asylums, was credited with being more 
pronounced than his exertions for the victims of en- 
forced starvation. He accepted the American control 
without question and counselled full obedience to it. 
Although, he said in his pastoral letters, the heroic 
flag of Spain had ceased to wave over the country she 
civilized and evangalized, and though they would never 
cease in their love and feeling for the mother country, 
the will of the Lord should be fulfilled. This pastoral 
letter was also conciliatory towards the Cubans and the 
prospective Cuban Government. Afterwards the bishop 
issued other pastorals reciting that the union of Church 

260 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

and State no longer existed, that consequently the 
Church must be supported entirely by voluntary contri- 
butions from the faithful, and exhorting them to this 
support. 

The bishop's attitude towards the American author- 
ity was correct if not cordial. He was aggressive in 
defending the property rights of the Church, and his 
protests were prompt and vigorous when the first sug- 
gestion was made of the municipalities taking control of 
the cemeteries. He steadily opposed all changes look- 
ing to lessening the privileges and perquisites of the 
Church in fees. Naturally he was against broadening 
the law of civil marriages. Distrust of American influ- 
ence was shown in one of his pastorals which guardedly 
warned his flocks against educational movements out- 
side the Church. 

The bearing of the Spanish priests towards the Unit- 
ed States authorities was sullen, but not defiant and 
meddlesome, as in Puerto Rico. They realized their 
helplessness. A few whose bitterness towards the Cu- 
bans had made their positions unbearable took the first 
opportunity to leave their parishes, but the majority 
preferred to remain and trust to the bishop to make 
provision for them. The religious orders, with one or 
two exceptions, were distrustful of the American influ- 
ence and of prospective Cuban control. The Jesuits 
showed their traditional acuteness and adaptability. 
When General Gomez emerged from the woods and 
made his journey to Habana, the Jesuit priests were 
among the first to visit him and receive his words of 
encouragement that religion was necessary to the State. 
When there was hesitation in Habana and its suburbs 

261 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

by the Spanish colony to receive the American flag, the 
Jesuits promptly raised the stars and stripes in wel- 
come of the new authority. 

The Habana diocese forms so important a part eccle- 
siastically of Cuba and its relation to the United States 
is so close that it has been taken as a mirror of the 
Eoman Catholic Church in the island. This is correct, 
for the conditions were not dissimilar in the archbish- 
opric of Santiago de Cuba, and the tendencies and the 
influences there were the same. Nevertheless the east- 
ern diocese is worth a word by itself. Notwithstand- 
ing that it was a superior diocese ecclesiastically, less 
was known of the Santiago jurisdiction because of its 
isolation geographically and its feebleness in compara- 
tive wealth and population. Though the Spanish pre- 
dominance was maintained, this was less pronounced 
because in the intensely Cuban provinces of Santiago 
and Puerto Principe it was impossible for the Church 
to be so thoroughly out of sympathy with the people 
and retain any hold on them. When the Spanish 
authorities were making their last and desperate at- 
tempt to save Spanish sovereignty by proffering the 
insurgents further propositions for amplified autonomy, 
one of these propositions was that the archbishop of 
Santiago de Cuba should always be Cuban-born. 

The archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, when the revo- 
lution broke out, deplored it as a fratricidal struggle. 
If not in direct condemnation of the Weyler policy of 
reconcentration, his voice at least was raised frequently 
deploring the results and pointing out the unmerited 
suffering of the innocent classes. When the American 

army lay in the trenches before Santiago, after the 

262 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

heights of El Caney and San Juan had been taken, his 
message was the first one which went to Madrid invok- 
ing the surrender of the city in the name of humanity. 

The feeling among the Cuban priests of the Santiago 
diocese does not seem to have been friendly, though it 
may not have been so intense as among the priests in 
the Habana diocese against the bishop. The Santiago 
journals began to publish articles calling for a change. 
The archbishop was defended mildly by some of the 
priests, yet it was apparent they would not be content 
with a Spanish ecclesiastic as their superior authority. 
Archbishop Saenz himself was too intense a Spaniard 
to remain under American administration and in the 
face of Cuban opposition. He returned to Spain. On 
the suggestion of Archbishop Chapelle as apostolic dele- 
gate, the Vatican named the Eev. Francisco de Barnada, 
a native-born Cuban priest, for the vacant diocese. This 
was the first step of Eome towards putting the Church 
in Cuba in harmony with the new conditions. After a 
struggle of nearly a year the bishop of Habana also re- 
signed. The Cuban priests charged that in resigning 
he sought to perpetuate his influence by persuading the 
Vatican to name his own choice for a successor. 

The extent to which the Cuban people have fallen 
away from the Church is recognized by American Cath- 
olics. Whether it is a permanent alienation must be 
determined by events. The author's opinion is that 
the alienation is not permanent. The Cuban women 
were all violent revolutionists. They lost their confi- 
dence in the Spanish priesthood even as an impure ves- 
sel which might hold the crystal water of the pure faith 

without corrupting it. Yet they did not lose the faith. 

263 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA 

It is rare to enter a Cuban household and not find a 
crucifix, a print or a picture of the Virgin Mary on the 
wall. During the bitterest period of the insurrection, 
in the families of Cubans it was not uncommon to hear 
from the men the remark, " Our women are not, like 
us, free-thinkers. They do not go to church, but they 
pray in the morning and they pray at night." The 
rosary in their hands would frequently witness the 
truth of this saying. The humble colored women, some- 
times of the outcast classes, keep the tapers burn- 
ing in oil to mark their saints' days. On the church 
holidays or celebrations, throngs of these black women 
may be seen gathered at the sanctuary, awe-struck and 
devout. Their devotion is mingled with superstition, 
it may be removed only a degree from fetichism, but to 
the zealous churchman it is a basis of belief, and it is 
infinitely more hopeful than indifferentism. 

The lack of faith has sometimes been cited as evi- 
denced by the poor attendance at the churches. Obser- 
vation does not support this assumption. At the early 
morning mass at any of the churches of Habana or of 
any of the larger towns, or at the later services, attend- 
ants are not lacking. The churches are usually well 
filled with worshippers. The absence of men may be 
noted, and it may be said that the services are more a 
social reunion than a devotional exercise ; but the same 
thing is said with equal truth of both Protestant and 
Catholic congregations in American cities. After the 
American military occupation began, in some places the 
parish priests blessed the Cuban flags anew. In the 
village of Jaruco, Te Deum was chanted in the Church. 

At Alquizar mass was said on the anniversary of the 

264 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

death of Maceo. In Santiago de Cuba mass was also 
said as in other towns. When Gomez entered Habana 
on the fourth anniversary of the insurrection, three Cu- 
ban priests rode with him. 

The intellectual life of the island has been variously 
described as agnostic, infidel, and free-thinking. A 
majority of the men call themselves free-thinkers to 
describe their mental attitude rather towards the Catho- 
lic Church than towards religion. They revel in the 
philosophy of Herbert Spencer; but speculative politi- 
cal philosophy has more attractions for them than spec- 
ulative theology. The influence of Freemasonry is not 
likely to be a serious bar to the efforts of the Church 
to regain the confidence of the people. The institution 
has not shown great vitality since the change in politi- 
cal conditions. Unquestionably its secret character 
drew to it many Cuban patriots who saw in it the 
means for furthering their aspirations for independ- 
ence. That inducement no longer exists. Without the 
stimulus likewise of prosecution and opposition the 
probability is that Freemasonry in Cuba will not be a 
potent factor outside of its social features. While it 
will remain under the condemnation of the Church, the 
antagonism is not likely to be strong. The Cuban 
priests in their national aspirations sympathized with 
it, and their condemnation of its members was lenient. 
This leniency may distress the superior ecclesiastical 
authorities, but it will continue during the lifetime of 
this generation of Cuban priests. 

The religious orders were stronger in Cuba in the 
earlier eras than in the later days. The nominations 

of the monks as bishops was proof of this fact. Their 

265 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

powers waned and rose in the Antilles with the vary- 
ing fortunes of the religious orders in the peninsula. 
Dominicans and Franciscans got the strongest foot- 
hold. It was the church of the San Franciscans that 
was profaned by English military occupation in 1762, 
and thereafter was given over to the secular business of 
the customs service. The convent of the Dominicans 
became the property of the university of Habana when 
that institution was secularized in 1837. Forty years 
ago there were sixteen convents for monks, and five for 
nuns in the diocese of Habana, with seven or eight in 
the jurisdiction of Santiago de Cuba. In Habana there 
were the monks of Santo Domingo, San Francisco de 
Asis, la Merced, San Augustine, San Felipe, San Juan 
de Dios, San Lazaro, Jesuitas, and Escolapias. The 
nunneries were of Santa Clara, Santa Catalina, Santa 
Teresa, and two of Santa Ursulina. 

At present there are eight religious congregations in 
Habana and vicinity — those of San Felipe, San Fran- 
cisco, Santo Domingo, San Isidor, Mission of St. Paul, 
Escolapians, and Jesuits. The mission of the two lat- 
ter orders is declared to be especially for the instruc- 
tion of youth. The Jesuit college of Belen in Habana 
has been honored by the astronomical discoveries of 
Father Yihez, who has contributed his share to higher 
education. The Jesuits also have a college in Sancti 
Spiritus. The Escolapians have schools in Guanaba- 
coa near Habana, and in Puerto Principe. Yet it can- 
not be said as a whole that the religious orders have 
done much for public education in Cuba. 

The convents of nuns include the Urbanistas of the 
Franciscan order, Santa Clara, Santa Catalina, the 

266 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

cloistered Carmelites, and the Ursulines. The Sisters 
of Charity have charge of various hospitals and charita- 
ble institutions in all parts of the island. At various 
times there has been an agitation against the ecclesias- 
tical authorities for keeping the cloistered nuns as pris- 
oners shut up against their will. All the religious 
orders have property, but the title to some of it will 
have to be settled by legal process. The formal title to 
the convent of Belen was conveyed to the Jesuits by 
the Spanish authorities after the signing of the protocol. 
Scandal was thereby caused, though the procedure was 
alleged to be simply recording the title which already 
existed. All the religious orders showed antagonism to 
the establishment of societies from the United States. 
Nevertheless, in Habana, the Augustine Brothers es- 
tablished a chapel where services are conducted in 
English. 

Eoman Catholic prelates in Cuba and elsewhere were 
fearful after the war lest there should be hostile legisla- 
tion and confiscation of church property if an indepen- 
dent Cuban government were established. The dispute 
over the title to church property shows a possible 
ground for this belief. It may be as well that this 
question is to be settled by judicial process during the 
American control. The other fears were born of the 
temporary resentment of the hour, and took no account 
of the restraining influence of the Cuban priests. A 
few individuals in what was called the intellectual ele- 
ment of the Cubans talked of a philosophical state 
without religion, but their talk was the empty echo of 
French reading. One of the assemblies in the woods 

which adopted a constitution for the Cuban republic 

267 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

included a provision making civil marriages alone valid ; 
but this came from the freshness of the memory of 
the Church's opposition to legalizing civil marriages. 
Such a provision could not secure support in a regu- 
larly constituted assembly legislating for the island. 
Whenever a Cuban congress comes to be chosen and 
enacts laws for the commonwealth, it will unquestion- 
ably exercise the complete divorcement of Church and 
State. There is no danger of it going further than this, 
and enacting proscriptive legislation against any creed 
or sect. 

From the outset the attitude of the American author- 
ity was clear. The union of Church and State ended 
with the end of Spanish sovereignty. None of the rev- 
enues collected by the American Government could be 
applied to the support of the Catholic clergy or of any 
religious sect. The Church holidays were not recog- 
nized as State holidays, though in deference to long- 
established custom on some of these days official busi- 
ness was not transacted. Absolute freedom of worship 
was guaranteed the same as in the United States. The 
assurance was given that the property rights of Eoman 
Catholics would be protected, and this assurance was 
broad enough to quiet all fears. Disputed titles to 
property, such as the Jesuit church of Belen, were left 
for future judicial adjudication. No other course was 
open. The American authorities on the one hand could 
not afford to confiscate church holdings, nor on the 
other hand could they confirm a clouded title and 
possibly rob the municipality of its vested interests. 

The most delicate question was that of the cemeteries. 

The popular resentment against the Church for its 

268 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

monopoly of the burial of the dead was strong. This 
Church ownership of the cemeteries and the resultant 
abuses were among the causes which weakened its hold 
on the people. The municipalities in various places 
declared for the right of free burial, and proposed to 
make the cemeteries free regardless of assumed prop- 
erty rights of the Church. The American authorities 
could only decree that where the complete ownership of 
the municipality was clear, the burial grounds should 
be free; where the title was plainly in the Church, it 
should so remain, and subject only to Church regula- 
tions. Where it was held in joint ownership or was in 
dispute the respective rights should be left to judicial 
process. Where the municipalities had taken posses- 
sion of the cemeteries before the American occupation, 
that action was allowed to stand subject to judicial 
action. In time all the towns and villages of Cuba will 
have free burial grounds. 

The embarrassment which the Roman Catholic 
Church will meet will be in its stand on popular educa- 
tion. Under the American authority what could be 
done towards establishing a school system on the basis 
of the former Spanish system was done, and in the 
teaching religion is ignored. In a country whose in- 
habitants are at least nominally Roman Catholics this 
may be called an unjust course; yet the American 
authority in assuring religious freedom could not do 
otherwise. The reversal of this policy may be sought 
by the Catholic Church when Cuba comes to manage its 
own affairs, but nothing is more improbable. A legis- 
lative assembly may have a majority of members who 
are devout churchmen, but they are not likely to make 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

provision for religious instruction in the schools. The 
popular mind is firmly, irrevocably fixed on keeping 
the schools apart from the Church. The religious in- 
struction of the Cuban youth must be within the portals 
of the temples and within the homes. 

Protestantism was quick to seize upon free Cuba as a 
promising field of evangelization. Under the old con- 
trol the discouragement and the obstacles were too 
great. After the signing of the protocol, even before the 
American occupation began, Habana was invaded by 
the apostles of rancorous and sensational theology. A 
brief experience was enough to show that the little head- 
way which Protestantism had gained would be lost by 
this kind of propaganda. It received no encouragement 
from those who had sought to inculcate a faith other 
than the common one, and it fell from its own weakness. 
The people might not hold the Catholic creed in vene- 
rated affection. At least they were not ready to accept 
a gospel which reviled what religious instincts they did 
possess. After this experiment came the more earnest 
effort of the various Protestant denominations, several 
of which established chapels in Habana and missions in 
other towns. 

Protestant ministers travelled over the island study- 
ing the prospects. They could not fail to see that the 
field for evangelization was a vast one. Some acquired 
the grotesque misinformation which is common in su- 
perficial observation made to carry out preconceived 
notions. The majority laid hold of the cardinal fact 
that the religion which would make progress in Cuba 
must be the religion of deeds. They showed the 

strength of Protestant evangelical work in their organi- 

270 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

zation for the relief of the suffering population and for 
the support of orphan asylums and hospitals. They 
also grasped the depth of the popular feeling against 
the Roman Catholic Church for its taxes on birth and 
death, and their first promise was free burial grounds. 
The utterance of a young Cuban, "Protestantism can- 
not be bad, because they baptize you free and they bury 
you free," was the keynote with which they sought to 
reach the conscience of the masses. 

Both Spanish prelates and American ecclesiastics were 
averse to the idea of Protestant evangelization of Cuba. 
The bishop of Habana, in his pastoral accepting Ameri- 
can authority, said that those who were happy in the 
thought that the Church would lose its influence and 
be vanquished by the Protestants had no cause to be 
happy at such a thought. It is certain that the various 
evangelical denominations will not withdraw from the 
work upon which they have entered. There is no oc- 
casion for a conflict of creeds in Cuba. The majority 
of people will be as in other Latin American countries 
at least nominally Catholics. If the liberal policy of 
the apostolic delegate succeeds in making them genuine 
Catholics, the incentive furnished by evangelical Protes- 
tantism may be credited with a share in the work. 

The Cuban clergy will not be content until the Cuban 
parochial priests are the custodians of the Cuban con- 
science. They will also insist on lessening the Spanish 
influence in the religious orders. It is doubtful whether 
either Protestant missionaries or Eoman Catholic eccle- 
siastics from the United States appreciate the thorough- 
ness of this movement or the degree to which it may 

be invoked in winning the masses back to the Church. 

271 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

In the lapse of years, when this national instinct has 
worked its mission, immigration from Spain may bring 
Spanish shepherds with the flocks from the peninsula, 
and the histor} r of the French in Canada in their devo- 
tion to the faith may be repeated. But that is not of 
the present day. 



272 



CHAPTEK XV 

Mannees and Morals 

Ingenuous Social Life— Reserve Towards Strangers — Immemorial 
Customs and Habits — Grosser Amusements — Bull-Fight and 
Lottery Disappearing Institutions — Gambling as a National 
Trait — Geography and Climate — Statistics of Illegitimacy Not a 
Criterion — Unmorality and Immorality— Habana as an Antillian 
Paris — Vice on Exhibition for Visitors — State Regulation of 
Prostitution — System Accepted by American Military Officials 
— Recruits for Iniquity from Abroad — Causes of Social Demor- 
alization Traced — Disproportionate Number of Males — Change 
for Better in Social State — Habana Not a Moral Mirror of the 
Whole Island — Healthful Influences. 

Political institutions reflect the character of social 
institutions. No government in the border tropics 
which seeks to place itself above and beyond the cus- 
toms and habits of the people can succeed. How far 
immemorial usages are to be deemed a reflex of the 
moral station is not worth stopping to discuss. The 
manners and customs and the amusements are all mir- 
rors of Latin traits. Naturally the climate has some- 
thing to do with them. 

Much of the social life is in the open air. Cubans 
and Spaniards are indifferent to the scrutiny of their 
neighbors. There is an unconsciousness, even a nai- 
vete, about their methods of living. It might be said 

that they live in public. The courtyards of their 
18 273 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

houses, the rooms opening directly on the street, make 
it so. Publicity is not annoying because nobody is cu- 
rious about that which can be seen so readily. Fam- 
ily groups at the open windows are indifferent to the 
passers-by. In the evening, when the heat of the day 
is past, it is customary to leave the house for the 
plaza or park where the band is playing. A stroll of 
an hour or two, a meeting with friends, the interchange 
of little gossip among the women make these evening 
strolls in reality social reunions. There is also the 
theatre to attend, and half an hour in a cafe with all the 
members of the family, and then the return home. 
Because of this habit of recreation in public and of the 
groups in the cafes, impressionist American observers 
form their conclusions of the lack of home life among 
Cubans and Spaniards. Nothing could be more mis- 
leading. The custom is in itself a tribute to the mode- 
ration and temperance among all classes which is so 
general as to be almost universal. The climate helps 
to enforce temperance ; but the simplicity of the social 
diversions, the innocence of the recreations, could not 
exist among a people predisposed to grossness. 

Cuban social life has lost some of its reserve, but it 
does not yet conform to American notions. The visitor 
from the United States does not readily understand 
why the men whom he meets in business affairs or in 
official intercourse do not invite him to their homes. 
At the balls or dances which he attends as a guest the 
constraint shown by the sexes appears stiff and unnec- 
essary. Some of the older usages are disappearing. 
After the return of the Cuban families which had been 
in exile in the States, the women began to appear in the 

274 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

streets and in the shops without being accompanied by 
the duenna whose presence had always been consid- 
ered indispensable. They also showed their indepen- 
dence of other customs with which previously they had 
been hedged. These innovations may all come with- 
out a real change in the social usages. It will be a long 
time before the visiting stranger will be received into 
the families of his Cuban friends with the same free- 
dom that he meets with in the United States. More 
than the crust of reserve has to be broken. Cuban hos- 
pitality is a proverb, but it is hospitality after the 
manner of a Latin country. Until he is on more famil- 
iar terms it is well for the American not to judge too 
confidently of the family life of which he is ignorant. 

Manners do undergo a change and not always for the 
better. American brusqueness has already modified 
the politeness which was always met with in public, in 
the cafes, the theatres, and the tramways. It was per- 
haps superficial, and there may have been too much 
servility for the independent and self-asserting native 
of the North. Yet the habit of being courteous should 
not be too readily accepted as a mark of an inferior 
civilization. 

The amusements of the Latin races do not always 
conform to American ideas. It is to be said for the 
Cubans that in spite of the sombreness of their political 
history they do not take their amusements sadly. The 
rural diversions are both simple and joyous. Music is 
the soul of these diversions. The serenade is the pop- 
ular form. The calendar of Church holidays, feast days, 
is a full one. Its length sometimes appalls the em- 
ployer of labor. The people are always ready to ob- 

275 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

serve the calendar not so much in the devotional frame 
of mind as in the holiday spirit. 

The robust and grosser sports are to be considered. 
There is the cocking main. This is not a noble sport, 
but it is distinctively a Cuban one. Nor is it the 
amusement of the lower classes alone. The neat lat- 
ticed structure in the form of an amphitheatre which is 
seen on the outskirts of many of the villages is the cock- 
pit. A similar structure is found on private estates. 
In the country the amusement is a favorite one. Its 
final disappearance is not of the immediate future. 
The most that can be expected for a time is that the 
Cubans who have been decrying the sport as a brutal 
and degrading one will find greater encouragement in 
their efforts to banish it. A Captain-General of Cuba 
once kept a cock-pit in the courtyard of his official resi- 
dence. Another Captain-General declared that game 
roosters made it easy to rule the Cuban people. The 
Spanish authorities licensed and encouraged matching 
the game roosters because of the revenue it brought the 
Government. This knowledge, among the Cubans who 
were bitterest in their opposition to Spanish rule, is a 
moral argument which has greater weight in banishing 
the amusement than its brutality. 

It was a question of many observers who judged from 
the South American countries whether when Spanish 
sovereignty was gone the bull-fight and the lottery 
would also go. In Cuba, so far as this generation is 
concerned, the answer is clearly foreshadowed. The 
bull-fight and the lottery were part of the Spanish in- 
stitutions against which the fiercest resentment was 

shown. Educated Cubans charged that they were 

276 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

maintained by the Government for the purpose of de- 
bauching the moral sense of the people. By one who 
has not lived in the midst of them the intensity of this 
feeling would not be understood. It was strong enough 
to give assurance that these institutions once gone 
would not be revived without determined resistance. 
Moreover, the bull-fight was the especial sport of the 
Spaniards. The majority of its patrons were always 
from their ranks. 

The lottery was a more subtle evil. Its existence was 
among a people who are declared to be gamblers by 
nature. That both Cubans and Spaniards are inordi- 
nately addicted to gaming there can be no denial. How 
far the Government was responsible for encouraging this 
instinct by maintaining the great gambling scheme of 
the lottery as a State institution may be a matter of 
individual opinion. Outside of this, the Spanish laws 
against gambling were very severe — quite as severe as 
the statutes and the police regulations in the United 
States. When the Spanish lottery fell, the mass of the 
people, though they had been in the habit of buying 
the tickets regularly, did not seem to miss it. Some 
surreptitious schemes of lottery drawing found their 
way into the island — just as similar schemes existed 
in the United States after the Louisiana lottery was 
driven out. But they did not secure patrons in the 
overwhelming numbers that would justify the belief that 
the people could not get along without the drawings. 

The time since the stain of the lottery was on the 
escutcheon of the United States, the agitation which 
was necessary in order to secure the passage of an act 

of Congress outlawing it from the mails, are so recent 

277 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA 

that it hardly lies in the mouth of Americans to be too 
critical of the Latin toleration. They will find to-day 
a pronounced public sentiment against the lottery which 
promises to continue strong enough to prevent it get- 
ting a foothold under whatever form of government pre- 
vails. And in any given community in Cuba quite as 
strong a feeling will be found against gambling and 
quite as urgent a demand on the authorities to enforce 
the laws as exist in any given community in the 
United States. This does not mean that gambling will 
be eradicated. It does mean that it may be lessened 
among a people who recognize that it is detrimental to 
their own welfare and demoralizing to their morals. 

These questions of manners, customs, and amuse- 
ments have a bearing on the relation of the social in- 
stitutions to the political institutions, yet they are not 
the core. That is one of usages and habits in their 
effect on the morality of the people and their capacity 
for maintaining good government. Public morality is 
the closed book of Spanish rule. Though never prac- 
tised in the past, it is compatible with representative 
government in the tropics. But what of private mor- 
als? Cuba comes within the geographical zone of sup- 
posed contamination. The state of civilization has 
been represented as one of gross immorality. 

It is proper to inquire how far this impression is 
correct, and what is the actual and the prospective state 
of morality among this people crossing the threshold 
of nationality. After that comes the inquiry into rela- 
tive morals, into the causes that have produced the pres- 
ent conditions and whether they are ineradicable. That 

is to say, whether the morals of the border tropics are 

278 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

a temporary condition, or a fact of geography and cli- 
mate, a natural rampart of vice and incapacity for good 
government which can be neither scaled nor beaten 
down. These might be considered subjects for the 
closet rather than for open discussion, but unfortu- 
nately they cannot bo settled in the closet. In making 
the inquiry I do not propose to take the statistics of il- 
legitimacy as the premises of any conclusion. The rea- 
son is that they do not furnish the basis from which 
just conclusions can be drawn. 

Illegitimacy is not confined to the tropics, and is not 
a product of the tropics. Acrid religious controversy 
may grow out of the discussions over Protestantism and 
Catholicism, or over the relative vice of the Anglo-Saxon 
as shown in London or of the Latin as shown in the 
rural regions of other countries. But on its theological 
side Cuba may cite Jamaica with an annual birth-rate 
of 76 per cent of illegitimates, and Habana may be com- 
pared with a dozen other cities. And if the religious 
instincts of the American people are done violence to 
through this apparent indifference to the sanctity of 
the marriage rite, they may find sober thought in their 
own statistics of divorce. If the statistics of illegiti- 
macy are their basis for measuring the capabilities of 
the tropical Antilles for self-goverment, why may not 
statistics of divorce be taken as a proper means of de- 
termining the standard of American civilization? Who 
shall take the measurements? The state of immorality 
in Cuba is deplorable, but this is not immorality nor 
the immoral basis of a commonwealth. 

Habana is the Paris of the West Indies. Its immo- 
rality is worn on the sleeve. The American visitor may 

279 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

learn more of its vices in a week than he has known of 
the dark shadows of his home city in a lifetime. He 
may go without apology or without disguising his 
identity to one of the public balls during the carnival 
season. When he encounters there acquaintances whom 
he has met in other spheres he need not be shamefaced, 
and seek to explain that he is observing the customs 
of the country. No explanation will be expected. He 
may attend social functions of the best society, and 
wonder at the insouciance of the refined ladies who 
dance what he is told is the Cuban national dance. If 
his mind is prurient he may dwell on its possibilities ; 
but this impression will not continue after his famili- 
arity becomes more extended. The Cuban dance will 
fade away as the waltz and schottische fade away. 

At the public ball he may see the national dance ex- 
aggerated and vulgarized in a manner that the good 
women whom he met at the social function do not know 
to be possible. The probabilities are very great that 
he will see nothing more ; and the hours will wear away 
into the gray morning to the thrumming of the music 
without variation and the monotonous motion of the 
dance without other incident. His desire for some 
excitement is almost sure to be disappointed. At the 
variety theatres of the lower order his experience will 
be more varied. The stage indecencies may be more 
pronounced than may be seen in the low variety thea- 
tres of the large cities in the United States, but this is 
doubtful. Much of the performance will be dependent 
upon an intimate knowledge of the Spanish language, 
its colloquialisms and the double meaning which can be 

given to so many of its words. 

280 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

The traveller may look twice at the comely, graceful 
woman with the chocolate complexion who passes the 
hotel or the cafe where he is seated, He may assume 
that he is in Savannah or Xew Orleans. He may won- 
der if it is the eternal doom of the mulatto to be de- 
classed, and if she is to know no other fate. If he has 
the opportunity to study the social life of the middle 
classes fully, he will learn that the struggle against this 
fate is going on, and that the mulatto race is not accept- 
ing the decree. But he will not know this in the begin- 
ning. The visitor will not see the strange women in the 
street as he may see them in Chicago or New York. 
But they will peer at him from the windows and the 
doorways of their habitations, and will resent his refu- 
sal of their hospitality. Their trade is the open trade 
of the outcast everywhere. It is lawful. The State 
recognizes it. 

The visitor may read in the newspapers municipal 

orders about the location and other regulations for the 

houses of tolerancy. He will probably be told that 

the indifference to their home surroundings is one of 

the characteristics of this branch of the Latin race, and 

that their lack of morality is shown in their toleration 

of neighborhood surroundings of that kind. It is true 

that the Spaniard or the Cuban builds his residence for 

himself and not for the outside vrorld. Its exterior 

gives little idea of the interior, and this sometimes 

causes the fine house to be near a foundry, a shop, or 

something not so harmless. Yet the visitor who reads 

the newspapers will find constant complaints against 

the authorities for permitting the houses of tolerancj to 

go beyond their prescribed limits and invade respect- 

381 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

able neighborhoods. This assuredly does not indicate 
a lack of moral sensibility. Being recognized by the 
State, they have their metes and bounds laid down by 
official orders, and the protests against their overlapping 
the bounds are usually numerous enough and emphatic 
enough to impress upon the authorities the enforcement 
of the regulations. 

If the curiosity of the visitor develops into legitimate 
inquiry, he may glean knowledge that will unsettle 
previous opinions. He will find a complete code of 
civil regulations for prostitution enforced by special 
police and re-enforced by medical inspectors. He will 
learn of the system of license fees, and will not fail to 
hear of the horrible abuses which grew out of that sys- 
tem under the Spanish administration. In comparison 
with these abuses, police blackmail of the unfortunate 
classes in American cities becomes a luminous spot in 
this dark shadow. The American military authorities 
accepted the system as they found it, which was as a 
measure of hygiene and not of reformation. Some of 
them approved the principle of licensing the social evil, 
but they would have preferred a different practice. 
Others indorsed it both as a general measure and for 
the special protection of the soldiers. Under military 
administration the enforcement of the regulations was 
rigid, but no effort was made to give them other than a 
hygienic character. 

Some phases of the subject are better fitted to a chap- 
ter on medical sociology than for popular information; 
but the system in so far as legalizing immorality is 
concerned is not different from that of other countries 

which adopt the same principle. Neither this official 

282 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

recognition of the social evil nor the abuses in connec- 
tion with its regulation are chargeable to the morals 
of the tropics. Moreover, notwithstanding the tolera- 
tion of public sentiment, State licensing was at all times 
opposed by a part of the community. Vicious prac- 
tices in the United States might be exhibited in their 
deformity because the American military authorities 
enforced the license system for the protection of their 
troops with the same justice as to set forth its existence 
as evidence of a low condition of morals in Cuba. 

But the stranger may learn other things. He may 
meet many persons who will tell him that it is hopeless 
to expect a pure home life; that the mixture of races 
forbids ; that the climate produces social demoralization, 
and that climate cannot be conquered. He may follow 
his inquiry into all the haunts of vice, and come to learn 
that Habana is a port where vessels from the four 
quarters of the world drop anchor. He will learn that 
the toleration which is everywhere extended to sailors 
ashore is not denied in Habana. With these sailors' 
resorts and with its Chinese quarters, this Paris of the 
Antilles is also the San Francisco of the West Indies. 
Do all these things indicate that the blood of this peo- 
ple is hopelessly corrupt? Or are they the excrescences 
which grow luxurious like all growths of the tropics, 
but which may yet be rooted out? Not rooted out 
entirely. The social vices do not have the germs frozen 
in the temperate climates ; they are not even chilled in 
the border tropics. 

The austere moralist may look upon it as a hopeless, 
almost incurable, condition of depravity. The cynical 
man of the world is a better judge. He will not be apt 

283 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

to condemn without knowledge of other cities than Ha- 
bana, nor will he accept unreservedly the verdict of the 
Habana residents regarding themselves. Probably the 
man of the world knows that the recruits for iniquity 
are not furnished by Cuban homes. He may know 
something of imported immorality — that more than 50 
per cent of the outcast classes come from Mexico, from 
the Canaries, and from the peninsula. If he were in 
Cuba during the insurrection, he will know that misery 
did not conquer chastity. He may see hope for the 
future among a people where wives do not refuse the 
office of maternity. He may be cynical over the toler- 
ance which permits the knowledge of male infidelity, 
but he will not fail to pay an honest tribute to the do- 
mestic life which withdraws the wife and mother from 
the social sphere and centres her life in the rearing of 
children. It narrows her intellectual horizon, but it 
enlarges her usefulness in the domestic circle. 

The casual visitor may not understand this state 
of tolerant morals for the men. Its existence may 
strengthen his conviction that all is bad. His other 
experiences may not undeceive him. He goes to the 
best theatre which is attended by a refined audience. 
Broad references to delicate subjects are made on the 
stage. He expects to see the fans which the Cuban and 
the Spanish women use with such coquettish dexterity 
instantly covering their faces. His surprise is great to 
find them utterly unconcerned, no lull in their talk, no 
embarrassment on their part or on the part of their 
escorts. And in social gatherings he will hear topics 
discussed which in polite society in the United States 

would cause a panic. Certain domestic subjects are 

284 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

treated with the same familiarity as in German house- 
holds. Is all this an indication of immorality? Was 
it so a century ago in the new American common- 
wealths ? Has Anglo-Saxon morality improved so vastly 
since Chesterfield's maxims were published, or has con- 
ventionality simply been veneered? 

Personal immorality does not muffle its face in Ha- 
bana — does not even veil itself. The American fresh 
from his own social environment prefers the hypocrisy 
of veiled vice, yet he can hardly sit in judgment among 
those who do not draw the curtains. What is good in 
Cuban social life is open. What is bad is not hidden. 
In time some of the conventionalities to which Ameri- 
cans are accustomed will come. In time conventional- 
ity will clothe the naked children ; but their nakedness 
is that of custom and not of immorality. Modesty will 
take the place of indifference. All this may happen 
without a real change in the innate morals of the peo- 
ple. Surface morality, if I may so call it, will im- 
prove. Houses of tolerancy may cease to be proteges 
of the municipality. Outward public decency will 
undoubtedly spread. Yet these things will not in them- 
selves mean a radical change in the morals of the topics. 

The hope of the Cuba of to-morrow for a sound 
public morality and for improved private morality lies 
deeper than the surface. It lies in the removing of the 
causes of past and present demoralization. The rela- 
tion is an intimate one to the future population of Cuba. 
Is it to be of mongrels, negroids, abhorrent to civiliza- 
tion? In discussing future immigration and coloniza- 
tion, something has been said on this subject. It bears 
development. The race mixture that grew out of slav- 

285 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

ery has not been prolific, although the unmixed illicit- 
ness of the colored race is declared not to be so sterile 
as that of the white race. A barren or a sterile popu- 
lation would make Cuba forever a stunted growth of a 
commonwealth, the stump of a state without branches 
and without foliage. The black race is prolific, but the 
families of the blacks are not relatively much larger than 
those of the whites. The Cuban family, of whatever 
color, usually has its half dozen blessings, and some- 
times there are a round dozen of them. So we may go 
out and beyond that phase of the subject, and ask again 
whether the morals of the tropics are indigenous or 
whether there is something exotic in them which may 
be corrected and improved. 

The condition which has prevailed in Cuba for cen- 
turies was not indigenous. The men outnumbered the 
women. The Spanish occupation for four hundred 
years was a male occupation. This was not alone in 
the military garrisons. It was also of the civil classes — 
the officials, the merchants, and even the laborers. 
They were in Cuba to make money and return to Spain, 
not to settle and bring up families. Those who did 
settle and marry raised Cuban families who became 
hostile to Spanish Government. Of those who had fam- 
ilies in the peninsula, few thought of bringing them 
to Cuba. They were conveniently forgotten during 
the residence on the island. Little distinction was 
shown in this regard between the husband and the 
bachelor. Inquiry was rarely made. They were single 
in Cuba, and custom tolerated their taking a mistress. 
The Cuban woman would not become the unlawful com- 
panion of the Spaniard. The Cuban home did not 

286 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

encourage degradation. The Spaniard had no choice 
except as between the mulatto and the black woman. 
Usually he chose the black woman because she would 
work, and she did not demand the finery that the wom- 
an of the chocolate complexion wanted. The latter 
occupied more the position of the Louisiana octoroon. 
She demanded that the title of a house or a small piece 
of property be vested in her. The Spaniard, thrifty in 
his personal vices, therefore took the black woman for 
mistress. 

The statement of this condition is revolting, but it 
was recognized. It is stated here because with the end 
of Spanish control this condition begins to end. Its 
prevalence can be judged from census figures. In 1860 
tho population of the island was 1,396,470. Of these, 
800,575 were men and 595,895 were women. By Span- 
ish nativity the total was 83,000, of whom 66,000 were 
men and 17,000 women. Of the Cuban-born it should 
be noted that the women were slightly in excess, the 
total standing 513,461, of whom 254,193 were males and 
259,268 were females. Further subdivision and analy- 
sis show that the black males outnumbered the black 
females. Therefore the excess of white Cuban women 
over white Cuban men was greater. In 1860 the for- 
eigners, including Europeans and Americans, numbered 
7,725, of whom 5,673 were men and 2,052 were women. 
Many of these foreigners were married to Cuban women. 
Many of the Spaniards also married Cuban women ; but 
the significant fact is that there was only one Spanish- 
bom female to four Spanish-born males. 

The census of other years does not give the Spanish 

residents by sexes, but the figures apparently indicate 

287 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA 

that this relative proportion was not changed. In 1877 
55.88 per cent of the inhabitants were males, 44.12 fe- 
males. In 1887 the ratio was 54.70 males and 45.30 
females. The variation is too small to be of moment 
when the uncertainty of all Spanish censuses is remem- 
bered. Early in the nineteenth century Humboldt 
observed that between one-fourth and one-fifth of the 
population of Cuba was condemned to live in celibacy. 
He meant more especially the negroes. He might have 
added that such Spaniards as were condemned to celi- 
bacy modified it by concubinage, and the irregular fe- 
male classes by polyandry. Under the new era the 
parasitic and bureaucratic class of Spaniards disappears 
forever from Cuba. The demoralization which their 
presence and their mode of living caused disappears. 

It has been noted that the majority of tradesmen and 
their clerks in Habana and the larger towns were Span- 
iards who expected to return to the peninsula. Few 
of the clerks, who were numbered by the thousands, 
married till late in life. They helped to swell the dis- 
proportion between the sexes of Spanish birth. The 
change in political and commercial conditions will 
gradually alter this unhealthy social state. Future cen- 
suses will show no such great disproportion as formerly 
existed between males and females born in the penin- 
sula. For various causes, such as in the first stage of 
immigration men coming without their families, the 
disproportion will not wholly disappear. The removal 
of this cancer may not insure the social regeneration of 
Cuba, but it does assure an improvement in morals. 

It might be said that for thirty years the social de- 
moralization of the island has been continuous, due to 

288 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

war. The ten-years' struggle from 1868 to 1878 kept a 
large armed force on the island. The entire body of 
troops was not moved until long after the peace of El 
Zanjon, for the insurrectionary spirit was not quelled 
in the eastern provinces. When the last insurrection 
broke out, in 1895, the Spanish garrisons numbered 
20,000 soldiers, chiefly single men. These 20,000 sin- 
gle men could not be accounted a healthful moral influ- 
ence. Then came the 200,000 soldiers from the penin- 
sula to crush the revolution. All this is gone forever. 
With an approach to normal industrial, political, and 
social conditions, there should be an approach to nor- 
mal morality. These are the signs to watch, rather 
than the surface moralities. 

Nor is Habana ever to be taken as a type of the whole 
island. Being the chief city, it will always have both 
the cream and the dregs of vice, and these will always 
be on exhibition. The country is seen to better advan- 
tage, and the virtues of the people are not obscured by 
the vices of individuals. Glimpses, too, may be ob- 
tained of the secluded home life, and the domestic qual- 
ities which have their foundation in the family. This 
home life is the answer to the supposed lack of morals 
in the tropics. Reinforced by family immigration, it is 
the hope of the future; and the prospect for better- 
ing the state of immorality may reasonably be assured 
in the circumstances which have taken the monopoly of 
marriage away from the grasping Spanish priesthood. 
From now forward both Protestantism and Roman Ca- 
tholicism may be expected to diminish the statistics of 
illegitimacy by the encouragement which they give to 

lawful marriage. 

19 289 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

These are mere incidents in the moulding of morals 
in the border tropics. The beginning of improvement 
is in the disappearance of the conditions which main- 
tain an excessive male inhabitancy. The continuance 
of improvement lies in family immigration. 



290 



CHAPTEE XVI 

American Military Control 

Setting Up of New Political Power— Provisions of Executive Proc- 
lamation — Exercise of American Sovereignty in Customs — 
General Wood's Bill of Eights — Extension of Authority to All 
the Provinces — Regulation of Taxes — Cabinet Secretaries — Tem- 
porary Nature of Military Occupation Affirmed — Its Usefulness 
Demonstrated — American Officials in the Temple of Corrup- 
tion — Example of Integrity and Efficiency — Political Reconstruc- 
tion — Defects in Military Control — Doubtful Reforms of Latin 
Laws — Unwise Interference with Customs and Usages — Sunday- 
Closing Regulations — Resemblance to Spanish Captain-General's 
Power — Military Trusteeship Creditable in Broad Sense. 

American authority in Cuba began with the surrender 
of Santiago by the Spanish troops in July, 1898. It 
was not complete until the formal yielding of sover- 
eignty in Habana on January 1st, 1899. Its basis was 
purely the military power of the United States in for- 
eign territory. This was set forth after the surrender 
of Santiago in the proclamation of President McKinley, 
which provided for the military government of that 
section of the island which was surrendered. Former 
political relations were severed and the new political 
power, that of the United States, was established. 

The municipal laws of the conquered territory — con- 
quered so far as related to Spain — such as affected pri- 
vate rights of persons and of property, were considered 

as continuing in force. The judges and other officials 

291 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

connected with the administration of justice, on accept- 
ing the supremacy of the United States continued ad- 
ministering the ordinary law of the land, as between 
man and man, under the supervision of the American 
commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief had the 
reserve power to replace or expel the native officials, to 
substitute new courts of his own constitution, and to 
create new or supplementary tribunals. The treatment 
of property and the collection and administration of the 
revenues was declared to be one of the most important 
and practical problems, and the moneys collected were 
to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of 
government under military occupation and for the pay- 
ment of the expenses of the army. All ports in Cuba 
in actual possession of United States land and naval 
forces were open to the commerce of neutral nations. 
Following the surrender of Santiago and the executive 
proclamation came the protocol in which Spain relin- 
quished all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 
The exercise of American authority began first in the 
province of Santiago, because the United States was 
earliest in possession there. Subsequently jurisdiction 
was taken in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Pinar 
del Eio, and on the first of January in the provinces of 
Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara. In Santiago the 
fixing of a new customs tariff was the first act of Amer- 
ican sovereignty. It was followed by measures of local 
government under the direction of General Leonard 
Wood as commander-in-chief and military governor of 
the province. By virtue of his authority he issued a 
bill of rights which was in the nature of a provisional 

constitution. It consisted of ten articles. 

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The first section guaranteed to the people the right of 
assembly for the common good and of applying to the 
authorities petition or remonstrance for the redress of 
grievances. The second guaranteed freedom of worship 
according to individual conscience, provided that there 
should be no interference with existing form of worship 
and assured protection to all Christian churches. The 
third article directed that the courts of justice should be 
open to all, and that no private property should be 
taken for public use without compensation. The fourth 
article, dealing with criminal trials, invested the accused 
with the right to be heard himself or by counsel, and 
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of 
witnesses in his behalf. The fifth said that no person 
accused of crime should be compelled to give evidence 
against himself or be deprived of life, liberty, or prop- 
erty, except in accordance with the laws of the country. 
The sixth section declared that no person once acquitted 
should be tried again for the same offence. The sev- 
enth provided that all persons charged with crime 
should be entitled to bail, except in cases of capital 
offence, and that the writ of habeas corpus should not 
be suspended except when the commanding general 
deemed it advisable. The eighth section declared that 
excessive bail should not be required, and that excessive 
fines or cruel or undue punishments should not be in- 
flicted. Article nine provided that every citizen should 
be guaranteed in his business, person, papers, house, 
and effects against every registry and embargo unjustifi- 
able while the probable motive of culpability had not 
been declared under oath. The tenth article declared 

the right of writing or printing freely on any matter 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

whatever, subject to responsibility for the abuse of the 
right. The municipal laws were to be administered in 
accordance with these declarations, subject to modifica- 
tions which in the judgment of the commanding gen- 
eral would be beneficent and would promote the princi- 
ples of enlightened civilization. Though some of the 
principles were new, these declarations found in the 
Castilian tongue a sufficient medium of expression. 

This promulgation of the bill of rights was followed 
by a new constitution of the judicial tribunals, by local 
administrative measures, the most efficient of which was 
sanitation, and by reconstructing the municipal govern- 
ments in the various towns of the province. Among 
the first municipal orders in Santiago was one prohibit- 
ing gambling and lotteries. 

The general plan of American military control was set 
forth by executive order on December 15th, 1898. This 
created the military division of Cuba, and designated 
Major-General John E. Brooke as commander-in-chief 
and military governor of the island. General Leonard 
Wood was commander in Santiago de Cuba, General L. 
H. Carpenter in Puerto Principe, General J. C. Bates 
in Santa Clara, General J. H. Wilson in Matanzas, Gen- 
eral George W. Davis in Pinar del Eio, and General 
Fitzhugh Lee in Habana province. The character of 
government was indicated in the proclamations and de- 
crees which followed the assumption of office. There- 
after the acts of the American authorities in tho differ- 
ent provinces were simply the carrying out of a general 
policy applicable to the whole island. Habana city was 
erected into a separate military department with Gen- 
eral William Ludlow as the military governor, but 

294 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

subject to the same supreme authority as the others. 
Subsequently, when the American volunteers were with- 
drawn, the departments were consolidated in the mili- 
tary administration; but for civil administration and 
purposes of local government the six provinces and the 
city of Habana, which might be called a municipal 
province, remained unchanged. 

Following the exercise of American authority over 
the entire island, by direction from Washington a new 
customs tariff and new regulations for the coasting trade 
were promulgated. Fiscal adjustment to the new con- 
ditions was made by proclamation of the American Ex- 
ecutive, fixing the parity of money to be received from 
customs duties and paid out in salaries and for other 
purposes. Thus was the highest prerogative of sov- 
ereignty affirmed. The basis of value was American 
money, and French gold and Spanish gold and silver 
coins in circulation were measured with it as the stand- 
ard by their bullion value, allowance being made for 
exchange and for transportation charges. 

Under the American control, the actual functions of 
internal administration were exercised by the military 
commanders of the various departments, while the cus- 
toms revenues, the telegraph lines, and the postal ser- 
vice were administered directly through the general- 
in-chief as Governor-General of the island. With the 
exception of the postal administration, all branches of 
the government were under the supervision of army offi- 
cers. The post-offices were administered as a branch of 
the department in Washington, with E. G. Bathbone, an 
experienced official, as director of posts. The customs 

districts were established by executive order from 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Washington, Colonel Tasker H. Bliss becoming collector 
at the port of Habana. 

All the commanders of the departments on assuming 
their offices issued addresses to the people, explaining 
the policy of the United States and inviting their co-op- 
eration. Governor-General Brooke, on recommendation 
of the military commanders, appointed civil governors, 
alcaldes of the towns, and other officials from among 
the natives. The acts of these officials were subject 
to the approval of the military commanders. Between 
the supreme power exercised by the Governor-General 
and the authority exercised by the military governors, 
many oppressive practices of Spanish rule were abol- 
ished and some of the laws were modified. One prac- 
tice which was abrogated was the requirement for pass- 
ports and the cedula or personal tax certificate for 
transit from one part of the island to another. 

Police regulations and municipal administrations 
were moulded to the new conditions. The internal 
taxes, as distinct from local or municipal taxes, were 
regulated by the central adminstration of the Governor- 
General. After a strong protest had been made against 
letting the Spanish Bank of the island of Cuba collect 
the taxes, as had been done under Spanish dominion, 
the War Department revoked the agreement with the 
bank, and on the request of the military authorities, 
left them free to establish an independent fiscal system. 
This was done, and subsequently an entirely new basis 
of internal taxation was promulgated by authority of 
the Governor-General. 

An advisory cabinet of four natives of the island was 

selected by Governor-General Brooke. It was com- 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

posed of Pablo Desvernine, secretary of the treasury; 
Adolf Saenz Yanez, secretary of public works, agricul- 
ture, industry, and commerce; Domingo Mendez Ca- 
pote, secretary of state and government; and Jose 
Gonzales Lanuza, secretary of justice and education. 
Geographically the cabinet was open to criticism be- 
cause all its members were from Habana. Their pre- 
liminary work consisted chiefly in reconstructing the 
administrative personnel of their departments and in 
reducing the number of place-holders that had cum- 
bered the official lists under Spanish rule. These 
cabinet secretaries were also given latitude in the mat- 
ter of appointing their subordinates. The judicial sys- 
tem, after much care, was entirely reconstructed. A 
supreme court was appointed for the entire island, 
which took the place of the former court of final appeal 
in Madrid. 

In every act of the United States Government, scru- 
pulous regard was had to the temporary nature of the 
military occupation. The American Executive acted 
within the narrow limit of those powers. No public 
franchises of any kind were granted. This policy was 
determined in the beginning and was adhered to with- 
out modification. Mr. Griggs, the Attorney-General, in 
giving an opinion against granting permission to land a 
cable in Cuba, declared it would be inexpedient under 
all circumstances. The United States, he said, was 
exercising administration under the law of belligerent 
right, and the matter was under control of the War De- 
partment, but the Executive Department had taken the 
ground that in view of the circumstances under which 

the United States came into control of affairs in Cuba, 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

and in view of the declared purpose of the American 
Government to retire and leave the government to the 
inhabitants, it would be inexpedient to grant applica- 
tions for concessions except in case of absolute neces- 
sity. The Attorney-General did not concede that what 
was known as the Foraker amendment to the army 
appropriation bill directing that no property, fran- 
chises, or concessions be granted by the United States, 
or by any military or other authority whatever in the 
island of Cuba, during the occupation thereof by the 
United States, was mandatory upon the Executive De- 
partment. He intimated that it could only be consid- 
ered as advisory. 

Since there was no difference in intention or policy 
between the Executive and Congress, the distinction 
between advisory legislation and mandatory legislation 
is not important. In demanding that Spain withdraw 
from Cuba, Congress by resolution disclaimed any dis- 
position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic- 
tion, or control over Cuba, except for its pacification, 
and declared a settled determination when that was 
accomplished to leave the government and control of 
the island to its people. President McKinley, in his 
annual message of 1898, reaffirmed this doctrine, and 
indicated that the United States would withdraw when 
complete tranquillity should be established. 

This is the framework of American occupation and 
administration in Cuba. It is an iron framework. It 
bridged chaos. Its strength was not so much in its 
flexibility as in its completeness. The conditions and 
the pledges under which the control of the United States 

in Cuba began have been regretted by many persons as 

298 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

an interference with the right policy and a hindrance 
to it. There need be no regret. The first duty, that 
of pacifying the island and maintaining public order, 
could have been fulfilled by no other agency so effec- 
tively. The foundations of political and industrial re- 
construction could have been laid by no other means. 
The situation was one in which was needful supreme 
power, unquestioned by either judicial or legislative 
limitations. Circumstances had to govern. Nor could 
the measures of sanitation, which was the greatest of 
emergencies, have been carried forward with such suc- 
cess under ordinary conditions. The military author- 
ity was best adapted to cope with this emergency. It 
was almost as valuable in the establishment of an edu- 
cational system. 

The administration of Cuba was a fresh and untried 
field for the American military officials, many of them 
new to civil duties and responsibilities. The discipline 
of the camp and garrison was not such as to fit them 
for the exercise of power that could be questioned. 
This authority in the main was exercised with tact and 
discretion. There was army politics with ramifications 
in Washington, but these personal ambitions did not 
interfere with the discharge of official duties, and did 
not affect the relations of the army officers towards the 
inhabitants with whose government they were charged. 
Though the tongue was foreign to most of them, and 
though they were among a strange people, they showed 
quick adaptability to their surroundings. They were 
not alien governors of conquered inhabitants. 

It was given to the American officials in Cuba to walk 

within the temple of corruption erected by Spanish 

299 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

bureaucracy while the ruined walls were yet standing. 
They might have misgivings about the capacity and the 
ability of the Cubans to maintain an independent repub- 
lic, and their doubts might sometimes find utterance. 
But they were all impressed with the conviction that the 
rotten structure of Spanish administration could not 
have continued and could not have formed the basis of 
a stable edifice of government, whatever changes in the 
system might have been made. Like all the world that 
saw the temple from within, their wonder was that it 
lasted so long. Their own administration has been an 
example of American institutions. The shrillest want 
of Cuba in the future, the one that cries out in the wil- 
derness of chaos and corruption, is that of official integ- 
rity. The American officials have set the example. 
Their standard of integrity is the lesson of to-day, but 
it will not be learned in a day. It should be continued 
to-morrow. The same sense of responsibility and of 
a high conception of duty has been shown in other 
administrative relations. It was an experiment. The 
experiment has been a success in demonstrating Amer- 
ican capacity and adaptability to administer govern- 
ment among other peoples accustomed to other institu- 
tions. 

In a general sense it may be said that the plan of 
American administration in Cuba was reconstruction 
both industrially and politically. In the midst of 
passing conditions it is not worth while to examine 
in detail experiments in fiscal systems. Being experi- 
ments, they can be rejected when found unsatisfactory. 
And the industrial recuperation is a manifest witness 

for itself. If it fails to make known its presence, 

300 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA 

searching for it between the covers of a book would be 
fruitless. 

The political reconstruction, the operation of the 
civil machinery, is apart and of itself. It can be fol- 
lowed in all the intricacies of administration. The 
strength of the American military control was demon- 
strated in its way of meeting emergencies and in the 
impress of official integrity and fidelity which it made. 
It stamped its mark so deeply that the impress will not 
be lost whatever government obtains. But there are 
defects in military control. The very success of the 
administration in its initial stages makes these defects 
the earlier apparent. To change the laws to which 
people have been accustomed for a long series of years 
is in all circumstances a doubtful experiment. The best 
that the wisest jurists would hope for would be to cor- 
rect flagrant abuses and trust to finding suitable judges 
to construe the laws not oppressively, but beneficently. 
The abuses were flagrant enough. They were part of 
the Spanish political system. 

The substance of the provisional bill of rights first 
promulgated in Santiago province was incorporated in 
the decree of the supreme American military authority 
regulating court practice and inculcating various de- 
sirable reforms in procedure. The tyrannical practice 
of keeping accused persons incommunicado — without 
means of communicating with friends or counsel — was 
abolished, and provision was made for giving the ac- 
cused person an opportunity to know the charges 
against him in the preliminary hearing. These changes 
were opposed by some of the Habana lawyers ; but they 

will stand because they are guarantees of personal lib- 

301 



TO-MOBROW IN CUBA 

erty which were lacking under the Spanish system of 
government. 

But a disposition was shown to go far beyond such 
simple provisions. The Boman law and its adaptation 
in the Code Napoleon do not suit a people who are used 
to the common law. Americans would not put up with 
it. Therefore the assumption was that under the new 
American relation to Cuba the Latin law must be rooted 
out, though a million or more inhabitants were accus- 
tomed to it, and what understanding of judicial systems 
they had was based upon it. When a purpose to reform 
the system of laws was first intimated, the College of 
Abogados — the bar association — of Habana was invited 
to make suggestions. The association was composed 
mainly of Cuban lawyers. Many had suffered exile for 
their opposition to Spanish misrule, all knew the op- 
pressiveness of the Spanish laws. But they venerated 
the Latin principles of jurisprudence. The issue was 
raised that a concealed purpose existed to supplant the 
Latin law by American law. Dr. Gener, the president 
of the bar association, supported the suggestion that 
reforms be outlined by the association. Though the 
common courtesy was to re-elect the president, he found 
the opposition to his course so strong that he declined 
to be a candidate. Domingo Mendez Capote, who after- 
wards became a member of General Brooke's advisory 
cabinet, was chosen president of the bar association on 
the issue that radical changes in the laws were to be 
opposed. 

Months afterwards, when the military authorities de- 
creed some reforms, the Spanish lawyers met and or- 
ganized an association to uphold the excellence of the 

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Latin law over the common law. The American military- 
power had the advantage, for it could decree not simply 
changes in the law, but could enforce the changes, nom- 
inally at least. Nevertheless the lasting force of all 
the changes cannot be judged in the midst of fleeting 
conditions. For a temporary governing authority of a 
military character to reform a permanent system of juris- 
prudence is a huge task. The extent to which the sys- 
tem is reformed cannot be judged until the military 
power is withdrawn and the reorganized system is left 
to stand on its own support among the people of whose 
institutions it is a part. Codifying commissions in the 
States which find years of laborious work rejected might 
sigh for the military authority to enforce the acceptance 
of what they know are beneficent legal reforms ; but the 
worth of a codification which rested on that basis is 
readily estimated. 

An illustration which better fits the case of Cuba is 
that of Louisiana. If in the reconstruction period fol- 
lowing the civil war the military commanders had 
undertaken to destroy the Code Napoleon and to bring 
Louisiana's system of jurisprudence to the basis of the 
common law in other States, the effect could be judged. 
And this is another way of affirming the author's belief 
that while provisions guaranteeing personal rights will 
stand, the bulk of changes in the laws made by direc- 
tion of the American military authority are too transi- 
tory to call for detailed analysis. 

After a few months' experience there was less disposi- 
tion to hasten the introduction of new and strange prin- 
ciples of jurisprudence. Conservatism took the place 

of enthusiasm. Events showed the need of going slow. 

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TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

The criminal laws required amendment, and the changes 
in the penal code, as well as in the court procedure, 
were salutary. Reforms in prison management were 
made with good results, especially in Habana under 
the vigorous direction of General Ludlow. Yet even in 
the criminal law reforms a halt was necessary. The 
most ardent military reformer did not advocate project- 
ing grand juries and trial juries on a people to whom 
even the statutory jury of other Latin countries was 
unknown. 

It was, however, in the domain of civil laws that the 
gravest shock to the progressive spirit was felt. The 
most troublesome question affecting the industrial re- 
construction of Cuba is that of mortgages. By direc- 
tion from Washington an extension of two years from 
May 1st, 1899, for the payment of mortgages on realty 
then due or which might become due within that period 
was granted. The extension was necessary in order to 
save a vast amount of property from becoming prey to 
the mortgage sharks. It was far from being what the 
debtors asked. It was more than the creditors con- 
ceded. No government can expect to please both debt- 
ors and creditors. In displeasing both classes the 
American authorities felt that they did substantial jus- 
tice. But the discussion of the mortgage law and the 
legal rights of debtor and creditor and the changes pro- 
posed brought up the whole question of the civil laws. 
It showed how one change must lead to another until 
the entire system of civil jurisprudence should be re- 
constructed. Though the American military officials 
had Latin jurists for pilots, they wisely hesitated to 
enter upon these unknown seas. Perhaps they were 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

conscious that a few months' tutelage could not make 
army commanders masters of jurisprudence. The 
strength of military administration is in its executive 
capacity, and not in its ability to construe abstract laws. 
It could and did correct abuses in practice, and endeav- 
ored to find the right individuals for the discharge of ju- 
dicial duties. The wisest way is to stop there. The 
Latin laws will shape themselves to the new political in- 
stitutions. American military authority cannot mould 
them too far in advance of the political institutions that 
are to prevail. 

What is true of the laws is true of customs and 
usages. The zealous social reformer might sigh for the 
power of the military reformer in Cuba. If the latter 
sometimes gave way to his zeal he may be pardoned 
his weakness. So much there was to be reformed that 
the temptation was great to seek to do it all at once. 
Many communities in the United States would perhaps 
be better if a power from above such as the military arm 
of the general government were to regulate their affairs, 
but the communities would not tolerate reforms coming 
in this manner. In Cuba there is danger of too many 
sumptuary reforms by the American military authorities 
overriding long-established local usages. 

When the American control began, the clerks in Ha- 
bana petitioned Governor-General Brooke for the early 
closing of the shops and stores, and also for Sunday 
closing. Their hours were very long, and they were 
required to be on duty till ten o'clock at night. The 
first intimation given was that to grant their petition 
was beyond the powers of the military government. 
The shopkeepers were opposed to the change from mo- 
20 " 305 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

tives of self-interest, but the habit of evening shopping 
was not without reason in a country where the heat 
of the midday and of the afternoon causes almost a sus- 
pension of trade. Ultimately the shops were ordered 
closed nights and Sundays after ten o'clock in the morn- 
ing, and the closing was enforced by General Ludlow as 
military governor of Habana. A few weeks or months 
of the enforced experiment will hardly furnish sufficient 
basis for complacent congratulation about the obser- 
vance of an Anglo-Saxon Sunday or a New England Sab- 
bath in a Latin community. Left to itself, the agitation 
would probably have resulted in a compromise arrange- 
ment. Under military pressure there could be no com- 
promise. When civil authority becomes supreme it 
will be time enough to judge of the experiment. Mean- 
time the Anglo-Saxon Sunday should not be taken in 
too liberal a sense. 

There are other customs which in the end would be 
better regulated by local regulations than by the mili- 
tary power of the United States. In a previous chap- 
ter I have given the reason for believing that the bull- 
fight is a dead institution — for this generation at least. 
If it were not so its formal prohibition by the American 
Governor-General of the island would not be apt to 
change the nature of the people who delighted in it. 

In the old days the Governor-General laid down iron- 
clad regulations for the cocking-mains. By a decree 
promulgated in February, 1882, they were only per- 
mitted on Sundays, Church holidays of two crosses, and 
the day fixed in each town or village for the celebration 
of its patron saint. Subsequent dispositions of the Gov- 
ernor-General prohibited rival cocking-mains on the 

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TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA 

same day; required the owners of the game fowls to 
alternate the lidias, or exhibitions, and reaffirmed the 
prohibition on other than Sundays and the Church holi- 
days which were specified. The idea was not to permit 
the sport to be held on regular working days because it 
would interfere with the industry of the laboring popu- 
lation. 

Probably in its effort to free itself from the past 
abuses the Catholic Church will exert its moral influ- 
ence against Sundays and saints' days as the occasion 
for cocking-mains and similar sports. This influence 
is also likely to be exerted against the amusement on 
any day of the year. With such encouragement, local 
public sentiment might be depended on to wean the 
people gradually from their liking for these sports, so 
that municipal regulations could be enacted and en- 
forced. But the circumstances in Cuba are not so ex- 
ceptional as to require the supreme military power of 
the island to issue edicts regarding this sport and simi- 
lar amusements grounded in habits and customs be- 
cause the customs are not in conformity with American 
notions. A proclamation against dog-fights by the gov- 
ernor of a great State such as New York or Illinois 
would be no more absurd. 

There is extant the decree of a Spanish Captain-Gen- 
eral prescribing the manner in which the legs of chick- 
ens should be tied when they were carried to market. 
The purpose was a humane one. If the highest military 
authority under American occupation is to be concerned 
with regulating the amusements and customs of the peo- 
ple it might with justice be asked to reform the customs 
of marketing and revive this humane decree. Against 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

this it may be urged that police regulations should be 
sufficient. So they should be in innumerable other mat- 
ters which were taken up by the higher authorities for 
regulation and enforcement under military decree. It 
is as if Connecticut were to regulate the habits of Cali- 
fornia, or Montana to prescribe the usages of Massachu- 
setts. 

These comments are made almost with apology for 
their triviality, but this tendency towards sumptuary 
and arbitrary regulation of the customs of a different 
people became a feature of the power exerted by the 
American authorities. It could not, therefore, be ig- 
nored. Errors of this kind may be made, yet they do 
not affect the American military control in its broadest 
sense. The example of official integrity and of earnest 
effort in good administration remains. When the mili- 
tary trusteeship ends it will be a creditable ending, with 
results to show which will justify the confidence of the 
American people. 



308 



CHAPTER XVII 

Political Aptitudes 

Training for Constructive Government — Autonomy as an Education 
— Growth of Popular Element — Germs of Party Organization — 
Development of Clubs — Caucus and Primary — Influence of the 
Newspapers — Responsiveness of Country People to Good Lead- 
ership — Regionalism Again — Santiago and Puerto Principe — 
Growth of Public Opinion — Factions and Groups — Cuban 
Weakness in Administration — Dreamers in the Custom Houses 
— Patterning the Institutions of the United States — Query Re- 
garding Respect for Authority — Necessity of a Trial — What 
Constitutes a State — Future Commonwealth. 

Mechanical aptitudes are usually inherited. Politi- 
cal aptitudes may be either acquired or inherited. Pro- 
pensity for revolution may exist without a grasp of the 
fundamental principles of free government. 

Of the Cuban people as a people, it cannot be said 
that they have an inheritance of political aptitudes from 
their grandfathers, and atavism in political government 
is a phenomenon not to be expected, because the right 
use of civil liberty is a growth and not a miracle. 
When so vast a majority of the human race has not 
advanced far enough in civilization to find chairs either 
a necessity or a luxury, it should not cause surprise 
that a people whose habitation is the border tropics 
cannot boast of inherited disposition for constructive 
government. What they do have is the acquired apti- 
tude. This is another way of saying that their training 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

has begun. The extent to which it has progressed and 
the influences affecting it may be studied. 

From the knowledge of what has gone we gain the 
knowledge of what remains. In brief compass of a few 
chapters the autonomist agitation and regime were nar- 
rated chronologically as an expisode of Spanish his- 
tory in the Antilles. From that narration the idea may 
be had of the degree to which the movement served 
the purpose of political education. The basis of free 
institutions is free discussion. Under the limitations 
of free print and free speech imposed by the Spanish 
dominion, this basis could not be a broad one. But 
Spanish Captain-Generals had one quality that was not 
bad. While they occasionally deported journalists and 
suppressed journals whose outspokenness was uncom- 
fortable to the Government, they were tolerant of ab- 
stract discussions of political principles. Liberty in 
the abstract, the theoretical bases of civil government, 
were beyond their ken or care, and discussion on this 
line was treated with contempt. It was only when 
abuses and misgovernment were attacked specifically 
that the iron hand was shown. 

These conditions strengthened a natural disposition 
towards speculative discussion, and speculative political 
philosophy forms a leading part in the programme of 
all the political leaders in Cuba. But in the days of 
repression, under its disguise real progress was made 
to a greater degree than was known. The terms " meet- 
ing," "mass meeting," "self-government," "home rule," 
had no equivalent in the Castilian language. Autono- 
my was not the translation of either self-government or 

home rule. That all these terms were incorporated into 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the idiom and are to-day current is the best evidence 
that the meaning of free discussion and free government 
is understood. The town meeting is not known because 
the town as conceived in New England did not exist. 
Besides, the discussion of local measures and of local 
officials would necessarily have been too concrete for 
the comfort of Spanish authority, and would have been 
treated harshly. But the town meeting is coming in 
Cuba. The aptitude for it is an acquired one — acquired 
from the mass meeting of the days of the Autonomist 
movement. 

In the revolution of 1868 it was stated that a few 
wealthy and influential Cubans took their families, 
their dependents, and their slaves into the field, and 
thereupon Spain had a Ten-Years' war on her hands. 
In the last insurrection the influence of a few leading 
Cubans was also very great; but all they could do was 
to sustain a revolution that already had the support of 
the masses. The autonomist propaganda was the work 
of a group of talented and cultured men. They laid 
down their principles, and a grouping of personal fol- 
lowers accepted the dictum. When the principles were 
shifted the followers waited until the chief formulated 
the changed issues. Then they fell in line. 

During the later years of the autonomist propaganda, 
when it gained its greatest strength as a popular move- 
ment, less disposition was shown to heed the formulas 
of the leaders ; but these men did not know it. They 
were going with the crowd, and they thought the crowd 
was going with them. When under Blanco the autono- 
mists who did not go into the field issued their allocu- 
tions and manifestoes accepting the new regimen, it was 

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TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

disclosed that old things had passed away. Neither 
whistle nor trumpet could bring back the followers who 
had once sat at the feet of the prophets. This was in 
part indisputably due to the presence of so many of 
them with the insurgents in the field. But it was also 
due to an advance in political education. 

When peace was affirmed, manifestoes, addresses, and 
allocutions fell like autumn leaves. Some were from 
old-time Autonomists who had kept out of the insurrec- 
tion, some from insurgent generals, and some from the 
Cubans who had been identified with the revolution on 
its civil side. They all had programmes and formulas. 
To the disappointment of their authors, little heed was 
paid to these allocutions. It was manifest that the peo- 
ple were thinking of their own concern and did not care 
for ready-made formulas. This does not mean that 
they had ceased to be responsive to good leadership. 
It is questionable if anywhere a people can be found 
who are more responsive to good leadership; but that 
leadership must interpret the sentiments and aspirations 
of the people ; and the authors of the allocutions were 
not doing it. Their prepared formulas were not the 
thing, and the majority of the Cubans had become apt 
enough in political intuition to know it. 

While the manifesto of the leader to his followers lost 
much of its importance in the later years, another out- 
growth of the autonomist movement gained fresh vital- 
ity. This was the organization of juntas or commit- 
tees. The Autonomist party rested on local juntas or 
clubs. So did that of their vigilant opponents, the 
Union Constitutionals. These local clubs delegated 

their functions largely to a central committee, a junta 

312 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

magna or junta directiva, as it was named. This body 
was in reality a directory of the entire organization, and 
it directed in a far greater degree than the central com- 
mittee of a political party in the United States. At a 
period when a few prominent men dominated the Auton- 
omist and Union Constitutional parties respectively, 
they were able to have their allocutions and manifestoes 
adopted by the directories, and the local juntas accepted 
the creed prepared for them without question. Though 
the later development of popular sentiment, whether 
intransigente or autonomist, made the central commit- 
tee more the organ than the moulder of opinion, the 
idea of a directory for a political party was not entirely 
lost. It has survived intervening events and exists to- 
day in a modified form. 

After the re-establishment of peace, great activity was 
shown in the formation of juntas or clubs. Usually 
they took the names of the heroes of the insurrection. 
They furnish the means for political activity and agita- 
tion. They also furnish the field for exercising the 
ambitions of young Cubans, In the period before the 
insurrection the lyceum was the institution in which 
young Cubans found vent for their literary and dramatic 
as well as their social ambitions. The lyceum existed 
in every town. It was an offset to the Spanish casino, 
the casino being to the Cubans the token of a favored 
and intolerant oligarchy. After the ending of hostili- 
ties the lyceum reappeared everywhere ; but it did not 
take on a political character. A common feeling ob- 
tained that it should continue what it had been, and that 
political effort should take a different form. So the 

membership in the political clubs grew. 

313 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

In the gradual development of parties the clubs will 
be the basis of them all. They are the existing politi- 
cal units. They are the medium of party organization 
and promotion. They will not be able to control public 
sentiment, but they promise to be its interpreters and 
thus preserve their influence. The primaries are yet to 
come. The germ of the caucus is already in evidence. 
It is likely to take the place of the directory. Cuban 
politicians who were identified with revolutionary juntas 
in the United States have shown a leaning to the caucus, 
though not under that name. 

The newspaper, even under the restricted liberty of 
the press which was permitted by Spanish institutions, 
showed an aptness for political discussion. Though 
pamphleteering always prevailed, the journals were the 
most sought-for mediums of promulgating opinions. 
They conformed to all the traditions. Each journal 
represented a party, a group, or an interest. No one 
ever picked up a leading paper curious to see what stand 
it would take on a given question. The only curiosity 
was as to how it would champion or defend its side. 
The journals announced themselves as the organs of one 
set or another set of opinions. They took a serious 
view of their mission. Discussion was to them an intel- 
lectual tournament, and they recognized that there could 
be no tournament without the knights of the contrary 
opinion in the lists. Invariably their leading articles 
were well considered. 

No great change was worked by the revolution except 
that with the end of the press censorship discussion 
was free. It is still possible to judge the probable 
course of the Spanish colony by reading two or three 

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TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Spanish, newspapers. The views of the moderate Cu- 
bans are reflected in journals which announce themselves 
as organs of moderate opinion, while the feelings and 
purposes of the radicals may be easily gleaned from 
journals which carry their own designation. It is in 
the new and changing conditions that the traditional 
organs are confused and lost. The manner in which 
the newspapers find their way through this wilderness 
will be a valuable guide for those who are watching the 
march of circumstances in Cuba. They may be de- 
pended on to reflect the aspirations as well as the per- 
plexities of the Cuban people. And their aptitude for 
discussing the problems which surround them may be 
accepted as an index of the aptitude of the people for 
free institutions. 

They are keen in retort. Some well-meaning Ameri- 
cans on their arrival in Cuba believed they had a mis- 
sion among savages of various degrees of gentleness. 
They thought to impress the natives that they came 
from a land of perfect government. Their mistakes 
were corrected by the watchful press. The wretched 
bickerings among the insurgent leaders over the pay- 
ment of the troops, the personal rivalries, were made 
much of in the United States as proof of Cuban incapac- 
ity for independence. The Habana newspapers had 
their campaign argument in reply. They gave instances 
of discord among the American officials which showed 
just as much jealousy, factionalism, and selfish ambi- 
tion. The American officials in the midst of their dis- 
cords could not fail to admit the fairness of the retort. 

To the talk of crime and especially of brigandage as 

a reason for continuing military control, the newspapers 

315 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA 

replied with full accounts of the train robberies in the 
Western States, the daily crimes of the cities, the scenes 
of violence at the strikes, and the lynchings. Nor did 
they fail to exploit the occurrences, unfortunately too 
frequent, which were discreditable to individual Ameri- 
cans in Cuba. These are passing incidents. They 
serve to show that while Americans insist on a search- 
ing scrutiny of everything that happens in Cuba, the 
inhabitants of the island are not inapt at measuring 
them with their own yard-stick. They have progressed 
far enough to make comparisons. 

In the broader sense the discussion in the journals 
showed in a high degree the faculty of critical analysis. 
Some of the American officials were sensitive over the 
criticism they received ; but it was no more personal and 
was usually less unjust than that which was visited 
upon them by badly informed newspapers at home. A 
full understanding was shown of the constructive work 
they were doing. The greater value of the newspaper 
comments and suggestions lay in the complete knowl- 
edge they showed of the close relation between the eco- 
nomic future of the island and the political system. 
Discussion of the Cuban tendencies was thoughtful. It 
is common to find in the journals a warning that the 
reality is coming to the Cuban people, a caution that 
they cannot live in the clouds. The enthusiasts are 
told that government is something more than writing 
poetical manifestos and making poetical addresses. The 
Spanish idiom is a flowing one. The sentiments which 
find utterance in the United States on the fourth of July, 
translated into the Castilian language, would be a stream 

of hyperbole. The Cuban patriot voices his feelings with 

316 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

more metaphors and more vivid imagery ; but the press 
moderates his exuberance. It hints at the practical side 
of government suggestively, though not in a way to de- 
stroy his idealism. That is a rare aptitude. 

From what has been written a fair conclusion may be 
drawn. Free discussion and political organization are 
not simply elementary ideas : they are a working basis 
for free government in Cuba. But it may be said that 
the discussion, which has been limited to newspapers 
and pamphlets and to public meetings which were nec- 
essarily select, cannot be looked upon as political edu- 
cation in an island a large proportion of whose popula- 
tion is unable to read or write. The assumption would 
be misleading in any circumstances, but especially so 
in Cuba. The commonest sight in the rural communi- 
ties is to see the village oracle reading the newspaper to 
a group of listeners, among whom, it is easy to guess, 
few can read for themselves. But there has never been 
a wide gulf between the classes who could read and write 
and the ignorant classes whose aspirations they inter- 
preted. 

Eocking in the cradle of the revolution, in the midst 
of guerilla warfare, in the manigua, and in the hills, 
there was the semblance of a political training. The 
stern commander, Maximo Gomez, who understood the 
Cubans better than they understood themselves, en- 
forced military discipline and civil obedience, while the 
camp-fire discussions were of free government. The 
systems of prefecturas in the regions held by the insur- 
gents were lessons in military and civil training. The 
juntas or revolutionary committees in the towns had no 

educational qualification. They were a political edu- 

317 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA 

cation as well as a political conspiracy under the shad- 
ow of Spanish authority. The army had real elections 
of a kind, for it chose the delegates who formed the as- 
semblies, which constituted the provisional government. 
The aptitude of the guajiro, the countryman or Cuban 
peasant, for public affairs, when he must be led through 
tho winding paths of intellectual reasoning, is not great. 
Mental processes are too abstruse. But he is an apt 
pupil when taught through the physical senses. And 
he is a tenacious positivist in his conclusions. Object 
lessons reach him. He found himself in the midst of a 
false artificial condition. He saw the Spaniards govern 
and take everything to themselves. He knew that he 
was a victim of oppression, cruelty, and tax-eating ra- 
pacity and corruption. He knew that in a dispute with 
his wealthier neighbor he had no rights, because the 
justice that sat on the magistrate's bench — justice in the 
choice of which he had no word — was open-eyed and 
keen of vision for the hand that stretched out the bribe. 
Where the guajiro was a negative character he became a 
pacifico, sympathizing mildly with the insurrection and 
aiding it like a sheep. Where there was sterner stuff 
in his make-up he became an insurgent and took to the 
brush. Once in arms, nothing could move him. His 
was not the sublimated patriotism of the intellectual 
classes. It was the simple grit of the peasant. The 
revolution, while it had the support of the educated and 
the wealthy Cubans, was the supreme work of the Cu- 
ban people as a mass. The mass was responsive to 
good leadership. It trusted its military leaders. It 
will trust leaders in civil life who are true to its instincts 

and unelfish in their devotion to its interests. 

318 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

Americans who have watched the internal affairs of 
the island closely sometimes propound a query, either 
mentally or openly, whether the aptness which may be 
shown for decentralized government will not become a 
propensity for revolution by sections or provinces of the 
island. It is in line with the general question whether 
the defeated party will accept the verdict of the elections 
or will take to the woods. The question cannot be 
answered with full satisfaction until the experiment has 
been tried. In outlining the provinces as a federal 
framework I have given the opinion that sectionalism 
or regionalism will be less rampant in Santiago de 
Cuba and in Puerto Principe than is feared. This is 
a matter of impartial administration, and in giving no 
just ground for jealousy of Habana. 

Should a forced test of annexation be made, Santiago 
might then drop out of line with the other provinces in 
the hope of being admitted as a separate State. But the 
ambitious chiefs will have little prospect of satisfying 
their ambition by taking a defeated faction to the woods 
in a single province. It is a pure assumption that this 
class of leaders would have followers at all. Moreover, 
General Maximo Gomez checked the possibilities of 
regionalism when in the first months of the insurrection 
he nationalized the cause of independence. His policy 
bore fruit, and one result of the revolution was more 
thoroughly to mix up the inhabitants of the different 
provinces. Some of the Santiago natives who marched 
west with Maceo to Pinar del Eio settled and remained 
there. Some of those from Habana and Matanzas who 
went to Puerto Principe made it their permanent abid- 
ing place. Greater homogeneity among the Cubans as 

319 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

a people is the consequence. This has its bearing on 
future government. It helps to develop the aptitude of 
the whole people for homogeneous political institutions. 

The political parties will not be essentially different 
from parties everywhere. As they exist to-day the line 
is not sharply drawn, because there is little chance to 
divide on domestic policies until the basis of division 
as a territory, state, or independent commonwealth ex- 
ists. There is the National League, which is composed 
chiefly of the civilian elements; the Cuban National 
Party, which wants to absorb all the elements favoring 
independence ; and the various factions which call them- 
selves military parties. They are all following one line 
in sustaining schools for voting which are preparing 
the Cubans for the use of the ballot. There will be an 
anti- American faction composed of a few military chiefs. 
These will be continuously demanding the immediate 
grant of absolute independence and the withdrawal of 
the intervening power. It is not probable that this 
group will ever reach the dignity of a real political 
party. Some of its agitators fought successfully in 
the insurrection, but it is yet to be shown that they 
have followers. They are like the Autonomist leaders 
who issued manifestoes without getting responses. 

In watching the development of sentiment in Cuba it 
is well to remember that the cigar smoke which rises 
from the cafes in Habana is not always the will of the 
Cuban people. Habana as a great city will naturally 
influence the politics of the island, but the controlling 
influence will not be with it. American officials in the 
beginning made the mistake of supposing that the me- 
tropolis was the whole island. Other Americans make 

320 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA 

the same mistake. What is best in Cuba is its town 
and country life. The influences, whether social or 
political, are more healthful there. They should always 
be sought before forming a judgment. 

The growth of public opinion is something that is 
also to be noted, and it has its basis in the country. It 
frequently stilled the voices of the agitators who were 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the American 
forces. When the factious Assembly was seeking to 
prolong the uncertainty about accepting the payment 
for the insurgent troops, public opinion compelled that 
body to dissolve itself. There is no reason to think 
that it will be less healthful in the future whenever a 
group of discontented leaders undertake to interfere 
with peaceful progress. 

The radical group, as it is called, is composed mostly 
of generals who were antagonistic to Gomez during the 
insurrection. They were patriotic enough to control their 
resentments while the struggle lasted. Now they seek to 
find expression for it and to prevent the old commander 
dominating in civil affairs. They have among them some 
respectable figures such as Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, 
who can show a record as president of the provisional 
republic during the Ten-Tears' war and also during the 
last insurrection. Despite their personal ambitions and 
resentments, it is not just to class all these men as un- 
patriotic. They want to see Cuba strong, maintaining 
friendly relations with the United States ; but they want 
to be the ones who shall direct her destiny. Some of 
them may rebound so that in time they will become an- 
nexationists, for the honor of being American Senators 

and Eepresentatives appeals powerfully to them. 
21 321 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA 

Americans who sympathized with the insurrection 
and who are sincerely desirous for the success of the 
Cuban commonwealth admit to themselves a certain 
distrust in the virility of the character when it comes to 
be applied to public administration. Their own robust- 
ness is lacking. They also note that duplicity is a 
common trait. Often they may turn over in their minds 
the question of the strong hand for the Latin races ; but 
a study of past and present conditions in the island sat- 
isfies them that the strong hand will never control the 
destiny of Cuba. Not even a progressive and patriotic 
Porfirio Diaz could make himself the master of this 
people. They have been educated to the point where 
they will not stand a dictator. It is also worth noting 
that while this lack of virility is manifest, sentiment is 
a most pronounced trait in their make-up. An appeal 
to sentiment rarely fails to achieve results. When their 
confidence is once obtained they are trustful and re- 
sponsive. But with distrust implanted among them, no 
progress can be made. 

The aim of intelligent and patriotic Cubans was to 
pattern the political institutions of the United States. 
They showed a hunger for information regarding local 
government as well as the methods of federal adminis- 
tration. The American control set the pattern before 
them. In every possible way Cuban administration 
was modelled after American methods. It is certain 
that with the entire power resting with themselves 
the Cubans will not do as well as the officials from the 
United States were able to do for them. In the begin- 
ning and at the various stages of progress these offi- 
cials were discouraged and sometimes disheartened. 

322 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA 

They had to meet one condition which was the out- 
growth of the war. This was the tendency to regard 
all the offices as a Cuban club, with the discharge of the 
duties a mere incident. Unquestionably under Cuban 
administration more public servants will be required 
than under American control. But in time the people 
of the island will learn what every people learns — that 
the cost of managing public affairs comes from the pro- 
ducers. 

It may furthermore be said that much fondness for 
office is shown by the Cubans. Whether this trait is 
really a racial one may be judged by the scenes at 
the White House in Washington in the months fol- 
lowing the inauguration of a new President, or the 
crowd in the anteroom of the newly elected mayor of 
a big city or of the governor of a State. There is 
one difference : the Latin office-holder or office-seeker 
cares more for the dignity of the position than for its 
emoluments. The American office-seeker first wants to 
know how much it will pay. Nor are public affairs in 
Cuba left to the monopoly of one profession. The doc- 
tor, the dentist, the journalist, and the civil engineer 
mingle in politics as well as the lawyer. 

Another inquiry which Americans make sincerely is 
to what degree respect for constituted authority exists 
among the people who respected it only when enforced by 
military government. They want to know whether the 
masses have a clear notion of the difference between lib- 
erty and license. They have curiosity to learn whether 
the decisions of judicial tribunals will be respected 
when there is nothing beyond the confidence in the tri- 
bunals themselves to enforce respect. These are ques- 

323 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

tions that cannot be answered until the opportunity has 
been given to put them to the practical test of experi- 
ence. The test cannot come under American military 
control. The most that can be looked for is some indi- 
cations of an answer in the choice of a constituent, rep- 
resentative assembly to formulate the future govern- 
ment. That the political aptitudes exist for the choice 
of such a body and for its deliberations is affirmed in 
what has been said of the progress of free discussion 
and political organization. Here seems to be the basis 
of institutions that will develop and endure. Probably 
the first congress, or convention, will bear witness to 
the saying of De Tocqueville that a nation is always 
able to establish great political assemblies because it is 
sure to contain a certain number of persons whose in- 
tellectual cultivation stands them to a certain extent 
instead of practical experience. The fashioning of the 
rude materials of the local community is, as the French 
philosopher says, a more difficult task; but the begin- 
nings of municipal government are already seen. 

The originator of the revolution of 1895, Jose Marti, 
was a poet. He sealed his aspiration for the liberty of 
the land he loved with his death on the battlefield. 
Other poets before him perished ignominiously for 
their faith in free government. Menocal, an artist of 
European reputation, left his easel to join the ragged 
forces of Maximo Gomez. Cultured men were marched 
through the streets of Habana tied to common crimi- 
nals. Loaded with chains and herded in the foul holds 
of vessels with these criminals, they were sent to the pe- 
nal sotilements of Africa. The clanking of these chains 
still echoes through many households. All this was for 

324 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

the crime of rebellion. College professors, learned 
men, educators, and writers went into voluntary and 
involuntary exile. These classes returned to Cuba. 
They are a part of its future. Some of them are 
dreamers. They dream with an apostle of liberty * of 
another island : 

"The dreamer lives on forever, 
The toiler toils for a day." 

These men may prefer to dream of idyllic government 
in the ideal future rather than to work for the imperfect 
structure which must be set up by toiling day by day. 
Their fondness for speculative thought, their theoriz- 
ing on the nature of liberty, may unfit them for the 
intensely practical business of government. Their abil- 
ity to administer the customs houses will never be dem- 
onstrated. A poet or dreamer in a Latin custom house 
will be a failure. But the sentiments which inspire 
them, and which they seek to inculcate, will have a fruit- 
ful soil. The dreamers will have their place in the 
evolution of the Cuban commonwealth. The problem 
is to evolve a successful administration not only of 
the custom house, but of all public offices between the 
dreamers on one side, and on the other side the men 
who think that revolution is merely a change to enable 
Cubans to loot their own island instead of letting Span- 
iards loot it. The poets and the dreamers themselves 
would be out of place in the custom house, but they 
have their place in keeping alive the sentiment which 
demands honest administration. 

In Pensacola are the ruins of an old Spanish fort. 

* John Boyle O'Keilly. 
325 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA. 

At St. Augustine are the ruins of the oldest Spanish fort 
on the American continent. Near Kingston, Jamaica, 
are the ruins of what must have been an extensive, 
almost impregnable, Spanish fort. When the Ameri- 
can troops landed at Daiquiri and Siboney the old for- 
tress which was discovered in the jungle compelled their 
admiration. They might have thought, too, of the ven- 
geance of history, if they had reflected that near Dai- 
quiri landed the Spanish expedition from Hispaniola 
which crushed the native chief Hatuey and established 
four hundred years of Spanish dominion over Cuba. 
The defences of Santiago de Cuba called forth the praise 
of the keenest military engineers. The defences of Ha- 
bana won admiration for their scientific thoroughness 
and for their mathematical exactness. If forts, moats, 
walls, castles, cannons, and batteries constituted a 
state, Spain never would have lost her American pos- 
sessions. 

Men, says Sir William Jones, constitute a state. 
And they would have constituted a colony. Battle- 
ments and walls and moated gates went down not 
because Spain lacked men to defend them ; it was be- 
cause she lacked men who knew that in themselves were 
the power and the majesty of the state. The lands 
from which the Conquistadores sought to draw only the 
gold that was yellow to the eyes, while neglecting that 
which renews itself with the turning over of the soil, 
could not constitute a state. All this has gone. The 
mediaeval civilization of fortresses and cannons is buried 
when the twentieth century is opening its chrysalis of 
potentialities. The future commonwealth of Cuba must 
be built with sound principles of government at the 

326 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

foundation, and with men — real men of muscle and 
mind— for the builders. If they have not the faculties 
of government fully developed, they have acquired the 
primary aptitudes. 



327 



CHAPTEE XVIII 

TO-DAY 

When and How to End Military Control — Position of United States 
— Good Government from Without — Euling by Decree — Transi- 
tion to Civil Authority — Calling a Constitutional Convention — 
Universal Suffrage the Basis for a Plebiscite — No Denial to Race 
of Color — Assumptions of Americanization — Some Un-American 
Influences— Arguments for Annexation — Mistaken Impressions 
— The Latin Doubters — Cuban Understanding Is Statehood — 
Parties During Transition Period — G6mez and His Poes — Pro- 
tectorate as Actual Independence— Opposing Economic Tenden- 
cies — Sugar as a Pactor — Choice of Popular Assembly. 

Transition of institutions may be during a transit of 
flags. The standard of Spain is of yesterday. The 
emblem of Cuba may be of to-morrow. The flag of the 
United States is of to-day. The creation of a common- 
wealth is under its folds. 

This does not mean an indefinite continuance of the 
American military occupation. Like other questions, 
the one as to the time of its withdrawal is better met 
frankly. No policy of avoidance will be successful in 
dealing with these problems. The pacification of the 
island may not be complete, but it is far enough ad- 
vanced to look forward. It is in advance of industrial 
progress, though the latter is not lagging. The question 
of the near future is both when and how to end the 
American military control in Cuba. It is of to-day, 

328 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

though by to-day should be understood not a few weeks 
or a few months, but a definite period. To-day * is a 
year. 

Pleas may be offered for indefinite control, but they 
fall away in the imperious presence of facts. Incentives 
to vagueness may be urged on the ground that the people 
are so far from being capable of self-government that 
they must be put through a long course of political 
training. All the arguments for indeterminate occupa- 
tion would in a short time force the necessity of a 
declaration of such purpose, and such a declaration 
would mean ultimate and coercive annexation. Sifted 
through all evasions, this is what these pleas mean. 

Before going further a restatement may be made of 
the position of the United States with reference to Cuba. 
That position is both of to-day and of all time to come. 
The United States is a continuous intervening power. 
In ending the Spanish misgovernment and the strife 
which grew out of it, the American nation pledged itself 
not to permit internal misgovernment in the future. 
Whatever shifting there may be of policies, it is pledged 
to prevent anarchy and intolerable internal conditions 
just as it ended those conditions under Spanish sover- 
eignty. It is also a continuous protecting power for 
Cuba. Should an independent government be set up, 
no bullying European nation could seize a pretext of 
damages to its subjects and send war-vessels into the 
harbors of Cuba to enforce the claim without reckoning 
with the United States. Besides, in the obligations for 
good government which it incurred the United States 
became the protecting power for foreign subjects therein, 

* October, 1899. 
329 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

whatever their nationality. So in every view the Ameri- 
can nation has a moral protectorate over Cuba. 

The immediate question is whether good government 
shall come from above and without, or from within. 
The military authority in its ultimate analysis is similar 
to the control exercised under Spanish sovereignty. The 
difference is that it assures good administration, free- 
dom from official corruption and from oppressive taxa- 
tion. But there is no misunderstanding that it comes 
from above. In describing the military control, I have 
stated its strength and what the American authorities 
were able to accomplish through its arbitrary nature. 
If it were of indefinite continuance the merging of a gov- 
ernment of law, order, justice, and equality into the im- 
position of American manners and customs would be 
hard to avoid, judging from the tendency that already has 
been shown. Don Geronimo Valdes might literally 
walk abroad with his paternal bando amplified to the 
degree of regulating public smoking and the wearing of 
undershirts by the workingmen with reference to the 
habits of a few thousand strangers rather than of some 
hundreds of thousands of natives. And under American 
rule it would be made more than ever manifest that 
these regulations were in reality the regulations of the 
military power. It would be the army which compelled 
the teamster to wear his undershirt, for the local law 
officers who enforced that order would rest on the mili- 
tary authority and would carry out its decrees. 

The complaints of the multiplicity of government and 

of rulers are a passing phase of the occupation. The 

number of officials might be reduced and still the civil 

authority would rest upon military power. The gradual 

330 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

widening of municipal government after the full frame- 
work of laws and regulations has been set up by the 
superior military commanders may be a progressive 
step, but it is not a decisive one nor one which meets 
permanent conditions. The test of the capacity and the 
willingness to respect authority — that is, lawful govern- 
ment — cannot come under army rule because it is the 
army which enforces that respect. The limitations of 
education in political self-rule under these conditions 
are obvious. In its essence the American military con- 
trol is as much government by decree as was the Spanish 
authority. The difference may be a wide one between 
beneficent government by decree and oppressive gov- 
ernment by decree, as is shown under the American 
administration. But the popular element cannot enter 
largely into it, and that is the weakness. 

So thorough is my own conviction that this fact will 
be recognized, and so scrupulous has been the American 
Executive in affirming that the military control is of a 
temporary nature, that without further analysis I pro- 
ceed to the subject of the transition from military con- 
trol to something else. Undoubtedly before this point 
is reached there will be a further relaxation of the mili- 
tary administration, and the high standard of official 
integrity and fidelity shown by the American officials 
will be given a deeper impress. 

In the transition from American military control to 
something else the preliminary step is to ascertain the 
will of the people. It may be said that instead of a 
constituent representative assembly to formulate their 
wishes in the shape of constructive government, it 
should first be determined whether the people of the 

331 



TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA. 

island want annexation. The power to force a deter- 
mination of that question before anything else is settled 
undoubtedly lies with the United States, and if it were 
attempted the verdict would be so overwhelmingly 
against annexation that the only thing accomplished 
would be to prepare for another election. There must 
unquestionably be a plebiscite in ascertaining both the 
aspirations and the wishes of the people of the island. 
The natural process would be the choosing of a repre- 
sentative constitutional convention. In that election 
the issues would determine themselves so that the 
opposing tendencies could be developed in the conven- 
tion. Then the work would be submitted to the people 
for their ratification or rejection. This would be 
another plebiscite. As the United States is at once the 
intervening power and the only recognized authority, 
whatever elections are held must be under its direction. 
This may be done by direct Executive action or by the 
sanction of Congress. The only important point is that 
it be by civil instead of by military agency. 

It is necessary to ascertain the basis of the plebiscite. 
The declarations are so clear that a stable government 
is to be formed by all classes that no question can arise 
on this point. But with the tendency of the Spanish 
colony, or the majority of its members, to continue as 
Spanish subjects, when the time comes it will be found 
that "all classes" who are entitled to participate in 
determining the form and the formation of the new 
government are largely and overwhelmingly the Cuban 
classes. The foreigners, whether Europeans or Ameir- 
cans, will doubtless exercise an indirect influence, but 

there can be no actual participation by them in the pro- 

332 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

ceedings to determine the form of the commonwealth. 
It will develop that the only basis for the plebiscite 
is universal suffrage. Americans are appalled at this 
idea when they think of the illiteracy of the island. 
The saddest chapter in the history of Cuba has been 
said to be the educational chapter. It is in reality a 
blank. With this in their minds, and with the further 
thought that the blacks are the bulk of the illiterates, 
Americans draw back and ask if the mistakes of recon- 
struction are to be repeated in Cuba. 

The cases are not parallel. In the chapter on the 
Eace of Color I have sought to show that the blacks in 
Cuba have reached a higher plane than the negroes in 
the United States. Their situation is not similar to 
that of the American negroes after the civil war. The 
race of color in Cuba fought for the freedom of the 
island. The blacks acquired political standing by their 
part in the revolution. It assures the continuance of 
their civil rights, but that in itself will not be enough. 
They are not aggressive in demanding a share in civil 
administration, but with their record in fighting for 
freedom they will never be content with a government 
in which they have no voice simply because the majority 
of them in this generation may not be able to read and 
write. 

If a qualification for suffrage should be required, there 
would be the question as to whether it should be an 
educational one or based on property, or both. A large 
number of the guajiros, or countrymen, are small prop- 
erty owners, but they cannot read and write. They 
have all the conservative instincts of the property 

owner. In the towns and cities where the vicious 

333 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

classes congregate, a fair proportion of these are not 
illiterate. An educational test would enable them to 
vote at the expense of the small landholders. Under 
the Spanish Government the voting was so manipulated 
that the influence of the small property owners was 
lessened, and the influence of the clerks and similar 
classes in the towns was augmented. Any efforts by 
the United States to restrict the suffrage would give rise 
to the feeling that the old Spanish practices were being 
restored. And the Spanish Government itself in the 
decrees proclaiming autonomy proclaimed universal 
suffrage. That was part of the autonomous constitu- 
tion. In actual operation it would unquestionably have 
been nullified, yet it stands as an offer from Spain. 
The United States can do no less. 

As to the blacks as a class, neither the white classes 
in Cuba nor the all-powerful American nation can deny 
them their rights. There was neither color line, prop- 
erty qualifications, nor educational requirement in the 
insurrection. There can be none in determining the 
future government of the island. An Australian ballot 
is not necessary. The method of voting by word of 
mouth, which until recent years prevailed in Kentucky 
and other Southern States, will answer every purpose. 
Various expedients will be suggested and various plans 
discussed for limiting the suffrage in Cuba on the 
theory that its exercise by all classes would be harmful 
to the people themselves. In the end these plans will 
fail, and the determination of the wishes of the Cuban 
people will be on the basis of universal suffrage because 
that is the simplest and the most natural way. It is 
also the just way. 

334 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

It is an unpopular thing to suggest a doubt about the 
early Americanization of Cuba. Nevertheless I venture 
to suggest it in the sense which is commonly under- 
stood. The veneer of Americanism is one thing, and so 
is the varnish. There will be plenty of veneer. The 
prophets already see Cuba an English-speaking country. 
My vision does not see it. So much has been promised 
from teaching English in the schools that it is heresy 
to insinuate a doubt. Nevertheless the American who 
speaks Spanish will be the successful one in Cuba dur- 
ing the lifetime of this generation. The American who 
depends on English-speaking Cubans or Spaniards will 
be misled. In spite of the wave of English teaching 
that has swept over the island, the mass of people will 
not be touched. When country schools come to be 
established the wisdom of forcing English upon them 
is questionable. They will speak the tongue of their 
mothers, they will think in that tongue, and they will 
act in accordance with the customs and traditions rooted 
in that tongue. These young Latins, whether black or 
white, have waxen minds. They show a facility in 
acquiring a foreign idiom ; but it will not be their think- 
ing and acting medium of expression. The institutions 
of which they become part will be interpreted in their 
own language. And if the stream of immigration flows 
in from the Mediterranean or from the slopes of the 
Pyrenees, Castilian will be the native tongue and Eng- 
lish the foreign language. 

At one time the German colony in Habana and West- 
ern Cuba numbered one thousand members. After the 
war there were four hundred of them. Not half a 

dozen purely German families existed. The German 

335 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA. 

merchants married Cuban women. Their children were 
gathered up into a school by the German consul-gen- 
eral. It was found that a very small number spoke the 
language of their fathers or had any knowledge of Ger- 
man customs. Americans and Englishmen who married 
Cuban wives generally had their children taught Eng- 
lish ; but the family talk was in Spanish, and the Ameri- 
can talk was sometimes the broken language of the for- 
eign country. Frenchmen, with more affinity between 
their own tongue and that of the Castilian, also had the 
same experience. The history of Louisiana for a cen- 
tury affords an example. Upper Canada, after one 
hundred and fifty years, is also an example. The 
leaven of genuine Americanism will be felt beneficially, 
but for a quarter of a century or more it will be only a 
leaven among a Latin people and an African population 
assimilated to a Latin people. Good schools do not 
mean that English will uproot the language which is 
native to the great majority of the inhabitants. 

Probably before the political future of Cuba is fully 
unfolded, ten per cent of the inhabitants will be natives 
of the United States. There will be a winter colony 
whose numbers will grow year by year. Many wealthy 
Americans with the charm of country life ever present 
to them will purchase country estates on which they 
may enjoy the palm-tree landscape and the azure skies. 
Trades and mercantile business and small farming will 
afford further openings. Yet with these inducements 
the prospect is not increased that the field labor of the 
country and the day labor of the towns can be drawn 
from the States. This is what bids a pause to the loose 

talk of Americanization. 

336 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA. 

The Americans who settle in the island will intermarry 
among the Cuban women ; their vitality will be replen- 
ished by fresh immigration, and perhaps by themselves 
revisiting the more life-giving climate of the North. Out 
of this intermixture will come in time the best product 
of the two civilizations. Types of it may be seen in 
Cuba to-day where Americans, Englishmen, and Ger- 
mans have married Cuban women. The rule is general 
enough to be accepted as a principle that their offspring 
combine the moral fibre and the physical stamina of the 
fathers with the domestic traits and virtues of the 
mothers. But these are only types. It will take fifty 
years or two generations to develop the tropical Ameri- 
can. When he is developed all the problems of govern- 
ment in the Antilles will be solved. Meantime it is not 
well to assume that the tropical American is already 
evolved or that a Latin people need Americanization in 
the sense of losing their language, their habits, their 
customs, and their own institutions. Many plants that 
flower in the temperate climates wither when transplanted 
to the tropics. The same may prove true of customs and 
laws. 

Nor are the un-American influences to be overlooked. 
Were the United States to be judged solely by its offi- 
cial representatives, military and civil, the influence 
would be without exception a healthy one. But the 
nation has to be judged by all classes of its represen- 
tatives. The buzzards and the vultures trailed their 
flight in the van and in the wake of the American oc- 
cupation. The adventurer from the Southwest who 
had failed in everything at home, and drifted into 

Mexico long enough to get a smattering of the tongue, 
22 337 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

appeared and told his contempt of Latin civilization. 
He talked of dagoes, gringoes, greasers, and mongrels, 
the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, the necessity 
of " our folks " taking hold of Cuba and running it so 
the country would be made to pay "us." Often he de- 
clared his preference for the gringoes, because the in- 
termixture of blood in Mexico was Indian, while in 
Cuba it was "nigger." 

American promoters, with experience in securing fran- 
chises and concessions from city councils and State 
legislatures, put in a prompt appearance. They knew 
what the Spanish system had been. They were ready 
to offer " gratifications " — bribes — with more effrontery 
than had been customary under the old rule. They 
sought out the insurgent leaders and opened negotia- 
tions on the theory that these men would have fran- 
chises and privileges to sell. Usually they proclaimed 
loudly that their investments were contingent upon Cuba 
seeking immediate annexation, but sometimes they 
became partisans of early independence. 

When the custom-house passed under American control 
it was brokers from the United States who went about 
whispering their ability to keep up the old fraudulent 
practices in new ways. It was American agents who 
sought out the merchants with promises of bargains based 
on the assumption that goods could be imported fraudu- 
lently through connivance of the quartermaster's depart- 
ment of the army. Sometimes, too, it was an American 
officer who heard of this proceeding and kicked his 
countrymen out of doors. American firms were the first 
ones caught in actual smuggling. American strumpetry 

drove through the streets of Habana in blazoned coaches 

338 



TOMOBBOW IN CUBA. 

and proclaimed its presence. American drunkards also 
reeled through the streets of a city in which drunken- 
ness was so rare as to be a genuine novelty. Habana 
saw more drunkenness in the six months following 
American occupation than it had seen in sixty years. 
American gamblers sought to dispute by new devices 
the lean pickings of the gaming table with the native 
gamblers. Americans first raised the color line and 
appealed to race prejudice in the cheapest and most 
blatant form. American braggarts swaggered through 
the town with their hands in their pockets and their 
hats tilted back. They shamed their fellow-countrymen 
who were there on legitimate business into silence and 
seclusion. They voiced their coarse criticisms of the 
domestic customs of a people of whose home life they 
could know nothing. The whole class of the buzzards 
abused the American officials who refused to recognize 
them as coadjutors in the work of uplifting Cuba. 
They almost justified the bitter comment of one com- 
mander that American military control was necessary 
in order to protect the island from American harpies. 

Americans understood this phenomenon of the scum 
floating across the gulf before the healthier undercur- 
rents reached the shores of the island. They sought to 
bear it with patience. Cubans who had lived in the 
United States also understood it. Those whose home 
always had been on the island, and the Spanish classes 
least of all, failed to understand it. This class of 
Americans is both of to-day and of to-morrow. They 
always will be of the same type, claiming kinship in the 
American nation, proclaiming the need of civilizing the 

Latin races and offering themselves as missionaries of 

339 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA. 

the higher civilization. If at times there is in Cuba a 
disposition to doubt the superiority of Americanism, the 
presence of these adventurers may help to account for it. 

Persons who visit Cuba for a week, especially if they 
happen to be officials, are impressed with the idea that 
the majority of the property holders and educated 
people, as well as a considerable number of the masses, 
want annexation. The sugar planters and the business 
men who want it call on them and tell them so. That 
the sugar planters long for the assurance of a market 
for their sugar the same that Hawaii has, does not 
require much argument. The Spanish financiers and 
merchants who want the American authority without the 
Americans to compete in business tell them that a stable 
government cannot be maintained except under the 
direct control of the United States. 

The Latin doubters confide their doubts to the inquir- 
ing and receptive visitors. These are educated and 
generally property-owning Cubans. They see with the 
clearness of intellectual perception the dangers and the 
uncertainties of the future. They tell of the quickness 
with which the Latin blood mounts to the head, and 
they distrust the capacity of their race to maintain free 
government. They also saw the hopeless corruption 
and oppression of Spanish authority ; but while sympa- 
thizing with the aspirations of their people, they doubted 
whether anything better could come of revolt. While 
they were doubting, the blacks and the guajiros and the 
educated Cubans who were not given to doubting carried 
the insurrection forward. These Latin doubters tell 
American visitors truly that a momentary agitation 

against annexation should not be taken as the deliberate 

340 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

conviction of the Cuban people. But their own influ- 
ence is no greater than that of the doubter in other 
places and in other circumstances. It is certain that 
American officials will hear all the arguments and pleas 
for annexation, but it is not always creditable to their 
judgment that they go no further. For one thing, they 
do not seem to understand that the classes who oppose 
annexation do not call upon them. 

Another point is thoroughly misunderstood. Of the 
Cubans who lean to annexation not one has the idea 
other than of immediate Statehood. The Cubans who 
have lived in the United States have been residents for a 
great part of Florida, Louisiana, and New York. They 
know nothing of territories. Those of them who advo- 
cate annexation have no notion that if they were to seek 
admission into the Union it could be on any other basis 
than that of equality, The island could furnish accom- 
plished Senators and Representatives in Congress famil- 
iar with the language and the laws of both countries and 
ambitious of distinction. The honor of sharing in the 
government, of taking part in the elections for President, 
and possibly at a not remote period of having a member 
of the Cabinet appeals to all the ambitious men. With 
$100,000,000 of commerce, there would also be that 
element of power. It is so improbable that annexation 
sentiment in Cuba could be based on anything short of 
Statehood that I have not stopped to discuss the pros- 
pect of the island asking territorial form of government. 
If such a thing should happen it would not be a twelve- 
month before the $100,000,000 of commerce would be 
demanding recognition, and the agitation for Statehood 

would be intense and ineradicable. 

341 



TO-MOBKOW IN CUBA. 

With the greatest faith in the capacity of the mixed 
nationalities in Cuba to work out their own destiny as a 
people, and with the determination to encourage and 
help them, it is very doubtful whether the people of the 
United States are ready to-day to share with them the 
full glory of American institutions. Manifest destiny 
can wait a quarter of a century, but in discussing the 
earlier future in Cuba there should be no misunder- 
standing. People of the United States should not turn 
their thoughts to annexation when by it they understand 
only limited territorial government, while the people of 
Cuba who are turning to annexation understand only full 
Statehood and equality in the American nation. 

It has been noted frequently that the leaders in the last 
insurrection were veterans of the Ten- Years' war — Maceo, 
Gomez, Calixto Garcia, Maso, and others. The young 
men never guided its fortunes. Many of them, espe- 
cially those who have lived in the United States, are an- 
nexationists. Some of the older leaders want to see the 
flag of free Cuba floating for a while and then see a new 
Antillian star in the American firmament. The majority 
of them still believe that the ultimate destiny of Cuba is 
to be a part of the republic, but they say not now. But 
if a change of feeling should come upon the people and 
the drift should be toward annexation, neither old lead- 
ers nor Americanized young Cubans would be found 
supporting a policy that was not based on Statehood. 

In the immediate future, during the transition from 
American military control to something else, the forma- 
tion of Cuban parties may be on the line of Gomez and 
anti-Gomez, though the National League may become 

strong enough to retain an independent existence. G6- 

342 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

mez is an old man. He gave his indomitable spirit to 
the winning of the freedom of Cuba. That he may live 
long enough to see in what form it shall be conserved, 
and to have a potent influence in determining that form, 
is possible. The Spanish blood in him is that of the 
conquistadores devoted to human liberty instead of to 
oppression. That he is capricious and dictatorial in his 
temperament is true. That his ambition was to be a 
dictator never has been justified by his history. He has 
experienced both the gratitude and the ingratitude of the 
people whom he served. The culmination of his influ- 
ence was when he entered Habana on the fourth anni- 
versary of the insurrection, and was received with honors 
by the American military authorities and with acclaim 
by the Cuban people. Their confidence in him was 
shown when they overwhelmingly repudiated the action 
of the Assembly in removing him from the command of 
their dissolving army. 

General Gomez has been called a soldier of fortune, a 
mercenary adventurer whose sword was at the disposal 
of the highest bidder. Yet Spain unavailingly bid mil- 
lions for it. Agents of sugar planters vainly sought the 
privilege of placing to his credit hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in the banks of London and Paris if his orders 
for the burning of sugar-cane and against the mills grind- 
ing were not enforced. No South American dictator 
could have levied such a tribute. The son of Gomez 
fell by the side of Maceo. His own life was risked 
countless times, but it was fated that the offspring who 
was his pride and his hope should be the sacrifice. 
There has been no change in the position of General 

Gomez regarding the future. He declared that Cuba 

343 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

was neither free nor independent so long as the United 
States administered its government. After coming out 
of the woods he threw the weight of his influence in sup- 
port of the American authority and in deprecating the 
agitation for its immediate withdrawal. At all times he 
showed his comprehension of the industrial conditions 
which underlie the political progress of Cuba. But he 
is not for annexation. 

The belief that immediate annexation is not likely 
to be an issue during the transition from military con- 
trol to something else, has been indicated throughout 
this chapter. While this opinion is put forth with diffi- 
dence in the face of confident contrary views, I venture 
to follow it up and to indicate the possible lines on which 
the division may take place. The mass of Cubans have 
not changed their aspirations and their ideals. They 
are, as when an American statesman * visited them dur- 
ing the dying days of Spanish sovereignty, united in their 
purpose. The prediction of General Gomez came true 
to them, and as an outcome of the struggle for indepen- 
dence every household had its martyr. But these aspi- 
rations, while clear, are not aggressive and unreasoning. 

It is my own conviction that while the overwhelming 
majority of Cuban people are not thinking of early an- 
nexation, they are not in a hurry to cut themselves 
adrift. They recognize that the moral protectorate of 
the United States is a fact. They have given more 
thought than is commonly credited them to what it 
means to create an army and a navy. The fondness for 
military show may be part of the Latin character, and 
there will always be that desire for military honors. 

* Senator Redfield S. Proctor. 
344 



TO-MOBEOW IN CUBA. 

But this desire is not an insatiate one, and it may find 
expression in the creation of a rural police. A navy is 
not being thought of at all, and yet the navy is a part of 
an island nation. 

There is another basis. This is the financial one. 
Under any conditions when the military control is with- 
drawn and a different government is set up, the new 
commonwealth will need money. The United States 
advanced $3,000,000 for the insurgent troops as a loan, 
and not as a gift. Further advances may be made for 
the internal improvements under similar conditions, with 
a lien on the customs receipts. It is an individual opin- 
ion, but I put it forth that this moral control and this 
lien on the customs and the guarantee of Cuba's protec- 
tion from European aggression is for years to come all 
that is desirable by the United States. And it need not 
be surprising if Cuban public opinion takes this channel. 
Its opponents may charge that this is disguised annexa- 
tion, but the disguise is so thorough that annexation 
would not recognize itself. 

A protectorate would be something more than auton- 
omy. It would be an independent government for Cuba 
in her internal affairs and in consonance with her aspi- 
rations. Many years would pass before such a govern- 
ment would be administered as well as the United States 
could administer it, but that is not the question. The 
certainty is that in determining the method of transition 
from military control to something else, the Cuban peo- 
ple as they approach the reality will be the less anxious 
to withdraw absolutely themselves from the American 
influence, though they will justily and properly oppose 

indefinite delay in ending the military nature of that 

345 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

influence. In these circumstances the Cuban public 
opinion which turns to a Protectorate may be left to con- 
trovert the public opinion which demands absolute sever- 
ance of the relations with the United States. All that 
the intervening power can do is to assure the untram- 
melled utterance of these opinions ; and if the ultimate 
sentiment should develop for a complete severance from 
the United States, it must be respected. 

To-day there are two opposing tendencies. On the 
surface they seem political and social. In their depths 
they are economic. Commercialism antagonizes the 
instinct of nationality. Legitimate capital thinks it 
sees quicker industrial recuperation and political stabil- 
ity under immediate annexation by whatever means 
brought about. Speculative capital has no chance of 
exploitation unless Cuba is made part of the United 
States. It sees chiefly that annexed Cuba would mean 
free sugar. If free sugar were sure, the present mort- 
gages on the cane lands would be easily lifted. Their 
value would increase at a bound. There would be an 
unexampled era of investment in plantations. Money 
that was seeking outflow in coffee culture, fruit raising, 
dairy farming, and in timber lands would change its 
course. It would all flow toward sugar-cane production. 
Tobacco would be the only agricultural industry not 
affected. Then the agitation would begin for more rad- 
ical tariff legislation by the United States to destroy the 
European beet-sugar bounties. With a profitable mar- 
ket gained, the next question would be the cultivation of 
the inexhaustible cane lands. The first inquiry would 
be for cheap labor in a mass. Efforts to get Chinese 

coolies would probably be defeated because of the exclu- 

346 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

sion policy of the United States. Some negro coloniza- 
tion might be attempted, and the dregs of miscellaneous 
labor would be gathered up in all quarters. This would 
not be an encouragement to family immigration. It 
would be harmful socially and politically. Ultimately 
the planters would have to turn to the provinces of 
Spain, but not until they had demoralized the whole 
island. The end would be a Latin plantation as one of 
the States of the Union. 

The United States by force of circumstances made an 
investment in Cuba. The investment is the promise of 
a people who are capable of self-government. Whether 
these conditions are met by encouraging a sugar craze 
which has no definite source of labor supply back of it 
can easily be judged. 

Against this tendency of commercialism is the aspira- 
tion of the Cuban people. Its impelling force, though 
not always clearly discernible, is the hope to have the 
country populated by small landowners. The labor 
which is looked for is not servile or cheap. The immi- 
gration which is sought is the immigration of the family 
from sources which give promise of constant freshening. 
It is not assured that the Cubans can maintain a gov- 
ernment which will invite immigrants and insure the 
repeopling of the island. That is part of the experi- 
ment which must be tried and which may fail. But it 
is no more doubtful than the experiment which in- 
evitably leads to the exploitation of Cuba as a huge 
plantation, and which insists on settling the political 
status before an approach has been made to securing an 
industrial population that will be in harmony with the 

political institutions. 

347 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA. 

Foreign capitalists, especially the English and Span- 
ish, are not concerned with the difficulties of government 
which may perplex the United States. They are tran- 
sients. They do not expect to be of the island and of 
its people. Naturally they lean to the annexation idea, 
and do not encourage small landholdings. Viewed as 
a billion-dollar plantation, Cuba seems to offer greater 
profit to foreign investment than as a country in which 
the cane lands are to be diversified by the lesser agricul- 
tural occupations. 

The Cubans are sometimes vague in their utterances. 
They do not put forth clearly the reasons which govern 
their motives. They realize the infinite richness of the 
sugar lands, but they also realize the importance of di- 
versifying the cane-sugar industry and increasing the 
number of small landholders who will not be dependent 
on the market for sugar. Their instinct is correct. 
The interests of the American people seem to lie with 
the interests of the Cuban people. Industry and com- 
merce must be encouraged, but they do not need to be 
stimulated artificially in order that great fortunes may 
be made by speculation in cane lands or in other pro- 
jects. The American people want the civilization of the 
church, the home, and the school to obtain in Cuba. 
They will seek the foundation for these in the economic 
conditions which develop the independent life of the 
small capitalists and landowners. Their patience will 
be tried. They may be sure that in the various stages 
of Cuban government human nature will be shown at its 
ordinary level, and not at loftiest heights. But the end 
will justify their patience. When the mass of Cubans 

know that they are not being dispossessed from the 

348 



TO-MOBBOW IN CUBA. 

country that is theirs, they will turn with intelligent 
judgment to determine the ultimate relation of the is- 
land to the United States. 

These are the natural processes. They are also the 
healthier ones. They give time for the closer knowledge 
and understanding of popular government in the United 
States which should be the indispensable requirement 
for sharing in that government. Americans on their 
part should not be deceived. They should keep in mind 
that the civilization of Cuba is Latin. They should not 
blind themselves to the fact that the streams of white 
immigration which are to freshen and renew the popula- 
tion of the border tropics must continue to flow from 
Latin countries. American contact and example may 
modify and mould this civilization, but cannot change 
its nature in a single generation. For half a century 
Cuba is to be understood as a Latin commonwealth, 
whether it be an independent nation, a protected repub- 
lic, or a State of the American Union. 

In conclusion, if the majority of the people in Cuba 
reject the idea of a protectorate and want to try the ex- 
periment of nationality, separate and distinct, with all 
its perils, they must be allowed to try it. That a gov- 
ernment of this kind would be more than an experiment 
its most earnest champions and its well-wishers would 
not assert. The first step toward testing the sentiment 
and toward solving the problems and the responsibil- 
ities with which the United States is confronted lies in 
the election of a constituent representative convention on 
the basis of universal suffrage. The island is for its 
people. Their welfare must be trusted to an assembly 

of their own free choice. 

349 



APPENDIX A. 

BEBLIOGEAPHY. 

Spanish colonial history begins in the pages of Pres- 
cott and Irving. Three centuries of its record are almost 
barren. The student who wishes to know its outgrowth 
may start with the nineteenth century. He cannot do 
better than to begin with Humboldt. He will find there 
a survey of the state of Cuba which covers its physical, 
political, social, and economic phases. Unfortunately 
Humboldt, as presented in English, was the victim of a 
zealous editor who imposed on American readers a long 
preliminary essay and followed it with copious argu- 
mentative notes. This was during the period of the slave 
controversy, and the editor was a partisan. It is possi- 
ble to extract the real Humboldt from a mass of irrele- 
vant matter, but a simpler way is to consult the original 
French edition or an excellent translation into Spanish 
which was published in Paris. After Humboldt comes 
a long list of Cuban and Spanish writers whose works 
are both historical and controversial. The official his- 
tory of Spanish rule in Cuba may be found in the Ga- 
zettes of the Captain-Generals and the Bulletins of the 
provinces. A summary of these was published two or 
three times a year as a collection of decrees, orders, and 
dispositions of the general Government. 

The insurrectionary period of Cuban history, as well 

as the political agitation, is reflected in current news- 

350 



TO-MOEKOW IN CUBA. 

paper literature for the last thirty-five years and in an 
avalanche of pamphlets. What may be called the Cuban 
special pleading is found in a series of volumes which 
were issued in the United States. The genuine insur- 
gent literature, from which the spirit animating the revo- 
lution may be gathered, appears in some publications 
which came from the printing-press in the woods, and 
in a small newspaper Las Villas, which was the medium 
of the official orders, appeals, and addresses of the in- 
surgent military chiefs. Necessarily the times of pub- 
lication were irregular, but the journal had an existence, 
and its files are valuable. When peace came the old 
book-shops of Habana also gave up insurgent literature, 
which is an aid in helping to an understanding of the 
struggle that ended Spanish rule. 

The intellectual life of Cuba for a hundred years is 
found in the archives of La Sociedad Economica de 
Amigos del Pais — the Economic Society of Friends of 
the Country. These archives contain the history of four 
centuries. From them was drawn the material for the 
most valuable works that have been published. Learn- 
ing breeds sedition, and the society, if not under the ban, 
was often under the frown of the Government. But it 
proved that it was composed of true friends of the coun- 
try. Its memorials, or reports, are of unusual value. A 
modern librarian would be appalled at the confusion in 
which the records and archives appear, but the honor- 
able poverty of this learned society does not impair its 
usefulness. 

On what may be called the American side it is not 
necessary to recapitulate the Congressional and Execu- 
tive documents which define the attitude of the United 

351 



TO-MOKKOW IN CUBA. 

States toward Spain. They are all accessible. Eco- 
nomic tendencies contemporary with Spanish political 
rule are set forth for a series of years in the reports of 
Consul-General Eamon O. Williams. Concerning the 
present military government in the island, its acts are 
fully recorded in The Official Gazette. The industrial 
and commercial conditions, as well as the financial sys- 
tem which are the basis of the tariff and other regula- 
tions, are discussed in the reports of Mr. Kobert P. 
Porter, special commissioner. Information regarding 
the customs duties, the laws of mortgages, railroads, 
public works, and other matters of interest are given 
publicity in pamphlet form from time to time by the 
insular division of the War Department. 

Since the guardianship of the United States over Cuba 
was assumed, many American libraries have been adding 
to their shelves by books obtained in Madrid and in 
Habana. It is with the belief that most of those which 
I have consulted may be available to the student that I 
indicate the following list of references : 

Antiguos Diputados de Cuba (Los). D. Eusebio Valdes Dominguez, 
Prologo de D. Rafael Montoro. Habana, 1879. 

Almanaque Bailly-Baillierie, Madrid, 1897-98-99. (Contains special 
chapters with reference to Cuba.) 

Asturianos (Los) en el Norte y los Asturianos en Cuba. Ramon 
Elices Montes. Habana, 1893. 

Bando de Gobernacion y Policfa de la Isla de Cuba expedido por el 
Excelentisimo Sr. D. Geronimo Valdes, Presidente Gobernador y 
Captain General. Quinta edicion. Habana, 1875: Imprenta del Gobi- 
erno. (The famous code of paternal despotism.) 

Cuba witb Pen and Pencil. Samuel Hazard. Hartford, 1871. (The 
best book in English descriptive of the country and its people. Thirty 
years have not lessened its value as a mirror of customs and habits.) 

Cuban Sketches. J. W. Steele, former consul at Matanzas. New 
York, 1881. 

352 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA. 

Cuba y su Gente: Apuntes para la Historia. Francisco Moreno. 
Madrid, 1887. 

Cuba y sus Jueces : Rectificaciones Oportunas. (Answer to the 
above.) Raimundo Cabrera. Sexta edici6n. Prologo de D. Rafael 
Montoro. Habana, 1889. 

Cuba por Fuera : Apuntes del Natural. Tesifonte Gallego Garcia. 
Habana, 1890. 

Cuba en la Cartera. Antonio E. Menendez. Habana, 1895. 

Cuba: Monografia Historica. Antonio Bachiller y Morales. Ha- 
bana, 1883. 

Cuba ante la Historia y el sentido com tin. M. Benitez Veguillas. 
Habana, 1897. 

Cuba para los Cubanos : Folleto Politico. Alvaro de la Iglesia. 
Habana, 1898. 

Cuba y la reforma colonial en Espafla. Rafael Delforme Salto. 
Madrid, 1895. 

Cuba : Physical Features of ; her Past, Present, and Possible Future. 
Fidel G. Pierra. New York, 1896. 

Centro Gallego — Memorias de la Junta Directiva. Habana, 1898. 

Centro Gallego — Mernoria de la Sociedad de Beneficiencia. Habana. 
1898. 

Cuestion de Cuba (La): Historia y Soluciones delos Partidos Cuba- 
nos. Juan Gualberto Gomez. Madrid, 1885. 

Cronicas de la Guerra de Cuba. Habana, 1895-96-97. 

Crimines y Criminales de la Habana. Ignacio D. Ituarte. Habana, 
1893. 

Control of the Tropics (The). Benjamin Kidd. New York, 1898. 

Cuestion Social en las Antillas Espafiolas (La). Rafael M. de Labra. 
Madrid, 1874. 

Collection de Reales Ordenes, Decretos y Disposiciones. Habana. 
1898. 3 tomos. (Contains the Decrees of Autonomy.) 

Compilation de (los) Articulos con Relation al Ramo de Loteria. 
Habana, 1873. 

Chinos fuera de China (los) y el Antagonismo de Razas. Federico 
Ordas Avecilla. Habana, 1893. 

Codigo penal para las Islas de Cuba y Puerto Rico. Madrid, 1894. 

Diccionairo geografico, estadistico, historico de la Isla de Cuba. Don 
JacobodelaPezuela. Madrid, 1863. 4 tomos. (The fountain of much 
valuable information.) 

Due South : Cuba, Past and Present. M. M. Ballou. Boston, 1885. 

Ensayo Politico sobre la Isla deCuba. El Baron A. von Humboldt. 
Obra traducida al Castellano. Paris, 1827. 

Esclavitud en Cuba ( De la) . F. de Armas yCespedes. Madrid, 1866. 

English in the West Indies (The). James Anthony Frcmde. London, 
1888. 

23 353 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 

Froudacity: West India Fables Explained. J. J. Thomas. Phila- 
delphia, 1890. 

Folletos escritos contra la Anexion de la Isla de Cuba a los Estados 
Unidos. Antonio Saco. Nueva York, 1856. 

Guia Geografica y Administrativa de la Isla de Cuba. Don Pedro 
Jose Imberno. Habana, 1891. (A valuable summary of the condition 
and resources of the island. ) 

Guia de Forasteros de la Isla de Cuba. Habana, 1872, etc.: Imprenta 
del Gobierno. 

Guia de Gobierno y Policia de la Isla de Cuba. Don Francisco Garcia 
Morales. Segunda edicion. Habana, 1899. 

Guia de los Ayuntamientos. Habana, 1891. 

Habana Antigua y Moderna (La.) D. Jose Maria dela Torre. Ha- 
bana, 1857. 

Historia economica, politic,a intelectual y moral dela Isla de Cuba. 
Remon de la Sagra. Paris, 1861. 

Historia contemporanea de la Isla de Cuba desde 1801 hasta 1896. P. 
Giralt. Habana, 1896. 

Historia de Matanzas. D. Pedro Antonio Alfonzo. Matanzas, 1854. 

History of the British Colonies in the "West Indies (The). Bryan 
Edwards. London, 1807. 3 vols. 

Insurrection de Cuba (La). Vicente Torres y Gonzalez. Madrid, 
1896. 

Insurrecciones en Cuba (Las.) Apuntes para la historia politica de 
esta isla en el presente siglo. J. Zaragoza. Madrid, 1872-73. 2tomos. 

Isla de Cuba: Recuerdo de dos Epocas. Don J. M. de Andueza. 
Madrid, 1841. 

He de Cuba (L'). J. B. Rosemond de Beauvallon. Paris, 1844. 

Isla de Cuba : Inmigracion de Trabajores Espanoles. D. Urbano 
Feyjoo Sotomayor. Habana, 1853. 

Libro del Ciudadano Espanol (El): Derechos Politicos y Administra- 
tivos. Jose Sedano y Agramonte. Segunda edicion. Habana, 1889. 

Leyes de las Indias. Madrid, 1847. 4 tomos. 

Llave del Nuevo Mundo. Arrate. Habana, 1830. 

Ley de Enjuiciamento Civil, reformada para las Mas de Cuba y 
Puerto Rico. Madrid, 1894. 

Legislation Autonomica. Jose - Raul Sedano. Habana, 1898. 

Manual de la Isla de Cuba. Su Autor D. Jose 1 Garcia de Arboleya. 
Segunda edicion. Habana, 1859. (A valuable compendium of infor- 
mation regarding the Cuba of half a century ago.) 

Memorias sobre el Estado Politico, Gobierno y Administration de la 
Isla de Cuba. D. Jose de la Concha. Madrid, 1853. 

354 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

Mernorias de la Sociedad Econoroica de Amigos del Pals. Habana, 
pa:-sim. 

Muerte del General Mace©. Jose Miro y Argenter, Brigadier, jefe de 
Bstado Mayor. Campamento de Manajanado, Diciembre 22 de 1896. 
dmprenta insurrecta.) 

Masoneria (La) pintada por si misma. D. Rafael de Rafael. Prologo 
de Don A. J. de Vildosola. Madrid, 1883. 

Masoneria (La) Apuntes Historicos sobre elorigen en la Lsla de Cuba. 
Comjjilados por Manuel Ruiz Inza. Habana, 1891. 

Masoneria (La) Procedimientos de la gran Logia. Habana, 1878. 

Negro in Cuba (El). Por un Amante de la Verdad. Habana, 1866. 

Pais de Chocolate (El) : La Inmoralidad :n Cuba. Francisco Moreno. 
Madrid, 1887. 

Pasado y Presente de Cuba. El Brigadier D. Francisco de Acosta y 
Albear. Madrid, 1875. 

Peninsulares y Cubanos. Aurelio C. Silveria y Cordova. Habana, 
1891. 

Partido Liberal : Segundo Anniversairo. Habana, 1880. 

Partido Liberal Autonomista : Procedimientos para la Eleccion de 
Representantes. Habana, 1398. 

Presupuestos Generales de Gastos e Ingresos de 1898-99. Habana, 
1898. Imprentadel Gobierno, 

Penal Code (The) of the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Trans- 
lated into English. Habana, 1898. 

Prostitucion (La) en la Ciudad de la Habana. Dr. Benj. de Cespedes. 
Habana, 1888. 

Restauracion Teocratica (La). Fernando Garrido. Segunda edicion. 
Madrid, 1881. 
Revista Cubana (La). Habana, passim. 

Sistemas Coloniales. Rafael M. de Labra. Madrid, 1874. 

Los Yankees enCuba : Pro Patria. Antonio P. Rioja. Habana, 1897. 

La Guerra con los Estados TTnidos. Adolfo Llanos. Habana, 1897. 

La Invasion Norte Americana. Antonio P. Rioja. Habana, 1898. 

(These last three pamphlets give an excellent idea of the feeling of 
the ultra-Spanish classes towards the United States when war was 
known to be inevitable.) 



355 



APPENDIX B. 

TKADE PROSPECTS. 

Exports and imports are a good means of showing the 
resources of the island and the opportunities it offers 
for American markets. Joined with these statistics are 
the possibilities of commerce as shown in the vessel 
clearances, and the sources of revenue as exhibited in 
the customs and similar receipts. Those persons who 
are specially interested in knowing what the inhabitants 
of Cuba are buying and what they are selling will be 
able to keep abreast of the subject by following the 
monthly and quarterly statements published in the news- 
papers. A general survey may be had from a summary 
of the first six months of American control. This infor- 
mation, together with that regarding the articles of ex- 
port and import, is supplied in the following official 
statement. I am indebted for it to Colonel Tasker H. 
Bliss, collector of customs at Habana, under whose effi- 
cient administration the opportunities of Cuban com- 
merce have been demonstrated. 

OFFICIAL STATEMENT. 

The principal exports of Cuba are sugar, tobacco, 

cigars, honey, molasses, aguardiente (cane rum), wax, 

sponges, fruits, minerals — principally manganese, iron, 

steel, etc., from the province of Santiago; wood from 

356 



TO-MOKROW IN CUBA. 

Santiago and Puerto Principe ; cocoanuts and bananas, 
the latter two articles principally from the ports of Banes 
and Baracoa. 

The principal imports with their sources are as fol- 
lows: 

Rice, mostly from England and Germany. 

Mineral waters, from Prance and Germany. 

Oats, barley, and hay, from the United States and South America. 

Olive oil, from Spain and France. 

Codfish, from Norway and Canada. 

Varnish and turpentine, from the United States. 

Beer, from the United States, England, and Germany. 

Cement, from the United States, England and France. 

Coal, from the United States and England. 

Coffee, from Puerto Rico and some from the United States. 

Shoes, from the United States and Spain. 

Onions, from the United States principally, some from Spain. 

Preserves, from the United States, Spain, and France. 

Drugs, from France, United States, and Germany. 

Beans, principally from Mexico, some from the United States. 

Cattle, from the United States, Mexico, and Central and South 
America. 

Wheat-flour, from the United States. 

Hams, from the United States and Spain. 

Condensed milk, from the United States. 

Crockery and crystal ware, from the United States, England, Ger- 
many, and Spain, principally from England. 

Woods, from the United States. 

Furniture, from the United States, France, and Germany. 

Butter, from the United States, Spain, and England. 

Corn, from the United States. 

Lard, from the United States. 

Machinery, from England principally, some from the United States. 

Metals, from England and Germany, some from the United States. 

Paper and pasteboard, from the United States, Germany, and France. 

Hides, from the United States, France, Germany, and Spain. 

Paint, from the United States, England, Germany, and Spain. 

Petroleum, from the United States. 

Chemical products, from the United States, France, England, and 
Germany. 

Potatoes, from the United States, England, and Spain. 

Cheese, from the United States and Holland, 

Silk, from the United States, France, England, and Germany. 

357 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

Canned sardines, from Spain. 

Hats, from the United States, England, and Spain. 

Jipijapa hats, from South America. 

Salt, from England and Spain. 

Linen tissues, from England and Spain. 

Woollen goods, from the United States, England, and France. 

Cotton goods, from the United States, France, and England. 

Bacon, from the United States and Spain, 

Dried beef ("tasajo"), from Uruguay and the Argentine Republic. 

Wines and liquors from Spain, France, and the United States. 

Eggs and poultry, from the United States. 

[Author's Note. — The importation of these last two articles will prob- 
ably disappear with the reconstruction of the country. The possibility 
of the Southwestern States securing a share of the trade in tasajo, or 
jerked beef, is worth following up. Dried beef, from the nature of the 
climate, will always have a market in the tropics. In Cuba it is con- 
sumed chiefly by the negroes and laboring classes generally, partly on 
account of its cheapness and partly on account of its toughness, which 
renders it difficult of digestion, and for this reason especially preferred 
by those who perform hard physical labor. Any one who travels in 
the interior learns to value its nutritive qualities. The consumption is 
chiefly in the tobacco regions of Pinar del Rio and Habana provinces 
in Matanzas, and in a section of Santa Clara where live beef is hard to 
procure. The price is eleven cents per pound in American money. 
During the last year the consumption has been about 12,000 hundred- 
weights per quarter ; but this is below the normal amount, and is due 
to the poverty of the people. Lately much of the importation has been 
by way of New York. Spanish ship captains, both of steamers and 
sailing vessels, were in the habit of buying large quantities of tasajo for 
sale in Cuba on their return voyages from South America. Minister 
W. I. Buchanan, in a recent report to Assistant Secretary of War 
Meiklejohn, leans to the belief that some of the trade can be transferred 
from Argentine and Uruguary to the United States, though he says 
the cheapness of stock raising in South America makes competition 
difficult. The process of salting and drying the raw beef in the sun 
could be followed as well in the Southwest as in Uruguay.] 

The following data furnished by Collector Bliss with 
regard to receipts of customs funds are instructive : 

Total receipts, sixteen ports from January 1 to July 
1, 1899, were $6,983,705. Of this amount there was col- 
lected at the port of Habana $5,146,162. 

Of the above-mentioned total receipts at all ports, the 

358 



TO-MOKEOW IN CUBA. 

import duties were 16,229,905, and the export duties 
were $388,960, the balance being from tonnage dues, 
fines, harbor improvement taxes, capitation taxes, cattle 
inspection fees, etc. 

At the port of Habana during the six months the im- 
port duties amounted to $4,537,348, and the export du- 
ties to $386,114. 

The order of the ports in the amount of collections 
was as follows: Habana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, Matan- 
zas, Cdrdenas, Nuevitas, Sagua le Grande, Manzanillo, 
Caibarien, Gibara, Guant^namo, Baracoa, Trinidad, 
Tunas de Zaza, Batabano, and Santa Cruz. 

During the six months there entered at the sixteen 
ports of the island, 2,227 foreign vessels and 4,487 coast- 
wise vessels, making the total number entered 6,714. 
During the same period there cleared from all ports 
2,125 foreign vessels and 4,524 coastwise vessels, making 
the total number of clearances 6,649. 

At the port of Habana during the six months, the num- 
ber of foreign entries was 1,031, coastwise, 889; total 
entries, 1,920. The total number of foreign clearances 
was 953, coastwise 850; total clearances, 1,803. 

The total tonnage entered at all the sixteen ports of 
the island was: foreign vessels, 2,477,562 tons; coast- 
wise vessels, 735,696 tons. The total amount of tonnage 
cleared was, of foreign vessels 2,351,936 tons, and of 
coastwise vessels 707,152 tons; making the total amount 
of tonnage entered of 3,213,258 tons, and the total 
amount of tonnage cleared of 3,069,080 tons. 

At the port of Habana the total amount of tonnage 
entered was, of foreign vessels 1,292,960 tons, and of 
coastwise vessels 124,420 tons. The total amount of 

359 



TO-MORROW IN CUBA. 

tonnage cleared was, of foreign vessels 1,227,234 tons, 
and of coastwise vessels 99,291 tons; making a total 
amount of tonnage entered during the sis months of 
1,417,380 tons, and a total amount cleared of 1,326,525 
tons. 

The course of commerce, foreign and coastwise, is ex- 
hibited at a glance in the following official tables : 

STATEMENT OF FOREIGN VESSELS ENTERED AND 

CLEARED, PORT OF HABANA, CUBA, 

JANUARY 1st TO JULY 1st, 1899. 

Entebed. 





Steam. 


Sail. 


£§ 


Months. 
1899. 


United 

States. 


Spain. 


Other 
Coun- 
tries. 


Total. 


United 

States. 


Spain. 


Other 
Coun- 
tries. 


Total. 




January. . 
February. 
March . . . 

April 

May 

June 


61 

58 
64 
53 
56 
47 


27 
17 
25 


17 


69 
47 
61 
61 
76 
47 


157 
122 
150 
114 
132 
111 


44 
32 
43 

27 
28 
10 


7 
1 
1 


7 


9 
5 
6 
12 
6 
7 


60 
38 
50 
39 
34 
24 


217 
160 
200 
153 
166 
135 


Totals. . 


339 


86 


361 


786 


184 


16 


45 


245 


1031 



Cleared. 





Steam. 


Sail. 


k 


Months. 
1899. 


United 

States. 


Spain. 


Other 
Coun- 
tries. 


Total. 


United 

States. 

i 


Spain. 


Other 
Coun- 
tries. 


Total. 


■at-") 

E-c H 

HO 


January. . 
February. 
March . . . 

April 

May 

June 


56 
45 
57 
49 
52 
49 


26 
16 
24 


17 


62 
47 
54 
69 

74 
49 


144 
108 
135 
118 
126 
115 


i 28 
26 
33 
38 
19 
20 


1 
1 
1 


3 


8 
6 
5 
4 

7 
7 


37 
33 
39 
42 
26 
30 


181 
141 
174 
160 
152 
145 




308 


83 


355 


746 


164 


6 


37 


207 


953 



360 



TO-MOEEOW IN CUBA. 



STATEMENT OF FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS EN- 
TERED AND CLEARED, PORT OF HABANA, CUBA, 
JANUARY 1st TO JULY 1st, 1899. 

Foreign. 





Jan. 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 


Total. 


^tered {1^; 


157 
60 


122 
38 


150 
50 


114 
39 


132 
34 


Ill 

24 


786 
245 


Total 


217 


160 


200 


153 


166 


135 


1,031 





Jan. 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 


Total. 


beared {1^; 


144 
37 

181 


108 
33 


135 
39 


118 

42 


126 
26 


115 
30 


746 
207 


Total 


141 


174 


160 


152 


145 


953 







Coastwise. 





Jan. 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 


Total. 


Entered {|^ m . 


22 

88 


25 
114 


20 
130 


20 
135 


24 
161 


26 
124 


137 
752 


Total 


110 


139 


150 


155 


185 


150 


889 





Jan. 

10 
110 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 


Total. 


beared {g^; 


21 

96 


14 
125 


17 
147 


18 
140 


27 
125 


107 
743 


Total 


120 


117 


139 


164 


158 


152 


850 



Supplementary to these tables is the following infor- 
mation relative to the arrival and departure of passen- 
gers, It should be noted that the departures during the 
months from April to October always have been consid- 
erably in excess of the arrivals. 

361 



TO-MOKBOW IN CUBA. 



PASSENGER STATEMENT, ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES, 
HABANA, CUBA, JANUARY 1st TO JULY 1st, 1899. 

Arrived. 





Jan. 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 


Total. 


United States . . . 


3,618 

369 

1,074 


3,486 

446 

1,023 


2,634 

1,106 

609 


1,675 
342 
689 


1,329 
745 
716 


951 
613 
454 


13,693 
4,565 
3,621 


Other Countries. 


Total 


5,061 


4,955 


4,349 


2,706 


2,790 


2,018 


21,879 


Departed. 




Jan. 


Feb. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


June. 

998 

1,749 

122 


Total. 


United States . . . 

Spain 

Other Countries. 


1,423 
769 
231 


2,215 
577 
235 


5,243 

1,031 

256 


2,492 

1,757 

869 


2,124 

2,084 

243 


14,495 
7,967 
1,956 


Total 


2,423 


3,027 


6,530 


5,118 


4,451 


2,869 


24,418 



K0 V 10 1899 



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